part0018

There is a growing feeling that our Members of Parliament (MPs) (and legislators in the states), once elected from a constituency, do not need it any more, till the next elections come around five years or so later. Rather than acting as a bridge between the constituency and the government, a MP in India perceives his role as one of following his party’s directions, apart from looking after his own personal interests. A MP gets a mandate from the constituency, treats it as an irrevocable power of attorney, and thereafter the people have no say in how they are administered on issue after issue.

Let us consider a few examples. When Anna Hazare’s Lok Pal was discussed in Parliament, one intuitively felt a very large degree of public support—a growing revulsion against corruption, and the need to take strong action to combat this menace. One did not find this general mood of the people reflected in the goings-on in Parliament. This was treated as another political matter, to be settled at convenience, and in a manner suitable to the various political parties in Delhi. Is Parliament concerned only with political manoeuvering and jockeying for party positions? Has it nothing to do with tackling issues? If a poll had been taken at any time whether the CBI should be under government control or not, there would have been a loud voice from the people to make the CBI free. The Parliament surely was out of tune with the people.

Let us take the instance of the policy on ‘reservations in promotion’. Accepting that the various deprived classes need special attention, and affirmative action, there could be two views on the subject. Many polls on television channels, while supporting reservation at ‘entry’, indicated a 90 per cent or thereabout opposition to reservations in ‘promotion’. Astonishingly nearly every party in Parliament supported the move (except one, but for reasons not on merit); can there be a greater mismatch between the Parliament’s views and that of the people in general?

In the Gujarat and Himachal Assembly elections in 2012, 74 per cent and 65 per cent respectively of the winning candidates were crorepatis (31 per cent and 21 per cent respectively had criminal cases against them). In theory, a legislator does not hold an ‘office of profit’. However, nearly each one multiplies his wealth while in office. A Congress spokesman, now a Union minister, in November 2012 let the public know in a media discussion that one candidate for the seat of MLA spent

20 crore in his assembly segment election campaign. Assuming a ‘modest’

10 crore expenditure as the norm for each assembly segment, the ‘speculative investment’ is of the order of

40 crore, assuming a 1:4 success ratio. A person willing to invest that much will not be satisfied without a 500 per cent return in one term. This translates to a

200 crore project for each MLA’s post; perhaps double that for an MP. These are turnovers bigger than many universities, hospitals, indeed large industrial projects.

In June 2013, a senior BJP party leader, Gopinath Munde, let it be known in a public speech that he had actually spent about

8 crore for his election as a MP, as against the formally approved limit of

40 lakh. This generated a major furore with the ruling party demanding immediate ‘action’ against the MP, as he had openly confessed to ‘breaking the law’. The Election Commission apparently is issuing him a show cause notice in this regard. What is remarkable is that every single MP and MLA, practically every politician knows that the prescribed limit is broken by 20 or 30 times or more—this is the most open secret in our politics. If Election Commission members are not aware of this fact, clearly they are nincompoops and undeserving of the high positions that they occupy. If they actually know the ‘facts of life’, it is a moot question why they have not taken strong action against rampant violation of the rules, nearly by every candidate. The EC should use this ‘confession’ to start a major campaign, to ensure the elimination of money power in elections. The black money requirements for election purposes is the prime mover for the massive parallel economy in the country. Action just against Gopinath Munde would be pure tokenism, the EC needs to make a significant move to bring the fear of god in defaulting politicians, to ensure that the limits are by and large stuck to. Munde has provided the EC with an opportunity which needs to be fully utilized.

The Election Commission regularly brings out a report after each series of elections on compliance with the existing regulations on expenditure limit by each candidate in each constituency—in general this is of the order of

50 lakh or so. Past practice has indicated that in about 10 per cent of the cases, the candidates have declared their expenditure as going up to 90 per cent of the approved limit; in 90 per cent of the cases, only up to 50 per cent of the limit is reached! These figures are unbelievable—it is surprising how the Election Commission accepts these patently false figures. As mentioned earlier, the limits are exceeded by 20 or 30 times or more in each case. Everyone knows that the official figures are absurdly off-beam. Clearly a change in approach is called for.

After T.N. Seshan, while we have had a number of high quality Election Commissioners and Chief Election Commissioners, none has so far attempted to begin the clean-up of the electoral process, in terms of cleansing it of ‘money power’. Seshan himself had shown how a major issue can be addressed. In later times, Vinod Rai showed how a strong ethical adversarial approach can bring skeletons out of the government’s financial cupboard, and contribute to bringing greater financial discipline. We have had high class commissioners in the past in our Election Commission—men of the of the calibre of T.S. Krishnamurthy have headed the Commission. However, the Election Commissioners in recent years have not fully discharged their functions; they have not used the full authority vested in them by the people through the Constitution to take effective measures to address money power distorting our elections. Nobody stops our Election Commission from hiring chartered accountants, their own financial secret agents to act as their eyes and ears and when false certification is made, to come down heavily and hand down punitive decisions, to act as deterrent. The Election Commission needs to look at itself in the mirror—it is not sufficient if it ‘conducts’ elections ‘peacefully’—it needs to conduct it ‘fairly’. That will happen only when money power is substantially eliminated; till then, no kudos whatever to our Election Commission.

The early 1990s saw the termination of muscle power in our elections (exceptions such as Kunda, only prove the rule); pre-Seshan, two gun-toting goondas, at the village entry point, would ensure that the ‘wrong’ people did not leave the village on voting day. It is the height of irony that two-third of the population is in deep distress and politicians are emerging as the crorepatis in India. The menace of money power is grossly distorting our electoral process. There seems no move from any quarter to reverse the trends. It is a safe bet that any new emerging Seshan will be nipped in the bud, the same way Anna Hazare was.

Why is the Election Commission so placidly supine? Why can’t it arouse itself and enforce the ‘model code of conduct’ with greater pungency and efficacy? It is a constitutional authority, it need not behave like a namby-pamby poodle to be coddled by government. It represents the interests of the people to ensure free elections—this trust is not being fully discharged now. Clearly the Election Commission is too soft, wants to please all political parties, does not want to be seen as unpleasant; its allegiance is to the Constitution and the people of India, who require the Election Commission to be bold, aggressive and do all that is necessary to weed out ‘money power’ in elections. The Election Commission after the days of Seshan has reverted to its standard mode of a pleasant comfortable friend of the government and political parties in the process betraying their trust. This is a call for the Election Commission to wake up, stand and be counted and ensure that money power is wiped out in our electoral system. The Constitution gives it unlimited powers to devise its own methods.

Other distortions are bedeviling our electoral process. Designs borrowed from the UK, US and France, where predominantly two major parties are in contention, have been imported into the Indian system. With multiple parties competing for each seat, the winner can have a mandate supported by as little as 20 per cent of the popular vote. Should a ‘transferable-vote’ system or ‘run-off’ not be envisaged to ensure that the winner or winning party gets at least 50 per cent of popular support? Will that not ensure greater stability and higher acceptability and credibility in dealing with contentious issues?

In theory, we have a parliamentary form of government, of the British model, as compared to the US presidential model. In nearly every state, the chief minister rules like a despot, supported by a kitchen cabinet of staff officers and a personal secretariat. To some extent, the same is also true at the Centre. Is this what our Constitution makers envisaged six decades back? Are there effective checks and balances on the Executive? Have we drifted into a presidential mode in substance, while retaining a Parliamentary façade? If this is so, this should be a conscious, well thought out and debated decision, not a matter of convenience for those in power to slip it in on the sly.

Sometime in May 2013, the Central Information Commission, taking up the petition of an activist, gave its orders that the Right to Information (RTI) Act was applicable to national political parties, giving technical and legal arguments to buttress its decision. Clearly this will be challenged in the apex court, and it remains to be seen as to what is the final legal view that will prevail. However, immediately after the finding, nearly every national political party roundly condemned the decision, referred to it as impracticable and wooly-headed and said that it was un-implementable. I recall that in 1997, when I got the first draft of the RTI prepared and took it to the Cabinet, nearly every government servant from the Joint Secretary to Secretary level that I spoke to, referred to it as impracticable, un-implementable and utopian and that it would seriously hamper the internal processes of the government. The objections now from political parties heard were nearly on identical lines! It should be remembered that in 10 years of implementation, RTI has brought out more ‘facts’ in the realm of the public, than 60 years of ‘Question Hour’ in Parliament. It has done a good deal to clean up the internal processes and to give spine to officers who want to stand up within the system. In an era where our electoral processes urgently need to be cleaned up, a new Seshan is required to emerge to purge our elections from the hold of black money. Clearly this new order of the Information Commission will contribute to the commencement of the process. For decades, practical recommendations for electoral reforms have remained unimplemented, indeed have gathered dust with no attention whatever from Authority. When there is no desire to reform the system by those concerned, the reforms have to be rammed through—this is what the RTI is seeking to do. Ironically, parties which generally oppose each other on nearly every issue, have gotten together to stand shoulder-to-shoulder to oppose this move!; much like they all worked together, overtly or covertly, to kill the proposal to create a Lok Pal a couple of years back. If one were to have a referendum in the country on whether political parties should become more transparent, whether their income and expenditure details should be widely available, one imagines that there will an overwhelming response in the affirmative. It is ironical that in this ‘democracy’, political parties which control our governance, appoint the prime minister, the cabinet and other executives take a position totally contrary to what the public wants or demands. It is only in the democracy-model of this country that one can see a total dichotomy between what the public wants and what their ‘representatives’ decide.

Detailed information regarding source of every income and where and in what manner the money is spent is essential to be available in the public domain for every party. After all, it is the parties which determine the chiefs of the executive branch, and have a major role to play in governance at the Centre and in the states. He who pays the piper calls the tune. People have the inalienable right to know who has money power over the parties. So much black money enters the electoral process, more information on party funding and expenditure will definitely inhibit the role of black money in our elections. Besides, the details of expenditure on helicopters/planes being hired and other related issues are of major public interest. Do businessmen pay for the political travel by party men is a relevant question. When a party person lands somewhere by private helicopter or plane, it is a very relevant question for the public whether the ‘leader’ paid for the ride from his own pocket, or was the expense covered officially by the party, or whether a private businessman funded the trip. Accordingly the finances of a party ought to be in the public domain. Whether this is done through the RTI Act, or by an administrative fiat by the Election Commission, or through voluntary agreement between the parties, the modality is irrelevant. The substance is that the detailed finances of parties should be in the public domain.

Not surprisingly nearly all political parties oppose exposure of their finances to RTI. They have all ganged up to legislate the exclusion of political parties from RTI. Legal ‘luminary’ Kapil Sibal, who propounded the ‘zero loss’ theory in the 2-G context, had announced that the Chief Information Commissioner’s verdict bringing political parties in the ambit of RTI was ‘flawed’. Clearly the flaw, under the concept of rule of law, ought to have been ‘rectified’ through an appeal in the apex court. However, the government chose to bring a hammer to the table—to ram through a legislation excluding parties from RTI in the process telling the citizens of this largest democracy that they do not count, that the hammer will smash the concept of ‘transparency’ if it impinges on the privacy of the political executive and the politician—in other words, utter contempt for democratic principles. Can a greater example of Parliament not bothering about what the citizens wants be given? Will this attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India?

Many countries have a ‘referendum’ procedure while considering policies or projects touching a cross-section of the population, either locally or nation-wide. Thus, for example in Switzerland, one of the best run democracies, each Canton has a referendum system; similarly so too in each US county. The only channel available in India is the Member of Parliament; he does not ‘represent’ his constituency—he ‘commands’ it—he is accountable to no one except his party boss .

Let us take the issue of FDI in multi-brand retail, where there is large-scale opposition. Without taking a position, we note that there are strong interests to support the policy and a vocal group opposing it. Chief ministers representing 70 per cent of the national population have expressed strong reservations. Is it prudent to plunge hastily into a policy decision, irrespective of what the people think? Is it a pure economic decision, not involving our people? Is it a mere matter of ‘proving’ a parliamentary majority? Should this not be subject to ascertaining the people’s opinion in a national election which is due in a year or so? For something that has not been done for nearly 65 years, is there a tearing hurry to do it today, in the teeth of major apprehensions? Are we a true democracy? Are the people important, or have we outsourced all our authority, power and interests to our politicians and Members of Parliament?

In the course of the FDI in retail debate in the Rajya Sabha, 18 parties spoke; of these, 14 spoke against introducing FDI in retail, while only four members of the ruling coalition spoke in favour. Of the parties who opposed the move, at least four belonged to the ruling coalition; all spoke vehemently against the move, mentioning that the medium and long term effects would be disastrous for small retailers and farmers, who constitute the bulk of the population; that the measure will eliminate jobs in the country, rather than create new employment. At the time of voting, however, one of these major parties abstained, and the other three voted for the proposal, having earlier stridently opposed the move. If all the parties had voted on the lines they took in the House, the executive decision on FDI in retail would have been defeated.

What is the morality of a party taking a strong position in the House, and voting against its own position when the matter is brought up for counting of numbers especially when it was made clear that the ruling coalition will not collapse if the vote went against it. What is the message sent by these Janus-faced parties to their own constituencies, as well as to the country at large? Is there a feeling in the country that it does not matter what position, principled or otherwise, that a party or a politician takes—the public can be hoodwinked and the prevaricators will not be punished? Is all our politics about vote banks, caste and community issues, all of which having nothing to do with major matters relating to our economy or culture or security? It is a terrible thought that the electorate in all likelihood will not punish those who say one thing, and vote the other way within the hallowed precincts of the Parliament—our temple of democracy. Indeed is this temple being treated by our pandas and pujaris with contempt? How can one expect the citizen to take Parliament seriously?

Given the mismatch between the way our Parliament performs and the thinking of the people, is it now time to consider introducing a ‘referendum’ procedure in our constitutional practice? A regime needs to be considered for adoption where major policy matters would be tested from time to time, to ascertain what the nation as a whole thinks about it, rather than depending exclusively on the interests of our parliamentarians to decide the nation’s direction. This will mean curtailing the powers of the Parliament, which has to some extent forfeited its right to represent the people, through a poor performance record over decades. The owner now desires to amend the power of attorney he signed and gave, to make it conditional on his consent on major issues!

Great Britain had a 1,000-year history of struggle between the Parliament and the monarch, before it could reach the current stage of democracy, where genuinely the citizen is supreme. Perhaps India got its independence too easily; strangely the struggle in India now appears to be between the citizen and his Parliament—the citizen may not be able to trust his own Parliament fully anymore to represent him! With the growing mismatch between the needs of our politicians and the interests of the people, and given the large levels of venality, vote bank politics and callousness exhibited by the political class, has the time come now to examine the need for a ‘referendum’ procedure in our constitutional practice?

In the past 60 years or so, a very large number of unresolved problems have continued to persist; many new serious difficulties have cropped up. No doubt issues like poverty, illiteracy, public health have all been victims of poor public policies, and worse implementation; but there are other kinds of issues which have lingered on for decades without a solution. No doubt time is a great healer, and many issues get resolved with efflux of time. However, there are many other kinds of issues which keep festering, occasionally come to the boil and generally become slowly intractable. For instance, the issue of settling our border with China, or the contours of our relationship with Pakistan, or say how to deal with internal insurgencies—Naxalism or Maoism. These have been with us for decades, flare up to fairly serious proportions from time to time and generally become politicized whenever they surface as an immediate issue. Whereas these should be treated as national problems, with a long-term national strategy and approach, these lend themselves to the buffetings of the politics of the day. Take, for example, the issue of our border with China—there is no question that if we get a reasonable settlement, it is better to settle the border, than to leave it open. However, with our present approach to the issue, every time an incident takes place, it assumes inordinate proportions, becomes a political football, a lot of loose comments are made and we lose strategic momentum. This is a national issue to be tackled as such. However, given the contentious political scenario, with none holding a clear majority in Parliament, postures and positions are taken often for the sake of the politics of the day, with little relevance to its long-term implications.

We may refer to the decision of the Cabinet taken in summer 2013 for the creation of Telengana by bifurcating Andhra Pradesh. This is a major decision, not only affecting the 13 or so crores of Telegus, but also with potential implication for many other states. Note that demand for creating new states is in different stages of intensity in many parts of India. The general policy hitherto had been on creating new states on a ‘linguistic’ basis. On these grounds, there is no logic in creating the new Telengana state. Indian experience has shown that the quality of administration is ‘size-neutral’—the quality of governance is a function of the people in-charge of affairs, rather than the size of the state. It can also be argued that given the increasing venality of our political class, the more distant decision-making is from direct political attention, the cleaner it is likely to be. Be that as it may, it is obvious that the Telengana decision was taken on grounds purely of expediency, from the strategic and tactical perspective of the party in power in Delhi, that is, the Congress Party. The timing of the decision also leads one to suspect that the creation of Telengana is related to the political fortunes of the Congress Party in the forthcoming elections. We may note that this decision, apart from anything else, is likely to intensify demands for new states in many locations in India.

We will have a piquant situation if the undivided Andhra legislature votes against a bifurcation! What will Delhi do? Will the Centre ‘overrule’ the state legislature? By now it is well known that politicians/members of legislatures do not represent the views of the constituencies; they act only in pure self-interest. Is not this an appropriate issue for a referendum in Andhra, whether a separate state should be created or not? Should this decision be taken only in Delhi by politicians who have no particular concern about the citizens of Andhra, and have an interest only in their own electoral fortunes? Given the current mismatch between the interest of the citizens and that of the legislature, which purports to represent him (citizen), the introduction of a ‘referendum’ procedure for certain types of important decisions seems to be highly desirable.

In 1984 Rajiv Gandhi came to power with a massive majority. At that time many of the long standing problems that the country faced like our international borders, many major domestic inter-state and state-Centre issues and others could have been sorted out, if there was some statesmanship available in the scenery. The fact is that Rajiv had no comprehension of the nature of the issues to be tackled, and how to go about it. This is the danger of having tyros in-charge of complex operations. However, that opportunity was lost, the goodwill and assets which Rajiv brought into his office were scattered away with careless abandon with both hands in a very short time, and we were back to square one. Now, sadly, we are in a position where no serious large national issue can be settled by consensus, and without a debilitating fracture in Parliament. This is where the device of a ‘referendum’ could come in handy. The most fractious issues, where consensus cannot be obtained due to political posturing, can be brought to the people from time to time to get the issue finally settled. After all, in a democracy, the citizens are the final arbiters—the Parliament is only a convenient way to represent their views and positions. While national sovereignty vests with Parliament, the citizen is supreme in a democracy—when he decides by majority vote, that should be final. There is a strong case for introducing a referendum procedure in our political process.

The past history of performance of Joint Parliamentary Committees (JPCs) to investigate major events in the country and to recommend remedial measures has been sub-optimal, to say the least. One can recall the four or five previous JPCs, which were built as mountains but turned out to be mole-hills. The Bofors or Harshad Mehta JPCs produced nothing worthwhile, they were merely political exercises in making a grand show of major activity, with no serious action intended. The JPC on the 2-G scam is going the same way as the three key witnesses, who were closest to the final decision-making, have steadfastly been prevented from tendering their evidence—contrary to the first principles of any investigation. In this continuing saga, one sees further failure in our Parliament to do the obviously right thing—to hide behind narrow technicalities, using brute political majority, to thwart the uncovering of truth. Parliament’s reputation has taken a further beating and the public is now seeing how openly it is being hoodwinked .

Two developments (summer 2013) need to be noted. The main accused in the 2-G case, previous telecom minister A. Raja had formally asked to depose before the JPC. The JPC, in its wisdom, denied his request and the Chairman of the JPC advised him to send a ‘written deposition’, if he so desired (it has been reported that Raja indeed has since sent a 15-page ‘deposition’ in writing to the JPC). The ostensible reason why Raja cannot depose was that he is an accused in a criminal case, and that it would be ‘inappropriate’ for him to be ‘examined’ by the JPC. At other times, the ‘reason’ trotted out was that calling him as a witness may entail asking all previous telecom ministers to depose before the JPC.

Both so-called ‘reasons’ appear to be hogwash. Firstly, a Member of Parliament can always make a statement in Parliament, whether being an under-trial or not. The Parliament and the judiciary are separate fora—there is no reason why an individual cannot engage or be engaged with both. Raja is not a convict, at present he is merely charge-sheeted. It is common practice that even convicts have interacted with Parliament and been allowed to be present on special occasions. Raja can be examined under Section 313 of the Cr.PC by the trial court, with no reference to the proceedings in JPC. Raja is squarely in the radar for the 2-G scam—if earlier telecom ministers need to be called to provide information, so be it; they should be called.

New information has recently emerged in the public domain that the details of all decisions, including those relating to policy and implementation, were known in the PMO, were analysed there thoroughly and that all concerned were in the loop. Similarly, a detailed internal government memo, mentioning the major developments relating to the scam (including the strong notings in the finance ministry arguing for market-related pricing), going to the extent that the then finance minister could have prevented the loss, has been in existence. In fact this paper purports to prepare a ‘common’ inter-departmental position on the 2-G matter. Can this not be interpreted as tampering with evidence and influencing witnesses, which possibly is another criminal act? A detailed analysis by a then senior officer in the finance ministry was quietly sidelined and that person shunted out, allegedly being deprived of a prestigious foreign posting.

Should not Parliament find out how such a humongous failure of governance took place? The JPC may not be a court of law, to award punishment to wrong doers and enforce the law; however it has a larger role to play—its duty is to find out the circumstances under which such massive failure took place, how the system was subverted—and make proposals on how to improve the system. How can this task even start, if there is refusal by the JPC to ascertain the basic facts from the people who know most about it? A refusal to look at the whole truth can be seen as a betrayal of the purpose for which it was set up.

It can be recalled that there was a petition against P. Chidambaram’s election from Sivaganga constituency in Tamil Nadu on the issue of alleged electoral malpractices, in particular of tampering with electronic voting machines (EVMs), during the elections in 2009. This was nearly five years back; the new elections are due in months and there is still no verdict from the court whether the election was valid or not. As soon as the present Parliament is dissolved prior to the general elections, one presumes that the petition against Chidambaram will lapse. This is not fair either to him or to the public at large. In all possible likelihood, there was no serious malpractice. In that event, there ought to be a declaration by an appropriate authority that the election process was fully valid. On the other hand, it is possible that there were malpractices, unlikely but possible. It is unjust to the nation to allow a person to hold a high office in the country dealing with Home and Finance, and then to declare that he was there without legitimacy. Either way there clearly ought to be a better method to decide the legitimacy of membership to the House within months rather than letting the issue fall by default.

I recall that when I was posted in Geneva in the late 1980s, I heard about the fodder case, and inquiries against Lalu Yadav in Bihar. The other day, in summer 2013, one saw in the newspapers that proceedings are on, and very recently he has been convivted in one case (autumn 2013). This really is an issue that concerns our justice administration, rather than a legislator. However, it is unfortunately a fact that rich, famous and influential people can get away with dilatory tactics and avoid facing real charges for decades. For instance, actor Salman Khan has managed delays for at least one decade on two very specific charges, without the matter actually reaching the trial phase. A large number of MPs/legislators are able to manipulate the system to ensure that the cases against them rarely advance.

Many have raised the question as to what is the real contribution made by Parliament in the process of governance. As one of the three major pillars of the Constitution, does it carry its share of the burden of governance? Firstly, Parliament is a place where important facts relating to the nation are recounted, specific actions or activities of the executive are questioned and facts elicited to keep the executive on its toes. Towards this we have the Question Hour, where ‘inconvenient’ questions demand credible, truthful answers. I really do not recall any information newly available to the public through the medium of the Question Hour, over the past six decades. On the contrary, the ten-year old Right to Information Act has produced much more information and facts relating to the executive than decades of Question Hour.

The other important purpose of Parliament is for major national issues to be debated and the perspectives and points of view of the political parties to emerge facilitating a citizen to take an informed view on public issues. This role is now being effectively done on television. Every evening, on every channel, parties express their views on national issues ad nauseam. I have not recently known of anyone who turns to Parliament to find out what a political party thinks on a particular issue. Ironically, many parties take a position outside and inside Parliament on a particular issue, but vote on a contrary manner when the time comes—this tendency to hoodwink the public is mentioned elsewhere.

The third major function of Parliament is enacting laws. In this context, much lament has been heard in the past couple of years about the opposition ‘obstructing’ the work of Parliament by denying a debate. The government of the day has blamed the opposition for lack of progress on reforms, and non-enactment of important legislations, due to obstructionist tactics, not allowing the Houses to function. This is totally absurd. Firstly, during the past two years, the Parliament functioned about 66 per cent of its total work schedule. Surely, it would not have achieved much more by functioning for, say, 90 per cent of its capacity. Secondly, in 2010 or so, 12 Acts were passed in Parliament within the space of eight minutes. That is all it really takes for an Act to be passed, if the government of the day wishes to impose its rude majority.

In summer 2013, the UPA government brought in the Food Security Ordinance, about a month before the scheduled monsoon session, which as per the Constitution, has to be confirmed in the following session. This was clear contempt of the concept of debate in Parliament and the sanctity of its functioning. The government had been in power for nine years so there was no tearing urgency, or emergency need for an Ordinance on this subject. In the monsoon session, which was getting stalled due to many other issues, the question was raised as to what the government would do in case it was unable to pass the relevant legislation. Astonishingly, the spokesman of the Congress Party, on a television debate (NDTV 18 August 2013) openly stated that it was the prerogative of the ruling party that it could bring an Ordinance at any time. If the Ordinance was not confirmed in the monsoon session, it would wait for the session to be over, at which time the Ordinance would lapse as per the Constitution. He then aggressively added ‘we will then re-promulgate the Ordinance the very next day after the session lapsed’. Can there be greater contempt for the concept of Parliament from the ruling party? Can there be greater proof to establish that debates and discussions are redundant in Parliament and that the ruling party will rule with or without Parliament.

Parliament is the repository of the sovereignty of the nation; it is the highest temple of democracy in the country. We have seen earlier how over the decades the priests have desecrated this hallowed institution. Of the major pillars of the Constitution, it is really the legislature (at the Centre and in the states) which is the weakest link – nearly non-functional in performance over time. Let us imagine a scenario where the Parliament (or state legislature) meets only once a year for two or three days, passes a vote of confidence on the executive (alternately dismisses the executive through a vote), passes a clutch of laws by vote and does nothing else. Would this scenario in any way reduce or impinge on the quality of governance as we have it today? Will the people notice any difference? Is the Parliament in effect irrelevant for India except for periodically renewing the mandate of the government in power? Sadly, this appears to be the case. Any country, where the Parliament and parliamentarians appear to be objects of ridicule or pity, or are seen to be brazen, is in trouble. The situation is surely in need of an effective remedy. It is for parliamentarians of different colours to ponder this issue, and see how they can bring credibility back to this highest institution. If this is not done seriously, one could question the future of democracy in the country with much anxiety.