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THE POLIS OF PLATAEA shared a close political and military bond with Athens. Perhaps the closest modern correlation is to be found in the “special relationship” between Britain and the United States, described by Winston Churchill in his 1946 “The Sinews of Peace” speech made at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. In it, Churchill acknowledged an exceptionally close economic and military relationship between Britain and the U.S. based on shared culture and history.[54] Because of Thebes’ aggressive attempts to unify Boeotia under its own hegemony, from the sixth century onward, Plataea turned toward Attica and Athens as its main ally. In return for Athenian military aid in preserving its autonomy, the Plataeans became the Athenians’ most loyal ally, standing by Athens through the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, even at the cost of their own city’s destruction and the enslavement or flight of its populace. During the Peloponnesian War, when the besieged Plataeans were offered a chance to lay down arms and become a neutral power, they replied that they could not do so without first consulting with the Athenians, who were protecting their families. Having received reassurances of Athenian support, the Plataeans decided not to surrender regardless the cost (Thuc. 2.2.72-4).
In recognition of their loyalty, Athens repeatedly provided shelter for Plataean refugees and granted the Plataeans citizenship, not once, but three times over a period of approximately 200 years. These repeated or renewed grants of citizenship appear to be rare in Athenian history. Although individuals were occasionally granted citizenship by the Athenians, the Samians are the only other autonomous population recorded to have received mass enfranchisement from Athens during the Classical period.[55] Moreover, there does not seem to be any other instance of a polis receiving such a grant multiple times, thus underlining the importance of the relationship between Plataea and Athens.
According to Herodotus (6.108), the Plataeans first made an alliance with Athens in the sixth century B.C.[56] This alliance was further strengthened when Plataea answered Athens’ call to arms at Marathon and was cemented at the battle of Plataea where the Persians were finally defeated.[57] Over the course of a century the Plataeans repeatedly sought refuge within Athens when their city was threatened by war, the first time when Thebes attacked the polis starting the Peloponnesian War in 431, and multiple times afterward as the populace shuttled from one settlement to the next until their city was finally rebuilt by Alexander at the end of the 330s.[58] The resulting migrant population both caused and faced enormous obstacles.
According to Thucydides’ chronology, Plataea first became allied with Athens in 519. This act is presumably associated with the events narrated by Herodotus (6.108), when the Plataeans “gave themselves” to the Athenians. It is during this period that the Plataeans may have received their first grant of citizenship from Athens. Thucydides (3.55.3) tells us that following the capture of Plataea during the Peloponnesian War, the Plataeans who defended the city were put on trial for allying themselves with Athens. In a speech before the Spartans, these Plataeans defended their actions by referencing the long history of alliances between Athens and Plataea and a grant of citizenship made by Athens to the Plataeans (Thuc. 3.55.3). Most scholars, including Shrimpton, believe that the grant of citizenship mentioned in this speech and the events narrated by Herodotus are one and the same.[59] Hammond, on the other hand, argues that the Thucydides passage has been misinterpreted and there was no grant of citizenship made during the sixth century, only an alliance against Thebes.[60] Hammond’s argument rests on a belief that Thucydides was interjecting events which he knew had occurred at Athens, namely the fifth-century grant of citizenship, into the speech given by the Plataean POWs. This argument, however, appears overly convoluted, especially given the testimony from Herodotus. The correct interpretation of this passage surely lies along the lines of that put forth by Amit and accepted by Hornblower, that a grant was made in 519 but not activated and not inherited because “...most of the Plataeans remained on Plataean soil,” that is to say they were not allotted tribes and demes in Athens, nor did they take up residence there.[61]
Whatever the truth regarding a grant, it is quite clear that the Plataeans continued their association with Athens into the fifth century. When the first Persian fleet landed on Greek soil at Marathon in 490, Plataea was the only polis to respond to Athens’ call for help; the Spartans were otherwise engaged. The bond formed in battle against Thebes was solidified by the Plataeans’ willingness to stand by Athens against an overwhelming enemy force. The subsequent victory against the Persians and the mythologizing of that event imparted a kind of holy glow to the alliance between Athens and Plataea, ensuring the continuation of their relationship. The Plataeans were, according to Herodotus (6.111.2), included in the public prayers conducted during the Great Panathenaea and festival of Poseidon; the event was also memorialized with a painting in the Stoa Poecile described by Pausanias (1.15.1-3). The painting was one in a series of battle scenes purporting to show epic victories of Athens’ past. Illustrations of Theseus’ Amazonomachy and the capture of Troy immediately precede that of the Battle of Marathon, clearly linking that event with a continuing narrative of Athens as the defenders of Greek civilization against various barbarians. The inclusion of the Plataeans in this narrative raised them to an equal footing with the Athenians, underscoring the close relationship between them.[62] Following the battle of Plataea and the end of the Second Persian War, Plataea sinks back into obscurity for a time. It does not appear to have played an active role in the struggle between Athens and Corinth which was ended by the Thirty Years’ Peace in about 445. This may have been because the polis was still attempting to recover from the effects of the Persian Wars. Plataea did play an important role in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War one might even call it the proximate cause of the war.
The Peloponnesian War began in the year 431 B.C. when a contingent from Thebes attempted to seize the polis of Plataea by subterfuge with the aid of some pro- Theban citizens (Diod. 12.41). At this time, Plataea and Athens were at peace with Thebes following the First Peloponnesian War. It was an uneasy peace, though; leading up to the assault on Plataea, Athens had already come into conflict with the Peloponnesian League over the towns of Aegina and Megara which Athens had harassing. Thebes, perhaps sensing war was on the horizon, decided to make a grab for Plataea. This move would have seriously weakened the Athenian frontier along Boeotia and left Athens exposed to Thebes on her northern flank. The attempt did not quite go as planned. The main body of the Theban army was delayed by rain and what seems to have been an atypically high flood of the Asopus River, forcing the advance guard to try and achieve surrender of the city by diplomacy rather than force of arms. Unfortunately for the Thebans, when the Plataeans discovered how few soldiers had actually infiltrated the city, they took up arms against the invaders. Some of the Thebans managed to escape, but a good number were captured. Holding these men as hostages, the Plataeans sent word to Athens of what had occurred and asked for assistance.[63]
The Athenians upon receiving news of the attempted coup at Plataea, Thucydides (2.6) tells us, immediately seized all the Boeotians within Attica. They also sent word to the Plataeans not to harm any of their prisoners. These actions would seem to indicate that Athens wished to attempt some sort of hostage exchange and perhaps even to negotiate a (somewhat) peaceful end to the hostilities. Regrettably, from the Athenian point of view, the Plataeans had already executed their prisoners in a show of force to the Thebans.[64] The situation thus spiralled beyond repair. Thebes appealed to Sparta and both sides began calling up their allies in preparation for war.
The Plataean non-combatants— composed of women, children and the oldest men— retreated to Athens, leaving behind a defensive force in the city composed of four hundred Plataean soldiers, 80 Athenians and one hundred and ten women “to bake bread.”[65]
For the Athenians, the arrival of Plataean refugees was unprecedented. The main issue was the fact that the Plataeans came to Athens in one large group. While Athens already possessed methods to accommodate small numbers of refugees or exiles, via individual grants of citizenship or through their inclusion in the metic population, the arrival of such a large number of refugees in a single group was unheard of.[66] There were no established methods or protocols for the Plataeans‘ accommodation.
Plataea was not a large polis by most standards, certainly not in comparison to the population of classical Athens. Hansen imagines the entire population of Plataea in 431 B.C. to be about 2,000 persons[67] as compared to the city of Athens which he estimates as possessing at least 50,000 adult male citizens alone.[68] Subtracting the Plataeans who remained behind to organize the city’s defense, the first wave of refugees might have totaled about 1500. At first blush, then, the Plataean refugees would appear to be a mere drop in the bucket. The problem lay in the fact that Athens was already overrun with evacuees from its own chora. Thucydides (2.52.1-2) describes these people as squatting in open spaces around the city, temple precincts, and eventually between the Long Walls. In such a situation, the arrival of approximately 1500 more refugees could only intensify the difficulty of providing sufficient housing, food, clothing, and sanitation in already an overcrowded city. Indeed, less than a year following the Plataeans’ settlement in Attica, the Athenian plague broke out, claiming no less than one-third of the city’s population before it subsided.
To make matters worse, the continuation of the Peloponnesian War made it impossible for the Plataeans to return home. The Spartan siege of Plataea from 429-427 prevented reinforcements or repatriation to the city; ultimately the city surrendered and was given over to the Megarians for a time before being razed in 426.[69] Although two hundred of the Plataean defenders managed to escape to Athens before the end of the siege, Thucydides (3.68) states at least another two hundred were executed upon surrender of the city. As a result, the Plataean population— perhaps 1700 strong now, based on Hansen’s calculations— were forced to remain in Athens. The loss of home, family, and worldly possessions, compounded by the physical hardships of the journey to Athens must have resulted in severe psychological and emotional stress for the refugees. One can easily imagine initial gratitude had given way to a degree of bitterness and resentment as their Athenian allies failed to reinforce, or even attempt to reinforce, the defenders. The surrender of Plataea to the Spartans could only have augmented this bitterness with despair of ever returning home.[70] With the addition of overcrowding in the city and the recurring plague, the allocation of resources and space were quickly becoming a critical factor (Thuc. 2.17.1-3; 2.52.1-2). All these elements were contributing to a potentially volatile situation for Athens; a decision would have to be made regarding the Plataeans soon.
The Athenians’ first attempt at negotiating this fraught situation was to make the Plataeans a block grant of citizenship in 427 (Thuc. 2.6.4; [Dem.] 59.103-4; Isoc. 12.94; Lys. 23.2-3). The contemporary authors Thucydides and Lysias both mention the grant made in 427 as well as the fourth century orator Isocrates,[71] yet the form of the grant and its recipients have been of considerable modern debate. The only record of the terms for this grant is to be found in Apollodorus’ mid-fourth-century speech Against Neaera; moreover, the decree as transcribed in the speech contains several inconsistencies with the description of the terms given by Apollodorus in the main body of the speech. According to the grant, as inserted into the speech ([Dem.] 59.104),
1) The Plataeans are to enjoy all the rights and privileges of full Athenian citizens, civic and religious, except priesthoods or other religious offices belonging to a particular family.
2) Naturalized Plataeans will not be eligible for the archonship, but their children will be.
3) The Plataeans will be distributed among the demes and phylai, and once this is done, no other Plataean will be eligible for the citizenship unless he wins the favor individually.
But in the text of the speech Apollodorus states that the rights of the Plataeans should be as follows:
1) Citizenship grants are restricted to persons who have materially benefitted the city of Athens.
2) The grant having been initially approved by the demos, must also be voted for in the next assembly by no less than 6000 citizens.
3) Even after the second ratification, the grant may still be revoked by a γραφὴ παρανόμων.
4) Those who are granted citizenship are barred from holding the archonship or priesthoods.
5) The children of grant holders may possess full rights if born of a legally betrothed Athenian woman.[72]
The main areas of contention between the two versions are the provision regarding which priesthoods the Plataeans should be barred from holding and whether any Plataeans might receive Athenian citizenship after the distribution among the demes.
Before examining the evidence presented in the speech, its context should be considered. This speech was concerned with the citizenship status of a woman named Neaera, a former slave and courtesan, and her daughter. Apollodorus argues that Neaera has lived for several years as the wife of an Athenian, Stephanus, thus usurping the role of a freeborn Athenian woman. Furthermore, Apollodorus alleges that the daughter of Neaera was given in marriage to an Athenian citizen under the false pretense of being Stephanus’ daughter by his first wife and therefore a freeborn Athenian woman of citizen descent. The prosecution rests upon a modified version of Pericles’ citizenship law passed in 451 (Aristot. Pol. 1278a) which stated that only the children of an Athenian citizen and a woman of Athenian citizen descent could possess Athenian citizenship.[73] This law was apparently an attempt to limit the number of Athenian citizens as the state grew increasingly more powerful in the mid-fifth-century. At some point in the fourth century, the law appears to have become much more restrictive, going so far as to prohibit outright the marriage of Athenian citizens and foreigners. If such a marriage was to occur, the offending foreigner was to be tried before the Thesmothetae (the six junior archons) and if found guilty should be sold into slavery ([Dem.] 59.17). Under the citizenship law passed by Pericles in 451/0, mixed marriages, that is a marriage between a citizen and non-citizen woman, were legal, but the children of such a union were disenfranchised and generally equated with illegitimate offspring.[74] Under the fourth-century law not only would the children be illegitimate, but the foreign parent could be sold into slavery; if the foreign parent was the mother, the children could also be sold since they would then become children of a slave.[75]
Given these circumstances, one would expect an extremely rigorous process for the granting of citizenship to foreigners, as indeed appears the case in the more restrictive measures narrated by Apollodorus as opposed to those provided in the purported decree. Despite this, Osborne, Carey, Kapparis, and Blok all read the text of the decree as included in Apollodorus’ speech to be genuine, albeit corrupted in places, thus accounting for any inconsistencies with the text of the speech. Canevaro, however, presents a convincing argument that the text of the decree is a later forgery inserted into the text of the speech. He bases this conclusion upon the decree’s inconsistencies with Apollodorus‘ summation of the naturalization process, as well as abnormalities of language and terminology compared to other decrees of the period.[76] The general tendency of later scholiasts to insert forged texts of decrees into transcripts of Athenian court cases also supports this theory. Demosthenes 21, in particular, has been shown in recent works to be filled with forgeries.[77]
Apart from the terminological differences between the decree presented in Against Neaera and other fifth century decrees, certain logical inconsistencies also point to the decree being a fabrication. For instance, the decree as presented states that the Plataeans would be eligible for all civic and religious offices except for the archonship and hereditary religious offices belonging to specific families, whereas Apollodorus stated that the naturalized Plataeans should not hold the archonship or any priesthoods. Although Athens and Plataea were allies, their forms of governmental offices and religious cults were not identical. Naturalized Plataeans would not have been trained in the proper forms of sacrifice and would not have been familiar with the intricacies of Athenian law. It is logical that the Plataeans would be excluded from these offices. The children of naturalized Plataeans, having been born and raised as Athenian citizens, would be trained in these matters and thus eligible to hold the offices.
The Plataeans were the first group ever to be granted Athenian citizenship en bloc. This occurrence is even more odd given how jealously citizenship was guarded by Greek poleis. That a large number of Plataeans should be given even restricted Athenian citizenship barely twenty years after Pericles’ citizenship law was enacted is a startling deviation from established policy, particularly since the children of an enfranchised Plataean and an Athenian woman of citizen descent would inherit full Athenian citizenship. This policy shift can only be explained by the extreme circumstances created by the residence of the Plataean population in Athens and the long-standing association of Plataea with Athens.
The extension of citizenship to the Plataeans solved several of the problems created by long-term residence in Athens. As citizens, the Plataeans could hold land; this alleviated both the need to provide some form of residence and also furnished the means by which the Plataeans could begin to provide for themselves.[78] The limited grant of citizenship also defined the parameters of the Plataean relationship with the Athenians. By making the grant, the Athenians recognized the special status of the Plataeans as long-standing allies and relieved them of the financial penalties associated with metic status. Finally, should the refugees not be able to return home, the grant provided a mechanism whereby the Plataeans would begin to be incorporated into the Athenian political body- that is, by granting children born of a citizen Plataean and an Athenian full citizenship rights. Children born with such rights would become a part of the Athenian civic structure— sitting on juries, holding office, serving in the Athenian army or navy— and identify themselves as Athenians rather than Plataeans.
Some discussion has arisen among scholars regarding who actually received the grant of citizenship. There were two groups of Plataeans living in Athens in 428/7, those who were evacuated in 431 and the small contingent of Plataeans who had stayed behind to protect the city and subsequently escaped the Spartan siege.[79] Hammond argues that the grant of citizenship was only made to the escapees of the siege.[80] He points specifically to one passage (59.104) in which Apollodorus states, “Again, we would have you observe the manner in which you granted the right to share citizenship with you to men who had thus manifested their good will toward your people, and who sacrificed all their possessions and their children and their wives.”[81] This statement comes at the end of Apollodorus’ narration of the various times Plataea had aided
Athens beginning with the Battle of Marathon and ending with the escape of the Plataeans from the Spartan siege. Hammond construes this placement to mean that only those who escaped the siege received citizenship. Hunt refutes this claim; he points to the fact that it is explicitly stated in Against Neaera, that any Plataeans wishing to take advantage of the grant only “needed to show that they really were from Plataea and friendly to Athens.”[82]
There are two major flaws in Hammond’s argument. First, Apollodorus never explicitly states that the decree was limited to escapees from the siege. The omission is glaring since the purpose of the entire speech is to prove that Naeara was not a naturalized citizen of Athens and Apollodorus‘ example of Plataean enfranchisement is meant to illustrate how difficult it historically had been to achieve a grant of citizenship in Athens. In such a case, should a grant of citizenship only have been made to the escapees, we would expect Apollodorus to point up this fact to highlight that even among Athens’ staunch allies the Plataeans, citizenship was only granted to a very select few. Second, Apollodorus does state that in order to be given Athenian citizenship, the recipient must have materially benefitted Athens. Normally, this benefit was conveyed by actions in war, but the escapees from Plataea do not seem to fit this criterion. It is difficult to see how the Plataeans defending their own city materially benefitted Athens unless it is because the defenders refused to surrender the city when initially asked, instead deferring to Athens and their alliance. This argument is tenuous, though, and it makes more sense to accept that the Plataeans were naturalized due to a long-standing and close alliance with Athens and with that the case, all of the Plataeans would be eligible, not just the defenders of Plataea. Moreover, if the purpose of the grant was to provide for the Plataeans during their stay in Athens and help assimilate them to the Athenian polis, there is every reason for the larger contingent to have been included. Granting citizenship to only 200 of the perhaps 1700 Plataeans living in Athens could only have caused more divisiveness and unrest while simultaneously making no provision for the maintenance of the bulk of the refugees.
Lysias in his speech Against Pancleon provides further support for the argument that all the Plataeans were naturalized. In it, he presents the case of an individual suspected of claiming Plataean citizenship which he did not, in actuality, possess.[83] Pancleon claimed to be a Plataean citizen, the son of Hipparmodorus; assuming Pancleon was a metic or, as some in the trial claimed, an escaped slave, what benefit was there to be gained by claiming Plataean citizenship? If a runaway slave, Pancleon might have been attempting to hide among the confusion of new residents in Athens and claim status as a free man. If, however, Pancleon was already a metic (as might have been the case, Apollodorus mentions Pancleon had several cases brought against him in the polemarch’s court) there would be no benefit to claiming Plataean status, unless all the Plataeans had been enfranchised, giving them rights under the law equal to that of citizens. It would be a fairly easy matter to determine whether or not Pancleon was among the 212 defenders who escaped from Plataea; he could only hope to hide his usurpation of Plataean identity among a larger number. In questioning Pancleon’s claim, Lysias’ (23.2-5) assumptions prove that the Plataeans must have been naturalized as a whole. Upon learning Pancleon claimed Plataean citizenship, he asked simply to what deme Pancleon belonged. This question presupposes that as a Plataean, Pancleon had been included in the citizenship grant made in 428/7 and distributed among the tribes and demes of Athens. If the grant had been made only to the 212 escapees of Plataea, one would expect Lysias to inquire as to which group of Plataeans Pancleon belongs— the enfranchised escapees or the larger refugee population. Since Lysias does not, it stands to reason that the grant was in fact made to all Plataeans. The very fact that Lysias brought a case against Pancleon for pretending to be a Plataean is in itself indirect proof that the entire population had been enfranchised.
Although the Plataeans had been granted a limited form of citizenship, it is clear that they did not attempt to incorporate themselves into the Athenian populace to any great degree. No Plataeans figure on any Athenian inscriptions from this period, an occurrence which can hardly be accounted for, as one would at least expect to find some gravestones, given the lengthy period and conditions of their stay.[84] We learn from Against Pancleon that the Plataean residents of Athens and Attica, despite being granted citizenship and distributed into various demes, made a habit of gathering once a month at the cheese market, marking themselves out as a sub-group of the general populace (Lys. 23.6). In the war effort, the Plataeans continued to be active as well. Plataean ψιλοί, or light-armed troops, participated in a (failed) campaign on Minoa in 424 along with a contingent of the Athenian περίπολοι under the command of Demosthenes.[85] Another group of soldiers was included in the Athenian expedition to Sicily, the only contingent of native Boeotians to fight against other Boeotians, according to Thucydides.[86] In both instances the Plataeans appear not as a contingent of the Athenian forces, but as independent, though coordinated troops.
The disinterest displayed on the part of the Plataeans in becoming part of the greater Athenian whole may be what ultimately prompted Athens to attempt resettling some of them. In 421, the refugees moved to Scione, in the Chalcidice. Scione had been an Athenian tributary prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war; two days after Sparta and Athens concluded a truce in 423, it revolted at the instigation of the Spartan general Brasidas (Thuc 4.120.1-2; Diod. 12.72.1). Once Athens gained control over the town again, it exposed the males to andrapodismos, while the women and children were sold as slaves. The town having been thus emptied; the land was given over to the Plataeans (Isoc. 4.109). But the Plataean tenancy was very brief; Scione was recaptured by the Peloponnesian League in 405/4, at which point the Plataean tenants returned to Athens (Xen. Hell. 2.2.9; Plut. Lys. 14.2-4). This resettlement of the Plataeans may have only been partial. Hornblower notes in his commentary that Thucydides (5.32.1) states, “Πλαταιεῦσιν ἔδοσαν νέμεσθαι” lacking a definite article. While it is not entirely uncommon to use an ethnic without an article, this usage can translate as “they gave the land to Plataeans to cultivate” rather than “to the Plataeans”which would indicate the entirety of the group.[87]
Lysias’ speech Against Pancleon, could be further evidence for a partial resettlement; Gagarin places the date of the speech shortly after 403.[88] In the speech, Lysias claims he served Pancleon with a law suit because “for a long time he would not stop doing me wrong.”[89] This suggests an enmity of long standing, perhaps even years. Depending on the length of time required for Lysias to gather evidence and prepare his case, Pancleon and the Plataeans whom Lysias called as witnesses might have been resident in Athens prior to the return of the Plataeans from Scione in 405/4. In fact, Pancleon must have been resident in Athens prior to 405/4 because Lysias mentions Pancleon had been involved in multiple actions prior to his suit (Lys. 23.3) It is unlikely that a single man would become the object of such extensive litigation in one year’s time. The question must be asked why some Plataeans would choose to remain in Athens rather than move to Scione with their fellow citizens. Perhaps Scione was not large or secure enough to host the entire populace and therefore only those deemed most capable of defending the site were chosen. Alternatively, some may have chosen to stay behind in the hope that their own lands would be similarly (re)captured. Such a decision would be consonant with the Plataeans’ persistence in keeping their own unique identity and connection to their city.
In discussing the removal to Scione, we speak of the Plataeans “choosing” whether or not to go. An undertaking of this nature would necessarily have required extensive planning and organization much of which, like the actual transportation, would most likely have been handled by the Athenians. The Plataeans would have to journey to Scione via ship since Boeotia was in enemy hands and travel to the Chalcidice overland would be an open invitation to extermination. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the Athenians alone would have selected the individual families or people who made the trip. That decision must have been at least partially made by the Plataeans, perhaps in consultation with the Athenians. This decision may have been made on the familial level, but it is also possible that it was made by the Plataeans as a group. We already have seen in Lysias that the Plataeans continued to meet once a month in some capacity; it is not a stretch to imagine the refugees gathering in an ad hoc boule to address the question of resettlement.
Athens clearly had little interest in maintaining a large Plataean population in its midst, if it could not be assimilated into Athenian society; it was not, however, above making use of the Plataeans’ insistence on remaining a separate and autonomous civic body. In 406, Athens enfranchised a number of slaves to man their fleet as oarsmen at the battle of Arginusae. This action was precipitated by a recent disastrous defeat of the Athenian general Conon at Mytilene in which 30 ships were lost and the remaining 40 ships of the Athenian fleet bottled up in the city’s harbor being attacked by both land and sea (Xen Hell. 1.6.17-18). Desperate times calling for desperate measures, Athens voted the outfitting of several new ships and manned them with slaves and metics by the expedient of granting them citizenship. Xenophon (Hell. 1.6.24) refers to the grant generally:
ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν και δέκα, εἰσβιβάζοντες τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὄντας ἅπαντας καὶ δούλοθς καὶ ἐλευθέρους...
They [the Athenians] voted to help with 110 ships, putting on board all together those being of military age both slaves and free...
Hellanicus (FGH 4 fr. 171) is quoted:[90]
τούς συνναυμαχήσαντας δούλους Ἡλλάνικός φησιν ἐλευθερωθῆναι καὶ ἐγγραφέντας ὡς Πλαταιεῖς συμπολιτεύσασθαι αὐτοῖς.
Hellanicus said that the slaves who fought in the naval battle were freed and having been enrolled as Plataeans, shared citizenship with them.
Diodorus (13.97.1) also mentions the grant and the fact that metics were included among the rowers as well.[91] The grant raised more than a few eyebrows in Athens, though not for the reasons one might expect. It is mentioned by the chorus of Aristophanes’ Frogs in what at first appears to be disapproving terms:
καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρόν ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ναυμαχήσαντας μίαν καὶ Πλαταιᾶς εὐθὺς εἶναι κἀντὶ δούλων δεσπότας.
And it is shameful that men who have fought in just one naval battle should immediately be Plataeans, masters instead of slaves. (693-94)
Aristophanes goes on to imply that the manumission and grant had been a source of irritation for some Athenians, not because slaves had been enfranchised per se, but because the rowers of Arginusae had been freed and enfranchised while Athenian citizens who had lost their citizenship following the oligarchic coup of 411 were still disenfranchised. The chorus addresses the audience directly on this point, saying:
κοὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔγωγ᾽ ἔχοιμι᾽ ἂν μὴ οὐ καλῶς φράσκειν ἔχειν ἀλλ᾽ἐπαινῶ; μόνα γὰρ αὐτὰ νοῦν ἔχοντ᾽ἐδράστε. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς, οἳ μεθ᾽ὑμῶν πολλὰ δὴ χοἰ πατέρες ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ προσήκουσιν γένει, τὴν μίαν ταύτην παρεῖναι συμφορὰν αἰτοθμένοις. ἀλλα τῆς ὀργῆς ἀνέντες ὦ σοφώτατοι φύσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἑκόντες συγγενεῖς κτησώμεθα κἀπιτίμους καὶ πολίτας, ὃστις ἂν ξυνναθμαχη.
Even this I could not say was not a good thing but I praise it; for it is the only sensible thing you did. But, in addition, it is also fair for those who have fought in many naval battles with you, and whose fathers fought, and who are related to you, that you forgive this one misfortune when they ask. But you naturally wisest of men, letting go of anger, let us freely hold as our kinsmen, and full citizens, every man who fights in our fleet. (695-702)
Aristophanes equates the new status of the slaves with the lost status of those Athenians who had been stripped of their citizenship, implying that the newly minted freedmen, having been enrolled as Plataeans, now possess some part of the Athenian citizenship that the others had lost. This is the source of the irritation expressed earlier in the chorus, not that the slaves were enfranchised but that they were enfranchised when people who had been born with Athenian citizenship still had not been returned to the fold.[92]
It has been suggested that the slaves were not truly enrolled as Plataean citizens but merely given a form of Athenian citizenship similar to that of the Plataeans in 427, and it is to this that Aristophanes refers. Osborne, rightly, discards this idea of so-called “Plataean rights” as a quintessentially Roman idea, rather than a Greek one; he cites the Hellanicus fragment for support of Aristophanes’ statement that a Plataean enfranchisement was given to the slaves.[93] He does note, though, that the slaves must have been enrolled among the Plataeans who had remained in Athens rather than those who had ventured to Scione. He denies that the ex-slaves would have been enticed to row for Athens by a promise to join the Plataeans living in Scione and, in a footnote, declares it unlikely that the Plataeans who had fought so hard to remain independent of Athenian influence by moving to Scione could be induced to accept former Athenian slaves as citizens. While this line of reasoning is understandable, it is based on the assumption that the Plataean polity had been split into two distinct groups by the settlement at Scione and, that the Plataeans who remained in Athens were somehow more willing to mix ranks with foreigners. The return of the Plataeans from Scione in 405/4 and rejoining of the two groups belies this assumption as does the evidence of Lysias which clearly shows the Plataeans left in Athens were still adamantly maintaining a separate identity from their hosts.[94] This argument also fails to take into account two important facts— the Plataeans had voluntarily associated with freed Athenian slaves in the past and by 406 the Plataean citizen population had, in all likelihood, been significantly depleted by the war.
The first enfranchisement of slaves by Athens in extremis, Pausanias (1.32.3) tells us, first occurred at the battle of Marathon in 490; facing the Persian hordes, Athens freed an unspecified number of slaves to join them and the Plataeans in the fight. After the battle, the ashes of the Athenian dead were gathered and buried together in one mound, while those of the Plataeans and the former Athenian slaves were buried in the second. There is no record of the Plataeans objecting to these arrangements and the mounds were clearly objects of veneration, not shame. If the Plataeans had found the idea repulsive, there was no reason why they could not simply have built a third mound for their own dead, unless we are to assume all the Plataeans who fought had been killed and burial arrangements left exclusively to Athens. Notopoulos suggested that the slaves were buried with the Plataeans because they most likely had not been formally enrolled in phylai as Athenian citizens, making the Athenian citizens in name, but not fully in law. Therefore, it would be a violation of religious and tribal customs to bury the ex-slaves in the Athenian mound.[95] The Plataeans consequently, perhaps not appreciating the distinction, agreed to the freedmen’s burial in their mound.
There may be another reason, though, for the Plataean acceptance of the arrangement. As naturalized Athenian citizens, the former slaves would have received the same form of limited citizenship accorded to the Plataeans in 427, or something very similar. We know from Herodotus and Thucydides that the Plataeans received their first grant of Athenian citizenship sometime in the last quarter of the sixth century and it is possible that the Plataean contingent at Marathon included recipients of this sixth- century grant. Should this have been the case, the burial of two groups of naturalized Athenian citizens in a single mound makes perfect sense. The Plataeans would not have objected because the freedmen had proven their worth in the battle and, legally, held the same status as they did.
Given this history, Osborne’s suggestion that the enrollment was potentially offensive to the Plataeans is questionable. Rather, it is possible the new citizens were a welcome addition to the polity because of losses sustained during the course of the war. In addition to the men the Plataeans lost when their city surrendered in 427, Diodorus Siculus claims an unspecified number of Plataeans caught outside the walls during Thebes’ first attempt to capture the city in 431 were also killed (Diod. 12.41.7). Further losses may be conjectured from the campaigns on Minoa and Sicily, the only two for which there is a record of Plataean participation; nevertheless, it is more than likely that the Plataeans fought alongside their Athenian allies in other battles and sustained casualties then as well. While the exact number of men Plataea had under arms in the Peloponnesian War is uncertain, Herodotus does give a number for the Persian Wars.
According to him, Plataea fielded 600 hoplites for the Battle of Plataea (Hdt. 9.28.6). If we can assume a similar size force in 431, the Plataeans would have already lost no less than one-third of their military strength by 427 when the city surrendered. Any additional casualties sustained on Minoa or Sicily would have seriously imperiled the Plataean body politic. When deaths from the Athenian plague and the normal course of life are considered, the bleak assessment of their situation by the Plataeans could have been the deciding factor in welcoming the newly manumitted slaves as citizens.
The Plataeans fade from the historical record after 405. The conclusion of the Peloponnesian war did not bring them restoration to their home city. They remained in Athens through the reign of the Thirty, the restoration of democracy and the Corinthian War (395-388/7), fought by Thebes, Athens, Argos and Corinth against the increasing power and encroachment of Sparta. The cause of the Plataeans‘ misfortune may have been Athens‘ need for Thebes during this period. Athens’ empire was dismantled at the end of the Peloponnesian War and Boeotia came increasingly under the influence of Thebes, the very city responsible for Plataea’s destruction, through the auspices of the First Boeotian Confederacy. Having been reduced to less than a shadow of its former power, Athens relied on alliances with Thebes to keep Sparta in check and prevent the reinstatement of Spartan hegemony in Athens after the Thirty were deposed.[96] Under these circumstances, Athens could not afford to champion the Plataeans’ return and given the Plataeans’ aversion to Theban rule they may not have wanted to; they were safer remaining where they were.
The Plataeans were not allowed to return and rebuild until the ratification of the King’s Peace in 387 which ended the Corinthian War and effectively restored Greece to the political state which existed prior to the Persian Wars. Thebes’ Boeotian Confederacy was disbanded, the Ionian states reverted to Persia and Athens was once again stripped of the territory it had occupied, except for Lemnos, Imbrus and Scyros (Xen. Hell 5.1.31-33). The Plataeans were finally allowed to return to their city and begin the long process of rebuilding (Paus. 9.1.4). That good fortune was to be short lived. Sparta occupied Plataea and Thespiae in 378 during the first of the Theban Wars, installing a governor there. The war ended in 375 with a renewal of the King’s Peace, but little more than a few months had passed when Plataea was again attacked by Thebes, ostensibly because they refused to join the Second Boeotian Federation.[97] Once again, the Thebans relied on surprise to take Plataea, this time with success. Diodorus Siculus (15.46.4-5) asserts that the Boeotian army was able to surprise a number of Plataeans working in the fields and, arresting them, carried them off, most likely to be sold as slaves ; those who escaped to the city eventually negotiated an agreement wherein they would be allowed to leave unmolested so long as they never set foot in Boeotia again. Centuries later Pausanias (9.1.8) would echo this tale, writing that the city was captured, but its citizens were allowed to leave and seek sanctuary in Athens.
καὶ ἡ μὲν πόλις ὑπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων καθηρέθη πλὴν τὰ ἱερά, τοῖς δὲ Πλαταιεῦσιν ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἁλώσεως σωτηρίαν παρέσχεν ἐν ἴσω πᾶσιν; ἐκπεσόντας δὲ σφᾶς ἐδέξαντο αὖθις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι.
And the city was destroyed by the Thebans, except the sanctuaries, but the manner of its capture granted safety to the Plataeans; and having been expelled, the Athenians received them again.
Xenophon’s account (6.3.1) is more ambiguous about the evacuation:
οἱ δέ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐκπεπτωκότας μὲν ὁρῶντες ἐκ τῆς Βοιωτίας Πλαταιᾶς, φίλους ὄντας, καὶ καταπεφεθγότας πρὸς αὑτούς...
Meanwhile the Athenians, seeing that their friends the Plataeans had been driven out of Boeotia and fled to them for refuge...
The second flight of the Plataeans is not nearly as well documented as the first, however, it is quite clear that no concerted effort was made upon the part of Athens to shepherd the refugees to safety this time; they were left to make their own ways. As a consequence, at least one of the refugees chose a different destination. A citizenship decree (IG IV 748) dating to 369 found in Troezen honors the Plataean Echilaus son of Philonides.
ἔδοξε τᾶι βουλᾶι καὶ τῶι δάμωι· ἐπειδὴ Ἐχίλαος Φιλωνίδου Πλα- ταιεὺς ἀφικόμενος ἐς Τροζᾶνα περί τε τὰν σωτηρίαν τᾶς χώρας ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, καὶ ὅσσα ἐδεῖτ- o ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Τροζανίων ὑπηρέτη- κε πάντα· δεδόχθαι τᾶι βουλᾶι καὶ τῶι δάμωι ἐπαινῆσαι Ἐχίλαον Φιλ- ωνίδου Πλαταιῆ ἀρετᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας τᾶς ἐς τὸν δᾶμον τ- ὸν Τροζανίων, εἶμεν δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ γένει εὐεργεσίαν καὶ πολι- τείαν. ἀγγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψάφισ- μα ἐν στάλαι λιθίναι καὶ στᾶσαι ἐν τῶι ἱαρῶι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Θεαρίου, ὅπως καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι ὑπη- ρετῶντι, εἰδότες ὅτι δύναται ὁ δ- ᾶμος ὁ τῶν Τροζανίων τὰς χάρ[ι]- τας ἀποδιδόμεν τοῖς εὖ ποιοῦ[σ]- ιν αὑτόν. εἶμεν δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ φυ- λᾶς ἇς κα λάχη<ι>, τὸν δὲ δεκαδῆ ἐ- πικλαρῶσαι ἤδη. Φιλήσιος εἶπε. [ἔλ]αχε φυλᾶς Σχελιάδας. |
Resolved by the boule and people: Since Echilaus son of Philonides a Plataean, having arrived in Troezen for the protection of the countryside, is a good man and as much as the people of Troezen has done service in every way. It is resolved by the boule and the people to commend Echilaus son of Philonides, the Plataean, because of his honor and friendship to the people of Troezen, and there will be for him and his descendants benefits and citizenship. And this decree will be inscribed on a stone stele and placed in the sanctuary of Apollo Thearius, as with others having done service, seeing that the people of Troezen are able to give back goodwill to him doing good things And he will be assigned both a phyle which will be by lot and a decury Philesius said. The phyle Scheliadas was allotted. |
Most of the Plataeans probably returned to Athens, though, as Diodorus, Xenophon and Pausanias wrote; after all the city was quite familiar to them by this point, and many of the refugees would still have had friends and perhaps even family living there.
Isocrates (14.51) references the fact that at least some of the Plataeans newly returned to seek asylum would have been blood relations of the Athenians through marriages that occurred during the first flight:
καὶ γὰρ οὐδ᾽ ἀλλότριοι τυγχάνομεν ὑμῖν ὄντες, ἀλλὰ ταῖς μὲν εὐνοίαις ἅπαντες οἰκεῖοι, τῇ δὲσυγγενείᾳ τὸ πλῆθος ἡμῶν: διὰ γὰρ τὰς ἐπιγαμίας τὰς δοθείσας ἐκ πολιτίδων ὑμετέρων γεγόναμεν:
For, indeed, we are not alien to you; but all of us are close kinsmen to you in goodwill and most of us in blood also; for through the right of intermarriage having been granted to us, we are born of mothers who were of your city.
Nevertheless, the archaeological record for Plataean refugees remains sparse. Two gravestones of Plataeans dating to the middle of the 4th century have been recovered at Athens (IG II2 10090 and 10092), along with a third from Eleusis (SEG 37:171), but the refugees were, apparently, no more inclined to leave epigraphic evidence of their second sojourn in Athens than their first.
Once again, record of the refugees is mostly found in the works of the orators and historians. Diodorus (15.46.5) tells us that those Plataeans who made their way to Athens had their grants of citizenship from 427 renewed. Demosthenes references the Plataeans several times in his speeches For the Megalopolitans, On the Peace and the second Philippic, but he does not discuss their circumstances. Instead he always mentions the Plataeans when discussing the need to punish Thebes and restore the refugees to their home. The continual pairing of the Plataeans and Thebes in Demosthenes’ speeches is to be expected, given the circumstances surrounding the Plataeans’ flight; still the impression given is that the Plataeans were simply a pawn in the on-going power struggle with Thebes. Demosthenes does not humanize them; they do not possess an existence outside of the wrong which Thebes has done.
Isocrates provides the most extensive discourse on the second flight of the Plataeans in his work Plataicus. In the speech. Isocrates takes on the role of a Plataean refugee to argue against the Theban contention that the attack was justified by Plataea’s refusal to join the Boeotian league. The speech does not so much deal with the trials and tribulations of the Plataeans deprived of their city, though, then it builds the argument that Thebes had broken the treaty of the King’s Peace by attempting to deprive Plataea of its autonomy (Isoc. 14.10), among its many historical crimes, and therefore Athens should intervene and restore Plataea to its rightful inhabitants. When he does address the current situation of the Plataeans it is to represent the refugees as wretched victims of fortune:
τίνας γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὕροι τις δυστυχεστέρους, οἵτινες καὶ πόλεως καὶ χώρας καὶ χρημάτων ἐν μιᾷ στερηθέντες ἡμέρᾳ, πάντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὁμοίως ἐνδεεῖς ὄντεςἀλῆται καὶ πτωχοὶ καθέσταμεν, ἀποροῦντες ὅποι τραπώμεθα, καὶ πάσας τὰς οἰκήσεις δυσχεραίνοντες: ἤν τε γὰρ δυστυχοῦντας καταλάβωμεν, ἀλγοῦμεν ἀναγκαζόμενοιπρὸς τοῖς οἰκείοις κακοῖς καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων κοινωνεῖν: ἤν θ᾽ὡς εὖ πράττοντας ἔλθωμεν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον ἔχομεν, οὐ ταῖς ἐκείνων φθονοῦντες εὐπορίαις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἀγαθοῖς τὰς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν συμφορὰς καθορῶντες, ἐφ᾽ αἷς ἡμεῖς οὐδεμίαν ἡμέραν ἀδακρυτὶ διάγομεν ἀλλὰπενθοῦντες τὴν πατρίδα καὶ θρηνοῦντες τὴν μεταβολὴν τὴν γεγενημένην ἅπαντα τὸνχρόνον διατελοῦμεν.
For who could be found to be more unhappy than we are who, in one day deprived of our city, our lands, and our possessions, and being destitute of all necessities alike, have become wanderers and beggars, not knowing where to turn and, whatever our abode, finding no happiness there? For if we fall in with the unfortunate, we grieve that we must be compelled, in addition to our own ills, to share in the ills of others; and if we encounter those who fare well, our lot is even harder to bear, not because we envy them their prosperity, but because amid the blessings of our neighbors we see more clearly our own miseries—miseries so great that we spend no day without tears, but spend all our time mourning the loss of our fatherland and bewailing the change in our fortunes. (Isoc. 14.46-47)
From this evidence, we can surmise that the Plataean’s second stay in Athens mirrored their first to a significant degree, the two exceptions being that the Athenians did not assist the Plataeans in evacuating their city this time, nor is there a recorded attempt to resettle any Plataeans on another site.
The Plataeans were allowed to return home for good in 338 after Philip II’s victory over Thebes and Athens at Chaeronea (Paus. 4.27.10, 9.1.8). They eventually took revenge on Thebes for their century of dispossession as well; Arrian (Anab. 1.8.8) and Diodorus (17.13.5) both narrate the participation of Plataeans at Alexander’s destruction of Thebes in 335. Their homecoming culminated in the rebuilding of Plataea by Alexander in 331 “because their ancestors offered their land to the Greeks to fight for their freedom.”[98] In their time as refugees, however, the Plataeans demonstrated great perseverance. Rather than assuming the role of victims, the Plataeans served as Athens’ ally on the battlefield and at Scione. They actively maintained their civic identity separate from the Athenians, as demonstrated by their monthly gatherings in the cheese market, despite being granted Athenian citizenship and never lost hope of returning home. For the Athenians’ part, in the fifth century they made every possible concession to aid their refugee allies. The Athenians escorted the majority of the Plataean demos to Athens prior to Sparta’s siege, they enfranchised the Plataeans when it became obvious that the Plataeans would not be able to return home soon, and as the years passed they offered an alternative site where some of the Plataeans could settle and live independent of Athens and its citizens. This last was, of course, not entirely altruistic but it is clear that the Plataeans settling in Scione were autonomous.
Athens actions toward the Plataeans were not quite as magnanimous. The Athenians did not assist in the evacuation of Plataea, but they did reinstate the Plataeans grant of citizenship. The Athenians also did not attempt to resettle the Plataean refugees in the fourth century, though this may be for a number of reasons. Because there was not an organized evacuation, fewer Plataeans might have sought refuge in Athens during the fourth century; on Plataean at least made his way to Troezen and another to Eleusis. Alternatively, Athens might not have attempted to resettle the Plataeans because there was nowhere to resettle them. Athens had sustained heavy losses by the end of the Peloponnesian War both in manpower and territory. It is entirely possible that there were no suitable sites available to Athens upon which they could settle the Plataeans. Whatever the reason, the Athenian demos was not nearly as involved in managing the refugees welfare during the fourth century as it was in the fifth.[99]
