1. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Forbes, C.-in-C., Plymouth, in his remarks on the operations states definitely that he regards the attack on St. Nazaire as more difficult than that on Zeebrugge.
2. The Normandie dock, aslo known as the “Forme Ecluse”, is the largest dock in the world; 1148 ft. long and 164 ft. wide, it could accommodate a ship of over 85,000 tons. Its caissons measured 167 ft. long, 54 ft. high and 35 ft. thick.
3. See Appendix A.
4. HMS Campbeltown was fitted out at Devonport for her task of destroying the lock gate, and the Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, remarks that the work done was admirably quick and efficient. The arrangements for detonating the explosives were devised by Lieutenant
N. T. B. Tibbits, R.N., of HMS Vernon. Lieut. Tibbits accompanied the expedition in the Campbeltown, and was among those who lost their lives. He was awarded the D.S.C. for his services. The endurance of M.G.B. 314 was not great enough for her to accomplish the return journey under her own power, but Commander Ryder found it possible to increase it sufficiently by fitting additional fuel tanks.
5. The possible alternative of the Campbeltown, being a steel ship, bearing the brunt of the fire while the light craft came in under her shelter was discussed, but rejected. The plan finally adopted envisaged sacrificing everything, if necessary, in order to get the Campbeltown in.
6. The entrance of the River Loire is about 6½ miles wide, narrowing to a mile at St. Nazaire. The deep water channel – 300 yards wide – follows the north-western shore at a distance of 2 or 3 cables, the remainder of the estuary being occupied by shoals. It was over these shoals, shortly before high water, that the approach was to be made. (See Plan 4).
7. At St. Nazaire:–
Sunset, 27/3, 1931; end of nautical twilight, 2040.
Sunrise, 28/3, 0701; beginning of nautical twilight, 0553.
Moon rise, 27/3, 1405; 1st quarter, 25/3.
Moonset, 28/3, 0452; 1st quarter, 25/3.
Low water, 27/3, 1944; high water, 28/3, 0123; height 13½. ft.
All times are B.S.T. (Zone–1).
8. This route passed through the lettered positions shown in Plan 3.
9. First sighted by the 2nd officer of the watch, Mr. S. W. J. Ford, Gunner, R.N., bearing 037°, 7½ miles distant.
10. During the passage all white ensigns were hauled down and the destroyers wore the colours of the Third Reich.
11. One hit is believed to have been obtained.
12. G.M.T., i.e., 0720 B.S.T.
13. Group Command West subsequently explained that owing to the late reception of the U-boat’s message and the lack of air-reconnaissance forces, the opportunity for an attack on the British force was missed.
14. M.L. No. 10 (341) had developed a defect in her port engine at 1830/27, which reduced her speed to 10.8 knots. Strenuous efforts failed to remedy this, and her troops were transferred to one of the spare M.Ls. – No. 15, M.L.10’s engine was not repaired till 2222/27. It being then too late for her to take part in the assault, she returned independently to Falmouth.
15. The Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, had arranged with Bomber Commmand for an air attack to be carried out.
16. Commander Ryder remarks that the use of R.D/F in the M.G.B. as a navigational aid was invaluable in working their way up the estuary. A considerable set to the northward was experienced during the approach. The Campbeltown grounded lightly twice – at about 0045 and 0055. This possibility had been foreseen, as no accurate charts were available, but she could not be lightened further.
17. In actual fact the force had been sighted ten minutes previously (at 0115) when a little over 4 miles from the lock gate by the lookout post on the headland of St. Marc. It was not, however, recognised as being hostile.
18. H.M. The King approved the award of the Victoria Cross to Lieut.-Commander S.
H. Beattie for his “great gallantry and determination” on this occasion in command of HMS Campbeltown. The citation goes on to say “Under intense fire directed at the bridge from point-blank range of about 100 yards, and in the face of the blinding glare of many searchlights, he steamed her into the lock gates, and beached and scuttled her in the correct position.
This Victoria Cross is awarded to Lieut.-Commander Beattie in recognition not only of his own valour but also of that of the unnamed officers and men of a very gallant ship’s company, many of whom have not returned.” - London Gazette.
19. The ship ran about 35 ft. into the lock, which was 34 ft. wide, the stem buckling and the forecastle deck running over the top and projecting a foot or so over the other side. This brought the explosive charge, the foremost end of which was 36 ft. from the stem, into an excellent position.
20. A summary of the narratives of the individual M.Ls. will be found in Appendix B.
21. This apparent slackening of the firing may have been due to commandos who had disembarked from the Campbeltown silencing the positions in her immediate vicinity.
22. M.L.457 had closed up on the leader when M.L.341 (originally No. 10) developed her defect at 1830/27.
23. M.L.477 (No. 9) to the north and M.L.192 (No. 1) to the south. This led to the opinion immediately after the operation that some of the M.Ls. had mistakenly gone to the south side of the Old Mole instead of the north side, as ordered. Under this impression the C.-in-C. Plymouth remarked “this unfortunate misunderstanding certainly reduced the number of troops who got ashore according to the plan and therefore hindered the complete overcoming of local resistance which had been hoped for...” It is now (1947) known that no such mistake occurred, and that any M.Ls. seen to the southward of the Mole got there due to circumstances beyond their control.
24. M.L.177 was hit about 10 minutes after she started down river, set on fire, and burned for four hours. The survivors, among whom was Lieut.-Com. Beattie, were eventually rescued by a German trawler
25. This was all that was known for many months about the work of the troops on shore, since none who landed was able to re-embark. Some account of how they fared, based on reports received after the conclusion of the war, will be found in pages 52-59 (original Battle Summary No.12).
26. M.T.B.74’s two torpedoes each contained 1,800 lb. of explosive, and was fitted with an improvised delay action device, set to explode 2½ hours later. Actually they did not go off till some 36 hours had elapsed.
27. This was the last seen of M.T.B.74, whose fate was unknown for some time. It has since been established that she was set on fire and burnt while attempting to assist one of the burning M.Ls. on her way out. Her C.O., Lieut. Wynne, was gallantly rescued by Chief Motor Mechanic Lovegrove, to whom the C.G.M. was subsequently awarded.
28. It was found extremely difficult to knock out the positions sited on the housetops.
29. The posthumous award of the Victoria Cross to Able Seaman W. A. Savage was approved by H.M. The King for his “great gallantry, skill and devotion to duty as gunlayer of the pom-pom in a motor gunboat. Completely exposed and under heavy fire, he engaged positions ashore with cool and steady accuracy...
This Victoria Cross is awarded in recognition not only of the gallantry and devotion to duty of Able Seaman Savage, but also of the valour shown by many others. unnamed, in motor launches, motor gunboats and motor torpedo boats, who gallantly carried out their duty in entirely exposed positions against enemy fire at very close range.”-London Gazette.
30. The withdrawal signals were to have been given by special 35 star red and green rockets. These rockets, however, together with part of Colonel Newman’s H.Q. Staff, had been sunk in M.L.267. Actually at this time the withdrawal on shore was in progress, but Commander Ryder had no means of knowing this.
31. H.M. The King approved the award of the Victoria Cross to Commander R. E. D. Ryder “for great gallantry in the attack on St. Nazaire. He commanded a force of small unprotected ships in an attack on a heavily defended port and led HMS Campbeltown under intense fire from short range weapons at point-blank range. Though the main object of the expedition had been accomplished in the beaching of the Campbeltown, he remained on the spot conducting operations, evacuating men from the Campbeltown, and dealing with strong points and close range weapons while exposed to heavy fire for one hour and 16 minutes, and did not withdraw till it was certain that his ship could be of no use in rescuing any of the Commando troops who were still ashore. That his motor gunboat, now full of dead and wounded, should have survived and should have been able to withdraw through an intense barrage of close-range fire was almost a miracle.”- London Gazette.
32. There were 4 dock gates and 2 swing bridges across the South entrance and 1 lifting bridge at the north end of St. Nazaire Basin to be dealt with. In addition were the lock gates of the Normandie dock, but these were not to be destroyed till later.
33. Letters in brackets refer to Plan 6.
34. The destruction of these vessels by some of the Commando troops was subsequently confirmed by captured German documents.
35. M.Ls. No. 262 (No. 2) and 276 (No. 3), having missed the Old Entrance at the first attempt, succeeded in landing their troops there later on: but they were repulsed and forced to re- embark.
36. This party had never got ashore, having been blown up in M.L.268.
37. Colonel Newman’s Narrative.
38. Colonel Newman’s Narrative.
39. Colonel Newman believed that the Germans in their excitement had forgotten to lower their sights.
40. H.M. The King approved the award of the Victoria Cross to Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Newman when the full story of the raid became known.
“...Although Lieut.-Colonel Newman need not have landed himself, he was one of the first ashore, and during the next five hours of bitter fighting, he personally entered several houses and shot up the occupants and supervised the operations in the town, utterly regardless of his own safety, and he never wavered in his resolution to carry through the operation upon which so much depended.
An enemy gun position on the roof of a U-boat pen had been causing heavy casualties to the landing craft and Lieut.-Colonel Newman directed the fire of a mortar against this position to such effect that the gun was silenced. Still fully exposed he then brought machine gun fire to bear on an armed trawler in the harbour, compelling it to withdraw and thus preventing many casualties in the main demolition area.
Under the brilliant leadership of this officer the troops fought magnificently and held vastly superior enemy forces at bay, until the demolition parties had successfully completed their work of destruction.
By this time, however, most of the landing craft had been sunk or set on fire and evacuation by sea was no longer possible. Although the main objective had been achieved Lieut.-Colonel Newman, nevertheless, was now determined to try and fight his way out into open country and so give all survivors a chance to escape.
The only way out of the harbour area lay across a narrow iron bridge covered by enemy machine guns, and although severely shaken by a German hand grenade, which had burst at his ft., Lieut.-Colonel Newman personally led the charge which stormed the position and under his inspiring leadership, the small force fought its way through the streets to a point near the open country when, all ammunition expended, he and his men were finally overpowered by the enemy.
The outstanding gallantry and devotion to duty of this fearless officer, his brilliant leadership and initiative, were largely responsible for the success of this perilous operation which resulted in heavy damage to the important Naval base at St. Nazaire.”- London Gazette, 15 June, 1945.
41. This was believed at the time, but it has since been established that the Campbeltown did not blow up till shortly before noon that day, (according to German sources, at 1146 B.S.T.). A search of the ship for explosives by the German mine-disposal squad had been prevented owing to a misunderstanding on the part of the officer who had the ship cordoned off. At the moment of the explosion, there was a large number of people onboard, some of them officials searching for secret documents, etc., and others merely sightseers. The casualty roll was heavy, with over 100 missing. See Appendix E.
42. H.M. The King approved the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross to Sergeant Thomas Frank Durrant, R.E. (attached Commandos) for “gallantry, skill and devotion to duty when in charge of a Lewis gun in HMS M.L.306 in the St. Nazaire raid.
M.L.306 came under heavy fire while proceeding up the River Loire towards the port. Sergeant Durrant in his position abaft the bridge, where he had no cover or protection, engaged enemy gun positions and searchlights on shore. During this engagement he was severely wounded in the arm, but refused to leave his gun.
The motor launch subsequently went down river and was attacked by a German destroyer at 30 to 60 yards range and often closer. In this action, Sergeant Durrant continued to fire at the destroyer’s bridge with the greatest coolness and with complete disregard of the enemy’s fire. The motor launch was illuminated by the enemy searchlights and Sergeant Durrant drew on himself the individual attention of the enemy guns and was again wounded in many places. Despite these further wounds, he stayed in his exposed position, still firing his gun, although after a time only able to support himself by holding on to the gun mounting.
After a running fight, the Commander of the German destroyer called on the motor launch to surrender. Sergeant Durrant’s answer was a further burst of fire at the destroyer’s bridge. Although now very weak he went on firing, using drums of ammunition as fast as they could be replaced. A renewed attack by the enemy vessel eventually silenced the fire of the motor launch, but Sergeant Durrant refused to give up until the destroyer came alongside, grappled the motor launch and took prisoner those who remained alive. Sergeant Durrant’s gallant fight was commended by the German officials on boarding the motor launch.
This very gallant non-commissioned officer later died of the many wounds received in action.”- London Gazette, 15 June, 1945.
43. See pages 61-62. original Battle Summary
44. Sunrise, 0700, 28 March.
45. Before settling down to the patrol, the Atherstone carried out a short search for the motor launch which had broken down – M.L.341 (No. 10) – but failed to find her in the dark.
46. 0217. From M.L.270 (No. 7) Still in.
0220. From M.L.177 (No. 6) Leaving, 15 knots.
0220. From M.L.160 (No. 8) Leaving, one engine only.
0221. From M.L.307 (No. 12) Leaving, 15 knots.
0222. From M.L.270 (No. 7) Steering broken down.
0316. From M.L.270 (No. 7) Leaving, 12 knots.
0320. From M.L.160 (No. 8) to M.L.270 (No. 7) “Whatchur, chum.”
0323. From M.L.307 (No. 12) Leaving, 12 knots.
47. The C.O. HMS Atherstone points out that by the time the destroyers arrived at the rendezvous there was an unknown number of M.Ls. in an unknown condition to seaward of them, and suggests that it would have been better if they had steered for the R/V on receipt of the first leaving signals, so as to check up on the M.Ls. as they came out, and give the earliest possible assistance with casualties.
48. She had received five hits in one petrol tank, which did not catch fire as it was full.
49. These were the only British aircraft sighted by the destroyers but the Commander-in- Chief, Plymouth, remarks that “aircraft of No. 19 Group, R.A.F. did much useful work in covering the withdrawal of the forces from St. Nazaire. Twenty sorties occupying 105 flying hours, were carried out during which one H.E.111 and two He.115 were encountered, and one enemy aircraft was destroyed.”
50. The Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, regretted this decision, with which he did not agree.
51. This was in lat. 46° 38’ N., long, 4° 52’ W. (about 110 miles W.S.W. of St. Nazaire) according to the Cleveland’s reckoning. The Atherstone put it about 6 miles to the northward.
52. Thereby anticipating the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth, who, at 1926 ordered him to detach two destroyers to the assistance of the motor launches, and at the same time informed him that two Hudsons were proceeding to locate them.
53. It had been intended to send this report early in the forenoon, the position of the force being then known to the enemy from air reconnaissance. Just then a signal was received from the Commander-in-Chief imposing stricter W/T silence. A Hudson aircraft sent for the purpose of receiving the report by visual failed to make contact. During the afternoon, when the force was nearing the Brest Peninsula and shadowing aircraft had apparently been shaken off, it seemed even more necessary to maintain W/T silence. The progress made by 1900 and the desirability of requesting air search for the missing M.Ls. decided Commander Sayer to break it, and the signal was sent at 1946/28.
54. Lieut. Platt had been transferred from M.L.443 (No. 13), on leaving Falmouth, to M.L.447 (No. 9), in order to relieve her C.O. – Lieut. Wood, who had fallen sick – as S.O., 2nd Flotilla.
55. About 1905 B.S.T.
56. About 55 per cent of these, including Lt. Com. Beatty, V.C. proved to have been taken prisoner and returned to the United Kingdom on the conclusion of hostilities. The final figure for killed or missing was 85 officers and men.
57. Photographs taken from the air at 1650/29/3 showed the seaward entrance of the lock dock open, the gate apparently missing, and the dock flooded. Two 450ft. tankers previously seen were still in the lock dock, the outermost emitting smoke, and the innermost with a slight list. There was much oil on the surface in the dock and harbour.
58. On a still night their engines were clearly audible at a distance of 3 miles.
59. Considered unfit for return journey and sunk by own forces.
60. Sunk in action.
61. Captured.
62. Lieut. Platt took over as S.O., 2nd Flotilla, after the order for proceeding had been made on 26/3, Lieut. Wood, R.N.V.R., the Senior Officer, having fallen sick. The spare C.O., Lieut. Horlock, relieved Lieut. Platt in M.G.3B.44 (No. 13).
63. This Officer was killed later in the action.
64. Informant’s grade – C.
65. There were a number of reports that two British Officers gave their lives to accompany the Germans onboard the Campbeltown in order to allay suspicions that she might blow up. These reports have never received confirmation, and it is believed that they had no foundation in fact.
66. Todt organisation.