ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN HISTORY

The Ayyubid state from 1193 to 1250 can best be understood as a confederation of rival principalities ruled by the extended Ayyubid family, generally under the hegemony of three sultans of Egypt: Saladin's brother al-Adil (1200–1218), his son al-Kamil (1218– 1238), and the latter's son al-Salih (1240–1249). When faced with a serious outside threat—such as a Crusader invasion from Europe—most of the rival princes united, only to again fall into bickering when the threat was removed. Saladin himself laid the foundation for this instability when, true to contemporary Near Eastern concepts of succession, he divided his empire among kinsmen, with brothers, sons and other relatives receiving semi-autonomous fiefs and principalities. With the feuding and incompetence of Saladin's sons weakening the state, Saladin's brother al-Adil (1200–1218) organized a coup, declared himself Sultan of Egypt, and established hegemony over the rival Ayyubid princes. Thereafter, although there was some expansion of Ayyubid power in northwestern Mesopotamia, for the next half century the Ayyubids generally remained on the defensive, facing two major enemies: Crusaders and Mongols.

In general, Ayyubid policy toward the Crusaders in the thirteenth century was one of truce, negotiation and concession. However, Crusader aggression aimed at recovering Jerusalem brought three major invasions. The Fifth Crusade (1218–1221) attacked Egypt and temporarily conquered Damietta, but was defeated at Mansura in 1221. Under the emperor Frederick II the Sixth Crusade (1228–1229) capitalized on an ongoing Ayyubid civil war and succession crisis, in which the Ayyubid princes of Syria and Palestine were allied against al-Kamil of Egypt. To prevent a simultaneous war against these rebellious Ayyubid princes and Frederick's Crusaders, al-Kamil agreed to cede a demilitarized Jerusalem to the Crusaders (1229). This respite provided the opportunity to force his unruly Ayyubid rivals into submission and establish himself firmly on the throne of Egypt. The last Crusader invasion of Egypt, the Seventh Crusade under Louis IX of France (1249–1251), also invaded Egypt, culminating with a great Ayyubid victory over the Crusaders at Mansurah (1250). But the untimely death of the sultan al-Salih at the moment of his triumph created a succession crisis resulting in the usurpation of power by mamluk generals, founding the Mamluk dynasty of Egypt (1250–1517).

Following the Mamluk usurpation of Egypt, supporters of Ayyubid legitimacy rallied around al-Nasir Yusuf (1236–1260), the grandson of al-Adil and ruler of Damascus and Syria. His failed attempt to invade Egypt in 1251 was overshadowed by the threat of the Mongols from the east, who destroyed Baghdad (1258), invaded Syria (1259), and captured and brutally sacked Aleppo, and conquered Damascus (1260). Al-Nasir was captured and put to death along with most surviving Ayyubid princes in Syria. The Mamluk victory over the Mongols at the battle of Ayn Jalut (1260) allowed them to add most of Palestine and Syria to their new sultanate.

WILLIAM J. HAMBLIN

See also: Egypt: Fatimids, Later; Salah al-Din/Saladin.

Egypt and Africa: 1000–1500

From Egypt, Islamic influence extended in three directions: Through the Red Sea to the eastern coastal areas, up the Nile Valley to the Sudan, and across the western desert to the Maghrib.

The Arab conquest, and the southward expansion of Islam from Egypt, were arrested by the resistance of the Christian kingdoms of Nubia. By the tenth century, however, a peaceful process of Arabization and Islamization was going on in northern Nubia as a result of the penetration of Arab nomads. Muslim merchants settled in the capitals of the central and southern Nubian kingdoms, al-Maqurra, and ‘Alwa. They supplied slaves, ivory, and ostrich feathers to Egypt. From the eleventh century, a local Arab dynasty, Banu Kanz, ruled the Nubian-Egyptian border. For four centuries they served both as mediators between Egyptian and Nubian rulers and as proponents of Egyptian influence in Nubia. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, they assumed control of the throne of Nubia after they had married into the Nubian royal family.

Arab revolts in Upper Egypt were endemic during the Fatimid and Ayyubid periods. The trained Mamluk troops defeated the Arab tribes that were forced to move southward, thus intensifying the process of Arabization of Nubia. Since the second half of the thirteenth century the Mamluk sultans had frequently intervened in the internal affairs of the Nubian kingdoms, and gradually reduced them to the status of vassals. In 1315 the Mamluks installed as king a prince who had already converted to Islam. This was followed two years later by the conversion of the cathedral of Dongola into a mosque. The Christian kingdom became practically a Muslim state. Christianity lingered on until the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Once the barrier formed by the Nubian kingdoms had been broken, waves of Arab nomads coming from Upper Egypt pushed beyond the cataracts, and spread westward into the more open lands of Kordofan and Darfur, and as far as Lake Chad. In 1391 the king (mai) of Bornu, ‘Uthman ibn Idris, wrote to Barquq, the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, concerning harassment by Arab nomads, who captured slaves including the king's own relatives. These slaves were sold to Egyptian merchants, and the king of Bornu asked the sultan to return the enslaved people.

With the decline of Christianity in Nubia, Ethiopia remained the only Christian power in Africa. There were close contacts between Ethiopia and Egypt throughout the Mamluk period. There was some awareness of the fact that the Ethiopians controlled the sources of the Blue Nile. The Ethiopians were concerned with the fate of the Christian Copts in Egypt, and when in the middle of the fourteenth century the Patriarch of Alexandria was arrested the Ethiopians retaliated by seizing all Muslims in their country and drove away all the Egyptian caravans. The Mamluks released the patriarch, and trade was resumed.

Beginning in the Fatimid period in the tenth century, Egypt developed trade with the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Muslim seamen from Egypt and Arabia established commercial centers along the Red Sea and Africa's east coast. Ivory and spices were exported via Egypt to the Mediterranean trading cities. Ethiopian slaves were in great demand in all Muslim countries. In the fourteenth century Egyptian economic influence was paramount in Zeila and other ports which were the starting points for trade routes to the interior. Muslim principalities emerged on the fringes of Christian Ethiopia, and the Egyptian rulers sought to be their protectors. Students from southern Ethiopia had their own hostel in al-Azhar. The Egyptians did not venture beyond Zeila, and there is no evidence for direct contacts between Egypt with the rest of the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Still, the role of Egypt in the development of Muslim trade all over the Indian Ocean must have indirectly influenced also the rise of Muslim trading towns on the East African coast. At the end of the period surveyed in this article the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean and broke the monopoly of Egypt as the commercial intermediary between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

Between the tenth and the sixteenth centuries Egypt absorbed huge numbers of black slaves from various parts of Africa, mainly from Nubia and Ethiopia. During the Mamluk period there were also slaves from central and western Africa. Black eunuchs in the service of the Mamluks were exported to Egypt from West Africa. Nupe (in present-day Nigeria) might have been the site where eunuchs were castrated.

According to Ibn al-Faqih (writing shortly after 903), there was a busy route connecting the Egyptian oases of the Western Desert with Ghana. But, according to Ibn Hawqal (writing between 967 and 988), this route was abandoned during the reign of Ibn Tulun (868–884) “because of what happened to the caravans in several years when the winds overwhelmed them with sand and more than one caravan perished.”

In the middle of the thirteenth century, a hostel was founded in Cairo for religious students from Kanem. In the second half of the thirteenth century, two kings of Mali visited Cairo on their way to Mecca. But the most famous pilgrim-king was Mansa Musa, whose visit to Cairo in 1324 left such an impression in Egypt that all Egyptian chronicles, as late as the middle of the fifteenth century, recorded the event. The huge quantities of gold that he spent affected the exchange rate between gold and silver.

After the exhaustion of the Nubian gold mines of al-’Allaqi, Mamluk coins were minted from West African gold. According to al-’Umari (writing in 1337), the route from Egypt to Mali once again “passed by way of the oases through desert country inhabited by Arab then by Berber communities.” Early in the sixteenth century, Leo Africanus said that the people of the Egyptian oases were wealthy because of their trade with the Sudan. Another route passed through Takedda and Gao. Egyptian merchants visited the capital of Mali, and some of them bought from a profligate king of Mali, Mari Jata II (1360– 1373), a boulder of gold weighing twenty qintars. In return for gold, Mali was a market for Egyptian goods, particularly fabrics. Mamluk brass vessels found in the Brong region, north of Asante, are silent witnesses to the trade with Egypt. The flow of gold to Egypt diminished somewhat in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries because of competition by Italian merchants in the North African coast, who channeled the gold to the Italian cities that were hungry for gold.

In the second half of the fifteenth century, the growth and refinement of scholarship in Timbuktu may largely be explained by influence from Cairo, then the greatest Muslim metropolis. Scholars of Timbuktu, on their way to Mecca, stayed for some time in Cairo, and studied with its distinguished scholars and Sufis. The Egyptian scholar who had the greatest influence in West Africa was Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (1445–1505). In his autobiography al-Suyuti boasted about his fame in West Africa. Indeed, his Tafsir is still the most widespread Koranic exegesis in this part of the world. He corresponded with West African rulers and scholars.

In 1492 Askiya Muhammad led a religiopolitical revolution in Songhay that made Islam the cornerstone of the kingdom. Four year later, in 1496–1497, Askiya Muhammad visited Cairo on the way to Mecca. In Cairo he met Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, from whom he learned “what is permitted and what is forbidden.” It was probably al-Suyuti who introduced Askiya Muhammad to the ‘Abbasid Caliph, who lived in Cairo under the patronage of the Mamluk sultans. The ‘Abbasid Caliph delegated authority to Askiya Muhammad that gave legitimacy to his rule. Twelve years earlier, in 1484, al-Suyuti was instrumental in arranging a similar investiture by the ‘Abbasid Caliph to the king of Bornu ‘Ali Gaji (1465–1497).

Al-Suyuti's teaching mitigated the uncompromising zeal of the North African radical al-Maghili, who sought to become the mentor of Sudanic kings at that time. Al-Suyuti saw no harm in the manufacture of amulets and ruled that it was permissible to keep company with unbelievers when no jizya was imposed on them. Al-Suyuti's pragmatic approach, representing the conservative tendencies of the alliance of scholars, merchants, and officials in Mamluk Egypt, contributed to the elaboration of an accommodating brand of Islam in Timbuktu of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

NEHEMIA LEVTZION

Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty: Baybars, Qalawun, Mongols, 1250–1300

The Mamluk dynasty rose to power in Egypt through a series of crises forced upon the Ayyubid dynasty by exterior threats. The Mamluks themselves were slaves purchased in large quantities by Sultan al-Salih Ayyub (r. 1240–1249), who were then trained as soldiers, converted to Islam, and then manumitted. The Mamluks formed an elite corps of soldiers with loyalty only to their former master. With the Mongol invasions of the Kipchak steppe, in what is now Russia, large numbers of Turks were readily available.

Egypt under the Mamluks, c. 1250–1500.

The first exterior threat that led to the rise of the Mamluks was the Seventh Crusade led by King Louis IX (1226–1270) of France in 1249. As the army of King Louis invaded Egypt, al-Salih Ayyub died. His son, al-Mu'azzam Turan-shah (r. 1249–1250) was not immediately present, and the Ayyubids of Egypt were briefly without leadership. Meanwhile, King Louis's army had halted at the fortified city of Mansurah. His vanguard swept away all opposition and entered the city before becoming trapped and annihilated by the defenders led by the Bahriyya regiment of al-Salih's Mamluks. The Muslim forces led by the Mamluks soon surrounded the Crusaders and King Louis. Facing the potential annihilation of his disease-ridden army, King Louis surrendered.

Upon victory, Sultan Turan-shah arrived and became the ruler of Egypt in 1249. The Bahriyya Mamluks, along with other Mamluks desired more power in the government due to their efforts at Mansurah. Turan-shah, however, disagreed and only placed his own Mamluks in positions of powers, thus alienating his father's Mamluks. In retaliation, Rukn al-Din Baybars, who also led troops at Mansurah, and other Mamluk leaders staged a coup and assassinated Turanshah in 1250, three weeks after the victory at Mansurah.

The Mamluks then elevated al-Mu'izz Aybak al-Turkmani (1250–1257) to the throne. During the reign of Aybak, a power struggle between the Bahriyya and other regiments ensued, resulting in the flight of most of the Bahriyya to Syria and to Rum (modern Turkey). After Shajar al-Durr, Aybak's queen, assassinated him in 1257, the victorious faction, the Mu'izziyya led by Kutuz, elevated Aybak's son, al-Mansur ‘Ali (1257–1259) to the throne though he was only fifteen. Nevertheless, he served as a figurehead while the Mamluk leaders waged their own power struggles behind the throne.

The second crisis that led to the firm establishment of the Mamluk dynasty was the invasion of the Mongols. After destroying the Abbasid Caliphate based in Baghdad in 1258, the Mongol armies led by Hulegu (d. 1265), a grandson of Chinggis Khan (1162– 1227) marched into Syria, capturing Aleppo and Damascus with relative ease by 1260. There was little reason to think that the Mongols would not also invade Egypt after they consolidated their Syrian territories.

Their arrival prompted a change in policy among the Mamluks. Sultan al-Mansur ‘Ali's reign came to an end as al-Muzaffar Kutuz (1259–1260) became the ruler under the rationale that it was better to have a seasoned warrior rather than a child. In addition, the Bahriyya regiment led by Baybars came back to Egypt to join the Mamluk army against the Mongols. After executing the Mongol envoys, Kutuz decided to go on the offensive rather than await the Mongol advance. His decision was well-timed as the bulk of Hulegu's army had withdrawn from Syria, and only a small force remained under the Mongol general Ket-Buqa, whom Kutuz and Baybars defeated at the battle of ‘Ayn Jalut.

Kutuz's glory was short-lived, however, as Baybars staged a coup against him during their return to Syria. Rukn al-Din Baybars Bunduqari (1260–1277) thus was elevated to the Mamluk throne of a kingdom that now consisted of Egypt and Syria. Baybars immediately began to secure his throne by moving against the Ayyubid princes of Syria as well as dealing with any dissenting Mamluk factions. Furthermore, although the Mongol Empire dissolved into four separate empires and became embroiled in a civil war, the Mongol Il-Khanate of Iran and Iraq remained a very dangerous foe.

To counter this, Baybars arranged an alliance with the so-called Mongol Golden Horde, which dominated the Russian lands to the North, who also fought the Il-Khanate. In addition, Baybars focused his offensive campaigns against the Mongols allies in Cilicia or Lesser Armenia and against the Crusader lord, Bohemund of Antioch (1252– 1275) and Tripoli. Baybars's invasions of their territories effectively neutralized them as a threat.

Not all of the Crusaders allied with the Mongols, as did Bohemund. Initially, Baybars left these in peace while he dealt with more urgent threats. He, however, was very active in ensuring their downfall. Through diplomatic efforts, he was able to divert another Crusade led by King Louis IX to Tunis with the help of Charles D'Anjou, the king's own brother. Charles D'Anjou enjoyed profitable commercial and diplomatic relations with Egypt and did not want to dampen them with an invasion. Without the assistance of another Crusade, those Crusaders who remained in Palestine could only defend their territories. Baybars quickly relieved them of a number of strongholds including Crac des Chevaliers, Antioch, Caesarea, Haifa, Arsuf, and Safad. He also crowned his military career with a second defeat of the Mongols at Elbistan in 1277.

The Sultan Barquq complex was built in 1384 by the first tower or Burgi Mameluke sultan who ruled from 1382 until 1399. This complex includes a cruciform medersa; a khanqa, which offered living quarters for the Sufi mystics; and a tomb of one of the sultan's daughters. Cairo. © Mich. Schwerberger/Das Fotoarchiv.

Baybars died in 1277. His military success was due to not only generalship but also to his use of diplomacy to gain allies, which in turn prevented the Mongols of Iran from focusing their efforts on him. Much of Baybars’ reign focused on securing Syria from the Mongols, which led to his efforts against the Crusader states, and Cilicia. Furthermore, in Egypt he solidified the power of the Mamluks, allowing their rule to continue after his death.

Baybars's son and successor, al-Malik al-Sa'id Muhammad Barka Khan (1277–1279), however, did not have the opportunity to equal his father's deeds. Although appointed as joint sultan in 1266, and secretly elevated to power on his father's deathbed, another coup soon developed in which another Mamluk emir named Qalawun committed regicide, as had the previous rulers, and soon rose to the throne in 1279.

To secure his power, Qalawun (1279–1290) purged the al-Zahirriya, or Baybars’ own Mamluks. He then quelled any internal revolt. Qalawun, like Baybars, however, still had to contend with the Mongols. Abaqa (1265–1282), the ruler of the Il-Khanate of Persia sent another army into Syria in 1281. This force, however, met a similar fate as those before it. Qalawun's army emerged victorious and routed the Mongols.

This victory allowed Qalawun to turn his attention against the remaining Crusaders. Through diplomacy and force, Qalawun steadily reduced the Crusader castles one by one. By 1290 only Acre and few minor castles remained in the hands of the Crusaders. Though he laid siege to Acre, Qalawun would not see the fall of this remaining stronghold, as he died in 1290.

Qalawun, however, was somewhat more successful than Baybars at establishing a hereditary succession. His son, al-Ashraf Khalil (1290–1293) continued the siege and captured Acre in 1291. This victory allowed him to firmly establish himself on the throne. After this, al-Ashraf swept away the remaining Crusader footholds and ended their two hundred year presence in Palestine.

Regicide, however, was an ever-present threat in the Mamluk sultanate. When alAshraf attempted to replace the Turk-dominated Mamluk corps with Circassian recruits, the Mamluks rebelled again. Qalawun had actually initiated the introduction of Circassians, but al-Ashraf's continuation of it and arrogance prompted another rebellion. Though al-Ashraf Khalil died under the sword in 1293, his Mamluks, known as the Burjiyya, successfully gained control of Cairo and the sultanate allowing the Qalawunid dynasty to continue in name, if not in actual power.

The uncertainty of the Mamluks’ legitimacy as rulers that surrounded the Mamluk kingdom and the threat of the Mongols in the Middle East hampered the Mamluks’ interests in Africa. Trade with North and Sub-Saharan Africa remained a constant. Furthermore, the Mamluks did maintain and stabilize their rule in southern Egypt by quelling the Beduin tribes. As the threat from the Mongols and Crusaders diminished, the Mamluks began to become more involved with other powers to the south and west.

TIMOTHY MAY

Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Literature

Literary production during the Mamluk Sultanate was massive in scope. Authors from divers backgrounds produced works across the gamut of genres and in different languages, supported in part by the patronage of the Mamluk elite. While much of the literary output of any medieval Muslim society defies easy categorization into the genres or modern literary analysis, the Mamluk era is known today for its works of poetry, history, and for what may be called, popular entertainment.

Arabic poetry was produced in vast quantities, although the diwans (collected verses) of many poets remain unedited. Thus our knowledge of this key aspect of Mamluk literary culture remains spotty and uneven in coverage. Classical poetical types such as fakhr (self-praise), ghazal (love poetry), hamasah (personal bravery), hija’ (invective), madih (panegyric), ritha’ (elegy), and wasf (descriptive) were all well represented as well as less traditional styles such as the highly rhetorical badi’ and the colloquial verse known as zajal. Interest in Mamluk poetry, however, has often been affected by later aesthetic trends. Techniques such as tawriyah (forms of word-play resembling double entendre), for example, were quite common in Mamluk poetry.

The popularity of ornamentation and literary devices among Mamluk-era poets no doubt contributed to their being classified by earlier Western scholars as “merely elegant and accomplished artists, playing brilliantly with words and phrases, but doing little else” (Nicholson 1969, pp.448–450). Some modern Arab literary critics, meanwhile, dismiss this poetry as “decadent, pallid, worn out, and lacking authenticity” (Homerin 1997, p.71). These views, while still encountered, are under increasing challenge by recent scholars who approach the material on its own terms as well as viewing Mamluk poetry as a vast and rich source for the study of Mamluk-era life and culture.

Major poets include al-Ashraf al-Ansari (d.1264); Al-Afif al-Tilimsani (d.1291) and his son, known as al-Shabb al-Zarif (d.1289); al-Busiri (d.1295), well-known for his ode to the Prophet; Safi al-Din al-Hilli (d. 1349); Ibn Nubatah al-Misri (d.1366), particularly well-known for his use of tawriyah; Ibn Abi Hajalah (d.1375); Ibn Makanis (d.1392); Ibn Malik al-Hamawi (d.1516); and the female poet ‘A'ishah al-Ba'uniyah (d.1516). While technically an Ayyubid-era poet, the work of ‘Umar Ibn al-Farid (d.1235) was well known and extensively cited after his death, and should be mentioned as representing the blending of poetry with mystical (sufi) concerns.

The sultan rendering justice. Miniature from The Fables of Bidpai: The Book of Kalila and Dimna (Arabic translation of the Panca-Tantra), fol. 100. Fourteenth century. National Library Cairo. Anonymous. © Giraudon/Art Resource, New York.

The Mamluk age is commonly celebrated for its prolific production of historical works. The major cities of the Mamluk sultanate were centers of learning and commerce, and in no small part the revenues of the latter supported the producers of the former. As a result, the Mamluk era is well recorded in many contemporary chronicles, regnal histories, celebrations of cities and other locales, biographical compilations, and other historically oriented texts. These works are in a variety of styles, ranging from ornate rhymed prose to straightforward narratives containing significant amounts of colloquial language. The authors of these texts were as varied as the texts themselves. Histories were written by Mamluk soldiers, government clerks, and the learned class of the ‘ulama’ (those learned in the Islamic sciences). To cite a minimum of examples, Baybars alMansuri (d.1325) was a Mamluk officer who participated in many of the military events he later discussed in his writings. Al-Maqrizi (d.1442) was a jurist and disappointed civil servant who frequently poured vitriol and criticism on the ruling Mamluk elite in his many works. Ibn Taghri Birdi (d.1470), the son of a major Mamluk amir, wrote histories reflecting the sympathies and insights made possible by his close association with that same ruling elite. Polymaths such as Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (d.1449) and al-Suyuti (d.1505) produced important historical works as but a small part of their vast oeuvre addressing many topics. Finally, in a similar situation to that of Mamluk poetry mentioned above, many important historical works, such as much of the chronicle of alAyni (d.1451), remain in manuscript form.

While often looked down upon by the literary elite past and present, the Mamluk period produced significant works of what may be termed popular entertainment. Apparently performed or recited in public spaces, these works are increasingly studied for what they tell us about the lives and attitudes of the lower social classes absent from the majority of the Mamluk historical works. In particular, the texts of three shadow plays by Ibn Danyal (d.1311), otherwise known as a serious poet, have survived. They are populated with a rogues’ list of characters and while clearly works created for entertainment, give a glimpse of the seamier side of Mamluk Cairo as it was perceived by their author.

Much more well known are the tales known by the title Alf Layla wa Layla, commonly rendered as the “Thousand and One Nights,” or “the Arabian Nights Entertainments” (or some combination thereof). These stories, ranging from a few paragraphs to hundreds of pages in length, are far from the collection of sanitized and selective children's stories with which many modern readers are familiar. They are a complex conglomeration of many tales that likely took an early shape among the professional storytellers of the Mamluk domains. As Muhsin Mahdi has shown, the earliest known manuscript of the Nights dates from late Mamluk Syria. It contains both the famous frame-story of the cuckolded and murderous King Shahriyar as well as the first thirty-five stories told by his latest wife and potential victim Sheherezade to postpone his deadly intentions. While some of the stories are clearly of earlier origin, and many are set in the golden past of the Abbasid Baghdad of Harun al-Rashid, descriptive details in many of these thirty-five tales and the later accretions reveal their Mamluk context. Their potential for providing insights into Mamluk-era life has been demonstrated by Robert Irwin.

WARREN C. SCHULTZ

Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Army and Iqta’ System

Although the phenomenon of using slaves as soldiers had antecedents in pre-Islamic and early Islamic times, the formal institution of military slavery in the Islamic world had its origin in the Abbasid caliphate in the ninth century, when al-Mu'tasim (833–842), distrusting the loyalty of some regiments of his army, came increasingly to rely on his personal slaves for protection, eventually expanding his slave bodyguard to an alleged 20,000 men, garrisoned at Samarra. From the ninth through the eighteenth centuries the Mamluk soldierslave corps formed an important part of the armies of many Islamic dynasties, including the famous Janissaries of the Ottoman sultans. It was in Egypt, however that the mamluk military system reached it apogee, under the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517), when Egypt was ruled for a quarter of a millennia by an aristocracy of slave-soldiers.

Mamluk is an Arabic term meaning “possessed” or “owned,” and generally refers to military slavery. (Military slaves were also sometimes called ‘abd or ghulam.) During the Mamluk dynasty the major source of recruitment was Turkish nomads from the steppes of Central Asia, who were viewed as exceptionally hardy, loyal and warlike, and who had learned basic skills of archery and horsemanship during their nomadic youth on the steppe. During the early Mamluk dynasty the majority of the mamluks came from Kipchak tribes; after the reign of Sultan Barquq (1382–1399), recruitment focused on Circassians. However, during different periods of the dynasty, smaller numbers of Mamluks were recruited from a number of additional ethnic groups, including Mongols, Tatars, Byzantines, Russians, Western Europeans, Africans, and Armenians.

Mamluks began their military careers as young nomad boys on the steppes of Central Asia, who were captured as slaves during military campaigns or raids. Slave merchants would select boys in their early teens with the proper physique and skills, transporting them to the slave markets of Syria or Egypt. There, agents of the sultan would purchase the most promising candidates, enrolling them in a rigorous training program. The new Mamluk recruits were taught Islam, and at least nominally converted, while engaging in multiyear military training focusing on horsemanship, archery, fencing, the use of the lance, mace and battleaxe, and many other aspects of military technology, tactics and strategy; several dozen military manuals survive detailing all aspects of Mamluk military science and training. Emphasis was placed on skill at mounted archery; Mamluk warriors represented an amalgamation of long-established Islamic military systems with a professionalized version of the warrior traditions of steppe nomads.

The displaced young teenagers soon became fiercely loyal to their new surrogate families, with the sultan as their new father and their barracks companions as their new brothers. They came to realize that, despite their technical slave-status, the Mamluk military system provided them a path to wealth, power, and honor, and, for the most fortunate and bold, even the sultanate itself. Upon completion of the training program, which lasted around half a dozen years, young Mamluk cadets were manumitted and began service in the army, the brightest prospects being enlisted in the Khassikiyya, the personal bodyguard of the sultan. Mamluks were distinguished from the rest of society by ranks, titles, wealth, dress, weapons, horse riding, special position in processions, and court ritual—they were renowned for their overweening pride in their Mamluk status. The Mamluks thus formed a military aristocracy, which, ironically, could only be entered through enslavement.

Armies were organized into regiments often named after the sultan who had recruited and trained them—for example, the Mamluks of the sultan al-Malik al-Zahir Baybars (1260–1277) were the Zahiriyya. Successful soldiers could be promoted from the ranks. The Mamluk officer corps was divided into three major ranks: Amir (“commander”) of Ten (who commanded a squad of ten Mamluks), the Amir of Forty, and the highest rank, “Amir of One Hundred and Leader of One Thousand,” who commanded one hundred personal Mamluks, and lead a 1000-man regiment in combat. There were traditionally twenty-four Amirs of One Hundred, the pinnacle of the Mamluk army, who formed an informal governing council for the sultanate; some eventually became sultan.

The Mamluks had a formal and highly organized system of payment based on rank and function, overseen by a sophisticated bureaucracy. Remuneration included monthly salaries, equipment and clothing, food and fodder supplies, and special combat pay. Many Mamluk officers and soldiers were given land grants known as iqta’, both for their own support and to pay for the maintenance of additional soldiers under their command. Such grants were carefully controlled and monitored by the bureaucracy, and amounted to regular payment of revenues and produce of the land rather than a permanent transfer of ownership; the grant of an iqta’ could be withdrawn and redistributed.

At its height, the Mamluk military system was one of the finest in the world, with the Mamluks of Egypt simultaneously defeating both the Crusaders and the Mongols in the second half of the thirteenth century. During most of the fourteenth century, however, the Mamluks faced no serious outside military threat, and their military training and efficiency began to decline. During this period the major fighting the Mamluks engaged in was usually factional feuding and civil wars associated with internal power struggles and coups. When faced with the rising military threat of the Ottoman Turks in the late fifteenth century, the Mamluks initiated military reforms, which ultimately proved insufficient. The Mamluks were also unsuccessful at efficiently integrating new gunpowder weapons into a military system dominated by a haughty mounted military aristocracy. The Mamluks were decisively defeated in wars with the rising Ottomans (1485–1491, 1516–1517), who conquered Egypt in 1517, overthrowing the Mamluk sultanate.

WILLIAM J. HAMBLIN

Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Plague

In the middle of the fourteenth century a destructive plague swept through Asia, North Africa, and Europe, devastating nations and causing serious demographic decline. Cities and buildings were laid waste, roads and way signs were obliterated, settlements and mansions became empty, dynasties and tribes grew weak. The entire inhabited world changed.

Thus wrote Ibn Khaldun in his Muqaddimah (v.1, p.64). The famous North African scholar spent the last decades of his life in Mamluk Cairo and saw firsthand the effects the early occurrences of the plague had on the lands and people of the Mamluk Sultanate.

The phrase “Black Death” was not used in the medieval Islamic world. In the Mamluk sources, the devastating and recurring pandemics were usually referred to by the common Arabic nouns ta'un (plague) or waba’ (pestilence). From the initial outbreak of 1347– 1349 to the end of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, there were approximately twenty major epidemics that affected large areas of Mamluk Egypt, occurring about every eight to nine years. Mamluk Syria seemed to be slightly less afflicted, with only eighteen epidemics over the same period. Given the descriptions of symptoms and the general mortality reported, it seems clear that the disease was that linked to the plague bacilli Pasteurella pestis or an earlier variant thereof. Buboes, for example, were frequently referred to as “cucumbers” (khiyar) in the sources. Michael Dols has argued convincingly that during several of the outbreaks a total of three forms of the disease—the pneumonic, bubonic, and septicaemic—struck simultaneously. The outbreak of 1429–1430, for example, was especially severe and was called in some sources the “great extinction.” The accompanying epizootics among animals frequently mentioned suggests a variant form, or perhaps an accompanying and as yet undetermined agent.

While demography for this period is inexact, it seems probable that the population of Egypt suffered a prolonged and aggregate decline of approximately one-third or so by the beginning of the fifteenth century. Egypt's population remained at levels lower than its pre-plague years into the Ottoman period. The plague did not afflict all segments of society equally. Reflecting the bias of the sources, we know more about the impact on the cities of Egypt then we do on the rural areas. It is common to encounter statements like the following in the chronicles: “the plague caused death among the Mamluks, children, black slaves, slave-girls, and foreigners” (Ayalon, p.70). The evidence suggests that the Royal Mamluks were especially hard hit, perhaps due to their recent arrival in Egypt, and previous lack of exposure to the plague. The cost of replacing these expensive recruits no doubt contributed to the increasing economic strain on the Mamluk regime during the fifteenth century.

The recurrent nature of the pandemic had other negative repercussions on the regime. While there is no evidence for a complete breakdown of either government or religious administrations, we read of confusion and disruption in land-holding, tax-collecting, military endeavors, the processing of inheritances, and the filling of vacated offices, not to mention the looting of abandoned properties and other civil unrest. Economic ramifications took the shape of price disruptions, labor shortages, decreased agricultural production in both crops and livestock, and an overall decline in commerce. Many modern scholars argue that the demographic decline brought about by the plague is the main contributing factor to the economic difficulties of the fifteenth century, and that the policies adopted by the Mamluk regime in that century are best understood as reactions to, not causes of, that decline.

Normative societal reaction to the plague was shaped by the ‘ulama’, those learned in Islamic knowledge. The guidance provided by this communal leadership was shaped primarily by those Hadiths of the prophet Muhammad related to disease epidemics, and featured these main points. First, the plague was both a mercy and a martyrdom for the believer, but a punishment for the unbeliever. Second, a Muslim should neither flee nor enter a plague-stricken region. And third, there was no interhuman transmissibility of the disease; it came directly from God (medieval Arabic medical terminology did not distinguish between contagion and infection). Other reactions on the part of the populace were condemned as innovation. The recurrent stressing of these points in the numerous pestschriften that survive, along with contrary reports in the chronicles, would seem to indicate that these policies were not always followed to the letter.

Nevertheless, it is clear that religion shaped both the individual and communal response to the horror and unpredictability of the plague, as seen in the poignant passage by the Mamluk-era author Ibn al-Wardi, who died in 1349, during the latter stages of the first outbreak:

I take refuge in God from the yoke of the plague. Its high explosion has burst into all countries and was an examiner of astonishing things. Its sudden attacks perplex the people. The plague chases the screaming without pity and does not accept a treasure for ransom. Its engine is far-reaching. The plague enters into the house and swears it will not leave except with all of its inhabitants. “I have an order from the qadi (religious judge) to arrest all those in the house.” Among the benefits of this order is the removal of one's hopes and the improvement of his earthly works. It awakens men from their indifference for the provisioning of their final journey. (Dols 1974, p.454)

WARREN C. SCHULT

See also: Ibn Khaldun: Civilization of the Maghrib.

Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Historical Outline

In January 1517 the mamluk sultan of Egypt, Tumanbay, was defeated by the Ottoman sultan Selim I. The Ottoman conquest ended a sultanate that had ruled independent Egypt since 1250. The Ottomans were militarily superior, having cannon and arquebus in the hands of well-organized infantry troops, the Janissaries. The mamluk forces, mostly cavalry, had already been defeated in a battle in Syria. The occupation of Cairo by Selim reduced Egypt to a tributary of the Ottoman Empire, symbolized by the removal of the caliph, the spiritual head of the mamluk sultanate and of the Islamic world, to the imperial capital of Istanbul.

The Ottoman conquest capitalized on rivalries among the mamluks, which had become evident during the Ottoman conquest of mamluk Syria in 1516. By supporting Khayr Bey of Aleppo against his rivals in Cairo, the Ottoman sultan ensured Ottoman supremacy, and in September of 1517 Khayr Bey was appointed the sultan's viceroy in Cairo. The viceroy initially was known by the traditional mamluk title of malik al-umara’, or commander of the princes, as well as residing in the Cairo citadel in a style very much like that of the previous mamluk sultans. Moreover, he reprieved the remaining mamluks, who continued to hold land as a type of feudal assignment, or iqta’, in the twelve administrative districts of Egypt, each of which was headed by a mamluk bey.

Upon the death of Khayr Bey in 1522 the mamluks revolted, resulting in a series of reforms decreed by the Grand Vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, according to the prescriptions of Sultan Sulayman al-Qanuni. Sulayman codified laws for imperial administration across the empire, designed in part to regularize land revenue. In Egypt the reforms ended the system of land assignments and replaced the mamluk assignees with salaried officials, amins. The laws of 1525 established a political constitution that gave Egypt some degree of selfgovernment, specifically through the diwan, or assembly, which contained religious and military notables, such as the agha, or commander of the Janissary troops. The Janissaries were the most important of the seven imperial regiments stationed in Egypt, including another infantry regiment, the Azaban, and two troops of bodyguards or attendants of the viceroy. There were three cavalry units, one of which was composed of mamluks. The mamluks were also given high positions that carried the rank of bey, such as the office of commander of the pilgrimage (amir al-hajj), treasurer (daftardar), command of the annual tribute caravan (hulwan) to Istanbul, and military commands with the rank of sirdar. On the side of the imperial officials, the newly drawn fourteen districts of Egypt were placed under the authority of an Ottoman kashif, who stood above the amins. The formal constitutional structure of 1525 remained intact until the end of the eighteenth century, when Ottoman power in Egypt declined.

Ottoman rule in Egypt depended to a large extent upon maintaining the prestige of the imperial troops. The imperial troops and officers were paid salaries, but the introduction of American silver in the Mediterranean commercial system in the sixteenth century reduced the value of Ottoman currency. The imperial cavalry units revolted against an investigation by the viceroy into Egyptian finances in 1586. This was because the cavalry depended upon illegal taxes to supplement their reduced incomes. In this instance, the troops toppled the viceroy. A second revolt in 1589 resisted a proposed reorganization of the troops. These troubles were followed by an epidemic, and in 1605 the viceroy of Egypt, Ibrahim Pasha, was murdered by his troops. In 1607 the viceroy Muhammad Pasha investigated and suppressed an illegal tax levied by the cavalry. Finally, after a revolt of the imperial troops in 1609, the viceroys turned to the beys whose power was independent of the regiments. As a result, in the seventeenth century the power of the mamluk beys increased in relation to the seven imperial troops.

North Africa under the Ottomans, c.1650.

The foremost regiment, the Janissaries, established their power bases in the cities, particularly through influence over commercial wealth, while the mamluk beys invested in landholdings. Personal landholdings were revived with the development of the iltizam system, another form of land assignment that gave the mamluks tax-collecting privileges. The revival of quasi-feudal landholdings undermined the authority of the kashifs, a position that in any case was often given to mamluks beys. Consequently, the mamluks were able to reassert their corporate strength when, in 1631, the beys removed the viceroy, Musa Pasha, and replaced him with a mamluk bey who acted as interim viceroy. This set a precedent recognized by the sultan.

By 1660 the distinction between the constitutional roles of the imperial troops and mamluk beys had become blurred, for instance, a conflict among the leading mamluk factions, the Faqariyya and the Qasimiyya, also involved the Janissary and Azaban troops. At that time the Faqariyya and Janissaries allied and established an ascendance not broken until the great insurrection of 1711. At this point, although the constitutional system remained intact in theory, real power passed to the leading member of the ascendant mamluk faction, the Qazdughliyya, who carried the unofficial title of shaykh al-balad. Through the eighteenth century, individual mamluks built power bases independently of the Ottomans. ‘Ali Bey ruled as shaykh al-balad from 1757 to 1772. He was said to have wanted to revive the mamluk sultanate in Egypt, and challenged the authority of the Ottoman sultan when he invaded Syria in 1770.

Although the viceroys were not effective arbiters of power in Egypt, the Ottoman troops in Egypt had some success in influencing Egyptian politics and economy. Evidently, the Janissaries were integrated into the leading mamluk families through their role as patrons of merchants and artisans. As a result, patronage, rather than formal constitutional procedure, became the usual method of raising revenue and consolidating political power. The decline in the power of the Janissaries in the first half of the eighteenth century is largely the result of their inability to control economic resources, particularly the essential spice and coffee markets. These were undermined by the development of European colonies specializing in their production. By the second half of the eighteenth century Egypt no longer paid an annual tribute to the Ottoman sultan, while ambitious mamluks based their autonomous power on new forms of revenue collection that weighed heavily on the Egyptian population. As a result, at the end of the eighteenth century Egypt was practically independent from the Ottoman Empire, while in political, social, and economic tumult. The period of declining Ottoman power in Egypt, therefore, mirrored events in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, where regional warlords reasserted their autonomy from the middle of the seventeenth century, until Sultan Selim III began modernizing reforms at the end of the eighteenth century.

JAMES WHIDDEN

Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Mamluk Beylicate (c.1600–1798)

The beylicate institution revolved around a number of prestigious appointments to the Ottoman government of Egypt. The holders of these appointments held the rank of bey. The most important appointments were command of the pilgrimage, amir al-hajj, and treasurer, daftardar, as well as the distinctive title of shaykh al-balad, which was applied to the bey who had established his political supremacy over his peers. The supremacy of the beylicate was enabled by the formation of mamluk households, led by men who won political power through the military, commerce, or landholding. The households were factions composed of officers, merchants, and other notables, as well as freed slaves (the meaning of the term mamluk). Politics involved contests to control households, the most important being the Faqari, Qasimi and Qazdughli households.

The political role of the households begins in the early seventeenth century, with the rise of the Faqariyya, led by Ridwan Bey al-Faqari. Ridwan Bey succeeded to the office of amir al-hajj when, in 1631, the beys deposed the Ottoman viceroy, Musa Pasha, because he executed one of the bey commanders. From 1640 Ridwan had the support of the Sultan Ibrahim. After 1649 Sultan Mehmed IV and his viceroy Ahmad Pasha attempted to reduce the growing power of the Faqariyya by blocking Ridwan's hold on the command of the pilgrimage. But factional strength was more enduring, and Ridwan held the post until 1656. Yet, upon Ridwan's death, the viceroy gave the command of the pilgrimage to Ahmad Bey, the head of the Qasimiyya household.

The Faqariyya had the support of the Janissaries, who profited from protection money taken from the Cairo merchants. As a result, the Janissary officers were resented by the other imperial troops, and in 1660 the Azaban infantry troop allied with the Qasimiyya against the Janissary officers. The Faqariyya beys fled, and the factional ascendancy passed to the Qasimiyya. Yet, Ahmad was not allowed to attain the autonomous power of Ridwan, and in 1662 he was assassinated by a supporter of the viceroy. Until 1692 the Qasimiyya beys ruled with the support of the Ottoman viceroys, who attempted to bring about some reform to the system of hereditary estates, or iltizams. However, Ottoman reform only tended to divide Egyptian society between urban factions dominated by imperial troops, particularly the Janissaries, and rural society under the control of the mamluks. It was in this period that the iltizam system was firmly entrenched, with the mamluks converting state lands into private domains while the Janissaries converted their control of the custom houses into iltizam hereditary rights in 1671. Thus, in the seventeenth century there was increasing competition between factions for control of resources.

In 1692 the Faqariyya, led by Ibrahim Bey, increased their influence over the Janissaries by winning over the Janissary officer Kucuk Mehmed. But when Kucuk attempted to cancel the Janissary system of protection money in Cairo, he was assassinated by Mustafa Kahya Qazdughli, probably with the support of the Faqariyya faction within the Janissaries. The Faqariyya political and economic dominance lasted until 1711, when an imperial decree against military patronage of economic ventures resulted in another factional war. The “Great Insurrection,” as it was called, pitted the Qasimiyya and the Azabans against the Faqariyya, who were divided. The defeat of the Faqari household also meant the end of Janissary dominance in the cities. Consequently, the authority of imperial troops declined and political power passed to the beys.

After 1711 the preeminence of the beylicate was recognized by the unofficial rank of shaykh al-balad (“lord of the country”). The Qasimiyya head, Isma'il Bey, ruled as shaykh al-balad until 1724 when he was assassinated, as were his two successors. However, during the long rule of Isma'il, the two mamluk households were reconciled. The outcome is evident in the formation of a new household, the followers of alQazdughli. This household rose to prominence by controlling appointments to the Janissaries and Azabans. With the imperial troops now controlled by one household, rivalry between the Azabans and Janissaries was no longer a feature of Egyptian politics. Meanwhile, the Qazdughliyya also placed its followers in the beylicate. As a result the political power of the beylicate became supreme, and the heads of the household alternated holding the posts of amir al-hajj and shaykh al-balad.

In 1754 an insurrection of the Janissaries resulted in the assassination of Ibrahim Kahya Bey, the head of the Qazdughliyya. ‘Ali Bey, a mamluk follower of Ibrahim, became the shaykh al-balad in 1757 and began a period of innovation. He created a personal retinue by elevating his supporters to the beylicate and destroying his factional adversaries. According to the chronicler ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, ‘Ali Bey wanted to make himself the sultan of Egypt. Therefore, he created an army of mercenaries with modern firearms. To raise revenue to pay for the army, he imposed extraordinary taxes on the Egyptian peasants, landlords, and merchants. He also confiscated the properties of his rivals. These innovations were accepted by the Ottoman authorities in return for a pledge to pay off the Egyptian deficit to the imperial treasury. Although challenged by opposition groups in Upper Egypt, ‘Ali Bey held power long enough to meet his obligations to the sultan. After these were fulfilled in 1768, he deposed the viceroy and took the office of interim viceroy, qa'im al-maqam. Established as the absolute ruler of Egypt, he turned to conquest, defeating a local warlord in the Hijaz, where he appointed an Egyptian bey as viceroy. In 1771 ‘Ali Bey defeated the Ottoman troops defending Damascus, thus establishing the previous frontiers of the mamluk sultanate.

The innovations of ‘Ali Bey were premature. He could not stand independently of both the Ottomans and the mamluk households. The Ottomans won over one of his closest supporters, Muhammad Bey Abu alDhahab. At the same time, his mamluk rivals who had sought refuge in Upper Egypt, particularly members of the Qasimi faction, allied with the Hawwara, a tribal group in Upper Egypt. Therefore, a combination of factors, but particularly the political rivalries of the beylicate itself, brought about a coalition of forces that defeated ‘Ali Bey in the battle of 1773.

The period from 1773 to 1798 was a time of economic, social and political upheaval, occasioned to a degree by the innovations of ‘Ali Bey. According to the chronicler ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, it was a period when the beys practiced expropriation and oppression, levying excessive taxes that ruined cultivation and forced the peasants to take flight. Similarly, merchants were extorted, which caused inflation and brought the markets to ruin. Three Quzdughliyya beys, Isma'il, Murad and Ibrahim, contested for power in this period. In 1778 Murad and Ibrahim, followers of Muhammad Bey, forced Isma'il to flee Egypt. Ibrahim, the shaykh al-balad, shared power with Murad. Murad employed Greek technicians to develop a navy and artillery. To raise the necessary revenues, Murad seized the customs and forced the merchants to sell their grain through his monopoly. This was an important innovation, indicating the development of mercantilist economies by the mamluk beys.

When the beys reneged on the obligation to organize the pilgrimage in 1784 and 1785, an Ottoman force under Hasan Pasha intervened and Ibrahim and Murad fled to Upper Egypt. Although an Ottoman restoration under Isma'il was promised, the two rebels profited from a severe epidemic in 1791 which claimed the life of Isma'il and weakened the Ottoman regime in Cairo. Murad and Ibrahim returned to Cairo, defeated the Ottoman forces, and signed an agreement with the Ottoman sultan in 1792. However, the innovations of the beys of the latter half of the eighteenth century shattered the structure of the beylicate and imperial authority. They also increased the involvement of foreigners in the Egyptian economy and society, particularly the French, who sought control of the Egyptian export economy. Therefore, Egypt was in a very much weakened state when Napoleon invaded in 1798.

JAMES WHIDDEN

Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Napoleon and the French in Egypt (1798–1801)

The French expedition to Egypt initiated the modern period of European colonialism in Africa, because it was spurred by strategic, economic, and scientific interests. The strategic importance of Egypt lay in its position on the route to Asia. After 1798 Egypt would be the scene of continual competition by the European powers for influence and political control, particularly between Britain and France. Egypt was of economic importance to France as a source of grain. Moreover, French merchants had been able to market luxury goods in Egypt during the course of the eighteenth century. French and Egyptian commercial relations had suffered during the reign of Ibrahim, who forced the French merchants out of Egypt in 1794. As a result, a commercial lobby in France wanted French intervention in Egypt to secure free trade. The scientific objectives of the expedition were to study ancient and Islamic Egypt, probably to enable colonial occupation. Scientific expertise was certainly indispensable to the project of conquering, administering, and colonizing Egypt. Finally, the expedition exposed Egyptians to modern Europe, beginning a period of interaction that would transform Egyptian culture, society and politics in the nineteenth century.

Napoleon's strategy was to drive toward Britain's empire in India, instead of the proposed invasion of England. The French fleet landed Napoleon's army near Alexandria on July 1, 1798, and broke local resistance on the following day. Napoleon advanced toward Cairo against the mamluk commander, Murad Bey, who fell back and was defeated decisively at Imbaba on July 21, at the so-called Battle of the Pyramids. The mamluk commander, Ibrahim, retreated with the Ottoman viceroy to Syria. Shortly afterward, Nelson destroyed the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile. This victory won the British the support of the Ottoman Sultan, who formally declared war on France in September 1798.

The French conquest of Egypt required an occupation of the Delta and the pursuit of Murad, who adopted guerrilla tactics in Upper Egypt. Aswan was taken in February of 1799 and at the same time Napoleon began his campaign into Palestine. But in neither case were the mamluk forces entirely defeated, as Murad engaged in a continual resistance and Ibrahim joined Ottoman forces in Syria. The French conquest also relied on propaganda, with Napoleon's publicists using revolutionary dogma to attempt to win the support of the Egyptian middle classes against what was described as mamluk tyranny. Equally, it was hoped this would neutralize the Ottoman sultan, to whom the French declared their friendship. The propaganda was produced by specialists in Arabic and printed as bulletins from a press established at Bulaq. The Egyptians nevertheless regarded the expedition as an invasion, rejected the dogma of the revolution, and viewed the scientific works with interested suspicion. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti recorded his impressions in his chronicles. From his testimony it appears that the Egyptians resented the foreign presence, viewed Orientalist interest in Arabic texts as cultural interference, as they did the conversion of French officers to Islam, such as in the case of General Jacques Menou.

The expedition nonetheless marks the end of an era, as the mamluk beys never again established their political and social dominance. Having disbanded the old aristocracy, Napoleon turned to the Egyptian notables, marking the ulama, or religious elite, for special favor. The purpose was to rally support for the French regime, and so Egyptian notables were given high positions in the administration. A system of representative assemblies was organized for the localities, as well as the general assembly, al-diwan al'umumi, which was convened in September 1798. Napoleon claimed that the natural leadership of Egyptian society was the ‘ulama’ and that the creation of assemblies would accustom them to ideas of representative government. Yet, ‘ulama’ and merchants were already established as a national leadership, having led several protest movements against the misrule of the mamluk beys in the last years of the eighteenth century. Similarly, there was a revolt in October 1798 against the French regime led by the ‘ulama’ of Cairo. The French brutally suppressed the revolt, executing some members of the ‘ulama’ and dissolving the general assembly. Nevertheless, the French occupation seems to have consolidated the political role of the urban notables and strengthened the national leadership.

In spite of the political experiments initiated by Napoleon, the French regime in Egypt was principally concerned with the collection of tax. The economist Jean-Baptiste Poussielgue created the Bureau of National Domains to administer the former iltizam estates, which were declared state property after the flight of the defeated mamluks. The bureau was directed by French officials, payeurs, who conscripted Coptic tax collectors, intendants, and the heads of the villages, shaykhs, to collect tax at the local level. Under Napoleon's successor, General Kleber, even more radical reforms were begun as the French regime became more entrenched and adopted a defensive posture in late 1799. The provincial districts were reorganized into eight arrondisements, administered by the payeurs, intendants, and shaykhs. At the same time a multitude of existing taxes were abolished and replaced with a single, direct tax payed in cash. Finally, land registration was begun and peasants were given individual property rights. This amounted to an abolition of the Islamic and customary laws of Egypt, bringing to an end a quasi-feudal social order. At the same it began a process of modernization that prefigured much of the subsequent history of Egypt.

After the retreat of the French army from Syria in June 1799, the Ottoman and British armies advanced, landing in Abuqir, where Napoleon defeated them on July 15, 1799. Yet, Napoleon failed in his grand design to control the Middle East and the Mediterranean. He escaped to France the same month. Kleber attempted to negotiate an evacuation of Egypt, withdrawing his troops first from Upper Egypt. At the same time the mamluks infiltrated Cairo and organized another revolt with the support of Ottoman agents and the Egyptian notables. The revolt lasted a month, through March and April 1800. It was crushed only when Murad Bey gave his support to Kleber. On June 14, 1800, Kleber was assassinated and succeeded by General ‘Abdullah Jacques Menou, who rejected negotiation in favor of strengthening the French position in Egypt. It was during this period that the more radical administrative reforms were carried through in Egypt. But Menou suffered a military defeat at the hands of a combined Ottoman and British force on March 8,1801 at Abuqir. Under siege in Alexandria, he capitulated to the allied command in August 1801 and departed for Europe on British transports in September.

The man widely credited with founding the modern Egyptian nation-state, Muhammad ‘Ali, was an officer in an Albanian regiment of the Ottoman army. His first lesson in politics began the last chapter of mamluk Egypt, when the Ottomans attempted to destroy the mamluk commanders after the French departure in 1801. In this instance the British secured the amnesty of the mamluks. After he seized power in 1805, Muhammad ‘Ali finally eliminated the mamluks. But his political ascent relied upon the support of the Egyptian notables. The French expedition strengthened the position of the notables, but it also provided the blueprints for future attempts to strengthen the state. These were taken up by Muhammad ‘Ali, who adopted Napoleon as his exemplar and brought about the modernization of the system of landholding, the military, and the administration.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849.

Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Nubia, Red Sea

After waves of pastoral incursions between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, Nubian society was reduced to Lower Nubia, the area between Aswan and the third cataract. Upper Nubia adopted an Arab identity through Arabic and Islam; it also came under the sway of the Funj Sultanate of Sennar. Another result was that Nubia was no longer the important intermediary between African and Mediterranean commercial systems. The trade in gold, ivory, and slaves was in the hands of the Islamic sultanates of Dar Fur and Funj. Consequently, the economy of Nubia declined, as the pastoralists encroached upon the Nubian farmers of the Nile valley. When the Ottomans annexed Nubia in the sixteenth century, all trace of the prosperous societies of the Christian kingdoms had been erased.

Although Nubian traditions claim that Nubia was conquered during the reign of Selim I, it seems that the conquest took place between 1538 and 1557, during the rule of his successor, Sulayman the Magnificent. The conquest was staged from Upper Egypt in an expedition that might have come after an appeal made by the Gharbia, an Abdallabi or Ja'ali ruling group. The appeal was made to the Ottoman sultan by the Gharbia against their adversaries, the Jawabra. The campaign was led by Ozdemir Pasha, a mamluk officer, who was perhaps directed to engage in a campaign against Funj, which had expanded from the confluence of the White and Blue Nile to Lower Nubia. It is likely that a battle took place at Ibrim and the defeated Jawabra fled southward to Dongola. According to Abdallabi traditions, the Funj defeated the Ottoman troops in a subsequent battle. This reputedly took place at Hannik, near Kerma, probably in the early seventeenth century. In any event, Hannik became the southern boundary of Ottoman Nubia.

The Ottoman ruler of Nubia was given the rank of kashif, a mamluk term for the head of a province in Egypt. Therefore, Ottoman Nubia had a status similar to an Egyptian provincial district. The Ottoman tax system was imposed, but Ottoman firmans, or decree laws, exempted the cavalry from having to pay tax. So, just as the kashifs established a hereditary ruling house, the cavalry evolved into a privileged aristocracy, known as the Ghuzz. The kashifs and Ghuzz resided in several castles, notably those of Aswan, Ibrim and Say, although there were several others.

The kashifs were the appointees of the Ottoman authorities, nominally responsible to the Egyptian viceroy, who paid them a salary. Equally, the kashifs were obliged to pay an annual tribute to the viceroys. Tax was collected from the Nubians by a display of superior force, during regular tours of the Nubian villages. Therefore, the kashifs created their own private armies, composed of members of the ruling lineage and slaves. The Nubians paid their taxes not in cash but in sheep, grains, dates, and linen. This provided the kashifs with trade merchandise, enabling them to count their wealth in cash as well as in slaves. The European traveler Burckhardt observed at the beginning of the nineteenth century that Nubian subjects were victims of slave raids if their conversion to Islam could not be proven. The kashif ruling lineage also intermarried with the local, Nubian lineages, providing another means to increase the size of the ruling house, as well as its properties, which were extorted from the Nubian lineages.

By the eighteenth century, the Nubian kashifs ruled as independent monarchs of the Upper Nile Valley, much like the mamluks in Egypt. The annual tribute to the Ottomans was not paid, and emissaries of the sultan could not expect free passage through Nubian territory. The Ottoman connection remained only as a theoretical guarantor of the privileged position of the kashifs and the Ghuzz in Nubian society. As a consequence of the warlike nature of these elites, the Nile Valley above the first cataract was an insecure trade route and caravans were forced to take the arduous desert routes. The inclusion of Nubia in the Ottoman Empire did, however, enable Nubians to migrate to Egypt, which has since become a common feature of Nubian society. Nubians fled southward also, to escape the kashifs and to engage in trade. Some went on a seasonal basis to engage in caravan trade among Egypt, Funj, and Darfur, or found employment in Egyptian markets and industries on a permanent basis.

The Ottoman period in Nubia continued the process of Islamization in Nubian society. The Ottoman elite became integrated into the lineage systems established by the Arab nomads, resulting in social stratifications in which the Nubians were a subject peasantry. The kashifs and Ghuzz, meanwhile, lived in the quasi-feudal style of a military aristocracy, much like that established by the medieval Christian kings.

A similar process occurred in the Red Sea after the Ottomans occupied the mamluk port of Suez, where they built a fleet to control the lucrative Red Sea trade to India. Trade had already been intercepted by the Portuguese, who landed emissaries in the Red Sea, near Massawa, in May 1516 and April 1520. The first Ottoman expedition to the Red Sea brought the Ottomans to Yemen in 1538. Afterward, Ozdemir Pasha descended from Upper Egypt to the port of Suakin on the Red Sea to forestall the Portuguese advance. The port of Massawa was taken in 1557. By 1632 the Ottomans had shut the Red Sea ports to all Europeans, while the Portuguese contained the Ottoman fleet in the Red Sea. At the same time, Africa became a battleground between Christians and Muslims in the Horn. The Muslim Imam, Ahmad Gragn, was defeated by Christian Ethiopia with Portuguese assistance in 1543.

The Ottoman province of Abyssinia, or Habesh, was situated in the region between Suakin and Massawa. Ozdemir Pasha built fortifications and a customs house at Massawa and left the port under the command of the agha of a Janissary troop. Suakin became the center of Ottoman power in the Red Sea, with a garrison of Janissaries under a governor with the rank of sandjak bey. When the Red Sea lost its important commercial importance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the decline of the spice and coffee trade, Ottoman authority on the African coast evaporated. The ports fell under the nominal authority of the pasha of Jidda. By the mid-eighteenth century even this connection was severed when the aghas discontinued their nominal payment of tribute to Jidda.

The Red Sea ports were foreign enclaves on the coast of Africa, engaged exclusively in trade between the interior of Africa, India, and the Ottoman Middle East. The ports therefore coexisted with the surrounding societies, composed of mixed African and Arab populations. Several lineages of the Beja constituted the ruling groups in these predominantly pastoral societies. In 1671 the Beja besieged the port of Suakin, and in 1694 the caravan trade to the interior from Massawa was intercepted. Before long the Beja were exerting their political authority in the ports. The heads of a royal line of the Beja, the Bani Amir, became the rulers, na'ibs, of Massawa. The Bani Amir participated in the government of the port, controlled caravan traffic, and took a share of the customs duties collected by the aghas. By 1769 the na'ibs were the rulers of Massawa, sharing customs duties with Abyssinian rather than Ottoman authorities. In Suakin the Ottoman officials relied on the support of another Beja lineage group, the Hadariba, who enforced their right to a share in the customs duties of the port by controlling the movement of caravans to the interior. The head of the lineage became the ruler of Suakin, known as the amir (emir), while the aghas controlled the customs house. This arrangement lasted into the nineteenth century.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Trade with Africa; Funj Sultanate, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries; Nubia: Relations with Egypt (Seventh-Fourteenth Centuries).

Egypt under the Ottomans, 1517–1798: Trade with Africa

When the Ottomans took Egypt in 1517 they were placed at the crossroad of African, Indian, and Mediterranean commercial routes. In 1538 the Ottoman navy was launched from Suez to Aden by the Egyptian viceroy, Sulayman Pasha, to control trade in the Indian Ocean. However, the Portuguese defeated the Ottoman fleet in the Indian Ocean, and the Ottoman presence in the Red Sea became of importance principally for trade to Yemen and to Africa. The Red Sea port of Massawa placed the Ottomans in contact with the commercial sphere of the African state of Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia). When Nubia was taken sometime after 1538, the Ottomans established a frontier with Funj on the Nile.

By far the most important trade with Africa was through the states of Funj and Darfur. The ruling lineages of these states adopted Islam in the early seventeenth century, probably to enable better trade relations with Ottoman Egypt. The principal trade route to Egypt from the Sudan was along the Forty Days’ Road, the Darb al-Arba'in, which bypassed the unsettled regions of Nubia. Darfur caravans followed this route from Qubayh to Asyut in Upper Egypt. Funj caravans followed several routes from Qarri or Shandi to Ibrim, where the caravans converged to form a caravan that went on to Isna in Upper Egypt. This line could also connect with the Darb al-Arba'in at Salima by crossing the Nile at al-Damir. At Asyut and Isna the caravans were taxed by the Egyptian authorities and some merchandise was sold, but the merchants moved onward to Cairo where the remainder of merchandise was again taxed and sold in the markets. The caravan merchants remained in Cairo for six to eight months, purchasing goods for shipment to Sudanic Africa. The circuit was completed when the next Sudanic caravans arrived. Another route to Egypt was by way of Cyrenaica, in Libya, which was also traversed by caravans coming from Darfur. There were also east-west routes, from the Funj town of Shandi to Suakin on the Red Sea, and from Shandi and Sennar westward to Darfur.

Caravan trade required a high degree of organization. As many as flve thousand people made up the Darfur caravan, with at least as many camels. As a result, the Darfur caravan was organized on an annual basis as a state monopoly. This allowed the sultans to raise revenue through customs, accumulate slaves for their armies, and to reward their followers with luxury goods. The caravans of Sennar appear to have been less of a state-led concern because several caravans were organized independently; however, the Funj sultans also relied on customs duties for revenue and slaves for their armies.

The intermediaries between the sultans of the Sudan and the Egyptian viceroys were merchants. The Darfur caravan was accompanied by five hundred merchants who were known as the jallaba, an ethnically mixed group who were predominantly from the Upper Nile Valley region. Many came from Arab-Nubian lineage groups, such as the Ja'ali, the Juhayna, and Abdallabi. The jallaba were responsible for financing the caravans as well as paying the customs duties to the authorities. Many Sudanic cities were simply commercial crossroads, as was Sennar, the capital of Funj, where customs were collected and merchandise was exchanged. The lesser towns of Qarri and Shandi were also commercial markets. The capital of Darfur, al-Fashir, was the seat of the sultans, whereas the jallaba were probably responsible for creating a city that specialized in commerce. This was the town of Qubayh, just north of the capital.

The trans-Saharan caravans also required the cooperation of the Saharan and Nile Valley nomads, who controlled the desert routes. The nomads demanded a customs duty for providing the caravans with protection and acting as guides and camel drivers. The Arab-Nubian lineage group, the ‘Ababda, guarded the Funj caravans to Upper Egypt. In 1798 the ‘Ababda collected three gold pieces for every slave and one and a half for every camel. The protection of caravans through nomadic territories was regarded as a prescriptive right. As a result, any caravan without its designated protectors was subject to plunder. Trade with Africa therefore required cooperation between the representatives of the states in the north and the south, merchants, and the pastoralists who lived on the peripheries of the states.

The slave trade was certainly the most important commerce. Perhaps as many as six thousand slaves passed along the Darfur routes annually, with Funj delivering approximately five hundred. The slave trade was legal. The capture of non-Muslim Africans, a practice sanctioned by Islam, provided the nomadic pastoralists with an important item of exchange and thus access to markets. Slaves were normally non-Muslims living on the southern borders of the Sudan. Darfur's source of slaves was in the Bar al-Ghazal region, in the Nuba mountains, or among the Shilluk and Dinka people. In the case of Funj, Abyssinia provided a number of slaves. The Abyssinian slaves were predominantly women. They sold for as much as sixty gold pieces in 1798. On average, slaves sold for thirty-five gold pieces in the Cairo markets in 1798, although eunuchs, aged between eight to ten years, sold for double or triple that amount. In the Darfur caravan approximately four-fifths of the slaves sold were women. Slaves were purchased by Cairo merchants or by slave merchants of Istanbul; however, many were purchased by the mamluk households of Cairo. The Egyptian governors at Isna and Asyut imposed a tax of four gold pieces for each slave imported. In Cairo there were further taxes amounting to one and a half gold pieces. As with Darfur and Funj, the slave trade was a significant source of income for Ottoman Egypt.

Besides slaves, the caravans supplied camels, gold, senna or cassia, tamarinds, gum, natron, alum, ebony, ostrich plumes, elephant tusks, tiger skins, and hippopotamus whips (kurbaj). As European demand increased in the eighteenth century, ivory and ostrich plumes became increasingly profitable. In 1798 the usual tax on a camel load by the Egyptian authorities was two gold pieces, but for camels carrying ostrich plumes the rate was five and a half gold pieces. In exchange the southbound caravans carried Indian muslins, Syrian and Egyptian silks and cottons, and in the later period, inexpensive European cottons. Luxury items included European firearms and swords, lead, gunpowder, copper, as well as rice, sugar, perfumes, spices, horses, glass, velvet, writing paper, and coffee.

Cairo was the primary market for African merchandise. The Janissaries controlled the Cairo customs houses of Old Cairo and Bulaq as tax farms, which enabled them to take two-thirds of the revenue as private income. Alexandria was the conduit for African and Egyptian merchandise to Europe. Rosseta and Damietta launched transports to Syria and Asia Minor. All of these ports were controlled by the Janissaries, who monopolized most of the revenues collected. Europe was a market for ivory, ostrich plumes, gum, tamarind, senna, and gold. Istanbul received animal skins, gum, tamarinds, senna, and African slaves. However, slaves, the most significant item of trade, were mainly traded in North Africa.

The Ottoman province of the Hijaz in the Arabian peninsula was another market for African products. In this case the trade was connected with the annual pilgrimage. The African sultans provided tribute to be delivered to Mecca annually. The Darfur tribute caravan joined with the great Egyptian convoy in Cairo. With the rise of the Sudanic Sultanates the flow of pilgrims also increased and, like those from the Maghrib and West Africa, the pilgrims engaged in trade along the way. Although pilgrim traffic followed the caravans to Egypt, Suakin also provided an alternate route, both for pilgrims from the Sudan and from West Africa. Ottoman trade with Africa therefore followed a pattern set during the Islamic conquest of Africa, when commercial contacts encouraged the Islamization of African societies.

JAMES WHIDDEN

See also: Funj Sultanate, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries; Sahara: Slavery: Trans-Saharan Trade.

Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: Imperial Expansion

In 1805 the Ottoman sultan named Muhammad Ali (1769–1849) the pasha (governor) of Egypt. In 1811 the sultan sought Egyptian military assistance against the Wahhabi rebellion in Arabia. It was to Cairo that Istanbul again turned for assistance when the Greeks rose in revolt, in 1821, to back their demand for independence from the Ottoman Empire. Egypt was able to effectively respond to these requests because Muhammad Ali had, from the first, set a high premium on an efficient military establishment. This army enabled him to create his own empire and ultimately defy the sultan.

The campaign against the Wahhabis gave Muhammad Ali control of the Hijaz (the key Islamic holy cities, Mecca and Medina). This success gave impetus to Muhammad Ali's imperialist designs. His 1819 treaty with the imam of Yemen, along with his control of Arabia, ensured Egypt's dominance of the east coast of the Red Sea. A revolt by Yemen-based Albanian soldiers prompted an invasion of the territory in 1833. The Egyptian forces easily defeated the rebels and by 1838 controlled the entire Arabian coast.

Motivated by the need for conscripts for his military and the need for gold, Muhammad Ali invaded Sudan in 1820. Within a year, much of Sudan was under Egyptian jurisdiction and became the foundation of his empire. In 1822 Khartoum was founded as the headquarters of Egyptian operations; in 1830 the first Egyptian governor of the Sudan was installed there. The military success did not yield the 20,000 to 30,000 conscripts Muhammad Ali had anticipated. Many Sudanese died resisting the Egyptians; transportation difficulties resulted in the deaths of many thousands more before they reached Egypt; and of the 20,000 who reached Aswan, only 3,000 remained alive by 1824. The hopes for minerals were similarly disappointed. The Egyptians were more successful in improving agricultural productivity in Sudan, for Egypt's benefit. Not only did Egypt control all external trade, considerable quantities of Sudanese products were also sent there. There was also the high taxation on Sudan, again for Muhammad Ali's coffers.

From Sudan, Egyptian domination was extended to include Suakin and Massawa. This undertaking established Muhammad Ali's power over the entire Red Sea and linked his two colonies, Arabia and Sudan. In the operations against the Greeks, Muhammad Ali encountered serious complications. European countries supported the Greek demand for independence. To head off a confrontation with the Europeans, the pasha urged the sultan to accede to Greek self-determination; this was declined. In June 1827, the Egyptian forces took Athens, Crete, and the Morea, only to be defeated by a combined Anglo-French force. For his efforts, the sultan gave Muhammad Ali jurisdiction over Crete.

Muhammad Ali recovered quickly enough from the defeat in Greece to invade Syria in November 1831. There were several incentives for this adventure: conscripts for the Egyptian army; an additional and lucrative source of minerals and agricultural wealth, especially timber for military and non-military ships; control of two major Islamic cities, Damascus and Jerusalem; and simply, the incorporation of Syria into Egypt's steadily expanding empire. Muhammad Ali had previously invaded Ottoman territories at the behest of the sultan; in Syria he was fighting Ottoman forces and thus clearly defying the sultan for the first time. By May 1832 Egypt had overrun Syria; by 1833 they were in Konya, inside Anatolia, where the sultan's army was battered. With the way to Istanbul totally open, Muhammad Ali's soldiers advanced to Kutahia, a day's march from the capital.

After the Konya debacle, the sultan (Mahmud II) sought but failed to secure British military assistance; he then sought and received Russian assurances of support. Nonetheless, Britain favored the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This and the realization that he was in no position to confront the Europeans influenced Muhammad Ali's decision to restrain his men from marching to Istanbul from Kutahia. The settlement that followed in May 1833 made Muhammad Ali the overlord of the Hijaz, Acre, Damascus, Tripoli, Aleppo, Syria, and the passes of the Taurus Mountains at the gates of Anatolia.

Britain, which had been using the Red Sea and its overland stretch at Suez for mails and passengers to and from India since 1820, was worried by Muhammad Ali's dominance of these regions. In 1839 Britain occupied Aden at the southwestern tip of the Arabian peninsula, driving a wedge between Muhammad Ali's Arabian and Sudanese possessions. This British move encouraged the sultan's attempt, in June 1839, to expel Muhammad Ali from Syria; an attempt that was easily repelled by Egyptian forces. Shortly thereafter, the sultan died, and the entire Ottoman fleet surrendered to Egypt. Egypt had become the strongest power in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Britain, meanwhile, coordinated the response of a jittery Europe.

Besides the European consensus that Muhammad Ali's ambitions threatened the Ottoman Empire, Britain was particularly concerned about the strategic importance of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and surrounding countries, and Russia's growing influence in Istanbul. On July 27, 1839, Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria delivered a note to Istanbul. This was intended to forestall direct Cairo-Istanbul negotiations that could further Muhammad Ali's imperial ambitions, a distinct possibility given Istanbul's very weak position. In July 1840 Britain convened a conference in London. The conference gave Muhammad Ali an ultimatum to withdraw from Syria, Adana, Crete, and Arabia. When he refused, a British force landed at Beirut in September, defeated the Egyptian army there, and forced them to withdraw to Egypt. Muhammad Ali was thus compelled to accept the conditions of the European coalition. By the Treaty of London, he lost his Syrian and Arabian colonies. On 1 June 1841, the sultan issued a firman (decree) that named Muhammad Ali governor of Egypt for life and granted his male descendants hereditary rights to office; retrenched the Egyptian army to 18,000 in peacetime; and stipulated that all treaties between the sultan and the European countries would apply to Egypt. These restraints curbed Muhammad Ali's imperial drive for the remainder of his reign.

EBERE NWAUBANI

Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: State and Economy

Muhammad Ali (1769–1849) came to Egypt as part of the Ottoman force sent to expel the French who had occupied the country in 1798. With the French evacuation in 1801, the Albanian soldiers became one of the major power brokers in Egypt. It was against this background that Muhammad Ali emerged as a formidable political figure. In 1805 the Ottoman sultan had to name him the pasha (governor) of Egypt. The pasha's ferocious campaign against the Mamluks in 1811–1812 finally secured his position.

Muhammad Ali hoped to bring Egypt up to par with European countries. A strong army, trained, equipped, and organized along Western lines, he believed, was essential in this regard. This was to be the pivot of most of his policies. He invaded Sudan in 1820 to secure conscripts for his army. As this did not materialize, he turned to the Egyptian peasantry. To train their Turkish officers, a military school and a navy war college were respectively established at Aswan and Alexandria, both with European instructors.

The Mohamed Ali Mosque in Cairo. Completed in 1830, it was built as a half-scale replica of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul. © Das Fotoarchiv.

Education, health services, agriculture, land ownership, and the tax system were all overhauled by Muhammad Ali. The educational system had previously operated along religious lines: Islamic, Coptic, and Judaic. Concerned with quickly producing the personnel needed for his programs, Muhammad Ali established state-run Western schools to train accountants, administrators, and for languages and translations. For the same reason, students were sent to Europe for advanced studies.

The Abu Za'bal, a military hospital, opened in 1827. Renamed the Qasr al-Aini hospital after it moved to Cairo in 1837, it served as a medical school. In 1837, it trained 420 medical students, many of whom went to France for specialization. In 1832 a school for midwives was opened in Cairo, to create a female medical corps. In 1837 a hospital was opened in Cairo for civilians. There were also free clinics in the major cities.

Egypt's agriculture had traditionally relied upon the annual flood of the Nile. Muhammad Ali improved on this by constructing new, deep canals and by regularly maintaining the old ones. This increased the cultivable land by 18 per cent between 1813 and 1830 and made all-year irrigation and farming possible, especially, in the Nile Delta. There was also the introduction (in 1821) and spectacular increase in the production of long-fibered cotton, which was highly valued in Europe's textile industries. These innovations resulted in higher agricultural output and a buoyant export commodity trade.

Muhammad Ali inherited a system of land ownership and taxation (iltizam, or tax-farming) system that benefited specific elites (the villages haykhs, religious leaders, and the Mamluks). In return for a fixed tax, they were granted tax rights over land. The tax was extorted from the peasants who cultivated the land; and the tax farmers were entitled to keep any excess beyond the set tax. This system and the tax exemption enjoyed by religious lands denied the state of considerable portions of the land tax and gave the tax-farmers a lot of leverage over the peasants. In 1816, tax farming was eliminated; taxes were now paid at the village level.

Under Muhammad Ali, the state controlled agricultural production as well as internal and external trade. The peasants were forced to grow crops sold only to the government at fixed prices, which were well below the market price. They then bought their foodstuffs at prices much higher than the original sale prices while the export commodities were sold abroad at substantially higher returns. Muhammad Ali himself controlled the bulk of Egyptian imports, and there was a state monopoly on grain exports.

Because of the agricultural, land, and tax reforms, higher taxes, state control of trade, and considerable expansion in international trade (notably with Europe), public revenues rose phenomenally and funded expansive military, social, and infrastructural (especially, communications and transport networks) projects. Intent on replicating Europe's industrial revolution, Muhammad Ali established a formidable militaryindustrial complex producing armaments, uniforms, footwear, and frigates as well as sugar refineries, rice mills, tanneries, and textile industries, all dependent on European machinery and technical expertise.

Through Muhammad Ali's reforms, Egypt became the most powerful and wealthiest of the Ottoman provinces. This outcome and his imperialist expansion, from Kordofan to the Red Sea and the Aegean Sea, troubled European countries. In 1838 London persuaded Istanbul to sign a treaty banning monopolies in the Ottoman Empire. This was important because taxes and profits from the sale of monopolized goods accounted for three-quarters of Egypt's revenue. Equally devastating was the 1841 Treaty of London that eliminated Muhammad Ali's empire in western Asia and also curtailed the size of the Egyptian army, the bedrock of his reforms. From then, the pasha lost the zeal and incentive for reform.

In the end, Muhammad Ali did not achieve an industrial revolution, nor did he bring Egypt to the same political and military status as the European powers. Even without British intervention, his policies were self-destructive. There was hardly any effort to win mass support for his policies. Instead, the confiscation of agricultural products, high taxation, and conscripting peasant labor for public works alienated the masses. Besides, Egypt lacked adequate financial resources (especially, after the 25 per cent decline in the export price of cotton in 1833) and skilled personnel to sustain the reforms; moreover, many of the Europeans in Muhammad Ali's service lacked the expertise they claimed, leading to bad management and the failure of many projects. And there was the endemic bickering between Turko-Circassian officials and their Arabic-speaking subordinates.

The peasantry paid a very high price for whatever counted for Ali's successes. It is also true that since the military and the civilian bureaucracy were dominated by TurkoCircassians, the indigenous Arabic-speaking Egyptians were very much marginalized by Muhammad Ali's rule. Indeed, to him, Egyptians were simply serfs, only useful for his ambitions. Nonetheless, he endowed Egypt with the structural foundation which transformed it into a “modern” state.

EBERE NWAUBANI

Egypt, North Africa: Scramble

The “Scramble” for Africa south of the Sahara did not begin in North Africa. The Maghrib had been an integral part of the Mediterranean world for three millennia until suddenly disrupted in 1830 by the invasion of the French. No longer able to seek conquests in Europe after the Napoleonic wars, the restored monarchy under Charles X sought to revive the empire by invading Algeria in 1830. The Arabs and Berbers rallied under the leadership of ‘Abd al-Qadir (Abd el Kader) to oppose the French. Born into a prominent family from western Algeria in 1807, he studied in Medina and after returning to Algeria mobilized the Sufi brotherhoods and declared a jihad in 1832 against the Christian French. After fifteen years of unremitting resistance he was forced to surrender after 100,000 French troops of the Armée d'Afrique under General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud had laid waste to Algeria. The campaign exhausted French imperial ambitions, but it provided training for French officers, the officiers soudanais, who thirty years later seized vast amounts of sahel and savanna in western Sudan for imperial France when the British were occupying the fertile valley of the Nile.

British interests in Africa were transformed by Isma'il ibn Ibrahim Pasha (1830– 1895), the khedive of Egypt from 1863 until his deposition in 1879. His determination to modernize Egypt by public works and personal palaces was symbolized by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. It reduced the long journey around Africa to a quick passage beside it. Profligate spending made possible by exaggerated cotton revenues during the American Civil War provided the resources for imperial adventures in Ethiopia and the Sudan. In 1875 and 1876 Isma'il sent two military expeditions to Ethiopia whose disastrous defeats confirmed his bankruptcy and left Massawa, the Ethiopian port of entry on the Red Sea, to the Italians.

Europe was not about to abandon its investments in Egypt whether cotton, railways, or the canal. In 1876 British and French advisers, the Caisse de la Dette Publique, were thrust upon Isma'il to restructure his debt that by 1878 could not be refinanced without reducing his autocratic powers. Isma'il refused, and in 1879 he was forced into exile leaving the government to European financial advisers. Led by Colonel Ahmad Urabi (‘Arabi) Pasha and his Egyptian officers, the army intervened in September 1881 with the support of liberal nationalists, Muslim conservatives, and the great landlords to regain Egyptian control of the government. Anti-European riots in Alexandria were followed by the British naval bombardment on July 11,1882. On July 19 Urabi announced he would seize the Suez Canal. On August 16 a British expeditionary force under General Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Suez and on September 13 destroyed the Egyptian army at Tall al-Kabir to accelerate the “Scramble” for Africa.

The British were reluctant to occupy Egypt, but Suez could not be secured without an administration in Cairo that would protect the foreign investments and their nationals that could not be entrusted to the defeated Egyptian nationalists. The khediviate would be retained, but acting upon the advice of its consulgeneral, Sir Evelyn Baring (latter Lord Cromer), the British would remain to cleanse the government of corruption, release the fallahin (peasants) from injustice, and produce surplus revenue for the European bondholders and public works for the Egyptians. His program to regenerate Egypt for stability in Cairo and security at Suez was dependent, however, on the presence of British troops at the canal and British officials in the Egyptian administration that by 1889 had become more permanent than temporary.

In 1882 Egypt lost its independence to Great Britain. In 1885 Egypt lost its empire in Sudan to Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abd Allah who had proclaimed himself the expected Mahdi in 1881 to relieve Sudan of religious and administrative corruption by the Turkish rulers from Egypt. His appeal united the disparate Sudanese ethnic groups into the Ansar (followers) who systematically annihilated every punitive expedition sent against them. Having occupied Egypt, the British also acquired responsibility for the defense of its empire in the Sudan against the Mahdists seeking freedom from the same oppression that the British used to justify their conquest of Egypt.

To resolve this dilemma the British government sent Charles George “Chinese” Gordon to Khartoum with ambiguous instructions that became irrelevant when the Ansar besieged the city. Gordon organized a tenacious defense, but at the approach of a British relief expedition the Mahdi ordered his Ansar to storm the city on 26 January 1885. Gordon was beheaded to become an instant English martyr that ignited the determination of his fellow officers, the British public, and its politicians to seek revenge for his death and the humiliation of a great power by savage Sudanese. Gordon became the moral motivation for the reconquest of Sudan in the “Scramble” for the Upper Nile.

The triumph of the Mahdi was short-lived. He died on June 22, 1885, but his legacy, an independent Mahdist state, was consolidated by his successor, the Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi Muhammad Turshain. Four years later, in June 1889, Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister, reluctantly accepted the arguments of his proconsul in Cairo that the regeneration of Egypt to secure Suez would require a more permanent British presence that would be dependent upon control of the Nile waters. This decision determined the beginning of the “Scramble” in northeast Africa that reverberated far beyond the Nile basin. Thereafter Lord Salisbury assiduously pursued diplomacy in Europe to neutralize all competitors whose pursuit of African territory might jeopardize the Nile flow.

In 1890 Salisbury concluded the Anglo-German (Heligoland) treaty that transferred British sovereignty of a tiny but symbolic island off the North Sea coast to Germany in return for German claims to Lake Victoria. In 1891 he concluded the Anglo-Italian agreement by which Britain would ignore Italian pretensions to seize Ethiopia in return for a commitment not to interfere with the flow of the Blue Nile. The Nile waters, Cairo, and Suez appeared secure for Britain until January 20, 1893, when the new khedive, Abbas II, sought to assert his independence that was promptly frustrated by a demonstration of British military power. On the same day Victor Prompt, the distinguished French hydrologist, coincidentally delivered a lecture at the Egyptian Institute in Paris that inspired France to challenge Britain for control of the Nile waters and ultimately Cairo and Suez. The French advanced up the rivers of the Congo basin toward the Upper Nile at Fashoda and through the highlands of Ethiopia. The prospect of a French empire from the Atlantic to the Red Sea was irresistible.

During the beginnings of the “Scramble” for northeast Africa, Britain had encouraged Italian imperial ambitions as a potential ally in the Mediterranean and to frustrate French designs in Ethiopia. Emperor Menelik skillfully manipulated each, acquiring weapons from the French to defend Ethiopia against the Italians and neutrality from the British when they refused to accept his exorbitant claims to the Nile below his highlands. On March 1, 1896, Menelik had assembled at the village of Adua 100,000 men, 70,000 of whom were equipped with rifles accompanied by forty-six pieces of artillery and 20,000 spearmen. The Ethiopians decimated the Italian expeditionary force advancing through deep valleys under General Oreste Baratieri. The Ethiopians lost 17,000 killed and wounded. The Italians lost 7,000 killed, wounded, and captured and their dream of an African empire.

Four months later, on June 25, 1896, Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand left France for Africa and Fashoda. Three other French expeditions were being assembled in Addis Ababa under the scrutiny of Menelik to march to the Nile. The “Race to Fashoda” was the end of the “Scramble” for Africa begun by the deposition of the Khedive Isma'il in 1879, but after thirty years Nile control for Suez and the empire could no longer be achieved by a naval demonstration in the harbor of Alexandria. To secure the Nile waters from the French, the British government approved a railway from Mombasa to Lake Victoria and when construction was delayed authorized a military expedition from Uganda that never reached Fashoda. The final solution was to send General H.H. Kitchener up the Nile to defeat the Khalifa and confront the French at Fashoda. On September 2,1898, his Anglo-Egyptian army of 25,000 men defeated the 70,000 Ansar the Khalifa had mobilized on the plains of Karari outside Omdurman. Kitchener had completed the revenge for the martyrdom of Gordon in 1885 to the satisfaction of Queen Victoria and the British public. On September 19, Kitchener and his flotilla met Captain Marchand and his 125 Tirailleurs Sénégalais, beleaguered at Fashoda, to the satisfaction of Lord Salisbury and the security of the Nile waters and Suez. Marchand withdrew on instructions from a French government humiliated at the end of the “Scramble” for the Nile, if not all of Africa.

ROBERT O. COLLINS

Egypt: Urabi Pasha and British Occupation, 1879–1882

Urabi Pasha Ahmad (c. 1842–1911) was an Egyptian soldier and nationalist politician who is regarded as the first hero of modern Egyptian nationalism. Leader of the anti-European nationalist movement in Egypt before the British occupation of the country in 1882, Urabi Pasha was one of the first Egyptians of indigenous descent to rise to officer rank in the foreign-dominated Egyptian army. He was himself the son of a peasant or fellah who, like other Egyptian fellahin (as the peasants were called), had suffered heavily under the foreigners before and after joining the Egyptian army. Apart from him and very few other Egyptian officers, all top positions in the Egyptian army were monopolized by the Turks, Albanians, and Circassians who enjoyed higher pay and rapid promotion.

Since the sixteenth century, Egypt had been subjected to various foreign influences, namely the Turks, the French, and the British. The Turkish conquest of 1517 had made Egypt a province of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, British interest in Egypt began to be prominent at the end of the eighteenth century when the French, under Napoleon, invaded and occupied the country. For commercial and strategic reasons the British did not want the French to dominate or administer Egypt, as French control was likely to become a springboard for an attack on conquest of British India and to threaten British trade in the Middle East and Far East. By the 1870s, when Urabi Pasha appeared on the scene as the embodiment of the growing spirit of Egyptian nationalism with the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians,” he was given solid support by every segment of Egyptian society.

Mounting Egyptian indebtedness to foreign financiers, emanating largely from projects initiated and executed by Khedive Ismail, coupled with his incompetent management of Egypt's finances, had virtually caused Egypt to lose its independence. At the peak of its financial crisis, representatives of Britain and France were sent to Egypt in 1878 to investigate and regulate the country's financial situation. When the representatives clashed with Ismail, he dismissed them, generating a reaction from the powers, who made use of their influence with the sultan of Turkey to depose the khedive, a request which the former granted. Following the removal of Ismail as ruler of Egypt, his son Tawfiq was immediately installed. Tawfiq could not ameliorate the situation and became a puppet of Britain and France, who manipulated him at will. The two powers acting together compelled Tawfiq to place Egyptian finances under joint Anglo-French control on the grounds that Egypt could not be relied upon to fulfill its obligations to its European creditors. This development provoked a powerful reaction that ended the joint control scheme or device, and set in motion a chain of events that culminated in outright British occupation of Egypt.

The Egyptian elite class began nationalist agitation through the press and the General Assembly for the removal from office of Tawfiq and a number of corrupt Turkish officeholders. These educated Egyptians denounced British and French interference with the domestic affairs of their country, and insisted that if allowed to control their country's financial affairs, they could fulfill Egypt's international obligations. However, since the British and French were unwilling to surrender their control of Egyptian finances, they remained resolute in preserving the power of the Khedive in order to continue to control the country through him. As the nationalist agitation increased, it spread to the army, whose senior officers were themselves disenchanted.

Urabi Pasha and his Egyptian officer colleagues spearheaded an opposition directed against the Europeans and Khedive Tawfiq, his autocratic government, and the TurkoEgyptians—people of Turkish descent—who monopolized the land, the wealth, the offices, and administration of the country by reducing Egyptians to servitude.

Urabi Pasha drew his support from the diverse elements of the Egyptian population, with the prevailing situation in the country reinforcing the support. His background as a fellah who suffered similar injustice as other fellahin, the sale of the Egyptian share of the Suez Canal to the British in 1875, the setting of a dual control or international commission to handle Egyptian finances, and the corrupt and oppressive foreign officeholders, all enhanced the nationalist cause. Petitions continued to pour in to Urabi Pasha from Egyptians who had suffered injustice and sought redress for their grievances.

On May 20,1890, Colonel Urabi and his colleagues, Colonels Ali Bey Fehmi and Abdul-Al, presented a petition to Khedive Tawfiq on the subject of Egyptian grievances, for a redress of the lopsidedness regarding pay and promotion for the rank and file of the Egyptian army as well as the reinstatement of those earlier dismissed from the force. The khedive summoned his Council of Ministers, which decided that the three colonels should be arrested and tried by court martial. When the news reached Urabi and his colleagues, they defiantly offered themselves for arrest. Before the court martial could decide their fate, however, a regiment of their soldiers arrived and freed their popular officers. Strengthened by this triumph, and the increasing powerlessness of the khedive, Urabi presented more demands, including constitutional reforms, and the control of the national budget by Egyptians themselves, as against the Anglo-French control of the fiscal policy of Egypt. Britain and France objected in strong terms, jointly sending a stiff note in which they stated that the only authority they recognized was the Khedive. Tawfiq, however, had become powerless in the face of the immense popularity then being enjoyed by Urabi. Continued nationalist agitation compelled the dismissal of the minister of war, Osman Rifki and in his place Urabi Pasha was appointed, while another nationalist, Mahmud al-Barud, was appointed prime minister.

It became clear then that Urabi and his nationalist counterparts were in firm control. The British and the French were naturally alarmed at this unusual development and feared the nationalists were working toward overthrowing the khedive, declaring Egypt a republic, and refusing responsibility for the discharge of the debts that the khedives had incurred. Both powers, under pressure from their citizens with financial interests in Egypt, intervened and mounted a naval blockade outside the port of Alexandria. This action provoked Egyptian nationals in Alexandria, and during the violent disturbances in June 1882 the British consul was injured and about fifty Europeans were killed. This episode provided an excuse for armed intervention by Britain, which decided that a show of force was necessary if the collapse of European authority in Egypt was to be prevented. Meanwhile, Urabi had started fortifying Alexandria in preparation for the next show of power.

The British became anxious about the security of Europeans in Egypt. France had recalled its fleet from Alexandria to deal with a revolt in Tunisia, so Britain had to act alone. On July 11, 1882, the British navy bombarded Alexandria, but when they could not quell the nationalist riots, troops landed. On September 13, the British forces led by General Garnet Wolseley defeated Urabi's forces at the celebrated battle of al-Tal alKabir. Two days later, Urabi himself was captured in Cairo. He was exiled to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) where he remained until 1901, when he was pardoned and allowed to return to Egypt. Urabi died on September 21, 1911. Meanwhile, from 1882 to 1922, Egypt became an integral part of the British Empire.

S. ADEMOLA AJAYI

See also: Egypt: Nationalism, World War I and the Wafd, 1882–1922; Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Historical Outline; Suez Canal.

Egypt: Cromer Administration, 1883–1907: Irrigation, Agriculture, and Industry

In 1882 Britain invaded Egypt. British reasons for military intervention included the suppression of a nationalist revolt led by Colonel Ahmed Urabi, protection of the rights of Egypt's legitimate ruler, Tawfiq, protection of the Suez Canal (and hence the route to India), and, perhaps most important, protection of British financial interests in Egypt. Though the occupation of Egypt was the result of long-term developments (including a mounting external debt and gradual separation from the Ottoman Empire), the immediate effect was the establishment of British control over the Egyptian administration. From 1882 to 1907, British control of Egypt manifested itself in the person of British agent and consul general, Sir Evelyn Baring (made Lord Cromer in 1891).

Though the nominal head of Egypt were the khedives Tawfiq (until 1892) and Abbas II, Cromer remained the effective ruler of Egypt until his resignation in 1907. Cromer's rule was neither official nor direct; the Cromer administration is often referred to as the “veiled protectorate.” Based on his own philosophy of colonial rule, developed in part during his service in India, Cromer placed primary emphasis on the need for a strong, sound financial system in Egypt. In his view, native rulers were tyrants; British rule, therefore, brought much-needed reforms and fair government. Since Cromer believed that the basis of successful reform must be economic, his administration in Egypt concerned itself with strengthening the Egyptian economy through the improvement of irrigation and agriculture and the building of industry.

Egypt's system of canals and irrigation had deteriorated markedly from Roman times until the French invasion in 1798, but during the nineteenth century Muhammad ‘Ali and his successors revitalized irrigation and agriculture by deepening canals, building dams, and expanding the cultivation of cotton. According to British officials, however, the irrigation system had been expanded on a less than scientific basis: canals had the wrong slope or capacity and were closed at improper times, channels were filled with silt, drainage was inadequate and confused, and the much-touted Nile barrages, begun by French engineers, had fallen far short of expectations. In 1884 a group of Anglo-Indian engineers, led by Colin Scott-Montcrieff, began reorganizing Egypt's irrigation system. Dividing Egypt into five irrigation districts, Cromer's engineers unblocked old canals, separated drainage from irrigation channels, cut new canals, and repaired the barrages. The result of the first year's efforts was a 30,000 ton increase in the cotton crop. Further irrigation efforts followed: the eastern Delta Canal was dug, river banks in Upper Egypt were raised and canals there enlarged so as to ensure an adequate supply of river water for irrigation even in seasons of low Nile floods, and more barrages were built in the Delta and in Upper Egypt.

Irrigation policy was tied not only to finances but also to control over Sudan. Plans were afoot to build a dam at the first cataract of the Nile in 1894 at the time when Anglo-Egyptian forces were about to embark upon the reconquest of Sudan (following the Mahdist revolt and the death of General Charles George “Chinese” Gordon in 1885). In Cromer's view, the new dam would help generate the income needed to retake and administer Sudan. Although the British government was hesitant to provide the funds for the dam, loans made by financier Sir Ernest Cassel allowed the dam to be built; it was completed in 1902. The successful reconquest of Sudan in 1898 afforded further irrigation possibilities; by 1904 British administrators had decided that the White Nile would provide for Egypt's irrigation needs, while the Blue Nile would be geared toward providing for Sudanese agriculture (on the theory that whatever helped Egyptian agriculture generated further income that could be used to develop Sudan).

Although these changes in irrigation resulted in a dramatic increase in cultivated land, they came at a price. Soil quality diminished as soils were exhausted from continual use and perennial irrigation, pest problems increased, and a rising water table caused by continued inadequate drainage combined to reduce yields during Cromer's administration. Despite the emphasis placed on irrigation as a way of increasing agricultural yields and hence national income, general agricultural policy under Cromer was not well developed. Cromer discouraged the formation of a governmental ministry or department of agriculture (the Ministry of Agriculture was not founded until 1914), and few efforts to improve agricultural techniques were undertaken. Agriculture was increasingly funneled toward the production of Egypt's primary export crop—cotton— and away from cereal crops for domestic consumption. Overall, irrigation policy was well intended and designed to increase cultivatable land; its unfortunate effects on soils and the overall lack of a coherent supporting agricultural policy limited its long-term benefits.

As Egyptian agriculture was undergoing a transformation, industry was undergoing changes as well. Industry during the British occupation developed along two lines: industries related to agriculture and those producing luxury goods for the urban elite. Industries based on agriculture (e.g., the processing of cotton, sugar, and tobacco) flourished with a union of governmental and private firms dedicated to the creation of a modern export sector. With few exceptions, large-scale industry in Egypt during this period was owned and operated by Europeans, and the majority of debts and shares of industrial concerns were held outside Egypt. Despite the growth of such industries, most manufacturing in Egypt remained traditionally organized, laborintensive, and Egyptian-owned. At the same time, guilds were being replaced with small-scale wage labor, as the government either officially abolished guilds or simply began referring in its regulations to occupations without recognizing any guild structures. During Cromer's time in Egypt, little attention was given to the development of heavy industry, and the government took steps to prevent the development of a modern textile industry. In short, industrial policy, like irrigation and agricultural policy, was formulated with an eye toward maximizing revenue for the British-led government and for foreign investors in Egypt.

Cromer retired from his post in 1907 following the “Dinshaway incident,” in which a British officer was killed in the village of Dinshaway and brutal sentences were imposed on the villagers in consequence. Reaction against the sentences swept through Egypt and Britain; pressure mounted for a more accommodating British policy in Egypt. Though Cromer had been out of Egypt during the sentencing, he nonetheless astutely realized that change was in the air and retired to England, where he spent his remaining time writing, serving in the House of Lords, advocating free trade, and presiding over the 1916 Dardanelles Convention. He died in 1917, his Egyptian post having been taken over by Sir Eldon Gorst.

AMY J. JOHNSON

Egypt: Salafiyya, Muslim Brotherhood

In the late nineteenth century, and throughout the course of the twentieth century, Egypt was the scene of important developments in reformist and politicoactivist forms of Islam. These forms included the Salafiyya, a purely intellectual trend, which aimed at the renewal of Islam, and the Muslim Brotherhood, a social movement, which began as a religious and philanthropic organization but eventually adopted a distinctive political agenda.

Although the Muslim Brotherhood was influenced by the Salafiyya's intellectual orientation, especially its emphasis on the pious traditions of Islam's early generations, its focus on activism and social reconstruction has prompted many contemporary scholars to label it an Islamist group. Islamism, according to these scholars, is characterized by the efforts of concerned Muslims to establish the Shari'a, or code of Islamic law, within the secular nation-state. As elsewhere in the Islamic world, Islamism in Egypt has adopted both moderate and radical means to attain its primary goal of creating a polity governed by Quranic principles.

The origins of the Salafiyya are closely associated with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935), whose efforts to reform Islam were prompted by the West's political and cultural domination of Egypt and other countries of the Islamic world. In order to once again make Islam a dynamic force in the world, these men sought to rid the Muslim community of intellectual stagnation, blind adherence to tradition, and nonIslamic elements, which had crept into Islam through the vehicle of Sufism. In their view, the key to reform was to be found in the practice of ijtihad, the individual effort to discern God's will directly through the investigation of Islam's two primary sources of guidance, the Quran and the Sunna (the normative custom of the Prophet Muhammad).

Although the Salafis upheld the principles enshrined in these two sources as valid for all times and places, they also believed that they should be applied in a manner consonant with the social and scientific requirements of modernity, for only thus could the general interest of the community be served. Thus, according to the Salafis, Islam emphasized the virtues of consultative government and encouraged the study of nature. The Salafiyya intended its program to bridge the growing gulf between the Westernizing and traditional sectors of Muslim society.

The teachings of the Salafiyya inspired the Muslim Brotherhood, which combined the message of Islamic reform with a willingness to mobilize the Egyptian population against the Western cultural influences favored by many within the ruling establishment. Founded in 1928 in the British-occupied Canal Zone by Hasan al-Banna, a primary school teacher, the brotherhood adopted a political strategy that was moderate and gradualist. Rather than take control of the state by direct political action, it sought to influence the direction of politics by “awakening” Egyptians to authentic Islam, which, its propagandists claimed, “lay dormant within their souls.” In time, the Brothers hoped, the Quran would be adopted as Egypt's “constitution.” During its heyday in the 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood claimed one million members and sympathizers, who were organized, throughout the country, in some two thousand branches. However, in the mid- and late 1940s some members of the brotherhood adopted a radical stance in response to gains made by the Zionists in Palestine, and to the heightened mood of anti-regime sentiment in Egypt itself. In 1948 a Muslim Brother assassinated the Egyptian prime minister, Nuqrashi Pasha, an action that precipitated the retaliatory killing of al-Banna by security police a few months later.

With the encouragement of their new leader, Hasan al-Hudaybi, the Muslim Brothers supported the 1952 coup d'etat of Abd al-Nasser and the Free Officers, with whom they had forged close links in the previous decade. When it became clear, however, that the officers intended to establish a secular regime, rather than one governed by the Shari'a, they withdrew their support. In 1954, in response to an attempt on his life by a Brother, Nasser banned the movement and imprisoned its leading members.

In 1971 Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, released many of the prisoners and granted the Brotherhood a degree of official legitimacy. In so doing, he hoped to use the organization as a counterweight against Nasserists and leftists, whose political influence he was eager to diminish. Abandoning the confrontational politics of the 1940s and 1950s, the Brotherhood resumed the original, Salafi-inspired strategies of social conversion favored by its founder. In addition to publishing weekly journals and magazines, the Brotherhood has, since the 1980s especially, infiltrated labor syndicates and professional organizations, and has petitioned the government to grant it political party status, a request that has repeatedly been denied.

Some Muslim Brothers, however, were forever radicalized by the prison experience of the 1950s. Sayyid Qutb, a literary intellectual who joined the Brotherhood in 1953, articulated the Islamists’ ill will toward the Nasser regime in a series of writings composed during the period of his incarceration. In these works he equated the moral universe of Nasser and his followers with that of the Jahiliyya, the condition of ignorance and cultural barbarism that existed among the peninsular Arabs prior to the advent of Islam. Released from prison in 1965, Qutb was immediately implicated in another alleged Islamist conspiracy against the government and hanged in August 1966. Although Qutb himself never explicitly called for armed action against Egypt's secular establishment, his writings nevertheless provided ideological inspiration for the underground Islamist cells, which since the 1970s have waged campaigns of violence and terror against the powers that be.

One such organization, the Jihad movement, assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981 on account of his close relations with the West and Israel. In the 1990s, the Islamic Group attacked groups of foreign tourists, in addition to government officials. The Mubarak government struck out against this latter movement with extreme force, with the result that in 1998 its leadership called a halt to violence.

JOHN CALVERT

See also: ‘Abouh, Muhammad

Egypt: Nationalism, World War I and the Wafd, 1882–1922

In Egypt the term “nationalism” was first used to refer to the native officers’ movement, led by Col. Ahmad ‘Urâbî, against Egyptian government policies that favored officers of Turkish, Circassian (Caucasus region), or other foreign extraction. In 1881–1882, Egyptians formed several societies, usually lumped together as the “National Party,” that demanded constitutional rule, fought the Anglo-French Dual Control, and resisted Britain's invasion of Egypt to protect the Suez Canal and the rights of European creditors. The invasion triumphed, ‘Urâbî was arrested and exiled, and the party was disbanded.

In the early years of Britain's military occupation, there was little overt resistance, because Egypt's viceroy, Khedive Tawfîq (r. 1879–1892), suppressed it. Nationalism revived after the succession of his son, ‘Abbâs Hilmî II (r.1892–1914). Various European and Near Eastern palace functionaries urged the young khedive to resist Britain's consul general in Cairo, Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), who was Egypt's de facto ruler. Although Cromer's access to military reinforcements from Britain intimidated the khedive's backers, there arose in his place an informal opposition movement that also called itself the “National Party.” Its leader was Mustafâ Kâmil, a French-trained lawyer who initially served as a liaison between ‘Abbâs and potential European and Ottoman backers. As he became better known, Kâmil founded a daily newspaper, al-Liwâ (“The Banner”), a boys’ school, and a political party open to all Egyptians seeking to end the British occupation. The revived National Party appealed to students, young professionals, and seekers of government jobs who felt their access was blocked by the influx of British subjects serving in Egyptian ministries. Most Egyptians were enraged by the 1906 Dinshawây Incident, in which several peasants were hanged, flogged, or jailed for assaulting British officers who entered the Delta village of Dinshawây to shoot pigeons, which Egyptians keep as barnyard fowl. The Nationalists also wanted Khedive ‘Abbâs to grant them a constitution with an elected parliament to whom his ministers would be responsible, reducing the power of British advisers in the Egyptian government. Soon after Kâmil became president of the National Party, he died in 1908 at age thirty-three. The large-scale demonstrations of grief at his funeral testified to his support from the Egyptian people.

Soon after Kâmil's death, the Nationalists elected their party's vice president, Muhammad Farîd, as its new leader. Although less charismatic than his predecessor, Farîd was high-principled, financially independent, and determined to continue the independence struggle. In addition to organizing party branches throughout Egypt, he also set up workers’ night schools and consumer cooperatives and lent support to the growing trade union movement. He continued to court European support but also strengthened ties with the Ottoman government and hired Shaykh ‘Abd al-’ Azîz Jâwîsh, an Islamist writer, to edit al-Liwâ. Jâwîsh soon antagonized both the Copts and the British and, although popular with many Muslim students, moved the National Party toward extremism, terrorism, and pan-Islam. When a Nationalist murdered Egypt's prime minister, Butros Ghâlî, in 1910, the Egyptian government (abetted by its British advisers) curbed the Nationalists. Within two years, both Farîd and Jawîsh, having served prison terms, sought refuge in Istanbul. The National Party, with many of its newspapers banned, went into eclipse.

Concurrent with the Nationalists were two other self-styled Egyptian “parties”: Hizb al-Umma (“Party of the People”) and Hizb al-Islâh al-Dustûrî (“Constitutional Reform Party”). The Umma Party, composed of landowners and intellectuals, advocated a gradual winning of independence, to be achieved by cooperation with Britain in educating the Egyptian people and showing them the rights and duties of citizenship. It upheld Egyptian interests and denounced pan-Islam, shunning both Khedive ‘Abbâs and the Ottoman Empire. The Islâh Party, however, upheld the khedive's rights and advocated Islamic unity. Neither was as popular as the National Party.

When World War I began, Britain severed Egypt's ties with the Ottoman Empire (which in November 1914 joined the Central Powers), deposed ‘Abbâs, declared a British protectorate over Egypt, and barred all nationalist activity for the duration of the war. Although Egypt's cabinet ministers, legislative leaders, and people did not want these changes, Britain's military presence, augmented to protect the Suez Canal after an Ottoman-German attack in 1915, squelched all opposition. Wartime conditions led to price inflation, restrictions on the acreage allotted to growing cotton, martial law and tight controls on civil liberties, conscription of Egyptians for the campaign to take Palestine and Syria from the Ottomans, and requisition of draft animals and foodstuffs from the peasants.

During the war Egyptians hoped that the British would withdraw their troops as soon as it ended, or that they could persuade Britain's allies to back their cause. The idea of sending representatives to the postwar talks may have come from Sultan Fuâd (r. 1917– 1936). The proposed delegation's charter members were Sa'd Zaghlûl, ‘Alî Sha'râwî, ‘Abd al-’ Azîz Fahmî, Ahmad Lutfî al-Sayyid, ‘Abd al-Latîf al-Makabbâtî, Muhammad ‘Alî ‘Allûba, Hamad al-Bâsil, and Sînût Hannâ, most of whom had belonged to the Umma Party. They opened their campaign with a visit by Zaghlûl, Fahmî, and Sha'râwî to Britain's high commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, in November 1918, two days after the armistice, stating their desire to go to London to negotiate with the Foreign Office for an end to the British Protectorate. A similar request was made the same day by Premier Husayn Rushdî and ‘Adlî Yakan. The Foreign Office replied that it was too busy preparing for the Paris Peace Conference to meet even an official Egyptian deputation, let alone Zaghlûl, who was convening Egyptian legislators, demanding complete independence, and proposing to head a delegation to the Peace Conference. When Britain challenged the credentials of Zaghlûl and his friends to represent Egypt, his followers set up a committee to gather contributions and circulate petitions, authorizing their wafd (delegation) to speak for the Egyptian people. Wingate banned political meetings, and the Interior Ministry seized some of the petitions, but Rushdî and ‘Adlî resigned from the cabinet when the Foreign Office refused to see even them. Zaghlûl and his backers sent memoranda to the conference, President Wilson of the United States, the representatives of the Western powers in Egypt, and foreign residents.

Although the Wafd's main aim was to achieve Egypt's complete independence by peaceful means, Britain's failure to gauge the Wafd's popularity led to repressive measures in March, including the internment of Zaghlûl and three of his associates, sparking the nationwide 1919 revolution, in which all classes and religions joined in opposing the British; even women took part in demonstrations. London appointed General Allenby to replace Wingate as high commissioner and authorized him to take any measures necessary to restore order. Allenby suppressed the violence but also declared Zaghlûl free to go to Paris. The other Wafdists drew up a covenant, chose Zaghlûl as president of the Wafd, and bound themselves not to negotiate in its name with persons of political standing without his permission. Formally organized like a European political party, the Wafd delegated many powers to its leader. Once Zaghlûl was free to go to the Peace Conference, the other seventeen members of the Egyptian delegation met before their departure to form a central committee to gather funds and information on Egypt's situation. It became the nerve center of Egyptian resistance to British rule. When Britain dispatched the Milner Mission to Egypt, the Central Committee set up a boycott and demonstrations against it.

The Wafd's hopes of addressing the conference were dashed when the U.S. government formally recognized the British Protectorate. Unable to make its case directly, the Wafd's members issued manifestos and met other delegates, seeking supporters for independence. In 1920 Lord Milner and Zaghlûl held informal talks on the Egyptian question without reaching an agreement. New disturbances erupted in 1921, and the British again exiled Zaghlûl. Some of the men who had left the Wafd formed the Constitutional Liberal Party (similar to the Umma Party) and drafted Egypt's 1923 Constitution. Once it took effect, the Wafd reconstituted itself as a party to run candidates in the first parliamentary elections, but many Wafdists continued to see themselves as standard-bearers of Egyptian nationalism rather than as a partisan movement.

ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT JR.

See also: World War I: North and Saharan Africa; World War I: Survey

Egypt: Monarchy and Parliament, 1922–1939

On February 28,1922, the British unilaterally declared Egypt an independent and sovereign state, after having failed to negotiate a treaty with the nationalist delegation (Wafd). The declaration also limited Egypt's sovereignty by reserving the issues of imperial communications, defense, foreign interests and minorities, and Sudan for further negotiations. The British declaration also initiated a new political constitution by establishing the Egyptian monarchy, while allowing the Egyptians to define the details of the new political system in a constitutional commission. The constitution was drafted as a compromise between conservative monarchists and liberal constitutionalists, who alternately held power between 1922 and 1923. A Liberal-Constitutional Party formed in 1922, with the support of the British high commissioner in Egypt, Edmond Allenby; however, the monarchists did not form a party until 1925. In the meantime, the Liberal-Constitutional Party was the main political opposition to the Wafd.

The Wafd rejected the declaration of 1922, as well as the liberal and monarchist governments that supervised the drafting of the constitution of 1923. The constitution defined civil and political rights and created a parliament that consisted of two chambers elected by a male suffrage. The chamber of deputies had the power to initiate legislation, which had not been the case in earlier assemblies, such as those formed in 1866, 1883, and 1913. In addition, the majority party in the chamber had the right to form a government. Therefore, the constitution was dubbed the liberal constitution. However, the final stages of the drafting of the constitution secured special privileges for the monarchy. King Ahmad Fu'ad had the right to appoint two-fifths of the senate and enjoyed the right to dissolve parliament, write legislation in the absence of parliament, veto parliamentary legislation, and control appointments to the ministry of religious trusts and personnel at the national mosque, al-Azhar. Consequently the leader of the Wafd, Sa'd Zaghlul, declared the constitution a “feudal and medieval text.”

Nevertheless, the constitution created the political arena in which monarchists and nationalists contested for power in the interwar years. The Wafd Party gained legitimacy as the leading national party at the polls, taking 90 per cent of the vote in the first elections of 1923. The Liberal-Constitutional Party was defeated and afterward served in numerous coalition governments, oscillating between the nationalist Wafd and monarchist parliamentary blocs. Political contests revolved around the issues of treaty negotiations with the British and the constitutional role of the king. When the premier, Sa'd Zaghlul, failed to reach an agreement with the British Labour government on treaty negotiations in 1924, a conservative faction within the Wafd Party seceded to the monarchists. As a result, Zaghlul moved to a more radical, nationalist position on treaty issues to rally support and confront the king. To do so involved a confrontation with the British also, who now depended upon the king as a counter to the nationalists. Dramatically, the Wafd failed in its contest with the king and the British after the assassination of the British commander of the Egyptian army in Sudan by unidentified assailants in November.

Blame fell on the nationalist government of Zaghlul, who was forced to resign. Afterward, the parliament was dissolved, and Allenby and the Conservative foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain, worked with the king to organize a monarchist party, named the Unity (Ittihad) Party. The elections of March 1925 gave the Wafd 54 per cent of the vote, which showed that the monarchists could, by vote rigging and patronage, secure a significant section of the electorate. Yet, the first vote within the parliament defeated the monarchist government. Rather than bow to the deputies, the king exercised his constitutional right to dissolve the parliament and appoint a government that included Ittihad and Liberal-Constitutional ministers.

King Fu'ad was key to this coalition because only the king had sufficient powers of patronage to draw support away from the Wafd and neutralize the Liberals. For example, prominent Liberals aligned with the monarchy in 1925, including Isma'il Sidqi, who accepted the post of Minster of the Interior, while ‘Adli Yakan and Husayn Rushdi accepted royal appointments to the senate. Royal patronage of this type resembled the style of politics practiced by the khedives of nineteenth-century Egypt. Consequently, the king could count upon the support of politicians bred in the culture of autocratic rule before 1922. Politicians such as Sidqi, ‘Adli, and Rushdi were distrustful of the populist politics of the nationalists; therefore, the monarchy seemed to them, as it did to the British, as the last line of defense against a more radical nationalist alternative.

Further Reading

Egypt and Africa: 1000–1500

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Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty: Baybars, Qalawun, Mongols, 1250–1300

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Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Literature

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Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Army and Iqta’ System

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Egypt: Mamluk Dynasty (1250–1517): Plague

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Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Historical Outline

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Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Mamluk Beylicate (c.1600–1798)

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Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Napoleon and the French in Egypt (1798–1801)

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Egypt: Ottoman, 1517–1798: Nubia, Red Sea

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Egypt under the Ottomans, 1517–1798: Trade with Africa

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Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: Imperial Expansion

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Egypt: Muhammad Ali, 1805–1849: State and Economy

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Egypt, North Africa: Scramble

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Egypt: Urabi Pasha and British Occupation, 1879–1882

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Egypt: Cromer Administration, 1883–1907: Irrigation, Agriculture, and Industry

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Egypt: Salafiyya, Muslim Brotherhood

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Egypt: Nationalism, World War I and the Wafd, 1882–1922

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Egypt: Monarchy and Parliament, 1922–1939