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APART FROM THE PLATAEANS, the resettlement of Messenians by Athens at Naupactus in the mid-fifth century is probably the best recorded instance of the Athenian response to refugees. On the surface it appears to be a simple enough undertaking; Sparta experienced a slave revolt which it could not put down. A truce was negotiated under which the revolting Messenians were required to leave the Peloponnese in exchange for their lives and freedom. Athens stepped in and offered the site of Naupactus to the homeless refugees on which to resettle. Athens saved the Messenians; the Messenians became grateful allies, end of story. But, such a summation is an enormous oversimplification of the events that surrounded the resettlement of Messenian refugees in Naupactus. The Messenians are unique among the cases to be examined, because they had not been self-governing for perhaps three hundred years when Athens became involved; they were, instead, under the control of Athens’ antagonist Sparta. Nor can it be determined that the Messenians ever formed an alliance or had a diplomatic relationship with Athens as had the Plataeans.[100] Their case is also unusual in that the Messenians appear to have already sought refuge in another polis, and been turned out, before accepting Athens’ offer of resettlement. Finally, and perhaps most strangely, Athens was not merely an innocent bystander in the events which led to the Messenians becoming refugees. Athens had actually fought against the revolting Messenians before becoming their saviors. These differences between the case of the Messenians and that of the Plateans will allow further examination of Athens’ motivations for assisting refugees, whether political or humanitarian.
The history of the Messenian wars and the eventual domination of Sparta over the Peloponnese, as related by the ancient historians, is shadowy at best and outright fabrication at worst. The earliest extant author to reference the wars was not even an historian, but the elegiac poet Tyrtaeus. Most of the information preserved regarding this early period derives, in fact, from the first century B.C./A.D. author Strabo and the second century A.D. author Pausanias, some seven to eight hundred years removed from the actual events. This information is naturally second- and third-hand by the time Strabo and Pausanias are writing their works; Strabo seems to have relied on Ephorus of Cumae’s fourth-century Universal History among others in writing his account,[101] while Pausanias, in his turn, appears to have based his narrative on the works of two Hellenistic authors— Myron of Priene and Rhianus, a Cretan poet (4.6.1-2). Nino Luraghi has shown in his recent work The Ancient Messenians: Constructions of Ethnicity and Memory, that much of what we know regarding Messenian “history” is, most likely, the result of competing propaganda circulated by Sparta and the Messenians, especially in the fourth century.[102] He states,
... it will never be possible to reconstruct the history of Messenia from the eighth to the sixth [centuries] in any detail and with any degree of confidence based on the literary evidence. No matter how many details of Pausanias’ early history of Messenia derive ultimately from oral traditions handed down for centuries among the inhabitants of Messenia, the amount of observable deformation is such that it is simply impossible, in the absence of contemporary evidence, to isolate supposedly genuine bits from the flow of the story.[103]
Given these circumstances, any attempt at a detailed analysis of pre-sixth century Messenian history would be more than slightly hubristic, in addition to being outside the scope of the current study. Suffice it to say that tradition recounts two major wars between Sparta and the Messenians prior to the fifth century.[104] The elegies of Tyrtaeus are believed to narrate the events and conclusion of the Second Messenian War, in which the Messenians were finally conquered after twenty years by the “fathers of our [the Spartans’] fathers” and “abandoned their fertile fields and fled from the high Ithomaean mountains.”[105] Most scholars date Tyrtaeus to the mid- or late-seventh century B.C., placing the end of the Second Messenian War in the early- or mid-seventh century.[106]
Following their conquest, the Messenian people largely disappear from the historical record until the fifth century, when they suddenly reappear in a brief note by Thucydides. In it, Thucydides explains that an earthquake had struck Sparta “...and besides, the Helots and the Thouriats and Aithaians of the perioikoi deserted to Mt. Ithome.”[107] He continues his narration by observing that most of the Helots were of Messenian descent and that the Spartans were so hard-pressed by this revolt that they sent to Athens for help. When that help arrived, the Spartans began to fear the Athenians would come to sympathize more with the slaves than themselves and sent the Athenians packing. This insult led to the first public fracture in the relationship between Athens and Sparta. Thucydides’ fleeting remarks introduce the beginning of the Third Messenian War which would set the stage for the First Peloponnesian War and the resettlement of Messenian refugees by Athens.
To understand why the Athenians offered to resettle the Messenians in Naupactus at the end of the Third Messenian War, it is necessary to examine the political climate between Sparta and Athens in the early fifth-century. Sparta’s dismissal of Athens‘ aid at Mt. Ithome brought to light long-festering distrust between the two states; it also allowed those in Athens who were discontent with the status quo to exploit Sparta’s moment of weakness, pushing a new policy of Athenian predominance in Greek politics. This policy is why Athens would ultimately choose to help the Messenians.
Although Athens and Sparta had worked together when faced by invasion from Persian, relations between the two had cooled somewhat following the end of the Persian invasions. The recall of the Spartan general Pausanias and consequent transferral of leadership in allied operations against Persia to Athens had to have disgruntled some back in Sparta, especially if Athens secretly had a hand in swaying the allies’ opinion.[108] What is more, Themistocles‘ prevarications regarding the rebuilding of Athens‘ walls, destroyed by the Persians in 480, was definitely seen as a betrayal of the pact all the allies had made at the end of the second Persian War (Plut. Them. 19; Diod. 11.39-40). Still, the goodwill (and pragmatism) between the parties was outwardly strong. The rise of Cimon following Themistocles’ ostracism in 472/1 is a sign of the continued inclination toward peace between Athens and Sparta during the early-fifth century.[109] Cimon was an avowed philo-Laconian; he was the Spartan proxenos in Athens and had even named one of his sons Lacedaemonius.[110] Like Themistocles, Cimon had served with distinction in the Persian Wars, particularly at the battle of Salamis where he earned the approbation of the demos (Plut. Cim. 5.2-3). We are told that Cimon also repatriated the bones of Theseus to Athens in accordance with an oracle of Apollo, ensuring himself a place among the influential members of Athens’ elite (Plut. Thes. 36.1-3, Cim. 8.3-7; Paus. 1.17.6, 3.3.7; Thuc. 1.98.2; Diod. 11.60.2). The Athenians’ general approval of Cimon and his pro-Spartan policies in the mid-fifth century, before the earthquake, can be read as indicative of a desire on the part of the demos to maintain friendly relations with Sparta, which was still the dominant land force in Greece at this time.
The earthquake and subsequent rebuff of Athenian aid by Sparta against the Messenians marked a turning point in Atheno-Laconian relations; unfortunately, the exact date it happened is unclear. Thucydides (1.103) does not provide a precise starting date for the Third Messenian War; instead he simply states that the war was a ten-year long affair.[111] Diodorus (11.63-64) gives his narration of the Spartan earthquake and ensuing Messenian revolt under the year 469/8 and likewise provides a duration of ten years for the war. The scholia to Aristophanes’ Lysistrata supply a similar date for the earthquake, quoting Philochorus who places the event in the twelfth year following the battle of Plataea, that is 468/7.[112] Unfortunately, this date would appear to conflict with one other piece of information provided by Thucydides (1.101.2), namely, that when Thasos revolted from Athens and the Delian League in 465/4 and was besieged, they requested help from Sparta. Thucydides alleges that Sparta agreed to send troops to the besieged capital, an action that was prevented by the earthquake. If real, this pledge would place the earthquake in approximately 464. It would also signal a major shift in Spartan foreign policy which had, up to this point, been outwardly as desirous of peace with Athens, as Athens was with Sparta. Aside from Thucydides’ statement, there is no evidence of a change in Sparta’s attitude toward Athens and the fact that Sparta sent envoys to solicit aid from Athens would tend to cast doubt upon the story. Had the Spartans truly agreed to aid the Thasians, inviting Athenian troops into the Peloponnese risked exposure and reprisals. That Athens clearly had no knowledge of the pact and did not learn of it during their expedition to aid the Spartans is evident, since Thucydides states that the Athenians acted in good faith in coming to Sparta’s defense and were offended when sent home. The story also raises the question of how Thucydides learned of the pact if Sparta’s agreement was a secret and the aid was never sent. The story of the pledge is most likely of later origin, created after the outbreak of war between Sparta and Athens as a way to place the blame for hostilities on Sparta.[113] As such it does not provide reliable evidence for dating the earthquake.
There are, however, two other testimonies for the beginning of the war in 464.
Pausanias (4.24.5-7) claimed that the Messenians “rebelled in the seventy-ninth Olympiad, when Xenophon of Corinth was victor, and when Archimedes was archon in Athens.” The seventy-ninth Olympiad would place the revolt in 464, but the archon in Athens for 464/3 was not Archimedes, it was Archedemides. This error in Pausanias‘ account has generally been viewed to be of small consequence, but it casts a date of 464 for the earthquake into further doubt. The second testimony comes from Plutarch’s Cimon (16.4) in which he claims that the earthquake occurred in the fourth year of the reign of king Archidamus, son of Zeuxidmaus. The date of Archidamus’ ascension to the throne has often been reconstructed as 469, upon the death of his grandfather Leotychides II. This dating, however, is a prime example of circular reasoning.
Herodotus (6.72) merely tells us that, at some point, Leotychides II made an expedition against Thessaly, after which he was exiled for accepting a bribe not to conquer the territory. On account of this action, he was tried and went into exile where he died at an unnamed date. In order to calculate the date of Leotychides’ II death scholars have used the date for the earthquake given by Pausanias, 465/4. Thus any information which might be gleaned from Plutarch’s statement is vitiated by the reliance on Pausanias’. In contrast, Diodorus Siculus (11.48) dates the beginning of Archidamus’ reign to the year of the seventy-sixth Olympiad when Phaedon was archon in Athens, that is 476/5. Four years from the beginning of his reign would place the earthquake c. 471 according to Plutarch’s reckoning. This does not conform exactly with the date provided by Diodorus, but it is very close. The weaknesses and errors in the ancient testimonies providing 465/4 as the date of the Spartan earthquake makes the date of 469/8 in accordance with Diodorus and Thucydides preferable.[114]
Sparta was seriously devastated by the earthquake which preceded the rebellion. According to Plutarch (Cim. 16.4) “... the countryside of the Lacedaemonians collapsed into many yawning chasms, caused by an earthquake greater then any in memory and the peaks of Taygetus, shaken, were broken off; and the city itself was completely obliterated except for five houses, but the others were thrown down by the earthquake.”[115] He goes on to relate (Cim. 16.5) that all the ephebes, or young men, of Sparta were killed in the earthquake when the gymnasium collapsed upon them. The death toll must have been extraordinary, and made all the more catastrophic as most of those killed would have been the Spartiates and their families- men who held full Spartan citizenship and formed the ranks of their famed military.[116] These men were exempt from the manual labor required to feed, clothe and house the Spartan population; instead those tasks fell to the Helots, who saw in the earthquake an opportunity not to be missed. Facing a potentially massive uprising, Sparta called in all its favors, appealing to all its allies from the Hellenic League including Athens.[117] And Athens responded.
Thucydides (1.102) records a single expedition sent by Athens to assist Sparta, supposedly because the Athenians were skilled in siege operations. Plutarch records two, one immediately after the earthquake (Cim. 16.7) and the second sent to Mt. Ithome to assist with the siege (Cim. 17.2).[118] The number of expeditions is not important to this study; what is important is that after fighting the Messenians for some time with the aid of the Athenians, the Spartans abruptly dismiss them. According to Thucydides (1.102) the Spartans did this because they were afraid of the Athenians’ “revolutionary character” and alien nature; Plutarch agrees that the Athenians were dismissed because the Spartans viewed them as revolutionaries.[119] Implicit in both accounts is the idea that the Spartans feared their Athenian allies might have a change of sympathies and side with the rebels. What the Spartans said to the Athenians when they packed them off is uncertain. Thucydides claims the Spartans merely said Athens’ services were no longer required (a Laconic statement indeed), while Diodorus (11.64.2) states they were told the Spartans now had sufficient troops for the rest of the campaign from their other allies. Both historians agree that this event offended the Athenians and marked the breaking point of Atheno-Laconian relations. While it could be argued that the Spartans’ abrupt about-face with regard to Athens was prompted by their own guilty conscience over the Thasos affair and concern that Athens might uncover their duplicity —should it actually have occurred— it is not impossible that the Spartans were reading the mood of their allies correctly. Having just fought one war to ensure the independence of the Greeks it must have been distinctly uncomfortable for the Athenians to be constantly reminded that the “slaves” with whom they were engaged were also Greek, and only attempting to secure that same freedom for themselves.[120] Both Cartledge and Ste. Croix recognize this fact. Ste. Croix says:
The ordinary Athenian hoplite, who had a rosy picture of Sparta presented to him by Cimon and his philo-Laconian friends, may well have been shocked when he arrived in Messenia and found that the revolting “slaves” of the Spartans were Greeks, the majority of them Messenians, who had never lost consciousness of the fact that their ancestors had been citizens of the polis of Messene, and were now fighting for their freedom and the right to be ‘the Messenians’ once more.[121]
While Ste. Croix’s assessment is slightly ingenuous— the Athenians must have been aware of the origins of the Helots— it perfectly reflects the probable mind-set of the average Athenian.[122]
The dismissal of the Athenian army had several repercussions, the most immediate being the ostracism of Cimon from Athens. Plutarch (Cim. 17.2) says, “the army came back home enraged, and at once took measures of open hostility against the pro-Spartan people, and above all against Cimon.” With the philo-Laconian element removed the Athenians did not, however, immediately come to the Messenians’ aid.
They were still embroiled in the siege of Thasos, and not yet prepared for an open rift with Sparta. Instead, Athens slowly began to build itself a position of power in Greece. Having first reduced Thasos c. 463, the Athenians exploited Sparta’s ongoing preoccupation with the Messenian revolt by building a new faction for itself among poleis disaffected from Sparta. Athens concluded a three-way alliance with Argos and Thessaly in 462/1.[123]
The benefits of an alliance with Argos need hardly be explained. An ally in the interior, on the very doorstep of Sparta, would certainly give the Lacedaemonians pause before initiating war with Athens, even if Sparta’s own greatly reduced numbers did not.[124] The benefits of an association with Thessaly are slightly more difficult to assess at first. Like Argos, Thessaly had been persona non grata following the Persian Wars for its equivocation and finally collaboration with the Persians. Unlike most of Greece, though, Thessaly is comprised of two large plains perfectly suited for agriculture and pasturage. It is ringed by mountains and accesses the sea at the Gulf of Pegasae. Three ports are known to have existed in antiquity, one in the bay of Volos, another in the bay of Halmyrus and a third, Phalara, near Lamia. The region of Thessaly was divided into four districts, known as tetrades, each represented in a federal government by a tetrarch. In the fifth century, Thessaly began to urbanize quickly and with urbanization came a trend toward democratization.[125]
The spread of democracy would have been of interest to Athens, as the establishment of democracy generally was seen to be a preventative measure against Spartan influence. More important to Athens, most likely, was access to the three Thessalian ports which an alliance would permit. The growth of Athenian hegemony in the Chalcidice brought with it a need for unobstructed sea-lanes between Attica and the north. The trade in agricultural products would certainly have interested Athens as well, since a sufficient grain supply was a perennial concern.[126] The Thessalians were noted cavalrymen and might be able to bring pressure to bear on Thebes, if it became necessary. Given these possibilities, the alliance with Thessaly is more comprehensible.
Not much later, sometime around 460, the polis of Megara deserted the Peloponnesian League and joined Athens’ new anti-Spartan party. Thucydides’ recounting of this event (1.103.4) attributes Megara’s turning-coat to the fact the Corinth had lately been fighting a border war with Megara. Normally, Sparta would have brokered some sort of deal between its two allies to prevent such an event. In this instance, the Spartans were apparently so involved elsewhere that Corinth felt free to attempt its own military solution. Athens’ eagerness to assist Megara against Corinth is easily explained. With Megara in the fold, Athens had a direct route into the Isthmus of Corinth. They could either strike at will, or be content with bottling up all land access to the Peloponnese, leaving virtually any shipping to be done by sea and exposed to the depredations of the Athenian fleet. Megara, lying directly across from the island of Salamis, was also a lucrative trading port and could, moreover, provide a staging point from the Athenian fleet to strike at the coast of the Peloponnese. Lack of support from Sparta led to Megara’s defection to Athens; the defection and Corinth’s response to Athenian interference, were to be the proximate cause of the First Peloponnesian War.[127] Only after the Athenians had welcomed the Megarans into their fold and begun hostilities with Corinth, including a pre-emptive strike on Aegina, would they once more turn to the Messenian question.[128]
Meanwhile, Sparta had finally given up on reducing Ithome and come to terms with the Messenians.[129] A virtual state of stalemate appears to have existed between the Messenians entrenched at Mt. Ithome and Sparta since Athens had been dismissed from that war. After several years of conflict, Sparta reached a compromise in which the rebels agreed to lay down arms and evacuate the Peloponnese with all their dependents on condition that they never return. Should any do so and be caught, they would again be enslaved. The reason given for brokering this deal was an ancient oracle from Delphi ordering the Spartans that they “should let go the suppliant of Zeus Ithomatas.”[130]
When the surrender and resettlement of the Messenians occurred is, as with all matters connected to the Third Messenian War, a matter for debate. Thucydides (1.103.1) says the war lasted for ten years after which the Spartans made the deal to allow the Messenians to leave the Peloponnese unmolested; Diodorus (11.48) as we have seen, states that the war began in 469. The surrender must have happened before 457, because we know in that year the Spartans marched on Phocis.[131] If the Messenian revolt had been so desperate and Spartan numbers so few as to require aid from their allies, it is highly unlikely that the Spartan army would leave the Peloponnese vulnerable to rioting Messenians no matter who was being attacked. This provides a terminus ante quem of 457. Likewise the surrender was probably not before c. 460, when Megara decamped to Athens, unless we are to assume that Sparta had concluded the siege but was simply too absorbed with its own problems to take notice of Corinth’s aggression. So the Messenians at Mt. Ithome most likely surrendered to Sparta and left the Peloponnese sometime between 460 - 457. The next question which must be asked is when, precisely, were the Messenians relocated to Naupactus?
Badian places the settlement of Naupactus after the Battle of Tanagra during the periplous of Tolmides in 456, in accordance with Diodorus’ (11.84) narrative. He argues that the Locrians were attempting to colonize Naupactus after seizing the city, and it was this act which led to Athens’ assault and capture of Naupactus, in their guise as protector of free Greeks.[132] Because the Naupactians were manifestly unable to defend their own city, as shown by the Locrian seizure and settlement of the place, the Athenians took the added measure of resettling Messenian refugees in the city to hold it against the forces of the Peloponnesian League.[133] Cartledge provides a date of c. 460 for the end of the Messenian conflict, but denies that the Messenians could have been resettled in Naupactus by Tolmides in 456. He does not, however, provide the reasoning behind this statement, merely saying “Diodorus is wrong to say (11.48.7) that it was Tolmides who planted the freed Messenian rebels here, at least at this date...”[134] The only date he provides for the resettlement is a terminus ante quem based on an inscription (IG 12 37) dating to c. 450, which he identifies as a possible treaty between the Naupactian Messenians and Athens, stating that the Messenians must have been settled before this date.[135] Given the lack of explanation for Cartledge’s reasoning and the plausibility of Badian’s reconstruction of events, it is more logical to accept Diodorus‘ assertion that the Messenians were relocated in connection with Tolmides‘ periplous of 456.
This presents a problem; where did the Messenians go between the years 460/457 and 456. It would appear that some went to Tegea. Plutarch (Quaes. Gr. 5) preserves a fragment of a treaty referred to by Aristotle:
‘τίνες οἱ παρ᾽ Ἀρκάσι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις χρηστοί;’
Λακεδαιμόνιοι Τεγεάταις διαλλαγέντες ἐποιήσαντο συνθήκας καὶ στήλην ἐπ᾽ Ἀλφειῷκοινὴν ἀνέστησαν, ἐν ᾗ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων γέγραπται ‘Μεσσηνίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας, καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι ‘χρηστοὺς’ ποιεῖν.’ ἐξηγούμενος οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦτό φησιδύνασθαι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτιννύναι βοηθείας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν.
“Who are the good among the Arcadians and the Spartans?”
When the Spartans had come to terms with the Tegeans, they made a treaty and set up in common a stele by the Alpheius, on it, among other things, was inscribed : “The Messenians must be expelled from the country; it is not allowed to make ‘good men’.”Aristotle, then, in explaining this, states that it means that no one shall be killed because of assistance given to the Spartan party in Tegea.
A date for the treaty is not given. Braun argues for a date at the end of the Second Messenian War; he points to Plutarch’s quotation of Aristotle in which the word “χρηστοὺς” had to be glossed because its meaning was no longer certain in this context.[136] It would be quite remarkable, however, given the general state of knowledge (or lack thereof) regarding the history of the Messenian wars that this piece of information should be preserved. Braun does admit the possibility of a date in the mid- fifth century following the earthquake and revolt of the Messenians.[137] The wording of the decree in particular points to a fifth-century context, if Aristotle and Plutarch quoted it correctly, in that Sparta specifies the Messenians should be turned out. Should this decree belong to an earlier period, we would expect to find the Spartans demand that the Helots be turned out, since that is how the Messenians were viewed up until the fifth century. It was only at the end of the Third Messenian war under the terms of the truce that the Spartans were forced to acknowledge the Messenians as an autonomous polity, particularly once they were settled at Naupactus.[138] Tegea was at this time hostile to Sparta, as were many of the Arcadian poleis. Herodotus (9.35.2) tells of how the seer Tisamenus won five battles for Sparta in the fifth century beginning with the battle of Plataea in 479, including battles against the Tegeans and Argives at Tegea, over all the Arcadians at Dipaea and the Messenians at Ithome before ending with the battle of Tanagra against the Athenians in 457. The battle at Tegea, though undated, falls within the period when Athens was building its coalition. It is probable that Tegea and the other Arcadian cities took advantage of the circumstances created by the earthquake and revolt to assert their independence from Spartan hegemony. The danger presented by a hostile Arcadia would require a redistribution of Spartan forces along the frontier and could also have led to the weakness which necessitated Sparta seeking aid from its allies to put down the slave revolt.[139]
A Tegea hostile to Sparta could be expected to receive Messenian rebels warmly. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which, at the conclusion of the Third Messenian War, the Messenians being forced to leave the Peloponnese set course for the Isthmus of Corinth. Upon reaching Arcadia and finding Tegea and the others at odds with Sparta, with backing from Argos (and Athens) no less, they decided to settle for a while. The Tegeans having witnessed the Messenians fight Sparta to a draw certainly would not have turned away such valuable allies. This respite did not last long; Sparta had recovered a portion of its strength and was sending troops into Boeotia to punish Phocis‘ incursions against the Dorians. It is highly likely that the Spartans learned of Messenians in Tegea during this campaign. Sparta’s victory against the Phocians rapidly followed by its defeat of Athens at Tanagra, reasserted Spartan military dominance and placed Tegea in a tenuous position. It is most likely in these circumstances the treaty with Sparta was made.
Though Messenian residency at Tegea was of a short duration, the treaty terms do provide one pertinent piece of information in the second clause quoted by Aristotle, “it is not allowed to make χρηστοί.” The usage of the word χρηστοί in the inscription is unusual. Aristotle clearly thought it was an elliptical way of saying that no one should be killed for being pro-Spartan following the conclusion of the treaty.[140] This usage would be parallel to tombstone inscriptions from around Greece which often bear the inscription “χρηστὴ χαῖρε.”[141] Jacoby found the colloquial usage of this word in a formal treaty to be inconsistent, not to mention that it would require a change of subject from the first clause that is not evident in the text as transcribed. Instead he offered a definition of “to be made useful,” meaning to be made a citizen, in opposition to the usage of ἄχρηστος in a decree from Dreros.[142] In this argument Aristotle copied the inscription correctly, but being unfamiliar with this usage of χρηστὸς, provided an explanation from his own experience. Braun prefers the reading by Aristotle, and argues against Jacoby’s proposal, saying that Jacoby was excluding the information subsequently provided in Plutarch’s Quaestiones Romanae 52. This information does not effectively change the reading of the inscription, though, because it merely clarifies Aristotle’s interpretation, rather than providing any further clues from the actual inscription. That Aristotle felt the need to gloss the usage of χρηστοὺς in the decree shows that there was some ambiguity in the meaning of the word for fourth-century readers of the inscription. If the purpose of the treaty was to clearly state the terms of the alliance, why wouldn’t the Spartans or Tegeans simply state “no one shall be killed?” Why use a euphemism for the dead? If, however, the usage was a formalized, archaic expression similar to that in the Dreros inscription, there is every reason why Aristotle would be confused and feel the need to explain it. Furthermore, the proposition that Tegea might offer citizenship to the Messenians who possessed no polis of their own and had not for centuries, is perfectly in accord with methods seen throughout Greece for incorporating refugees into a new civic body, despite Braun’s protestations.[143] Accepting Jacoby’s proposition gives us some insight into the Messenians’ stopover in Tegea. For instance, why should the Spartans have felt it necessary to prohibit the Messenians’ enfranchisement? We believe it was to prevent the Tegeans from circumventing the first clause of the treaty. If enfranchised by the Tegeans, the Messenians could, in a way, cease to be Messenian and therefore legally remain in Tegea.[144] Unfortunately for the Messenians, with the defeat of Athens and its allies in Boeotia, the Tegeans no longer felt secure enough to provide them with safe harbor. The Messenians were once again put out on the road; this time Athens stepped in.
Athens’ reception of the Messenians was not a humanitarian act. Thucydides (1.103.3) says, “and they [the Messenians] went out with their children and wives, and the Athenians, receiving them on account of their hatred now for the Lacedaemonians, settled them in Naupactus, which they happened to have seized recently from the Ozoloian Locrians.”[145] This is clearly not an altruistic act on the part of Athens. Ever since its dismissal by the Spartans, and the ostracism of Cimon, Athens had openly pursued a policy to become the pre-eminent power in Greece. The alliances with Argos and Thessaly were strategic moves aimed at providing Athens with allies who could threaten the ambitions of its three main rivals—Sparta, Corinth and Thebes. Located in the heart of the Peloponnese, Argos had nursed a deep and abiding hatred of Spartan hegemony ever since the sixth century when the Argives suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of Sparta at Sepeia.[146] They never joined the Peloponnesian League, the only Peloponnesian polis outside Achaea not to do so. The Athenian alliance was merely a new twist to an old tale, providing Argos with the opportunity to regain an edge over the Spartans. From the Athenian perspective, the alliance was incredibly unorthodox. Athens had steadfastly and loudly refused to ally itself with any city which had “Medized” during the war; this was even one of Athens’ overt reasons for conflict with Thebes. To suddenly propose such an association with Argos (regardless of the Argives’ reasons for not participating in the war) was nothing short of confounding. Perhaps no other act might have brought home how far Athens had become estranged from its sometime ally Sparta.
Athens was now clearly pursuing a policy of isolation and containment towards its enemies and consolidating her hold on all roads leading into Attica. When Sparta marched into Boeotia and attacked Phocis in 457, Athens quickly responded to prevent the Lacedaemonians from gaining a foothold outside the Peloponnese. Fielding their entire army and an Argive contingent, Athens met the Spartans at Tanagra and suffered a costly defeat. Undeterred, the Athenians waited a few months for the Spartans to return to the Peloponnese and then retook Boeotia and Phocis (Thuc. 1.108). Not long after the Aeginetans, whom Athens had attacked at the beginning of the First Peloponnesian War in 460, finally surrendered, leaving Athens with a virtually unfettered hand everywhere south of Thebes and east of the isthmus of Corinth. The Athenians could now turn their attention to neutralizing Corinth and the newly expelled Messenians provided an opportunity.
The Athenians’ sudden change of heart regarding the Messenians is perplexing. It is too easy to claim that they aided the refugees only because they now were at war with Sparta and other members of the Peloponnesian League. There had to have been a rationalization as to why the Athenians could now give aid to people who, in the guise of slaves, they had fought against at Mt. Ithome. A shift had occurred in how the Athenians viewed the rebels. During the early stages of the uprising, Thucydides clearly stated that the rebels were comprised not only of Helots, some of whom were the descendants of the conquered Messenians, but also of certain perioikoi. The transition from Helot to Messenian happens once the rebels are entrenched at Mt. Ithome. Ithome had strong associations with the Messenians from the Second Messenian War against Sparta.[147] Choosing this site was not only a strategic decision but a propagandistic one. By fortifying Ithome, the rebels were placing themselves in the tradition of all the Messenians who had fought Sparta in the past. By assuming the mantle of Messenian identity the rebels were advertising themselves as the inheritors of the Messenian nation, a distinct political and social group unfairly subjected and once more seeking to claim their birthright, not as hereditary slaves of Sparta. No longer bound by alliance with Sparta, Athens could reassess the status of the rebels. By accepting the rebels self-identification as Messenians, Athens was not meddling in Sparta’s internal affairs or promoting slave revolt by resettling the Messenians. Rather, Athens was acting consistently with her policy of ensuring the independence of all Greek polities. This re-evaluation is undoubtedly why Athens changed its policy toward the Messenians.
This is not to say that Athens’ new policy toward the Messenians was purely the result of realizing they weren’t the bad guys Sparta made them out to be. The Athenians had a clear objective in helping the refugees and that objective was to cut Sparta off from Corinth. The city of Naupactus on the Corinthian gulf provided a perfect base from which to blockade Corinthian naval activities, but the denizens of the city had once already proven to be ineffective in combating Peloponnesian forces.
Stationing a large contingent of Athenian troops on the site was not a tenable solution; it would only appear that Athens had colonized the city rather than the Locrians. Instead, the Athenians brokered a deal wherein the Messenian refugees, newly evicted from Tegea, might be welcomed into the city. That such a deal existed is attested by two inscriptions. The first is a fragmentary inscription (SEG 51.642) of an oath sworn to by the Messenians, Locrians and a third group whose name has been mostly lost.
The deity overseeing the oath, and to whom indemnities were to be paid for the breaking of it was Athena Polias. This coupled with certain ionizing elements in the inscription and its generally high-quality point to Athens as also being a party to the oath. No doubt the first part of the oath which has been lost laid out the terms upon which the Messenians were to cohabit with the Naupactians.[148] The inclusion of a fine payable to “the tax-collectors” for violation of the oath might suggest a joint government administered by both Messenians and Naupactians and to whom both were subject. The second inscription is a thank-offering (IG IX.12 3, 656) erected at Olympia sometime between 425-421.
Μεσσάνιοι καὶ Ναυπάκτιοι ἀνέθεν Διὶ Ὀλυμπίωι δεκάταν ἀπὸ τῶμ πολεμίων. Παιώνιος ἐποίησε Μενδαῖος, καὶ τἀκρωτήρια ποιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ναὸν ἐνίκα.
The Messenians and Naupactians dedicated to Olympian Zeus one-tenth from the enemy. Paionios the Mendian made it, and he won [the competition] for creating the acroteria on the temple.
The dedicants of the offering were “The Messenians and the Naupactians” indicating two distinct groups who were not only living alongside each other, but were actively engaging in military operations together.[149] An arrangement of this nature brings to mind instances of co-colonization, where two poleis would jointly found a new city.[150] Certainly, when the Opuntian Locrians attempted to colonize Naupactus after capturing it (Thuc. 1.103.3), no provision was made in the colonization decree (GHI no. 20) for the pre-existing population. The tact shown in creating a joint settlement agreement between the Messenians and the Naupactians is most likely the reason why we later find the two groups fighting together on behalf of Athens in the Peloponnesian War— the Messenians had cause to be grateful for receiving a home and citizenship in a new polis, while the Naupactians had reason to be grateful in that they were not disenfranchised with the arrival of the Messenians, but incorporated into a single civic body.
Though Athens did what it could to smooth over relations between the Messenians and Naupactians, it was not necessarily out of concern for the refugees. A resentful Naupactian populace could have provided Sparta and Corinth the means with which to unseat the refugees and retake the city for the Peloponnesian League. An accord between the Messenians and Naupactians benefitted the Athenians by consolidating the position of their new allies and ensuring that their newly won naval base was safe from Spartan influence. The Athenian decision to assist the Messenians in resettling at Naupactus was predominantly a military strategy aimed at neutralizing the Corinthian fleet and providing a base of operations in the Corinthian Gulf without over-extending Athens’s own resources.
The experience and reaction of the Messenian refugees is less clear. That even a small group of Messenians had remained in the Peloponnese at Tegea in defiance of the re-enslavement clause of the cease-fire leads one to the conclusion that the refugees were not entirely defeated or demoralized. As well, the treaty between Sparta and Tegea would seem to indicate that someone had considered enfranchising the Messenians at Tegea, otherwise there would be no need to insert a clause forbidding it. These two facts suggest that the Messenians were ready and willing to continue their struggle against Sparta and perhaps attempt to make a home for themselves in the Peloponnese. The capitulation of the Tegeans to Sparta, however, negated this possibility and forced the Messenians to accept aid from Athens.
Life for the Messenians in Naupactus, from the little evidence preserved, shows the Messenians working together with the original population of the town as equals; even more so than the Plataeans in Athens during the fifth century. Joint dedications were made on at least two occasions by the Messenians and Naupactians. What is more, although the Messenians did act as Athens‘ ally during the Peloponnesian War, most famously at Sphacteria, and allowing the Athenians use of a naval base at Naupactus, the campaigns for which the Messenians and Naupactians made their dedications were not connected to Athens at all, but a private venture of the two groups. These actions show the degree of acceptance of the Messenians by the Naupactians; even so the two groups clearly considered themselves to be discrete populations as indicated by their continued use of their ethnics.
