Plans and Preparations (Plans 1 and 2)

The planning, preparation and execution of the project, which was known as Operation ‘Tungsten’, was entrusted by the Commander- in-Chief, Home Fleet,4 to his second-in-command, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Moore,5 Captain L. D. Mackintosh,6 an officer of great experience in Naval air matters, being specially appointed as his Chief of Staff. The following ships7 were detailed to take part:–

One battleship (Anson (Flag, Vice-Admiral Moore)). Two Fleet carriers (Victorious, Furious).

Four escort carriers (Emperor, Searcher, Pursuer, Fencer).

Four cruisers (Royalist (Flag, Rear-Admiral, Escort Carriers)8, Jamaica, Belfast, Sheffield).

Two Fleet oilers (Brown Ranger, Blue Ranger). Fourteen destroyers.

It was originally intended to carry out the operation between 7 and 16 March, but the Victorious was delayed in dockyard hands and it had to be postponed for about a fortnight. Even this left very little time for training, especially in the case of the Victorious, some of whose squadrons were newly formed.9

Vice-Admiral Moore’s plan had to cover two distinct phases – the assembly of the surface forces at the flying off position and the details of the air attack. It was framed so as to be readily adaptable to an alternative locality, in case the Tirpitz should shift berth, and was sufficiently flexible to permit easily of postponement in event of bad weather. In order to minimise the risk from enemy submarines and also to give the surface forces a good chance of making their approach undetected, it was decided to synchronise the operation with the passage of an outward bound North Russian convoy, which was certain to draw the submarines to the eastward of Bear Island. Convoy was due to leave Loch Ewe for Kola Inlet on 27 March; this was accordingly chosen as “D-Day”, and provisional arrangements were made to carry out the air attack on D + 8 Day, 4 April, by which time the convoy would be in the Barents Sea.

Part of the ‘Tungsten’ force was to be included in the battleship covering force, and for the 1,200 mile passage to Northern Norwegian waters the following organisation was laid down:–

Force 1, consisting of the Duke of York (Flag, Commander-in-Chief), Anson (Flag, Vice-Admiral Moore), Victorious, Belfast and six destroyers, covering convoy J.W.58.

Force 2, the remainder of the ‘Tungsten’ force, under Rear-Admiral Bisset, was to meet Force 1 in position “OO”, lat. 72° 30’ N., long. 13° 00’ E. (some 250 miles to the north-westward of Kaa Fjord), at 1800, 3 April, when the Commander-in-Chief intended to part company, leaving the Vice-Admiral to conduct the operation against the Tirpitz.

The air attack was to be made by two bombing forces of 21 Barracudas each launched from the Fleet carriers, supported by Wildcats and Hellcats from the Pursuer, Searcher and Emperor Corsairs from the Victorious. The first strike was to be carried out by No. 8 (Furious) Wing; the second, which was to leave the carriers an hour later, by No. 52 (Victorious) Wing.10 Nine bombers were to be flown off from the Furious and 12 from the Victorious in each strike.

It was decided to use four different types of bombs, the effect of which would be complementary,11 and each bombing force was to be armed as follows:–

(a) Eleven aircraft with three 500 lb. S.A.P. each.

(b) Five aircraft with one 1,600 lb. A.P. each.

(c) Five aircraft with three 500 lb. M.C. or 600 lb. A/S each.12

As a result of training practices, it was found that bombing errors in range were more than double those in line under conditions of light wind. For this reason the direction of the attack was to be along the length of the target, the bombs being released in a tight stick to give a maximum probability of hitting with at least two bombs in each successful attack. Fighter protection for the Fleet during the attack was to be provided by Seafires from the Furious and Wildcats from the Fencer.13 Zero time was fixed for 0415 on whatever day the operation might take place, when the carriers would be approximately 120 miles to the northward of Kaa Fjord (position “PP”, lat. 71° 30’ N., long. 19° 00’ E.).

During the weeks preceding the attack, training was carried out energetically. A full scale bombing and air firing range, representing realistically the Tirpitz in Kaa Fjord, and including smoke defence and dummy A/A batteries, was constructed at Loch Eriboll. Ordnance and special target maps of an exactly similar type to those provided for the actual operation were supplied to all air crews; and in spite of unfavourable weather, a large number of practices were carried out by both T.B.R.s and Fighters, which in the event “proved to be of inestimable value”.14 A full dress rehearsal of the whole operation was staged off Scapa, testing the forming up and flying procedure with Loch Eriboll as the target, on 28 March, and two days later the forces left Scapa to carry out the operation.