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WHILE THE PLATAEANS, Messenians and Olynthians are three of the best documented cases of refugees in ancient Greece, they were by no means the only displaced peoples during the fifth and fourth centuries. Nor was Athens the only polis which received and assisted refugees, though it may have done so more frequently than other cities. As we have seen, the Messenians were sheltered for a time by the polis of Tegea, before being resettled by Athens. Tirynthian refugees were welcomed by the town of Halieis after the destruction of their own city. Even Sparta, renowned for its xenophobia, aided refugees from the island of Aegina following their expulsion at the hands of Athens. These resettlements are similar to the examples we have already examined with two prominent exceptions: these refugees, like the Messenians, never seem to have taken up residence in the polis facilitating their resettlement, and the refugees never appear to have been recipients of any form of citizenship or isoteleis.
The arrival of Tirynthian refugees at Halieis coincides with the events resulting in the Messenians taking up residence at Naupactus and mirrors that of the Messenians in many respects. The cause of the Tirynthians’ expulsion appears to lie in circumstances caused by Argos’ defeat by Sparta at Sepeia at the beginning of the fifth century. As was mentioned above in Chapter Two, this defeat and its resultant loss of life among the Argives were cited as their reasons for not participating in the Persian wars. In fact, the death toll was so high that, according to Herodotus (6.83), the Argives were forced to hand over their affairs of state to their “douloi” until the male children of the dead citizens came of age. At that time, the adult children took back control of the state and expelled the douloi who made for Tiryns and captured that city. The identity of these douloi has been debated for some years. The word means “slaves,” however, both Aristotle (Pol. 1303a 6) and Plutarch (Moralia 245F) call these men “periokoi,” those who lived in the outlying communities of Argos. The arrival of the so-called douloi at Tiryns was not an immediate impetus for the original inhabitants to leave the town, which one might expect if the town had indeed been captured by slaves. Yet Herodotus explicitly states that the town was seized by the douloi, not an action one would expect, should the group have been composed of perioikoi, some of whom might even have lived in the area prior to taking up affairs in Argos. If the douloi were truly perioikoi as Aristotle and Plutarch say, one would expect them to simply resettle in their original homes and surrounding countryside rather than to violently attack their former friends and neighbors. In such a circumstance, perhaps Herodotus should be read to mean that they seized control of Tiryns from Argos, that is, they declared themselves no longer dependent upon Argos, but a free-standing polis. This interpretation also explains why Tiryns abruptly initiated hostilities with Argos resulting in a long drawn out war which the Argives barely won.[227] This war resulted in the flight of the Tirynthians to Halieis.
The ancient site of Halieis is located on Porto Kheli Bay, along the western coast of the Southern Argolid, in a region known as the Acte. This area, separated from the rest of the Argolid by mountains, turned toward the sea early on, forging commercial, cultural and religious ties with the other port cities throughout mainland Greece. In the Archaic period, Hermione, the principal city of the Acte, joined with Nauplia, Prasiae across the Argolic Gulf, Epidauros, Aegina, Athens and Orchomenus in Boeotia to form the Calaureian amphictyony.[228] This loose alliance was centered on a cult of Poseidon on the island of Calaureia and, no doubt, reflected the major trade contacts for the Acte.[229] As Sparta and Argos became more and more prominent in the region, this change was reflected in the membership of the amphictyony whereby Sparta replaced Prasiae and Argos replaced Nauplia, each city having fallen under the other’s respective hegemony.
During the Archaic period, Halieis was a minor settlement, perhaps not yet a full-fledged polis. Though sporadic occupation of the site can be dated back to the Late Neolithic period, the first firm evidence for a polis on the site of Halieis only appears in the late seventh or early sixth century B. C., when defensive walls were built around the acropolis.[230] In the same period, a major sanctuary of Apollo boasting two separate temples was built just outside the city walls.[231] Despite this evidence, it is clear that Halieis was largely at the mercy of its more powerful neighbors. As the struggle between Argos and Sparta to be the pre-eminent city of the Peloponnese expanded, Sparta pushed into the Acte and occupied Halieis’ acropolis. Significant quantities of Laconian everyday ceramics dating to 590-580 have been excavated in the destruction layer of the acropolis’ sixth-century fortifications, indicating a Spartan garrison on the site. Excavators have argued that this destruction came at the hands of Argos, who exercised hegemony over the area at that time. The Argives’ destruction of Halieis’ acropolis would have been an attempt to prevent further Spartan encroachment upon their territory. The attempt proved futile when Argos was defeated by Sparta in 546 following the Battle of Champions and its aftermath.[232] From that date, the southern Argolid looked toward Sparta; Laconian influence is prominent in the Acte during the sixth and fifth centuries, as expressed by the use of a Laconian-style alphabet.[233]
The change in ownership, as it were, had very little effect upon Halieis. The town’s fortifications were not rebuilt after their destruction by Argos in the sixth century and Halieis is glaringly absent from the list of cities which participated in the Persian Wars. Jameson believed that this was because Halieis’ contribution was either too small to be of account or because the city was dependent upon another polis, either Hermion or Sparta.[234] While both suggestions are viable, the latter seems more likely, given Halieis’ history up to that time.
Halieis is not mentioned in Herodotus’ account of the Persian Wars, but the city once again became the pawn of greater powers in the aftermath. The sharp reversal of fortunes experienced by Sparta following the earthquake and Messenian revolt, however, had severe consequences for the polis. The arrival of the Tirynthians at Halieis can be dated sometime in the second quarter of the fifth century, at which time the Argive alphabet used by the Tirynthians first appears on the acropolis.[235] This date would place the expulsion of the Tirynthians from their home just before the earthquake in Sparta. According to Pausanias (2.25.8), following the capture of Tiryns by Argos, a portion of the population was taken as prisoners of war and moved to Argos; another group, according to Strabo (8.6.11), managed to escape and relocated to the city of Halieis. Although Strabo does not mention it, there is every reason to believe that the Spartans had a hand in the resettlement of the Tirythians at Halieis.[236] Sparta and Argos had historically vied for control of the Acte; because Argos chose to remain neutral in the Persian Wars, the participation of her allies Mycenae and Tiryns independently and alongside Sparta would have been viewed as a direct challenge to Argos’ control of the Argolid. Subsequently, it was necessary for the Argives to re-establish control over the region, which they did by destroying Tiryns and Mycenae.
The destruction of Tiryns and flight of its refugees, coming as it did before the earthquake, ironically gave Sparta the opportunity to solidify control over the Southern Argolid by facilitating the relocation of the refugees at Halieis. This assistance might be hinted at in Thucydides (1.105.1), when he mentions a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians, both Spartan allies, present at Halieis c. 460/59.[237] A sequence of events can be constructed in which Sparta, following the destruction of Tiryns c. 470, assisted some of the refugees by offering them sanctuary in the town of Halieis. This act of beneficence provided Sparta with a crucial ally and military force in the Acte on a site boasting a harbor through which Sparta could maintain contact and supply additional troops. The occurrence of the earthquake in 469/68 threw a wrench into the plan, however, forcing Sparta to either abandon the enterprise or hand over its management to allies— that is the Corinthians and Epidaurians.
The outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War once again endangered Halieis. When the Tirynthians arrived at Halieis, Athens and Sparta were still allies, and Athens took little notice of the refugees’ relocation. Once the alliance was broken and Athens came into conflict with Corinth, the situation changed. By 460/59, Athens had already reduced Thasos, concluded its three-way pact with Argos and Thessaly, welcomed Megara into the fold and begun the siege of Aegina. A Corinthian presence at Halieis might well have been sufficient cause to attack that city, but it can hardly be imagined that the Argives didn’t have a hand in the affair either; at the very least, they probably were pressuring their new ally to help remove a credible threat to the Argeia. The acquisition of Halieis coincided with Athens‘ strategy of isolating its enemies and securing ports around the Aegean from which it could expand its naval empire. The Athenians might even have considered the campaign one of minimal risk, since the fortifications of the town had still not yet been fully repaired following their destruction in the sixth century, leading Athens to acquiesce to Argos’ request.[238]
The outcome of this expedition was not a happy one for the Athenians. Thucydides (1.105.1) tells that the Athenians met the Peloponnesian force and were defeated. A greave (SEG 42.383) taken from the Athenians and dedicated at Olympia by the Sicyonians is generally believed to be from this battle. Though it is odd that Thucydides does not mention the presence of the Sicyonians, it is not entirely surprising. Athens’ main quarrel in this war was with Corinth, because of Megara.
Epidaurus, meanwhile, was the metropolis of Aegina in addition to being something of a maritime power itself, both points which would have brought the city into conflict with Athens. By comparison, Sicyon was relatively unimportant and its participation would not have garnered much attention.
Diodorus Siculus (11.78.2) provides another account of an Athenian attack on Halieis. He says that the Athenians attacked Halieis and “destroyed not a few of the enemy” after which they proceeded to Cecryphalia where they “won again.” This description of Athens‘ expedition against Halieis has generally been taken to be the same as that narrated by Thucydides, leaving modern scholars perplexed as to what precisely occurred. Based on the archaeology of the site, however, Jameson suggested that Diodorus’ account fits better with evidence for a battle that resulted in the destruction of Halieis’ acropolis c. 450.[239] There is no discussion in Thucydides of a second attack on Halieis by Athens, but Herodotus (7.137.2) does mention that a Spartan by the name of Aneristus orchestrated a successful infiltration and capture of the city. This event must have taken place sometime before 446/5 when the Thirty Years’ peace was signed and Halieis would have been returned under the terms of the treaty along with Troezen (which is specifically mentioned) and the other cities which Athens had captured. It is very possible that the raid occurred in 447/6 following Athens‘ defeat in Boeotia and during the revolt of Euboea and Megara. Athenian troops would have been badly needed on the northern front, perhaps causing them to strip forces from less important sites, such as Halieis. At the same time, Peloponnesian forces were harassing Thria and Eleusis (Thuc. 1.113-114) focusing Athenian attention on its own coastline and providing Aneristus with his opportunity. Halieis is conclusively back in Spartan allied hands by c. 430, when Thucydides (2.56.5) lists Halieis among the cities whose territories were destroyed by Athens in its coastal raids. Taking the historical and archaeological evidence, together the chronology of Tirynthian settlement can be reconstructed as follows:
c. 470 Tirynthians expelled from Tiryns; resettled at Halieis.[240]
469/8 Spartan Earthquake and Messenian Revolt.[241]
Settlement of Tirynthians handed over to allies.
460 Megara deserts the Peloponnesian League; allies with Athens First Peloponnesian War begins.
460/59 First Athenian attack on Halieis; repulsed by combined Peloponnesian force of Corinthians, Epidaurians and Sicyonians.
c. 450 Second Athenian attack on Halieis; acropolis destroyed and city captured.[242]
c. 447/6 Aneristus re-captures Halieis. 446/5 Thirty Years Peace.
c. 430 Athens raids coast of Acte, including Halieis.
If the goal of resettling the Tirynthians at Halieis was to provide Sparta with a military advantage in the Southern Argolid, the maneuver was only partially successful. While the group of refugees did provide a buffer against Argos for approximately a decade, the Athenian attacks in 460/59 and again in c. 450, when the acropolis was destroyed and city captured, required an expenditure of troops by Sparta and the Peloponnesian League that they could ill afford.[243] In the end, an alliance with Sparta proved untenable for Halieis; the townspeople either chose or were forced to sign a treaty with Athens (IG I3 75) in 424 wherein they provided Athens access to their harbor and space for a garrison in the town.
Although Sparta may not have gotten what it wanted from the resettlement, for the Tirynthians, the outcome seems to have been rather brighter. They had a new home in which they quickly became the dominant faction of the community; the town became known as “Ἀλιεῖς οἱ ἐκ Τίρυνθος” - “Halieis the Tirynthian [settlement]” (Hdt. 7.137.2). A new mint was opened in the lower town sometime at the end of the 5th century or beginning of the 4th, from which the Halieians began issuing their own coinage bearing the symbolic palm tree of Tiryns and the legend ΤΙΡΥΝ or ΤΙΡΥΝΘΙΟΝ on the reverse, with the head of Apollo, the patron god of Halieis, on the obverse.[244] The religious life of the city was permeated, if not outright co-opted, by the Tirynthians who made costly new modifications to the extra-mural sanctuary of Apollo.[245] New column bases were given to the temple as well as a new lock and possibly doors.[246] The keys for the new temple, bearing the name of the god, and a bronze plaque excavated inside the temple both are inscribed with the Argive alphabet used at Tiryns.[247] Moreover, votive offerings excavated from a shrine on the acropolis included terra cotta figurines bearing a remarkable resemblance to ones dedicated to Hera at Tiryns.[248]
The resettlement of the Tirynthians at Halieis was learning experience for Sparta. Like the three Athenian resettlements of refugees already discussed, the Spartans followed a pattern of using refugees as buffers and weapons against hostile powers. Sparta’s long contention with Argos for primacy in the southern Argolid informed Sparta’s decision to welcome the Tirynthians who had been displaced by Argos. The strategic placement of the refugees at Halieis is also consistent with the policy adopted by Athens in the fifth century. The experiment was unfortunately cut short by the earthquake of 469/8 which sapped Spartan resources forcing the polis leave final provisioning of the refugees to its allies. It is an open question whether the polis’ acropolis would have been destroyed and the city captured in c. 450 if Sparta had been able to properly support the city from the beginning.
What makes the Tirynthians unique among the groups of refugees so far examined is the manner in which they came to dominant the culture of Halieis so completely. The closest parallel to this effect would the case of the Messenians at Naupactus, but even their relationship is one of partnership whereas at Halieis the Tirynthians are clearly the ascendant group. The Tirynthians offer an example in which it is not the refugees who have acculturated but the host population. No doubt it was just such an event that Athens wished to avoid when it resettled the Plataeans, Messenians and Olynthians on the fringes of Athenian territory.
Some thirty years later c. 431, Sparta would again actively assist a group of refugees, this time from Aegina. The Aeginetans became refugees after being forced from their island by Athens. Athens and Aegina had been enemies at least since the sixth century, a state of affairs caused in part by economic rivalry between the two poleis. In the eighth and most of the seventh centuries, Aegina was politically oriented toward Argos and participated in the Calaurian Amphictyony.[249] Some time in the late seventh century the island came under the control of Epidaurus for a period, before violently asserting its independence at an unknown date in the Archaic period.[250] Just before the first Persian War, some Aeginetans joined the Spartan army against Aegina’s former hegemon Argos at the battle of Sepeia. Though the Argives were defeated,
Aegina appears to have once more come under their control because Herodotus (6.92.1-2) mentions a fine levied against the islanders for participating in the battle.[251] It is possible that the Spartans, having neutralized Argos, followed their established pattern of withdrawing home, leaving the Aeginetans exposed.
At the beginning of the Persian Wars, before Marathon, the Aeginetans declared themselves for Darius, sending the symbolic gifts of earth and water, according to Herodotus (6.49.1, 6.73.2). But they were prevented from actively helping the Persians when, at Athens’ insistence, the Spartan king Cleomenes mounted a punitive expedition against the island, during which he took hostages to ensure Aegina’s neutrality.[252] The hostages taken were the ten wealthiest and most influential Aeginetan aristocrats; they were not kept by the Spartans, but handed over to Athens for safe-keeping. This event proved to be the spark which ignited the animosity between Athens and Aegina in the fifth century. Upon the death of Cleomenes, Athens refused to return the hostages to his co-king Leotychides. In retaliation, the Aeginetans seized a group of Athenians during a festival at Sunium; rather than attempt a direct attack to regain these new hostages, Athens stirred up civil war in Aegina (Hdt. 6.86-88). With the backing of Athens, the pro-Athenian demagogue Nicodromus attempted to overthrow the Aeginetan ruling party and establish a democracy in its place; the revolt failed when Athenian support troops were delayed by the weather. The revolt was brutally suppressed by the city’s oligarchy with only a few of its adherents escaping to seek political asylum in Athens.[253]
Hostilities between Athens and Aegina continued up to the second Persian War; in fact, Herodotus (7.144) claims that at least 200 ships of the Athenian fleet which fought Xerxes were actually commissioned for the on-going war with Aegina. These and all other hostilities between non-Medizing Greek states were set aside, however, following the invasion of Xerxes (Hdt. 7.145). Aegina joined the Hellenic league, voluntarily this time, perhaps persuaded by the Greek success against Darius or maybe to avoid another visit from the Spartans. Regardless of the reason, once pledged, the Aeginetans proved loyal to the cause. When Athens was forced to evacuate before Xerxes’ on-coming army, Aegina hosted some of the Athenian non-combatants, while the men of military age reported to Salamis.[254] The apparent threat from Xerxes must indeed have been great for any Athenian to seek refuge on an island that, until recently, its forces had been building ships to attack.[255]
Once the immediate crisis was over and the Persians had been expelled from Greece, Aegina reverted to its ancient antipathy toward Athens. The islanders did not join the Delian League and it was an Aeginetan, Polyarchus, who subsequently reported to Sparta that Athens was rebuilding its walls in contravention of the agreement made at the end of the Persian Wars (Plut. Them. 19.2). Although not a member of the Peloponnesian League, Aegina appears to have drifted into closer relations with Sparta, as opposed to Argos, following the Persian Wars. It may have been a practical consideration, given Argos’ supposed weakness during this period as it recovered from the disaster at Sepeia. Despite not being a member in either the Peloponnesian or Delian Leagues, the Aeginetans didn’t sit quietly at home minding their own business; they were among the allies who responded to Sparta’s call for help during the Messenian revolt (Thuc. 2.27.2). It was in repayment for this aid, according to Thucydides, that Sparta later took on the responsibility of resettling the Aeginetan refugees during the main Peloponnesian War.
Aegina’s participation in the First Peloponnesian War was minimal. Besieged by Athens in 458, the island was captured a year later. The Aeginetans were forced to pull down their walls, relinquish their navy and become tributaries of Athens (Thuc. 1.108). From that time until the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Aegina was under the control of Athens. A number of the exiled democrats returned to Aegina and founded a cult of Athena Polias (IG IV 29-32); Aegina also appears in the tribute lists a number of times between 454 and 431.[256] This apparent acceptance of Athenian hegemony did not mollify Athens. When Thebes initiated the Peloponnesian War by its attack on Plataea in 431, Athens’ second order of business, after evacuating its allies, was to expel the Aeginetans from their island. A number of the refugees fled to Cydonia, but others were received by Sparta and settled in Thyreatis (Thuc. 2.27.2) an area of land which had been disputed by Sparta and Argos going back at least to the sixth century.[257] Figueira argues that the language used by Thucydides in discussing the grant of the Thyreatis to the Aeginetans indicates that they were given perioecic status.[258] This arrangement appears very similar to that of the Plataeans with Athens and the Chalcidians on Myrina. The non-combatant Aeginetans were settled by Sparta in the town of Thyrea after which their military contingents served alongside the Peloponnesian forces. When the Athenians began raiding the Peloponnesian coast in 424, Thucydides observes that an Aeginetan force was busy building a fort alongside a Spartan garrison.
The refugees in Thyrea also appear to have been contributing to the war effort. A fragmentary inscription from Sparta (Meiggs and Lewis 67) records donations to the Spartan war fund. Among the donations is one from the Aeginetans totaling 10 mnai, 10 staters. The other donors listed on the inscription include Chians, Ephesians and Melians. The inscription has been variously dated to 427 (soon after the Aeginetans settled at Thyrea),[259] to just before the end of the Peloponnesian war in c. 405, or even to 396/5 during the Corinthian War.[260] A date in the later half of the 5th century would make the most sense given the combination of donations from Chians, Ephesians and Melians on the inscription. Chios and Ephesus did not join the Peloponnesian side until very late; Chios revolted from Athens in 412 and Ephesus joined the Spartans no later than 407 when the Spartan commander Lysander established a naval base there. These dates would tend to lend weight to a date of c. 405 for the inscription, however, the inclusion of a Melian contingent presents some difficulty because Melos was supposed to have been captured, exposed to andropodismos and the women and children sold into slavery during the campaign of 415. Given this testimony, there can be only two possible explanations. The inscription either belongs to c. 427 before Athens’ destruction of Thyrea and Melos, in which case the donations made by Chios and Ephesus would have to be private contributions by pro-Spartan elements in the cities, or the inscription does indeed belong to c. 405 after Ephesus’ conversion to Sparta, forcing us to assume that the Melians mentioned were refugee survivors of their city’s destruction.[261] The former seems to me to be the more likely. Private donations from Chios and Ephesus are not improbable, though it would be difficult for anyone to convey such funds to the Spartans while still allied with Athens and under the watchful eye of its navy, but not impossible. Donations to the war fund from pro-Spartan factions in Melos c. 427 might have been one of the first signs of trouble brewing between that island and Athens, trouble that ended in the destruction of the polis. Furthermore, Figueira discards the fourth-century date, citing the smallness of the donation from the Aeginetans.[262] He connects the collection of the donations with the campaign of Alcidas, a reasonable supposition in our collective opinion.[263]
The Aeginetans were not safe from Athens’ forces in the Thyreatis. Thucydides (4.57) records an Athenian attack made on Thyrea in 424; he states that the Athenians razed the city and those Aeginetans who were not killed, were taken prisoner and later executed.[264] This would seem to imply that the Aeginetan refugees were annihilated, but we know from Xenophon (Hell. 2.2.9) and Plutarch (Lys. 14.3) that Aeginetans were repatriated by Lysander at the end of the war. These statements indicate that the refugees had not all been killed. In fact it appears there was more than one Aeginetan settlement in the Thyreatis. Pausanias (2.38.5-6) mentions a town he calls Athene, near Eua and Neris in the Thyreatis, which was once inhabited by Aeginetans. This town has been equated with the polis of Anthene mentioned in Thucydides (5.41.2) that was part of negotiations between Sparta and Argos in 416.[265] Anthene is not discussed by Thucydides in his narrative of Aeginetan resettlement leading scholars to the conclusion that the survivors of Thyrea’s destruction moved inland following Thyrea’s destruction and settled at Anthene.[266] Evacuating the remaining Aeginetans inland would be a logical course of action paralleling the evacuation of the Olynthian coastal villages in 432 when threatened by Athenian troops. Additionally a second settlement of Aeginetan refugees outside Thyrea would explain who precisely Lysander repatriated.
The Aeginetans were able to reclaim their island at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Both Xenophon (Hell. 2.2.9) and Plutarch (Lys. 14.3) tell us that Lysander was responsible for returning the Aeginetans to their polis. During the Aeginetans’ sojourn in the Peloponnese the Spartans employed a policy toward the refugees similar to that of the Athenians toward the Messenians and Chalcidians in Myrina. The refugees were granted land and perioecic status in exchange for their service in the war and acting as a buffer between Argos and Sparta. The war fund inscription illustrates how deeply the Aeginetans felt their debt to Sparta by contributing money to the military effort at a time when they were experiencing a precarious financial situation. Like the Plataeans, the Aeginetans required the intervention of an ally, Lysander, to secure their repatriation.
Sparta’s treatment of the Aeginetans exhibits similar characteristics to its treatment of the Tirynthians. Although it is unclear whether Sparta provided the Tirynthians with assitance during their move to Halieis, Spartan assistance to the Aeginetans is almost certain. Like the Tirynthians, Sparta made the effort to see that the refugees were fortified in their new home, but, also like the Tiynthian case, when threatened the Spartans preferred to conserve their own resources and troops rather than to render aid to the refugees. The placement of the Aeginetans in the Thyreatis— an area whose ownership had been disputed by Sparta and Argos for years, located along the eastern coast of the Peloponnese and between Sparta and Athens— also demonstrates Sparta’s intention that the refugees serves as a buffer against its enemies.
One noticeable difference between the two instances is that eventually Sparta repatriated the Aeginetans which they did not do for the Tirynthians. Why this should be so is unclear. Perhaps whatever forces led to the abandonment of Halieis in the fourth century forestalled any attempt at repatriation.[267] On the other hand, the Tirynthians might have become so integrated in the culture and society of Halieis, as exhibited by the material culture, that there no longer existed any impetus to reclaim their ancestral home. In either case, the Spartan attitude toward the Aeginetans is another example of its general hands-off policy once refugees are resettled.
In the fourth century, the Samians became refugees at the hands of the Athenians. Originally an ally of Athens, and one of the autonomous founding members of the Delian League (Hdt. 9.106.4), Samos revolted against Athens in 441/0 after Athens interfered in the Samian feud with Miletos (Thuc. I.115.4-117.3). The Samians were defeated and forced to make amends by destroying their walls and surrendering their fleet, in addition to paying a large fine (IG I3 48). From this time, until the last decade of the Peloponnesian War, Samos was effectively a tributary state of Athens, despite an abortive revolt staged by oligarchic families in 412 (Thuc. 8.21). In reward for staving off the revolt, Athens returned Samos’ autonomy and, in 405 following the mass murder of several oligarchic leaders in the city, Athens conferred citizenship upon the Samians (IG I3 127.11-18).[268] With Sparta’s victory in the Peloponnesian War, an oligarchy favorable to Sparta was once more established on Samos and the pro-Athenian democrats were exiled. Samos briefly broke with Sparta in 394, following the Persian victory at Cnidus (Paus. 6.3.16)— led by none other than the Athenian general Conon— but was once more under Spartan hegemony by 391 (Diod. 14.97.3). Samos became independent again under the terms of the King’s Peace in 387/6, if not before, though Isocrates (4.163) at least feared the island was leaning toward Persian sympathies. This state of affairs persisted until 366/5 when a Persian garrison suddenly appears on the island under the command of Cyprothemis a junior officer to Tigranes (Dem. 15.9).[269] Athens, busily building its second empire, launched a siege against Samos led by Conon’s son, Timotheus. While the siege itself was somewhat justifiable, in that the Athenians were attacking a Persian garrison on the island, the outcome was not. After ten months the island was reduced (Isoc. 15.11; Dem. 15.9). In order to consolidate its gains, Athens expelled the Samians c. 366/65 and established a cleruchy, in much the same manner as it had once treated the Aeginetans (Diod. 18.18.9; IG XII.6 42.10-30).
The Athenian cleruchy lasted until 321 when Perdiccas evicted the Athenians and restored the Samian refugees (Diod. 18.18.9, Diog. Laert. 10.1). Unfortunately for the Samians, no one appears to have offered sanctuary to the fleeing population as a whole, although considerable sympathy was felt for the refugees, even in Athens (Arist. Rhet. 1384 b 32-5).[270] A few inscriptions testify to the Samians in exile. Three men made a dedication in Delphi (SIG3 239 C III lines 33-9) in the year 363, each employing the ethnic Σάμιος. Since the Athenian cleruchs were still Athenian citizens and employing their own demotics even while resident on Samos, we can be reasonably sure that these three men were actual refugees. In a rather bizarre turn, a Samian named Meidon was enrolled as a metic in the Piraeus (IG 22 1628 ln. 859). What series of events could have led a Samian refugee to settle in the port of Athens, the city which had dispossessed his people? Similarly, a fellow by the name of Archias is found selling timber in Eleusis around 329/8 (IG 22 1672 ln. 62-5, 93-4). In a series of honorary inscriptions, passed after the return of the refugees, various persons are commended for their efforts to aid the fleeing demos. From Iasos the brothers Gorgus and Mineon are honored with citizenship for their actions (IG XII.6 17); on Rhodes Acamas, son of Damonicus, was of aid to some refugees (IG XII.6 149), and the sons of Minion from Ephesus, Coees and Leontiscus (IG XII.6 39). The refugees might even have made it so far afield as Heracleia in Sicily; a man by the name of Epinoides son of Eudamus is identified as a Heracletian on his honorary decree (IG XII.6 38). Shipley proposes a diaspora of the Samians upon the maritime routes resulting in a spread encompassing an area stretching from Sicily to Phaselis and from the Hellespont to Rhodes.[271] The decrees primarily honor individuals who were of assistance to the Samians while they were dispossessed and few actually indicate whether the Samians were resident in the cities of those honored, or not. The decrees as a whole indicate that as the Samians dispersed across the Mediterranean they were principally reliant upon individuals rather than being welcomed by a particular city’s government. Like Meidon in Piraeus, we might expect that the Samians became metics in the cities to which they fled, and the men honored for helping them acted as their sponsors.
The first effort to return the Samians home came with Alexander’s Exile Decree in 324 (Diod. 17.109, 18.18). The Athenians were predictably not pleased, “having made Samos a cleruchy they were in no way willing to give it up” (Diod. 18.8.7). A challenge for clarification must have been issued on this point. Plutarch (Alex. 28.1) quotes a letter from Alexander to the Athenians in which he must have been answering Athens’ claim to Samos saying “I would not have granted you [Athens] a free and glorious city [Samos]. But you hold it, having received it from him who was in control then, and is being called my father.”[272] Plutarch does not provide the rest of the letter (he was only interested in how it illustrated claims of Alexander’s divinity), but one presumes that it would have continued to present Alexander’s ruling the the Samians should reclaim their island. Further evidence for a diplomatic war waged over the possession of Samos is found in another honorary inscription (IG XII.6 17), this one for Gorgus of Iasus.
Gorgus was a high-ranking officer in charge of the armory, a hoplophylax, a position that few Greeks ever attained in the Macedonian army. Athenaius (12.538b) preserves mention of one instance when Gorgus crowned Alexander with a crown worth 3000 gold pieces and pledged a gift of 10,000 suits of armor for Alexander’s anticipated siege of Athens. The exaggerated generosity of the pledge and the note that the pledge was announced after Gogrus personally consulted with Alexander demonstrates the access which Gorgus held at the Macedonian King’s court. In the inscription from Samos, the demos records that Gorgus used his influence to intercede on their behalf with the king.
The “canvassing” Gorgus engaged in was most likely in response to Athens’ challenge of the application of the Exiles Decree to the Samians. As a trusted officer, his representation of the Samian position might have been instrumental in Alexander’s subsequent decision. Moreover, once Alexander made his ruling, Gorgus was able to arrange for funds to be donated by his polis, Iasos, for the repatriation of the Samians, earning the refugees’ further gratitude.
Following Alexander’s ruling, some Samians took it upon themselves to return home; however, after Alexander’s death, Athens felt no need to remove its cleruchy immediately and continued to occupy the island. In 322/1 a group of refugees that had settled in the plain of Anaea, returned to the island with near disastrous results. The returnees were arrested and transported to Athens where they were tried, convicted and sentenced to death. But the Athenians had not won many friends during their attempts to rebuild the League, whereas the Samians had garnered the sympathies of many people throughout the Greek world both before and after Alexander’s decree. To prevent the execution from taking place one man, Antileon son of Leontinus from Chalcis, bribed the Athenian boule with what must have been an exorbitant, though unfortunately lost, amount of money (IG XII.6 42 ln. 1-25).
The Samians were released and shipped to Chalcis where they presumably stayed until the cleruchy was removed by Perdiccas in 321. Once the Samians were again in possession of their island, they wasted no time in publicly recognizing the people who assisted them while they were refugees. The typical response was a grant of citizenship as seen in Gorgus’ and Mineon’s (IG XII.6 17) and Epinoides’ (IG XII.6 38) decrees. The inscriptions for Acamas (IG XII.6 149), Coees and Leontiscus (IG XII.6 39) are all badly damaged with less than half of the inscription preserved; it is impossible to determine what rewards these men received, but it may be reasonable to assume a similar award of citizenship. The citizenship grants appear to be more than honorary as the recipients are to be allotted a tribe and clan, indicating that they could be voting members of the polis. The granting of citizenship to their benefactors by former refugees is a neat inversion of host poleis’ grants of citizenship to refugees and illustrates the possibility for close relationships to arise between refugees and their hosts. Antileon’s decree has also been reconstructed to include a grant of citizenship, though it is not definitively known. The addition of a statue and crown to whatever else Antileon was granted is indicative of the extreme danger from which he rescued one particular group of Samians and might also be an acknowledgment of the size of Antileon’s personal expenditures.
The case of the Samians has many parallels to that of the Olynthians. Both groups were widely dispersed across the Aegean (and wider Mediterranean in the case of the Samians) when their cities were taken. Furthermore, both groups engaged in diplomatic maneuvering to secure a return to their homes. In the case of the Olynthians, Callisthenes took it upon himself to represent the Olynthian cause to Alexander; unfortunately personal issues interfered. In contrast, the Samians seem to have relied heavily on third parties like Gorgus to champion them. One presumes that Antileon of Chalcis also had some pre-existing relationship with the higher-ups of the Athenian boule. How else could he have known that the boule was susceptible to a bribe, and how else could he have offered a bribe without causing offense? The effectiveness of the Samian’s approach is proven by the fact that Alexander clarified the terms of the Exile’s Decree to include the Samians but not the Olynthians.
