At the foreign ministers’ meeting at Vorontsov Palace that morning, at which Eden, the day’s chair, presided, Stettinius had succeeded in convincing Eden and Molotov that FDR’s desire that the conference on the world organization take place almost immediately—not later than the latter part of April—in America was sound and should be adopted.
The fifth plenary meeting began slightly late, at 4:15. FDR, delighted at the outcome of the foreign ministers’ meeting, opened by congratulating the foreign ministers and asking Eden to give a report. Eden announced to the assemblage that following the wishes of the president, they had settled on Wednesday, April 25, as the date to convene the United Nations Conference, the meeting to take place in America. They had found membership a thorny issue: they recommended that only those nations that had signed the UN Declaration by the end of the Yalta Conference be invited, that when the conference convened, the members would then decide the list of original members; at that time the delegates of the U.K. and the United States would support the proposal to admit to original membership the two Soviet Socialist Republics.
Stalin raised a possible problem: ten states at the conference that would be original members had no diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union. He found it somewhat strange for the Soviet Union to work with states that had no desire to have diplomatic relations with it to build a world security organization. What could be done?
FDR replied that most of these states wanted to have relations with the Soviet Union “but had just not gotten around to doing anything about it.” There were a few, however, he admitted, where the influence of the Catholic Church was “very strong.” (The Catholic Church was a thorn in FDR’s side; official Catholic opposition to any Communist state was a threat that might turn the Catholic vote in America’s eastern cities against FDR and his policies. FDR pointed out to Stalin that the Soviet Union had sat down with these states at Bretton Woods and UNRRA conferences. But Stalin protested that the new organization was different: at this conference they were to consider the vital question of the establishment of world security.
FDR then explained about the South American countries: Sumner Welles had told six of them that breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis was sufficient. Frankly, FDR said, it was a mistake on Welles’s part in not advising them to declare war instead of merely breaking off diplomatic relations. He had sent letters to the presidents of the six countries urging them to declare war: Ecuador had just done so.
Stalin next brought up Argentina. “I am not for the Argentines,” he said. “I do not like them; but I do desire there should be no logical contradiction; the nations which declared war would feel not quite at ease with those nations that have not declared war, who were trying to speculate on who would win and who generally were not straight in their behavior.”
FDR replied that it was his idea to invite only those associated nations that have declared war. Stalin asked by what date. FDR replied, right away. Put a time limit on them.
“Say, the first of March.”
“All right, the first of March.”
There was then some discussion about countries such as Turkey and Egypt. Would they be acceptable if they declared war by March 1? The answer was yes.
FDR said that the matter of the Ukraine and White Russia should be presented to the conference and that all three had agreed to support it. Stalin worried that somehow membership for the Ukraine and White Russia would be blocked. He requested that the two republics sign the UN Declaration. Molotov asked if the two Soviet republics could become members of the assembly if they too signed by March 1. Churchill supported the idea, mentioning “the martyrdom and sufferings of the Ukraine and White Russia.” FDR explained that it was a technical question: they had been discussing new countries to add to the list, but this was about giving a great power three votes instead of one; it was a matter that should be put before the conference: all three had agreed to support them. Stalin asked again if the Ukraine and White Russia could sign the UN Declaration. FDR said a third time that that would not overcome the difficulty. Stalin then said he would withdraw his proposal.
During the morning FDR, who with his staff had worked over Molotov’s proposals regarding Poland, had sent a reworked proposal to Eden and Molotov incorporating new elements. His proposals were now close to those of Molotov, according to Roosevelt: he wanted Molotov’s comments.
FDR’s proposal in essence was as follows:
1. There was no objection to point one, that the eastern boundary of Poland should be the Curzon Line with modifications in favor of Poland in some areas of from five to eight kilometers.
2. No objection to the western frontier extending from Stettin up to the line of the Oder, but “there would appear to be little justification to the extension of the western boundary of Poland up to the Western Neisse River.”
3. Concerning the future government of Poland it was proposed that Molotov, Harriman, and Clark Kerr be authorized to invite to Moscow Mr. Bierut, Mr. Osóbka-Morawski, Bishop Sapieha, Mr. Vincente Witos, Mr. Mikołajczyk, and Mr. Grabski to form a government along the following lines.
4. Three of the above, representing the Presidential Office of the Polish Republic, will undertake the formation of a government consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw, from other democratic elements inside Poland, and from Polish democratic leaders from abroad.
5. This interim government will pledge itself to the holding of free elections as soon as conditions permit for a constituent assembly to establish a new Polish constitution.
6. When a government is formed, the three governments will then proceed to accord it recognition as the Polish Provisional Government.
Molotov started with the last point: Would it mean that the London government would then disappear? Churchill answered yes. Stalin wanted to know what would happen then to the property and resources of the London government. Churchill assured him that withdrawal of recognition would take care of that. FDR agreed: the property would go to the new government.
A short recess was then declared, during which tea and coffee and light refreshments were served.
Molotov was the questioner upon resumption of the session. The proposals they made the day before had been based on certain realities, he said. The Soviet government had felt it would be useful to have discussions on the basis of enlarging the government, given that the Lublin, or Warsaw, government “stands at the head of the Polish people and enjoys great prestige and popularity…We might have some success if we start from the basis that the present government should be enlarged…The people who now compose the Polish Provisional Government have been closely connected with the great events of the liberation of Poland, but Messrs. Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Witos have not been.” His observations, he said, applied not only to the question of a new government but also to the proposed presidential committee. Additional difficulty might result from the creation of a presidential committee because there already existed a national council, which of course could be enlarged.
In regard to the question of frontiers, Molotov was glad to note complete agreement on the eastern boundary, but on the western boundary there was no unanimity. The provisional government stood for the western frontier as outlined in the Soviet proposals.
Molotov did not exclude the possibility that some Poles from abroad could be involved, but he was not a bit sure about Mikołajczyk. The president had proposed five names; it would be a good idea to invite the three members of the provisional government (Bolesław Bierut, Edward Osóbka-Morawski, and General Michał Rola-Z˙ymierski) and two from the president’s list.
FDR asked whether Molotov meant that the presidential committee should be avoided.
Molotov answered that it would be better to avoid the presidential committee and enlarge the National Council and the provisional government. He and Harriman and Clark Kerr could discuss the question of how to enlarge the National Council and the provisional government with three representatives from the Polish Provisional Government and two persons from the president’s list.
Churchill spoke eloquently. He noted that they were now at the crucial point of this great conference: “We would be found wanting by the world should we separate recognizing different Polish governments…If the British Government brushed aside the London government and went over to the Lublin government there would be an angry outcry in Great Britain…We had no special feeling for the Polish government in London, which in my opinion had been foolish at every stage…If they were to give up the London government it must be evident that a new start had been made on both sides from equal terms.”
FDR said all were agreed on the necessity of free elections and that the only problem was how Poland was to be governed in the interval. Having phrased it this way, he was putting Stalin on notice that he expected the government they were wrestling over would be of short duration.
Stalin answered that he could assure the conference that the people running the government were popular. “The three leaders…had not fled from Poland but stayed on in Warsaw and had come from the underground…What puzzles the Polish people is that a great event—the liberation of their country by the Red Army has occurred…For many years the Poles had hated the Russians and with reason, since three times the Tsarist government had participated in the partitioning of Poland…The liberation of Poland had changed the attitude and old resentments had disappeared…The driving out of the Germans by the Red Army had been received by the Poles in the light of a great national holiday.” Then, addressing himself to Churchill’s concern, Stalin continued, “We have different information—the best method, therefore, would be to summon the Poles from different camps and to learn from them. Why could we not deal with an enlarged Polish government? It would be better to deal with the reconstruction of the Provisional Government rather than to attempt to set up a new one.”
FDR asked how long it would be before elections could be held in Poland. Stalin replied it might be possible in a month provided no catastrophes occurred on the front and the Germans began to beat them. With that bit of welcome news, FDR ended the discussion, proposing that the matter be referred to the foreign ministers for study, and this was agreed to. The meeting adjourned at 7:40.
FDR had fifty minutes to rest and change before it was time to leave for the Yusupov Palace in Koreis, where Stalin was giving a dinner in his honor. Going with him were Stettinius, Leahy, Byrnes, Harriman, Flynn, Anna Boettiger, Kathleen Harriman, and Bohlen. When the party arrived at the Yusupov Palace, they found, to their surprise, among the guests, the British and Russian chiefs of staff. In spite of the absence (because of some failure of communication) of the American military, the evening was in many ways the high point of the conference.
The good camaraderie among them started almost immediately, remembered Stettinius: “As we were having vodka and caviar before going into dinner Molotov edged up to me and asked, ‘We have agreed upon the date, where is the [UN] conference to be held?’ ” Stettinius had been working with FDR on finding a suitable place for the conference somewhere in America. Many cities had been considered and rejected for one reason or another. Stettinius had awakened the previous night at about 3:00 a.m. with the clear picture in his mind that San Francisco should be the venue: he had checked it out with FDR in the afternoon, but FDR had merely said, “It sounds most interesting.” Now, remembered Stettinius,
I crossed the room and leaned down to Mr. Roosevelt who was still in his little portable wheel chair, and said, “Molotov is pressing me for a decision as to a place for the conference. Are you ready to say San Francisco?” The president said, “Go ahead, Ed, San Francisco it is.” I went back to Molotov and told him that Mr. Roosevelt had just approved the selection of San Francisco. Molotov beckoned to Eden and we stood in front of an open fire in the presence of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, and drank vodka in the Crimea to the success of the San Francisco conference to open April the 25th, just eleven weeks later.
Two huge tropical plants framed the entrance to the dining room, which was dominated by a great half-moon window set high in the wall. The dinner itself was epic. “Great quantities of food, thirty-eight standing toasts, and mosquitoes under the table,” wrote Admiral Leahy ruefully in his diary. The dinner, which started at 9:00 p.m., consisted of twenty sumptuous courses, during which there were (according to another count) forty-five toasts.
Stalin was in an unusually happy, expansive mood. He was as host seated in the middle of the fifty-foot-long dinner table, with FDR on his right and Churchill on his left. Opposite were Molotov, Eden, and Stettinius.
Stalin led off with a toast to Churchill, toasting him as the bravest governmental figure in the world, who had carried on the fight when England stood alone: he knew of few examples in history where the courage of one man had been so important. He then toasted FDR, saying of him, even though his country was not directly imperiled, he had been the chief forger of the instruments that had led to the mobilization of the world against Hitler. FDR in his toast took the opportunity to reiterate his goal of a world at peace. He spoke of the atmosphere at the dinner as that of a family, that each of them was working in his own way for the interests of his people, that their objectives were to give every man, woman, and child on earth the possibility of security and well-being.
Harriman said afterward he’d never seen Stalin in such great form. “The Bear was at his most friendly,” agreed Sarah Churchill. Kathleen Harriman, too, thought he really was terrific: “He enjoyed himself, was a splendid host and his speeches meant something more than the usual banalities.” He even, at times, according to Kathleen, “just sat back and smiled like a benign old man, something I’d never thought possible.” Furthermore, he kept leaping to his feet to talk, once calling himself a “garrulous old man.” He teased Ambassador Gusev, mimicking his dour look, then wound up about him, “He is a gloomy old man, but sometimes gloomy men are more reliable than likeable ones.”
“He toasted Churchill as the great leader who’d taken command when England was without fighting allies,” recalled Kathleen. “His tribute to the President was harder to explain. Stalin talked about America miles from the war and her leader who prepared her for that war. He talked about allies in war and allies in peace and that allies deceived each other only if they thought they could get away with it. Deceiving was impossible among equals.”
During the dinner FDR noticed Beria, who as the person in charge of security at the conference had not been present before at an event. “Who’s that in the pince-nez opposite Ambassador Gromyko?” he asked Stalin.
“Ah, that one. That’s our Himmler…That’s Beria,” replied Stalin loud enough so that, FDR noticed uncomfortably, Beria could hear him.
Stettinius remembered that during the dinner FDR suddenly had a coughing fit “and couldn’t speak…It lasted a long time. Something due to nerves.” Perhaps it happened following this comment by Stalin. At some point Stalin toasted the hardworking interpreters, “who worked while we were enjoying ourselves.” Bohlen answered his toast with the rephrasing of a line from The Communist Manifesto: “Interpreters of the world, unite; you have nothing to lose but your bosses.” Stalin absorbed the words, then laughed, got up from the table, went and clinked glasses with Bohlen, and congratulated him on his “wit.”
A mark of Stalin’s unusually benign mental outlook was his behavior toward FDR: he left his seat “quite regularly,” one onlooker noticed, to pat the president on the back.
Stalin even waxed philosophical: “History has recorded many meetings of statesmen following a war. When the guns fall silent, the war seems to have made these leaders wise, and they tell each other they want to live in peace. But then, after a little while, despite all their mutual assurances, another war breaks out. Why is this? It is because some of them change their attitudes after they have achieved peace. We must try to see that doesn’t happen to us in the future.”
Roosevelt replied, “I agree with you entirely. The nations can only be grateful for your words. All they want is peace.”
“We felt we were at the focus of history and that justice was standing by, scales in hand,” recalled Gromyko.
Byrnes made a toast “to the people of our respective countries—the workers on farms and in factories—who did not wear the uniform but whose contribution made possible our victories.” Stalin liked the toast so much he rose, went over to him, and, wrote Byrnes, “clinked his glass with mine in approval of the sentiment. The truth is, he is a very likeable person.”
The dinner continued until 1:00 a.m. according to one account, until 2:00 a.m. according to another. It had been a long, ultimately fruitful day. After it Stalin undoubtedly met with his marshals to learn what was happening with the Red Army and issue new orders. FDR went home to bed.
FDR began the day meeting with Stettinius to talk about Poland, instructing him to drop the idea of a presidential committee and present a compromise statement to the plenary session.
At 11:00 a.m., he and the American chiefs of staff together with Churchill and the British chiefs of staff met to hear the final report of the Joint Chiefs on the various theaters of war. Churchill expressed the opinion that Russia should join them in calling on Japan to surrender unconditionally: this might lead it to ask what mitigation could be extended if it accepted the ultimatum. FDR said he doubted whether this would have much effect on the Japanese, who still seemed to think they might get a satisfactory compromise and therefore “would be unlikely to wake up to the true state of affairs until all of their islands had felt the full weight of air attack.” FDR and Churchill and Marshall agreed on the advantages of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which had simplified the solution to the many problems until now, and agreed their military staffs should continue to collaborate.
Gromyko conferred with Stalin during the morning. FDR’s staff had written up the Far East agreement the president and Stalin had worked out the previous afternoon: Stalin wanted Gromyko’s translation. Gromyko produced it and gave it to Stalin. It had a marked effect on the premier, according to Gromyko: “Stalin was so pleased by Roosevelt’s letter. Several times he walked across the room with it, as if he didn’t want to let go of it, and he was still holding it when I left it.”
FDR had invited Churchill to lunch, which was served, as usual, by the Filipino staff in FDR’s dining room. The president, again desiring it to be a purely social lunch, this time invited all three daughters—Sarah Oliver, Anna Boettiger, and Kathleen Harriman—to dine with them, plus Leahy and Byrnes. There was casual conversation initiated by Byrnes who teasingly suggested giving Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska votes in the General Assembly.
The foreign ministers’ meeting began at noon, also at Livadia. Stettinius, the presiding officer, opened the meeting by saying that after consideration he agreed with Molotov’s position of the day before that the creation of a presidential commission should be dropped. Following through on FDR’s directive to find common ground, he continued that the British “Provisional Government,” the American “Government of National Unity,” and the Soviet “Polish Provisional Government” agree that the new government should be composed of members of the present Polish Provisional Government, augmented with members of other democratic elements inside Poland and some Polish leaders from abroad.
Eden questioned the popularity of the Lublin government among the Polish people and defended the reputation and the presence of Mikołajczyk as reassuring to the British people. He touched on the 150,000 Poles fighting with the British army.
Molotov replied that the Russians wanted to hold general elections as soon as practical, and that would do away with all the difficulties. Stalin had said the provisional period would be perhaps one month, the prime minister had mentioned two. However, right now the question was the rear of the Red Army; there were obstacles in the rear. An impossible situation might arise, which was why he had suggested reorganization be on the basis of the present Lublin government with the democratic elements from within and without the country added. As far as Mikołajczyk, the Poles themselves must decide.
Eden said if the Lublin government controlled the elections, they would not be free; Stettinius stated he supported Eden’s views in full. Molotov then, after reading the translation of the American proposal, said he had to consult Stalin. Eden and Molotov continued to argue about a Lublin government as opposed to a more fully representative government.
Stettinius suggested that unless the foreign ministers could get away from the words “existing Polish government,” no agreement could be reached. Because they were deadlocked on the issue and further argument appeared fruitless, Stettinius suggested that they report to the plenary session just that state of affairs: that they had not reached an agreement.
They then discussed the principles governing reparations. Maisky suggested that the Moscow Commission accept the total of $20 million as a basis for its studies. Eden retorted that the prime minister was strongly against stating a figure.
Stettinius suggested that while not mentioning a sum, they could merely state that 50 percent of the total sum would go to the Soviet Union: Molotov did not object.
THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET chiefs of staff were also meeting at Livadia. They had one topic: coordinating the upcoming Russian and American invasion of the Japanese home islands. They set to it, in contrast with the foreign ministers’ meeting, with a singleness of purpose.
General Antonov explained that he had only minor changes to make in the plans that he had worked out with Harriman and Deane in October in Moscow. He went over a list of Soviet needs, plans, and answers to American questions:
a. The main change he had to report was that some units that were supposed to be already moving to the Far East were still in the center of the line on the Russian front and so were behind schedule.
b. Specific supply routes—sea and air—needed to be worked out for food and petroleum after the outbreak of hostilities.
c. The U.S. Air Force could begin operating in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area without delay.
d. U.S. assistance for the defense of Kamchatka was desired: it was a great distance from the bulk of Soviet military strength.
e. Pre-hostility preparations, including construction and storage of U.S. stockpiles in eastern Siberia, were being prepared for U.S. air units.
f. A survey party from Fairbanks to Kamchatka, being so visible to the Japanese, had to wait until the last moment.
g. The Soviets will take southern Sakhalin unassisted by the U.S. forces. It would be one of their first operations. They would open the Strait of La Pérouse.
h. General Antonov assured General Marshall that combined planning between the two armies “will proceed vigorously.”
i. The U.S. request for additional weather stations had been approved.
In reply to a question from General Marshall, General Antonov stated that the Soviets were already shipping supplies, fuel, and such: upon completion of hostilities in Germany the shipments would accelerate. Marshall then asked how many divisions per week could be moved from the German to the Japanese front. Antonov replied that a three-month period was required. As they adjourned, they all expressed pleasure “at the free, frank, clear, and definite interchange of information between the Russian and the American military staffs.”
The sixth plenary meeting convened at 4:00 p.m.
FDR opened the meeting by asking Stettinius to report on the foreign ministers’ meeting. Stettinius stated that the American idea of creating a Polish presidential committee had been dropped, that Molotov was presenting certain new American considerations to Marshal Stalin, and that the three foreign ministers thus far had not reached agreement on the matter.
Molotov stated that they were eager to come to an agreement; he suggested that the first sentence of Stettinius’s proposal be changed. It had read:
The present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed the Provisional Government of National Unity.
Molotov suggested:
The present Provisional Government of Poland should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad, and in this connection this government would be called the National Provisional Government of Poland.
He also suggested that the sentences dealing with the three ambassadors observing and reporting on the elections be eliminated on the grounds that it would be offensive to the Polish people.
Churchill cautioned FDR not to hurry the decision on Poland, that hurried decisions were a great mistake.
FDR then proposed that Stettinius finish his report and they then adjourn for half an hour in order to study Molotov’s changes. Stettinius proceeded to summarize the discussion on reparations. Then he wound up with a matter he said had so far been overlooked: at Dumbarton Oaks it had been decided that the five governments with permanent seats on the Security Council should consult with each other as to the establishment of trusteeships and dependent areas. Hearing the words “trusteeships” and “dependent areas,” Churchill suddenly interrupted and, in a tantrum that was so amazing that James Byrnes, who took shorthand, included it in his book Speaking Frankly, said, “I absolutely disagree. I will not have one scrap of British territory flung into that area. After we have done our best to fight in this war and have done no crime to anyone I will have no suggestion that the British Empire be put into the dock and examined by everybody to see whether it is up to their standard.”
He closed, according to Hopkins, with words to the effect that he would never consent under any circumstances to the United Nations’ thrusting interfering fingers into the very life of the British Empire, and he kept muttering, “Never. Never. Never.”
Churchill’s outburst so amused Stalin that he rose from his chair, walked up and down beaming, and, at intervals, broke into applause. FDR tried to stop the prime minister. “I want Mr. Stettinius to finish the sentence he was reading,” he said. Churchill began to calm down after Stettinius said that the subject was in reference not to the British Empire but to the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific. But, still not entirely calm, he suddenly demanded of Stalin how he would feel if the suggestion was made that the Crimea should be internationalized for use as a summer resort. Stalin smugly replied he would be glad to give the Crimea as a meeting place for the three powers.
A brief adjournment was called, during which coffee and tea and light refreshments, as usual, were served.
When the meeting resumed, FDR applied himself to the task of finding common ground on which they could all come together. He said,
I find that it is now largely a question of etymology. We are nearer than we have ever been before. I believe there is a chance of real agreement to settle this question of the period before the Poles can hold their elections. I suggest that the words [of Molotov’s amendment] be changed to The Polish Provisional Government now functioning in Poland. Mr. Molotov proposes the elimination of the last sentence. I suggest that some gesture be made to show that there will be an honest election…A little more work by the three foreign ministers tonight…might settle the question.
The genius of FDR, who knew that they both relied on him, was that his words forced them to see things his way: by saying they were close to agreement, he made them see the areas of agreement rather than the areas of disagreement.
There followed a long conversation between Churchill and Stalin. Churchill said he knew there were bitter feelings among the Poles and fierce language had been used by Osóbka-Morawski in regard to the London government and that he understood the Lublin government had declared its intention to try as traitors the members of the Polish Home Army. He said these reports caused great anxiety and perplexity, and he wanted observers at the elections. Stalin said there were some very good people among the Poles, that they fight among themselves. He said something that would resonate much later: “Mikolajczyk is a representative of the Peasant Party. The Peasant Party is not Fascist and will take part in the elections. Those candidates will be allowed to stand.”
FDR said he wanted to add a word: the elections were the crux of the matter; it was true, as Marshal Stalin said, that the Poles were quarrelsome; he wanted assurance for the six million Poles in America that the elections would be freely held.
At the beginning of the meeting the Declaration on Liberated Europe, originally drafted by the State Department and revised by Stettinius and FDR, approved by the foreign ministers at their morning meeting, had been distributed to the participants. It was a stirring document, invoking the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.
Stalin now said that he had one small change to propose, which was an added sentence: “Support will be given to the political leaders in those countries who have taken an active part in the struggle against the German invaders.”
FDR pointed out that the foregoing conversation was the first use of the declaration, in that it included the phrase “to create democratic institutions of their own choice.” And further, that the next paragraph (3) contained the following statement: “to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people.”
Stalin replied, “We accept paragraph three.”
FDR now uttered his famous simile: “I want this election in Poland to be the first one beyond question. It should be like Caesar’s wife. I did not know her but she was pure.” Stalin immediately quipped, “They said that about her but in fact she had her sins.” Roosevelt did not rise to the bait, instead answering, “I don’t want the Poles to be able to question the Polish elections. The matter is not only one of principle but of practical politics.”
FDR proposed that they leave the final wording to the foreign ministers. But before they did, Stalin suggested another compromise in the wording: delete the word “present” from “present Provisional Government,” and say “the Polish government which acts in Poland.”
Churchill, still smarting from the mention of trusteeships, agreed to the declaration “as long as it was clearly understood that the reference to the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the British Empire.” By way of explanation he said he had once been on record as interpreting the Atlantic Charter (mistakenly) as affecting the British Empire and had sent a copy of this interpretation to Wendell Willkie. Retorted FDR, to laughter, “Was that what killed him?”
Molotov had the last word on Poland, with the suggestion that the following phrase be added: “and there will be secured a wide measure of support to the men in those countries who have taken active part in the struggle against German occupation.”
Churchill now suggested preparing lists of war criminals and discussing the holding of trials. FDR replied that he was not ready for this question. After a few minutes, FDR called for adjournment.
FDR, CHURCHILL, AND STALIN retired to their respective quarters. FDR had a working dinner with General John E. Hull, the army’s top planner for the war in the Far East; General Kuter, who would command the Pacific Air Forces; Leahy; and Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke. After dinner he worked on the White House mail that had arrived by courier during the plenary session. It would go out first thing the next morning.
The three foreign ministers, charged by FDR with resolving the unresolved issue of Poland, met at the Yusupov Palace at 10:30 p.m., Molotov presiding. Eden announced that his government would not approve Molotov’s formula (as they now referred to the proposed statement), and Molotov objected to Eden’s proposed formula. There was even argument as to whether they were discussing the American formula with amendments added or the prime minister’s words: it was a lengthy but, Bohlen wrote, amicable discussion.
The following text was finally agreed on:
A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.
However, in spite of Bohlen’s writing for the record that it was an amicable discussion, it was not. Stettinius had proposed the addition of a further sentence: “The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.” Molotov absolutely refused to include any variation of these words.
There was disagreement on another issue. Stettinius and Eden refused to accept Stalin’s proposed addition of the following sentence to the draft Declaration on Liberated Europe: “Support will be given to the political leaders in those countries who have taken an active part in the struggle against the German invaders.”
Both of these matters were referred to the next plenary session.
In spite of all the disparate loose ends, FDR had a sense that it was time to wind up the conference. At their morning meeting, saying that he had already been away too long, had pressing problems back in Washington, and had made plans to see Ibn Saud, Haile Selassie, and King Farouk, FDR told Stettinius he had to leave the next day: he would tell Stalin and Churchill later in the day. Stettinius was not surprised.
FDR had already decided in early January that the conference should not extend past five or six days. As he had done at Tehran, he got his way not by announcing that it was time for the conference to end but by saying he was going to leave. A few days earlier he had warned Stettinius that he planned to leave possibly on February 9 or 10, certainly by February 11. As they spoke, Stettinius told FDR about the battle the previous evening with Molotov to insert words giving Harriman and Clark Kerr the right to observe the Polish election process. FDR replied, “If we agree to withdraw this sentence, it must clearly be understood that we fully expect our ambassador to observe and report on the elections. If the statement of this fact irritates the Russians, we can drop the statement, but they must understand our firm determination that the ambassadors will observe and report on the elections in any case.”
Stettinius met with Eden and Molotov as usual at noon. It was Eden’s turn to preside, therefore the meeting was at the Vorontsov Palace.
Stettinius stated that FDR was ready to withdraw the offending sentence “on the understanding that the president would be free to make any statement he felt necessary on Poland relative to his receiving information from his ambassador on the question.” Eden stated that he did not wish to indicate that he approved of the withdrawal. Stettinius agreed and in his acknowledgment indicated that he thought FDR was wrong; he, too, “of course, preferred the document as it existed…The president was so anxious to reach agreement that he was willing to make this concession.”
Molotov then announced he had several new amendments: “as soon as practicable” should be changed to “as soon as possible,” certainly a minor change, but his next amendment was major. He wanted the end of the last paragraph changed to read, “The Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union.” Stettinius said he could not agree with the latter change, which would have put the Soviet Union in charge of any future Polish government. Eden also objected, stating the obvious: that it was most necessary that the three allies move together in recognizing the new government. Molotov then brought up again the issue of Poles’ raising difficulties in the rear of the Red Army. As was the usual case, the matter was dropped, with the thought that it could be revisited later.
The Declaration on Liberated Europe was the next subject of discussion. Stettinius said he had discussed the Soviet amendment stating that “strong support will be given to those people in these countries who took an active part in the struggle against German occupation” with FDR, and the president would not accept it. Molotov then suggested a few minor word changes that Eden and Stettinius agreed to, following which Molotov agreed to drop his amendment regarding U.S. and British acceptance of the new Polish government following Russia’s lead. The issue of reparations was next. Eden stated the case against taking too much from Germany: Britain did not want to finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of reparations. Whether reparation payments should be for five or seven or ten years was discussed and again amounts.
FDR had lunch at Livadia with Anna, Kathleen Harriman, Leahy, Admiral Brown, and Byrnes, who was leaving immediately after lunch. Meanwhile, following the foreign ministers’ conference, at 2:00 Harriman went to the Yusupov Palace, where he met with Molotov to work out the final terms for Russia’s entry into the war in the Far East. Molotov handed him a paper outlining Stalin’s demands, as he and FDR had discussed two days earlier:
1. Status quo in the Outer Mongolia should be preserved.
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:
a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union,
b) possession of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored.
c) the rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding that China should continue to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated. For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.
FDR wanted the following changes made, Harriman informed Molotov: Port Arthur and Dairen should be free ports, and paragraph 2c should cover the alternative of the railways being operated by a Chinese-Soviet commission. In addition, Harriman said, FDR wanted the concurrence of “the Generalissimo,” Chiang Kai-shek. The changes were (additions italicized):
b) possession lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored, or these areas should become free ports under international control.
c) Add the following after the word “Manchuria,” at the end of the paragraph “or these railroads should be placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet Commission.”
Add final paragraph:
It is understood that the agreement concerning the ports and railways referred to above requires the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.
After checking the revised document, FDR told Harriman to resubmit it to Stalin, which Harriman did. The two leaders met at 4:30 in FDR’s study. At that time Stalin told FDR he was willing to have Dairen a free port, but that Port Arthur was to be a Russian naval base, and therefore required a lease. FDR agreed to the change. Then Stalin conceded that it would be more appropriate for the Manchurian Railroad to be operated by a Chinese-Soviet commission, agreed that the generalissimo should be notified and his concurrence sought, and stated he wished FDR (not himself) to seek this out from the generalissimo. FDR said he would send an army officer from Washington to Chungking carrying a letter of instruction to the American ambassador to ensure secrecy, which was the main, indeed overriding concern.
The final draft was drawn up to be read and signed the next day by FDR, Stalin, and Churchill.
THE SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION in the grand ballroom was scheduled to start a bit later than usual, at 4:50, on account of this meeting. It actually started even later, because Stalin met briefly with Churchill who urged him to accept the foreign ministers’ compromise wording on Polish elections. Roosevelt was as usual already seated at his place at the great round table, with his back to the log fire burning in the fireplace, when the two entered the room. Each, singly, went up to FDR and apologized for being late.
FDR opened the meeting by asking Eden to give a report on the progress achieved at the foreign ministers’ meeting. Eden then read the final version of the statement on Poland they had agreed upon. It basically reflected Western, rather than Eastern, terms: there had never been a free, unfettered election on the basis of a secret ballot in the history of Eastern Europe.
A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government will then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
The hours of wrangling had produced a document that all could live with. For FDR and Churchill, there was the promise of free, unfettered elections and the reorganization of the Soviet-controlled government on a “broader and more democratic base”; for Stalin, there was the elimination of the official presence of Harriman and Clark Kerr when the voting would actually take place. In all ways it was an amazing document for Stalin to sign, reflecting, as it did, none of his values, only those of a truly democratic philosophy of government. Observed Churchill’s doctor, Lord Moran, privy to all that transpired at Yalta, “One cannot help noticing Stalin’s deference to the President’s opinions…This frame of mind does not come naturally to Stalin. It must cost him great effort. What is behind it all?”
As they continued talking, Churchill observed that there was no mention of Polish boundaries in the document. FDR explained that he was reluctant to have a public declaration on this subject for a very good reason: he had no right to make an agreement on boundaries; that must be done by the Senate.
Molotov suggested they could say that the Curzon Line was generally representative of the opinion of all present and say nothing about the western frontier. But Churchill disagreed, saying they must say that Poland is to get compensation in the west; also that they must discuss it with the Polish government before the line was drawn. Molotov liked this, replying, “Very good.”
The next subject Eden brought up was a minor matter, having to do with the Declaration on Liberated Europe: the exact wording of the penultimate paragraph. It was finally resolved as follows: “… shall consult together on the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.” Eden then asked for approval of the foreign ministers’ proposal on France hammered out the previous evening: “In issuing this declaration the three powers express hope that the Provisional Government of France will associate itself with them.”
At this point FDR entered the conversation. Stettinius, Freeman Matthews, who had been counselor at the American embassy at Vichy, Harriman, and Hopkins had all been championing Churchill’s view to FDR that if France had a zone in Germany, it had to be on the Allied Control Commission. The unanimity of his advisers finally succeeded in convincing the president and finally overcame his antagonism to de Gaulle, whom he neither liked nor trusted. Now FDR abruptly said, “I have rather changed my opinion. I was opposed to France sitting in on the Commission of Three, the Control machinery. The more I think of it the more I think the prime minister’s contention that a country which has an area to control cannot do so without sitting in on the Control Commission. I think it would be easier if France is on that Control Commission to get De Gaulle to agree to this Declaration and other things. I would like Stalin to think about it.”
In fact, at the time FDR had changed his mind, he had notified Stalin, who had said that “since this was the president’s considered decision he would go along with it.”
Now Stalin said, simply, “I agree.”
There was then a short discussion of the Yugoslav government that was in formation in which FDR did not take part.
The next big subject was reparations. Churchill had the first word, stating that his government had instructed him not to mention figures; FDR went along with his idea not to mention money. Stalin stated he wanted only a monetary expression of what goods cost, not money: monetary sums mentioned were only expressions of the value of reparations in kind. Roosevelt worried that people at home would think of reparations in terms of dollars and cents. Churchill replied that he didn’t understand what was to be published. FDR answered that nothing was to be published.
These words do not do credit to the emotions exposed nor give the details of the arguments generated during what reads like a reasonable disagreement. Disagreement was intense, particularly between Churchill and Stalin, and the written record as given in Foreign Relations of the United States is incomplete. Recounted Hopkins, “Stalin rose and gripped the back of his chair with such force that his brown hands went white at the knuckles. He spat out his words as if they burnt his mouth. Great stretches of his country had been laid waste, he said, and the peasants put to the sword. Reparations should be paid to the countries that had suffered most. While he was speaking no one moved.” Stettinius also noticed Stalin’s unusual emotional state: “Stalin…spoke with great emotion, and even passion, in sharp contrast to his previous manner. On several occasions he arose, stepped behind his chair, and spoke from that position, gesturing to emphasize his point. The terrible German destruction in Russia obviously had moved him deeply. Although he did not orate or even raise his voice, he spoke with intensity.” He wanted it spelled out not only that in principle Germany would pay reparations but that when the Reparations Commission met in Moscow it would take into consideration the U.S.-U.S.S.R. figure setting reparations at $20 billion, with the Soviet Union receiving fifty percent.
Churchill, objecting, read out a telegram from the British War Cabinet stating it was inadmissible to include any figure without further investigation, and the figure of $20 billion was too great.
During the discussion Hopkins advised FDR to support Stalin, passing him the following note: “The Russians have given in so much at this conference that I don’t think we should let them down. Let the British disagree if they want to.” FDR then suggested the matter be left to the Reparations Committee in Moscow.
In the face of Churchill’s opposition and Roosevelt’s refusal to be pinned down as to whether a figure should be mentioned, Stalin proposed the following formula: (1) that the heads of the Governments had agreed that Germany must pay compensation for the damages caused to the Allied nations as a result of the war, and (2) that the Moscow Commission be instructed to consider the amount of reparations.
Churchill agreed, and asked whether FDR did.
“The answer is simple,” he replied. “Judge Roosevelt approves and the document is accepted.”
As the conversation on reparations finally wound down, Stalin leaned over toward Gromyko and asked him for his opinion of FDR: “What should I make of Roosevelt? Does he really disagree with Churchill, or is it just a ploy?” Gromyko’s answer shows how an intelligent person remained in Stalin’s good graces: by showing an understanding of possibilities and nuances and at the same time exhibiting the proper skeptical attitude toward capitalist leaders. He replied, “There are differences between them, but one must be aware that he is correct in his behavior towards the British Prime Minister. Even so, that same correctness would never stop him bringing unofficial pressure on Churchill. If he [FDR] hasn’t done this, I hardly think it accidental.”
Gromyko definitely had a point: when FDR felt strongly about something his view prevailed. Would FDR press the point and agree to the $10 billion figure? Whose side was he on?
As the meeting broke at 6:00 p.m. for a fifteen-minute rest and tea break, Stalin pushed back his chair, and Gromyko heard him mutter, “It’s possible the USA and Britain have already agreed on this with each other.”
Stettinius noticed that the president’s hand shook as he drank his tea.
Gromyko, wanting everything to go well between Roosevelt and Stalin, sought out Hopkins, who he knew was also in favor of rapprochement between Roosevelt and Stalin, and confided to him Stalin’s skepticism about Roosevelt’s commitment. Hopkins thereupon wrote a note to FDR: “The Marshal thinks you did not back up Ed [Stettinius] relative to Reparations—and that you sided with the British—and he is disturbed about it. Perhaps you could tell him privately later.”
When they reconvened, FDR announced that he wanted to revisit the discussion about Poland’s frontiers. During the earlier discussion Hopkins had sent FDR a note of warning: “Mr. President: You get into trouble about your legal powers and what senate will say.” To help solve the problem, FDR had asked Stettinius to confer with his staff for a possible solution; while they were conferring, according to Stettinius, FDR “suddenly looked up at us and said, ‘I’ve got it’…Instead of the first three words, ‘The three powers,’ he would like to substitute, ‘The three Heads of Government consider.’ In the second sentence he proposed eliminating the words ‘three powers,’ and in the last sentence, the word ‘feel’ instead of ‘agree’ should be used.” That turned the statement from a governmental commitment to an expression of views that FDR could safely sign:
The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favour of Poland. It is recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.
Stalin now suggested an addition to the text to indicate that Poland should receive the return of her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder. FDR at this point laughed and asked how long ago these lands had been Polish. Molotov replied very long ago but they had in fact been Polish. FDR said, “This might lead the British to ask for the return of the United States to Great Britain,” and said to Churchill, “Perhaps you would want us back?” Stalin replied, “The ocean prevented this.” After a few more exchanges, FDR announced that he had to leave the next day at 3:00 p.m.
There remained the question of hammering out the final communiqué: he suggested that if they met at eleven the next day, it could be finished by lunch. Both Stalin and Churchill objected: they thought that wouldn’t be enough time, but FDR was obdurate. Stalin said he felt it was impossible to complete the work in view of the dinner Churchill was planning and suggested the dinner might be canceled: this was not seriously considered. The meeting adjourned. The foreign ministers were given the task of agreeing on the wording of the final draft communiqué the Big Three would sign. It was 8:00 p.m.
A half hour or so after the adjournment, FDR and Stalin were on their way to Vorontsov: Churchill was giving the final dinner. It was a very small, select guest list: Roosevelt, Stettinius, and Bohlen; Churchill, Eden, and Birse; Stalin, Molotov, and Pavlov.
The presidential party was the first to arrive at Vorontsov. They were greeted by a regimental guard lined up on the steps of the palace. They entered the palace, which looked more like a castle, to find themselves in a grand vestibule measuring some forty feet wide, the walls of which were lined with large portraits of famous Russian generals in full dress uniforms. Walking through that, they were ushered into a small, beautifully furnished reception room. Cocktails, according to Stettinius, were not served until Stalin and Molotov arrived. A short while after the Russians entered, all moved into the ornate, Moorish-style dining room. The dinner was elaborate and had many courses. Menus were at each place, listing the following: caviar, pies, salmon, sturgeon in aspic, game, sausage, suckling pig with horseradish sauce, and vol-au-vent of game for the first course; game bouillon and cream of chicken for the second course; white fish with champagne sauce and baked kefal for the third course; shashlik of mutton, wild goat from the steppes, and mutton pilaf for the fourth course; roast turkey, roast quail, roast partridge, and green peas for the fifth course; ice cream, fruits, petits fours, roasted almonds, and, finally, coffee finished the dinner.
There were many toasts, but there was also business done. FDR found time to reassure Stalin on the reparations issue, as Hopkins had suggested. Stalin told Churchill that he was unhappy with the way the reparations issue had been settled; Churchill finally backed down. The three, talking together, agreed to state in the protocol the concrete dollar amount that Stalin so desired to have mentioned: that Russia and America would take as a basis of discussion the figure of reparations as $20 billion, half to go to Russia, and that mention would be made in the communiqué that Germany would pay for the damage it had caused the Allied nations.
They toasted each other. Churchill proposed a toast to Stalin’s health, remarking that he hoped the Marshal had a warmer feeling for the British than he had had in the past, that the great victories of the Red Army had made the Marshal more mellow and friendly, the fires of war having wiped out old animosities.
Roosevelt reminisced about an incident involving the Ku Klux Klan, the American organization that he described as hating Catholics and Jews. He had been the guest of the president of the chamber of commerce when he visited a small southern town, he recounted, and had asked the president whether the Italian sitting on one side of him and the Jew on the other were members of the Ku Klux Klan. The president told him they were considered all right because everyone knew them, thus illustrating how difficult it was to have any prejudices—racial, religious, or otherwise—if you really knew people. Stalin observed that “this was very true.”
FDR then proposed a toast both prescient and thoughtful to the prime minister that illustrated how sensitive he was to information and how capable of reacting to it. He must have felt in his bones that Churchill would be voted out of office when the war ended. He now said Churchill had been in and out of government “and it was difficult to say whether he had been of more service to his country within or outside the government…He personally felt that Mr. Churchill had been perhaps of even greater service when he was not in the government, since he had forced people to think.” (He would tell Mackenzie King in March that he intended to see if he could help Churchill get reelected.)
Stalin, showing an ignorance of American politics, asked FDR whether a Labor Party existed in America. FDR replied that it did not, although labor was “extremely powerful.”
FDR mentioned that he was meeting the three Near Eastern kings, including Ibn Saud, at which point Stalin brought up what he called the Jewish problem, which, he said, was a very difficult one: they had tried to establish a Jewish homeland in Birobidzhan, but after a few years they had scattered. FDR answered that he was a Zionist. Stalin said he was one in principle but he recognized the difficulty. This brought Stalin in mind of his treaty with Hitler: he stated that if it had not been for Munich and the Polish-German treaty of 1934, he would never have made the treaty with the Germans in 1939.
When Stalin said to FDR that he didn’t think they could complete the work of the conference by three o’clock the next day, FDR replied that if necessary he would wait over until Monday; Stalin expressed gratification.
Conference staff worked through the night to get the various agreements into final form for the Big Three to sign the next day: the final plenary session was set for noon.
While both Churchill and Stalin felt FDR should stay longer, in fact when they convened at noon for the final plenary session, they found there was little to do except make small changes in the documents: one of Churchill’s changes had to do with substituting a word for the word “joint,” which to him meant British lamb on Sunday. An interesting change, initiated by Stalin, was to request that the final communiqué not say that it had been the president who had put forth the proposal on the voting procedure: he was not against its being made public that the U.S. proposal had been adopted; he just didn’t think the reference to the president belonged in the communiqué; his change was adopted.
There were, however, some final fireworks. Churchill and Eden were shown for the first time the Far East agreement Stalin and FDR had worked out: it caused an immediate row. Presented with the document as a fait accompli, both were furious. Eden advised Churchill not to sign the agreement. As they argued and FDR remained out of the argument, which meant he was not going to insist on Churchill’s signature, both Englishmen became even more furious. Worse, according to Eden, was that the argument was “in front of Stalin and Roosevelt,” Eden being against Churchill’s putting his signature to the document, Churchill maintaining he must. (Neither FDR nor Stalin ever commented upon this.) Eden and Churchill decided to call in for advice Alexander Cadogan, ex-British ambassador to China. Cadogan, agreeing that Churchill should not sign the document, backed Eden. Churchill would not be dissuaded; he and the British general staff were deep into plans to recapture Malay, Singapore, and Burma. Noting that their authority in the Far East would suffer if they were not signatories, and therefore not parties to any later discussions, he signed. Eden’s view of Roosevelt changed: where before he had admired Roosevelt fairly unreservedly (except for what Eden considered the president’s unnatural bias against colonialism), he now thought FDR devious. He would write in his memoirs, “For those who attributed Roosevelt’s decisions to illness, it must be remembered that though the work of the Conference was strenuous enough to keep a man even of Churchill’s energy occupied, Roosevelt found time to negotiate in secret, and without informing his British colleague or his Chinese ally, an agreement with Stalin to cover the Far East. This document was, in my judgment, a discreditable by-product of the Conference.” Churchill did his best to hide the disagreement from the world, later calling it an American affair that was not Britain’s to shape.
FDR had written a letter the day before formally asking Stalin to support him if he felt it necessary, to win the support of Congress and the American people, for the United States to have two more votes in the General Assembly. Stalin now handed FDR a letter saying that he was prepared to officially support the president’s proposal. FDR took measures to keep the matter secret for the time being; in fact, according to Hopkins, he was “extremely anxious” that no aspect be discussed, even privately.
When it came to the matter of actually putting their signatures on documents, the Big Three at first couldn’t agree on who should sign first. FDR said Stalin should sign first because he was such a wonderful host, but Stalin objected on the grounds that if his was the first signature, everyone would say he led: he insisted he be in last place. Churchill then pointed out, “If you take the alphabet I’ll be first. If you take age I also come first.” In the end, the report of the conference and the protocol on German reparations, the main trilateral documents, bore the signature of Churchill first, Roosevelt second, and Stalin third. The agreement regarding the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, however, was signed in a different order: it was the sole agreement signed first by Stalin, then by Roosevelt, and lastly by Churchill.
Much was left out of the documents that were made public. There was no mention of the extra votes for the Soviet Union, the word “dismemberment” was left out for fear it would increase German resistance, and the voting procedure in the Security Council and the matter of territorial trusteeships were not mentioned, because they first had to be cleared with France and China, which were going to be the other two permanent members of the Security Council.
The final lunch, with FDR as host in his dining room at Livadia, followed. With FDR were Leahy, Stettinius, Hopkins, Harriman, and Bohlen. Churchill’s group consisted of Eden, Clark Kerr, Cadogan, and Birse. With Stalin were only Molotov and Pavlov. Stettinius asked Molotov if he could have the painting of a winter scene that was hanging on the wall behind FDR as a memento of their collaboration. Molotov gave it to him. Stettinius’s thank-you letter, sent from Cairo, read, “It will occupy a place of honor at my farm in Virginia which I hope you will be able to visit sometime soon.”
The lunch went on until 3:45, after which FDR left by car for Sevastopol to view the terrible destruction there that Stalin had told him about: the Germans had left not one house standing. According to the New York Times reporter Harrison Salisbury, it looked like a city of the dead. (According to the mayor, “If a room has three walls and a ceiling we count it in good shape.”) After a brief tour FDR would spend the night on the USS Catoctin. An added bonus for this plan was that the drive would take him by Balaclava, where he could see the site of the Charge of the Light Brigade, the famous field that lay between two ridges a quarter mile apart. The following morning the president left for Saki, where the Sacred Cow awaited to fly him to Egypt. There he would board the USS Quincy, anchored in the Great Bitter Lake, in the Suez Canal, have one day of rest, and then meet the three kings, Ibn Saud, Farouk, and Haile Selassie, who were coming aboard the Quincy, one after the other: he particularly wanted to learn about Palestine. Then he would sail for home. (Admiral Leahy, witness to the Churchill-FDR wars over the wisdom of mounting a second front, wrote in his diary that when Churchill learned FDR was meeting with the three kings, the prime minister hastily arranged to do the same thing, “undoubtedly with the purpose of neutralizing any accomplishment the President may have made during his talks with the three kings.”)