10

The Butcher’s Bill

As the final rounds of musketry crackled over Kilcommodan Hill in the fading light, both commanders could – for greatly differing reasons – be fairly satisfied with their relative situations.

For Patrick Sarsfield, the Battle of Aughrim had been a true a ‘baptism of fire’, serving to either make or break his military reputation. Although as a colonel of horse, he had been entrusted with several independent commands during the first two years of the war, such as his capture of Sligo in 1689 and the cavalry raid on the Williamite siege train at Ballyneety the following summer, the size of his forces had always varied between several hundred and one or two thousand men. Nothing in his career, to date, had demonstrated an ability to control a large body of troops, but as a result of the fortunes of war he was to assume command of the Jacobite field army, the last obstacle between the enemy and the ports of Galway and Limerick.

The situation in which the new commanding general found himself was unenviable to say the least; the death of St Ruth at a crucial stage in the battle had meant that there was no accepted plan for the Jacobites to fall back upon, and then the wounding of de Tessé as he attempted to contain the Williamite attack on Dorrington’s left flank had meant that Sarsfield was as far away as possible from the critical sector of the battlefield at a time when the army was in danger of suffering a total collapse. The army needed to be quickly reorganised if it were to survive, and the question was could Sarsfield effect such a reorganisation faster than the enemy could roll up the Jacobite left flank.

By skilfully ordering a staged disengagement by his own division on the right flank covering the Attibrassil Bridge, Sarsfield was able to withdraw a number of cavalry units from the front line and, with the addition of the two troops of Life Guards and Galmoy’s Regiment of Horse, created a mobile reserve, the purpose of which was threefold: firstly, to cover the rear of John Hamilton’s division and stabilise that part of the battle line; secondly, to counter the enemy’s exploitation of the collapse of the Jacobite left wing; and finally, and most difficult of all – once he had decided that the battle had been lost – to cover successfully the army’s retreat.

That Sarsfield was almost able to achieve these three aims, when the enemy had the tactical initiative, is indeed an endorsement of his ability to operate under pressure. However, geography would also play a crucial role in the escape of the remnants of the Jacobite army from the battlefield. St Ruth had chosen a defensive position which sat astride the roads to Galway and Limerick (respectively thirty-five miles and sixty miles distant from Aughrim), and naturally as the troops fled the field they would tend to use what they believed to be the quickest route to safety. With the remnants of the army thus divided, it would be several days before the extent of Sarsfield’s success in extricating the army would be known.

On Urraghry Hill, as he received reports from his subordinate commanders, Ginkel was no doubt reflecting on the campaign so far. Generally regarded as a cautious and unimaginative officer, he was fully aware that he had never been neither the first nor even the second choice for the command of the Williamite army in Ireland, and that his appointment rested more on his nationality than anything else. Accordingly, he would certainly have been justified in deriving satisfaction from the fact that he had nevertheless succeeded where a number of his contemporaries had met with failure.

Ginkel’s handling of the 1691 campaign – so far – had been sound enough, although there would always be claims that this success was only achieved either as a result of the forceful counsel of subordinates such as Hugh Mackay or Thomas Tollemache, or indeed due to the ineptitude of St Ruth at Athlone and his unexpected death at Aughrim. Whatever the truth of these claims, the fact is that the Dutchman had now led his army to two consecutive victories which had combined to leave the Jacobites in a state of total disarray. This tactical situation, however, was to pale into relative insignificance as the couriers arrived at the army’s headquarters.

Following the fall of Athlone, Ginkel had agonised over St Ruth’s intentions, fearing that the French general would choose to divide his forces thereby forcing him to reciprocate, with both sides then becoming embroiled in an inconclusive campaign that would most likely be dragged out until the end of the current campaigning season and thence into 1692. If this were to happen, it was almost certain that the Jacobite Irish would receive further reinforcement from France, and just as certain that William would order his recall from Ireland and appoint another officer in his stead.

Undoubtedly breathing easily when it became clear that St Ruth was determined to give battle at Aughrim, and despite what had at first seemed to him a comprehensive victory, the fruits of Ginkel’s triumph had soured slightly when it became clear to him that although the bulk of the Irish forces had retreated south-west towards Limerick, a number of enemy units had also chosen to flee westwards towards Galway, thereby realising his worst fears.

Having clearly defeated the Jacobite army, and just as clearly having failed to destroy it, Ginkel was confronted with the spectre of King William’s ‘complete and utter victory’ at the Boyne the previous summer, following which the Williamite propagandists had believed that the result of the battle would herald an immediate Jacobite collapse, preceded by a triumphal entrance into Dublin, an expectation that was never realised.

Even James’ precipitate flight from Ireland and his unwarranted ingratitude to the Irish, which in the process had earned him the derogatory nickname ‘Séamus a chaca’ (literally ‘James the shit’), had had little or no detrimental effect upon the Jacobite position – stoically following their officers the troops marched westwards across the Shannon and into the Province of Connacht, occupying new defensive positions and awaiting the inevitable enemy attack.

For William, the follow-up campaign to the Boyne did not go as anticipated. Despite the unqualified success of the joint operations of the Earl of Marlborough and von Württemburg-Neustadt which had resulted in the capture of the main southern Irish ports such as Cork and Kinsale, a column under James Douglas had been crucially thwarted in its attempt to storm Athlone. This failure to capture the vital river crossing across the Shannon, together with Patrick Sarsfield’s attack on the unescorted Williamite siege train at Ballyneety, were but two factors in a chain of events that contributed heavily to a mounting series of delays as William moved the main body of the army to besiege the Jacobite forces at Limerick. Although William was able to invest the city and develop a practicable breach in the walls, an initial assault was beaten back with heavy loss, and there was no time to develop the attack further before the weather broke and he was forced to call off the siege.

Such was Ginkel’s quandary: although he was now across the Shannon, his forces were once again at the end of their supply lines. With the enemy having retreated in two separate directions he needed to make a decision as to whether he should consolidate his position and secure his lines of communication and supply or simply press on and, if the latter, decide whether his target was to be Galway or Limerick. While he was considering his options, another variable came into play – Hugh ‘Balldearg’ O’Donnell and his army of Ulstermen who were operating to the north around Sligo. Although the antipathy between O’Donnell and Tyrconnel over the title to the Earldom was well known, the question of which king O’Donnell would support – James or William – was still an unknown variable, and would need to be factored into any operational plans.

Almost as soon as the fighting had stopped on Kilcommodan Hill, the first of these eyewitnesses began to write their accounts of the battle in an effort to be the first to break the news. And as these accounts, both official and unofficial, began to filter back – firstly to Dublin and then to London – they were obviously magnified in the telling.

Although most modern historians tend to agree that both armies were roughly equal in terms of numbers, the relative suddenness of the Jacobite collapse, combined with a plethora of personal accounts from participants on the Williamite side has helped to create a flawed perception of the battle which, over time, became so deep rooted so as to become the ‘official’ version of events. In these accounts, there are two recurring themes: the first is that despite St Ruth’s exceptionally strong position, Ginkel accepted battle whilst being heavily outnumbered; the second lies in the excessive amount of Jacobite casualties in comparison with relatively minimal Williamite losses. The reason for this is the obvious need to report back to London the news of a signal victory in Ireland. The progress of the war in Flanders was not favouring the Allied Coalition, and although it was viewed as a secondary theatre of operations, a military setback in Ireland could easily prejudice Parliament’s willingness to continue to prosecute the war. Drawing from these ‘official’ dispatches the diarist Narcissus Luttrell, in London, noted that

‘By letters from Ireland of the 13th, that our army there had past the Shannon the 10th, and the 11th came to Ballinasloe, within three miles of the Irish army at Aghrim; the 12th, our army marched towards them, and engaged the enemy at about 4 In the afternoon, who for some time maintained a desperate fight, being very strongly encamped; but at last it pleased God that our army gave them an entire rout, and pursued them some miles, till night putt an end thereto; the Irish army was superior to ours in number, consisting of 8,000 horse and 20,000 foot: of the Irish about 6,000 were killed on the place, amongst which are the lord Galloway, col. Barker, col. Moor, col. Gordon Oneile, and several other officers: St.Ruth, the French general, is also killed; major general Hamilton mortally wounded; major general Dorington, lord Buffin, lord Bellew, lord Slane, col. Butler, col. Ulick Bourke, major Lawless, with 100 other officers and 500 private soldiers, are taken prisoners: we took also all their baggage, tents, provisions, ammunition and cannon, which consisted of only 9 pieces, with many colours and standards, and most of the armes of their foot, which they threw down in their flight: on our side we lost about 500 men, major general Holstaple, col. Herbert, col. Mongats, of the Danes, major Petit, of Belcastles regiment, major Devenish of Earles, major Colt, of Brewers, major Cornwal and major Fox, of Fowkes, with other officers are killed: the prince of Hesse D’armstadt, lord George Hamilton, lord Cutts, col Earl, and lieutenant col. Brudenel are wounded.’

Two days later, the publication of further correspondence caused Luttrell to amend his commentary.

‘Letters from Ireland confirm our great victory there, but with much more advantage: that St.Ruth, the French general, was killed with a cannon shott, that the 2 French lieutenant generals, one of them had putt himself into Limerick, the other into Galloway; that they had 7,000 men killed; that we had taken above 100 officers prisoners, and among them 2 major generals, 2 brigadeers, 8 collonells, 3 lieutenant collonells, 5 majors, 12 captains, 24 ensigns and lieutenants.’

The reports and correspondence referred to in Luttrell’s diary show a slightly different version of events than is generally accepted. Here, St Ruth’s army not only occupies a strong defensive position on Kilcommodan Hill, but it also comfortably outnumbers Ginkel’s forces by several thousand men. Likewise, more emphasis is placed upon the heavy casualties suffered by the Jacobites than on the desperate stalemate that had taken place along the lower slopes of the hill, which was only broken after the Williamites had turned the Jacobite left flank. This is the account of the battle which has been accepted for almost three centuries and has greatly contributed to the perception of the battle not only within Ireland but also elsewhere. The question which needs to be asked is how much of the ‘official account’ is based upon hard evidence and how much is embellishment intended to please Ginkel’s political masters in London?

An invaluable source of information lies within the respective casualty lists. Although there is no definite listing for the Jacobite dead and wounded, we are able to refer to two letters from the French Commissary Fumeron to the Marquis de Louvois, respectively dated 23 July/2 August, and 30 July/9 August 1691, in which he lists the various regiments which had retreated from the battlefield to either Galway or Limerick, as well as the existing garrisons at both locations.

In his first letter (Ref No 1511) Fumeron lists the forces as follows: 9,356 foot, 3,037 horse and 2,608 dragoons, for a total strength of 14,991 officers and men. In comparison with this, the second letter (Ref No 1530) which effectively adds a number of stragglers who, in the intervening few days, have returned to the ranks of the Jacobite army the numbers have increased to 11,061 foot, 3,285 horse, and 2,666 dragoons, giving a total for the field army of 17,012 officers and men.

What this means is that if we were to subtract the figure which Commissary Fumeron gives for the strength of the Jacobite army as at 30 July/9 August from its generally accepted numbers as at the beginning of the Battle of Aughrim (i.e. 20,000 men) we would be left with an approximate casualty figure in the region of 3,000 including dead, wounded and prisoners as well as those who may have used the confusion engendered by the rout to desert the colours. Needless to say this number contrasts greatly with the figure of 7,000 which is quoted in many of the ‘official’ sources.

A final point that should be made when dealing with these losses is that in Fumeron’s initial letter he cites the name of four regiments that are commanded by officers who are known to have fallen at Aughrim – namely colonels John O’Connell, Thomas Butler, Denis MacGillicuddy and Macarty – and this inclusion undoubtedly reflects the initial uncertainty as to their fate. Similarly in his second letter, four ‘new’ regiments are mentioned for the first time – those of Colonels Michael Burke, Michael Roth, Murphy and Moore Power. The most logical explanation to this discrepancy would be that these latter individuals have in the intervening period been promoted to assume the place of the fallen or missing officers.

In comparison with those of the enemy, the ‘official’ Williamite casualty list – as reproduced in both Story’s Impartial History and Col. Clifford Walton’s History of the British Standing Army 1660 – 1700 – gives the following totals: foot 375 killed, 879 wounded, horse 246 killed, 102 wounded and dragoons 52 killed, 36 wounded, which combine to give a total loss of 673 killed and 1,017 wounded.

This total figure of 1,690 casualties may – at first – seem a bit light given the intensity of the combat, but what should be remembered is that the ‘official’ list was based upon the various regimental troop returns after the battle and as per the practice of the period these would no doubt include a number of unreported losses which would allow the regimental commanders to draw pay and supplies for these missing men, hence the term ‘dead reckonings’. A more realistic estimate would be that the Williamite losses numbered around 2,000, most of which would have been incurred before the Causeway had been forced, a figure which compares favourably with the figure of 3,000 or so for the Jacobites. In short, the ‘official’ list may be an understatement of the actual losses, but not by an unacceptable margin.

Despite the absence of a concrete casualty listing for the Jacobite forces, the Williamite casualty list provides us with an interesting overview of the nature of the fighting. If we look at the three main phases of the battle, their losses are apportioned as follows: von Tettau’s feint against the Jacobite right flank (411), Mackay’s attack against the Jacobite centre (1,010) and Ruvigny’s passage of the Causeway and turning of the Jacobite left flank (269).

The first units to become engaged were a composite squadron from von Donop’s regiment of Danish horse and Sir Arthur Conygham’s Enniskillen dragoons, who reported a total of 21 and 72 casualties respectively; both figures being realistic for the level of combat involved. The next phase of the battle is von Tettau’s feint against the Jacobite right flank which, by its very nature was not intended to bring on a major engagement, and thus a loss of 81 men from a brigade of almost 3,000 is suitably negligible.

Following on from von Tettau’s attack came de la Mélonière’ movement against Hamilton’s position around the ‘Bloody Hollow’, with Belcastel’s Huguenot foot taking relatively heavy casualties, almost a 100 men, whereas their compatriots in the brigade suffered proportionately less – van Auer with 70 dead and wounded, du Cambon with 50, and de la Mélonière only 14.

As for Hesse-Darmstadt’s brigade, whilst there is no reported figure for losses taken for the commander’s own battalion, the remaining three units took a total of 144 casualties, or roughly ten per cent of their strength, reflecting the possibility that the whole brigade may not have been initially engaged, and took some time to conform to the firing line.

Again, the two brigades of Anglo-Irish foot can be seen to have received casualties proportionate to their involvement in the battle. Of all the Williamite battalions – and under-strength as a result of its participation in the siege and storming of Athlone – Erle’s regiment fared the worst: becoming increasingly isolated as it thrust into the enemy lines, and with little direct support, the unit lost over 160 men, almost thirty per cent of its strength. Following directly on from Erle, Herbert’s regiment was also immediately caught up in the Jacobite counter-attack, suffering over 80 casualties, with Steuart’s regiment, forming the core of Tollemache’s attempt to rally the Williamite line also losing a similar number of men.

On the extreme right of the Williamite centre, however, where the battalions of Kirke, Meath and Hamilton were solely engaged in exchanging long range fire with the Jacobite positions, the losses incurred were relatively negligible, being on average around 20 men per battalion.

What we have therefore seen is that, in the centre of the battlefield, the heavier losses incurred by Ginkel’s troops came only when they were involved in hand-to-hand combat with their opponents, and that the actions of the Jacobite commanded musketeers occupying the banks and hedges lining the bog were not designed to cause casualties but rather to harass and delay the advancing Williamites, destroying their cohesion and wearing them down before the inevitable counterattack – a role in which, given the near collapse of Mackay and Tollemache’s brigades, they excelled.

For the Williamites, the crucial sector of the battlefield was the right flank, and the passage of the Causeway, as this was the manoeuvre which led to the unravelling of the Jacobite position, and again here the number of casualties received by the individual units gives an interesting overview of the closing stages of the battle.

The leading elements of this final attack – the Earl of Oxford’s Blues and Villiers’ horse – had to run the gauntlet of enemy fire, before initially halting to cover the deployment of the remainder of the two brigades and then wheeling left into the unprotected flank of the Jacobite foot. During this confused mêlée, both regiments lost heavily, the Blues suffering 70 casualties and Villiers’ 54, each from an average strength of around 300 effectives.

With the Jacobite brigades of Sheldon and Luttrell having left the field, Leveson’s ‘Royal’ dragoons were now allocated the task of further protecting the Williamite redeployment by masking the detachment of Walter Bourke’s regiment which was in occupation of the ruins of Aughrim Castle, in the process suffering a total of 7 killed and 5 wounded, which was mainly due to Bourke’s men running out of ammunition.

Of the other regiments in the division, as a result of de Tessé’s ill-fated counter-attack and Sarsfield’s delaying actions, those of de Ruvigny and Sir John Lanier took 73 and 28 casualties each, but as a percentage of the troops involved, these are actually higher as both regiments had previously detached a squadron of troops to support the feint attack against the Jacobite right flank, in the case of de Ruvigny being almost thirty-three per cent of the regimental strength in this sector.

In closing the discussion with regard to losses, it is worthwhile to note that two regiments of Dutch horse – van Ginkel’s and Montpouillon’s – and one of Anglo-Irish dragoons – Wynne’s – are recorded as having suffered no casualties at Aughrim at all. This would give a possible indication that all three regiments took no part in the fighting whatsoever and would again serve to vindicate St Ruth’s choice of ground upon which to initiate the battle, the adverse terrain effectively denying Ginkel the services of almost 1,000 mounted troops whose presence either during the battle or the pursuit would have been of crucial importance.