14    Isolating Nicaragua’s Somoza

Sandinista Diplomacy in Western Europe, 1977–1979

ELINE VAN OMMEN

On 30 October 1978, the Central America Human Rights Committee (CAHRC) hosted a public lecture at the London School of Economics (LSE).1 Approximately two hundred people attended this event, the purpose of which was to raise awareness about the increasingly violent situation in Nicaragua and to collect money for the left-wing revolutionaries of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, Sandinista National Liberation Front). Ángel Barrajón, the representative of the FSLN in Western Europe, was one of the speakers. His speech, according to a critical observer from the British Foreign Office, “consisted largely of revolutionary rhetoric and denunciations of North American imperialism.”2 Apart from blaming the United States “for all Nicaragua’s present trouble,” the civil servant noted that Barrajón called on the British people “for moral, economic and material assistance to enable the Nicaraguan people to continue their armed struggle against the regime.”3 Barrajón specifically underlined the importance of collecting money for weapons, stating that “the victors in the conflict would be those who had the most and best arms.”4

This event in London is just one example of the massive international campaign the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and their supporters waged in the tumultuous period leading up to the fall of the Somoza dynasty on 19 July 1979. From 1977 onward, the FSLN broadcasted its message of Third World revolution and national liberation to thousands of solidarity activists, trade unionists, human rights campaigners, priests, business leaders, politicians, students, and journalists in Europe and the Americas. While doing so, it successfully mobilized and coordinated an international support base that strengthened the FSLN’s legitimacy and provided Sandinista guerrillas with material and political support to overthrow the Somoza regime. The international campaign of the FSLN in the late 1970s was a crucial breakthrough for the Nicaraguan revolutionaries, who had fruitlessly tried to topple the Somoza dictatorship since the FSLN’s foundation in the early 1960s.5

This chapter traces the origins of this international mobilization in support of the Nicaraguan struggle against Somoza by analyzing and assessing the efforts of the FSLN to shape public opinion and the foreign policies of Western European countries in the late 1970s. It argues that the key to the Sandinistas’ successful targeting of Western European audiences and politicians in the two years leading up to the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution was their ideological flexibility and pragmatism. Indeed, the 1977 decision to start working with individuals, governments, and organizations from all across the political spectrum proved remarkably effective, as it allowed the revolutionaries to create and coordinate an international anti-Somoza movement. In Western Europe, this led to the formation of a diverse alliance in support of the Nicaraguan struggle against the Somoza dictatorship, in which the Socialist International (SI) and Third World solidarity activists played a significant role.

Intimately related to the Sandinistas’ change of revolutionary strategy was the new public image—or rather images—the FSLN adopted to mobilize supporters for its cause. Although Sandinista representatives consciously tailored their revolutionary message to fit their audiences’ preferences and interests, there was a notable attempt to counter the idea that the FSLN was merely a group of Cuban-backed Marxist guerrillas. To challenge the historically negative portrayal of their movement, Sandinistas campaigning in Western Europe described the FSLN as the legitimate representative of a nationalist struggle for democracy and social justice, in which Nicaraguans from all political and socioeconomic backgrounds participated. By arguing that the revolutionary war could not be framed as a conflict between East and West, as well as by continuously stressing that the FSLN would adopt a nonaligned foreign policy once in power, the revolutionaries placed themselves outside of the Cold War and inside the long tradition of Third World national liberation movements.6 At a time when Europeans were increasingly dissatisfied with the American tendency to frame international affairs solely in Cold War terms, and Western European social democrats started to develop an active interest in the Global South, this message resonated in an important number of ways.

Adding a crucial layer to the traditionally U.S.-centered narratives of the region’s history, this chapter aims to contribute to the historiography of the Cold War in Latin America by integrating Western European perspectives into the history of the Nicaraguan Revolution.7 This is not to suggest that the United States was a marginal actor in Central America during the Cold War, but rather that to fully understand the origins and impact of the Nicaraguan Revolution, we need to adopt a more global approach. What makes the late 1970s such an intriguing period in Central American history is that, for the first time in decades, actors beyond the Western Hemisphere developed a proactive interest in the region.8 What is more, as this chapter shows, rather than being on the receiving end of outside interventions, Nicaraguans themselves encouraged Western European involvement in Central American affairs, as they hoped European governments could pressure the Carter administration to break ties with the Somoza regime. By incorporating Central American voices and perspectives, therefore, this chapter contributes to the growing body of literature that stresses the importance of Latin American agency in shaping the region’s international history.9

Since the FSLN’s international campaign targeted a range of state and nonstate actors, this chapter draws on a wide variety of sources. In addition to drawing on diplomatic archives in Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States, it is based on private papers, the archives of solidarity committees, and interviews with activists and politicians from Western Europe and Nicaragua. Combined, these sources shed light on the complex origins and impact of the international mobilization for the Nicaraguan struggle. Due to the nature of its source base, and inspired by, among others, the works of Matthew Connelly and Lien-Hang Nguyen, this chapter combines international and transnational history.10 Western European solidarity activists and Nicaraguan guerrillas were not part of the state, but they participated in a struggle that was inherently political and shaped by the international Cold War system: they lobbied politicians, engaged with governments, and tried to overthrow an anti-Communist regime. To capture and assess the impact of the Sandinistisas’ international campaign, it is important to integrate state and nonstate perspectives and actors. Looking at either one in isolation makes little sense when trying to understand the strategies and consequences of FSLN revolutionary diplomacy. In particular, this chapter discusses how Western European governments dealt with the Sandinistas’ international campaign and how state officials juggled public pressure, traditional Cold War concerns, and the transatlantic relationship.

Sandinistas Go Global

The diplomatic campaign the FSLN launched in 1977 targeted primarily Latin America, Western Europe, and North America. In the years before the 1979 revolution, the international strategy of the FSLN was still rather unorganized and often lacked clear coordination. Nevertheless, Sandinistas around the globe had a solid idea about what their organization needed: material and political support for the military struggle and the isolation of the regime of Anastasio Somoza. With this in mind, Sandinista supporters organized themselves and presented their arguments to labor organizations, church groups, solidarity committees, governments, and political parties in their host countries. In particular, the FSLN’s international strategy relied on the prestige and expertise of Nicaraguan intellectuals, such as the novelist Sergio Ramírez, the priest Miguel D’Escoto, and the liberation theologian Ernesto Cardenal.

The mobilization of a broad support base for the struggle against Somoza was rooted in the revolutionary ideology of one of the three factions of the FSLN. This insurrectional faction, better known as tercerista, became the most powerful of the three Sandinista factions after its foundation in 1977. The terceristas opposed the traditional foco theory of Che Guevara, which described rural guerrilla warfare as the most effective revolutionary strategy. Rather, terceristas believed in urban uprisings and, crucially, a temporary alliance with the country’s other opposition forces.11 Despite this pledge for a multiclass and politically diverse alliance, the terceristas were still principally inspired by Marxist ideas. Daniel Ortega, one of the leaders, clearly spelled out his faction’s strategy in an interview in early 1979. Terceristas, according to Ortega, “aim at joining together all the anti-Somoza sectors and mass organizations of the country, including sectors of the opposition bourgeoisie.”12 In doing so, he continued, “we seek to conserve the political hegemony of the FSLN and … avoid the possibility of the bourgeoisie becoming the political leader of an anti-Somoza front.”13 Terceristas, then, disagreed with the proletarian faction, led by Jaime Wheelock Román, who argued that the key to a successful revolution was the recruitment and mobilization of workers. They also clashed with Tomás Borge, one of the three founders of the FSLN, who headed the prolonged war faction. This faction believed that the struggle should take place in the mountains, not the cities, and that it would take a long time before a coalition of peasants and workers would be able to overthrow the Somoza regime.

In the late 1970s, the pragmatic tercerista strategy of looking beyond the radical Left to build an anti-Somoza alliance was extended to the international arena. The FSLN looked for donors other than Fidel Castro’s Cuba for financial aid, logistical support, and political backing. To achieve their goal, the FSLN employed several arguments and tactics. First, Sandinista representatives argued passionately against Somoza’s claim that the only two options for Nicaragua were “himself or the communists.”14 To assuage fears that Nicaragua would become a second Cuba—isolated and dependent on the Soviet Union—Sandinistas tried to move beyond the ideological bipolarity of the Cold War.15 Instead of being aligned to either the Soviet Union or the United States, they presented the FSLN as a national liberation movement, which fought for democracy, social justice, and political pluralism. According to U.S. sources, guerrilla commander Ortega “seemed to go out of his way to stress the moderate, democratic orientation of the Frente” in a meeting with U.S. officials in Panama in June 1979.16 In that same month, Tomás Arguello Chamorro, a Nicaraguan student who also functioned as spokesperson for the FSLN in Britain, emphasized to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) “that it was quite untrue that the only alternative to Somoza or Somocismo was the extreme left and that it had been untrue for many years.”17 It was completely false, Sandinistas proclaimed, to compare the FSLN with Latin America’s radical armed Left. One tercerista was quoted in the Washington Post pointing out that “while other revolutionaries enter banks to assault them, we were just received in Ecuador by the president of the central bank.”18 And the famous commander Edén Pastora, then known by his guerrilla name, Comandante Cero, denied claims that Fidel Castro’s Cuba was funding and influencing the FSLN. Describing a successful raid of Nicaragua’s National Palace in August 1978, Pastora declared the Sandinistas “did not need anyone” as “we are intelligent, we are capable, and we are revolutionaries.”19

While playing down their connections with Cuba and international Communism so as not to provoke opposition from anti-Communists, the FSLN simultaneously highlighted the dependency of the Somoza regime on the United States.20 When unidentified gunmen in Managua murdered the popular editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in July 1978, for instance, Ernesto Cardenal accused President Carter of trying to cover up Chamorro’s murder, declaring publicly “Somoza knows who killed Chamorro and if Somoza knows, Carter knows, and if he doesn’t know he has not wanted to ask.”21 Invoking memories of the early twentieth century, when U.S. Marines had occupied Nicaragua for several years, the FSLN also repeatedly warned the international community of the possibility of another “North American military intervention in Nicaragua” to prevent the FSLN from taking power.22 In private meetings with U.S. government officials, FSLN negotiators toned down their anti-imperialist rhetoric and acknowledged that Carter’s efforts were “being distorted by Somoza and the media.”23 Indeed, Ramírez and D’Escoto told Richard Feinberg in 1978 that “the Sandinistas were not anti-U.S.” and pointed out that in the recently released FSLN manifesto “one of the references to the U.S. was favorable.”24 They did, however, stress the U.S. responsibility for Somoza’s behavior, stating “the U.S. could remove him if it wanted.”25

To bring across the message of democracy and nonalignment in a more convincing manner, the terceristas employed the support of a group of Nicaraguan intellectuals, known as the Grupo de los Doce (Group of Twelve). On 21 October 1977, citing the “repressive apparatus” and “irrational violence” of the Somoza regime, this respectable group of businessmen, politicians, priests, and academics publicly endorsed the Sandinistas’ armed struggle in Nicaragua’s main opposition newspaper, La Prensa.26 In the two years leading up to the revolution, members of Los Doce skillfully used their prestige and international network to give the FSLN’s revolutionary war momentum, legitimacy, and international press coverage. Sergio Ramírez, one of the founders of the group, played a particularly important role.27 Taking advantage of his contacts with famous Latin American writers such as Gabriel Garciá Marquez and Julio Cortázar, Ramírez was able to get in touch with several sympathetic Latin American leaders and convinced them of the “moderate tendencies in the Sandinistas.”28 Ramírez and the Group of Twelve also tried to convince the U.S. government that the FSLN was not as radical as was generally believed. In 1978, for instance, he told Feinberg that the group’s new manifesto was quite “moderate.”29

The arguments FSLN representatives used to mobilize support, however, varied greatly depending on the audience and location. When talking to potential candidates in Western Europe, the Sandinista campaign strategy was to “avoid political discussions” and instead “look for common ground.”30 For example, if an organization or individual was unlikely to directly support the guerrillas’ military struggle, but could perhaps be persuaded to denounce the human rights violations of the Somoza regime, the conversation’s focus was on the latter. In meeting with Western European officials, the Sandinista leadership did not ask them to recognize the FSLN as the “diplomatic representative of Nicaragua.” Instead, they focused on the crimes of the Somoza dynasty and asked Western European governments to officially “break off diplomatic relations” with the regime.31 During a visit to the West German capital, Bonn, Cardenal called for “a suspension of all German investment and credits” in Nicaragua, arguing all aid would end up in “the pockets of the Somoza family.”32

To mobilize the public, Sandinista representatives consciously adapted the style of their campaigns to suit the domestic situation in the countries they targeted. For example, in 1978, Barrajón wrote in a letter to a comrade that, unlike the Spanish, British people had little “sympathy for armed movements.”33 Therefore, he recommended that campaigns in Britain, in order to raise money for the FSLN, should have a “humanitarian” instead of a revolutionary and political character.34 In letters to the Foreign Office and the Nicaraguan embassy, then, the abovementioned CAHRC focused on human rights violations. They accused Somoza of “imprisoning, torturing, and killing” and denounced the “atrocities perpetuated by the National Guard against ordinary people.”35 On their flyers, the CAHRC wrote that any money they received at fundraisings events would be used “for immediate relief work” and “items such as beds, blood, blankets, field hospitals, etc.”36 Most likely, however, this money was used for military means.

The new strategy the Sandinistas launched in the late 1970s appeared to be remarkably effective, as the FSLN was increasingly seen as the vanguard of the anti-Somoza movement, mobilized a range of people for its cause, and managed to obtain financial and political support from new sources. Latin American governments, such as those of Costa Rica, Venezuela, Panama, and Mexico, financially assisted the struggle of the FSLN. And by repeatedly asking the Carter administration when the United States “would be getting rid of Somoza,” these governments contributed to Somoza’s isolation.37 Other Nicaraguan opposition groups such as the Frente Amplio Opositor (FAO, Broad Opposition Front) clearly worried about the growing popularity of the FSLN. In May 1979, one FAO representative reported to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the FAO was currently “sandwiched” between Somoza’s army on the one hand and the increasingly powerful Sandinista guerrillas on the other.38 Somoza too, noticed this trend, and complained to the U.S. ambassador, Mauricio Solaun, about the “new legitimization of the FSLN,” adding there was clearly “a problem with the growing respectability of the Communists.”39 It needs to be noted that behind the scenes the Cubans continued to play a crucial role in the Nicaraguan struggle, particularly since Fidel Castro used his negotiating skills and prestige to ease the tension between the three FSLN factions.40

To understand why the FSLN’s new campaign was so successful, however, it is important to look deeper than the general international strategy and analyze how Sandinista diplomacy played out on the ground. Individuals, political parties, and governments in Western Europe responded to the Sandinistas’ diplomatic offensive in different ways. Solidarity activists, for example, were attracted to Nicaragua for a wide variety of reasons. The FSLN was also lucky to encounter an unusually receptive Socialist International. Furthermore, clearly not all Western European governments were entirely convinced by the Sandinistas’ apparent move toward the political center.

Transnational Solidarity Activism and the FSLN

A key aspect of the FSLN’s campaign was the coordination of a transnational network of solidarity activists. Solidarity committees in Latin America, Western Europe, and North America cooperated with the Sandinistas to collect money, spread information about the situation in Nicaragua, and pressure governments to break off relations with the Somoza regime. In the years before the revolution, the network of Western European solidarity activists was still small, especially when compared to the 1980s, when hundreds of committees worked to “defend” the Sandinista Revolution against the Reagan administration and the counterrevolutionaries. Nevertheless, to understand the later functioning and importance of the solidarity movement, it is important to study how this network came into being.

As noted above, Cardenal visited Europe regularly to propagate the Sandinista message. The charismatic priest gave television interviews and was regularly quoted in newspapers.41 Cardenal was a particularly well-known figure in Western European literary circles, and his books on liberation theology and Nicaraguan history were published in German, English, and Dutch.42 His visits to Western Europe, however, had a purpose that went beyond mere publicity; he also traveled through the region to collect money for weapons, give messages and instructions to exiled Nicaraguans, and encourage Western European activists to set up solidarity committees. As a writer, priest, and activist, Cardenal established contacts with many grassroots organizations in Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the Netherlands. The flyer from the CAHRC, for example, called upon the people of Britain to raise funds for the Nicaraguan people and send them “to the account of Father Ernesto Cardenal.”43

Due to the nature of his work, Cardenal was never in one place long enough to become the official FSLN representative in Europe. To oversee and coordinate the foundation of a Western European network of solidarity activists, then, the Sandinista leadership appointed two official representatives. One was Ángel Barrajón, a Spanish ex-priest who had lived in Nicaragua since the 1960s, but was forced to move back to Spain because of his connection to the Sandinistas. Barrajón, based in Madrid, was appointed responsibility for the solidarity movement in Southern Europe and in Great Britain in September 1978.44 The other representative was a Nicaraguan of German descent named Enrique Schmidt Cuadra, who had worked for the FSLN but had been living in exile in West Germany since 1977.45 Schmidt Cuadra was responsible for the functioning of the solidarity movement in Northern and Central Europe. To instruct the solidarity committees and provide up-to-date information about the situation in Nicaragua to the press, Barrajón and Schmidt received monthly faxes from the International Department of the FSLN, which was based in Costa Rica. Additionally, on multiple occasions in 1978 and 1979, Barrajón and Schmidt traveled to Costa Rica and Nicaragua, carrying with them suitcases filled with thousands of dollars, which the solidarity movement had collected for the Sandinista struggle.46

The primary task of the two Sandinista representatives in Western Europe was to encourage people to set up local solidarity committees and to simultaneously incorporate all these individual committees into a functioning transnational structure. To achieve the latter, the FSLN organized two Western European solidarity conferences in 1978, in Madrid and Utrecht. At the conference in Utrecht, the activists decided that the solidarity movement needed national representatives as well as one central Western European secretariat. Throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, this secretariat, initially headed by the Dutch professor Klaas Wellinga and the German author and activist Hermann Schulz, coordinated campaigns on a Western European scale. The secretariat was also responsible for communication with Nicaragua, the International Department of the FSLN, and the national coordinating committees. In the late 1970s, the office of the Nicaragua Komitee Nederland (NKN, Dutch Nicaragua Committee) in Utrecht simultaneously functioned as the headquarters of the West European solidarity movement.47

By 1979, it was clear that the Sandinista representatives had, to a large extent, succeeded in their task. In West Germany, dozens of solidarity committees campaigned for the Sandinista cause.48 In most Dutch university cities, too, such as Groningen, Nijmegen, Utrecht, and Wageningen, local activists managed to set up active Nicaragua solidarity committees and promote the FSLN’s cause.49 In Britain, Nicaragua groups operated in at least twenty cities, such as Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Bath, and Oxford.50 Nevertheless, as the Foreign Office noted, “despite two very disturbing television documentaries” about the violent situation in Nicaragua, “the campaign has failed to capture much public interest” in the United Kingdom.51 Solidarity activists such as George Black and Ángel Barrajón admitted the solidarity movement in Britain had a slow start, but they became increasingly skilled at raising money for the FSLN during the 1980s.52

In Western Europe during the late 1970s, Nicaragua’s Sandinista rebels and their allies employed the imagery and language of national liberation and Third World solidarity, particularly in Western Europe. One of the most active support networks was the Nicaragua Komitee Nederland (NKN, Dutch Nicaragua Committee) in Utrecht. A few weeks before the revolution’s success in mid-1979, the NKN circulated this poster calling for Dutch people to show solidarity for Nicaragua’s Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, Sandinista Front for National Liberation. The poster reads “Steun het FSLN” (“Support the FSLN”), and it contains a bank account number along with contemporary rebel photographs superimposed upon an image of 1920s Nicaraguan revolutionary Augusto Sandino, namesake of the FSLN. (Image courtesy of the International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, BG D10/698.)

Before the revolution, then, the FSLN relied mostly on committees in the Netherlands and West Germany, where the Nicaragua solidarity groups were bigger and better organized.53 In these countries, the movement succeeded in building an anti-Somoza alliance by establishing ties with human rights organizations, church groups, political parties, labor unions, and charities. The NKN, for instance, offered a petition to Nicaraguan consul in Rotterdam, stressing the right to “self-determination” of the Nicaraguan people. Political parties across the political spectrum had signed this petition, including not only the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA, Labour Party) and the Dutch Communist Party, but also the center right Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) and the conservative Christen-Democratisch Appél (Christian Democratic Appeal).54 In West Germany, committees also succeeded in creating a broad opposition front, as they had a good relationship with the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany), and received support from politicians of the Green Party and the Communist Party, as well as from Christian groups inspired by the work of Sandinista liberation theologians, such as Ernesto Cardenal.55 By contrast, the solidarity movement in Britain was not able to bridge the political divide in the country and received support only from the Labour Party, not the Conservatives.56 Nevertheless, the British Secretary of State, David Owen, received dozens of letters asking the British government to support the “development of a democratic government in Nicaragua.”57 These letters were sent by a range of organizations, including the British Council of Churches, constituency Labour Parties, War on Want, the Justice and Peace Group for Prisoners of Conscience, and several student unions.58

In some cases, the competition and distrust between members of the three Sandinista tendencies spilled over to Europe. In November 1978, a German solidarity committee, based in Göttingen, wrote in a circular letter stating that they did not recognize the authority of Schmidt Cuadra and refused to accept the solidarity committee in Wuppertal as their national representative.59 One reason the Göttingen committee gave for refusing to accept Schmidt Cuadra’s position was that he gave favorable treatment to his “friends from the proletarian tendency” of the FSLN.60 Overall, however, the FSLN succeeded in preventing Nicaraguan divisions from having a negative impact on the functioning of the transnational solidarity network. George Black, for instance, wrote to the FSLN that the British committee was “pluralist” and had been able to “avoid ideological conflict.”61 At solidarity conferences, FSLN representatives spoke openly about the ideological differences that existed between three tendencies but were conscious to stress that they now worked together to overthrow Somoza.62 As Ángel Barrajón wrote to Miguel Castañeda, another Sandinista, in February 1979, “The struggle against the dictatorship is just more important than problems between the tendencies, particularly when this endangers the solidarity movement.”63

Undoubtedly, the solidarity activists’ personal determination to avoid ideological disputes was inspired by their earlier experiences with the Chilean solidarity movement, which started to disintegrate in the 1970s. Since the violent overthrow of the socialist Salvador Allende in 1973, Chilean exiles in Europe had worked hard to isolate and overthrow the military regime of the anti-Communist Pinochet. The Chile movement, however, was split between the radical Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR, Revolutionary Left Movement), the Chilean Communist Party, and the Chilean Socialist Party. The inability of these parties to overcome their differences prevented them from working effectively for their cause. Furthermore, their movement was increasingly split between exiles and activists who continued to believe in the value of armed struggle and those who advocated the human rights narrative as a more effective strategy to overthrow Pinochet.64 The internal divisions and debates within their network frustrated Chilean exiles and left many of their Western European and Latin American supporters confused and disenchanted. Nicaraguan exiles, and particularly Schmidt Cuadra, who had participated in the Chile solidarity campaign in Germany, naturally did not want history to repeat itself and therefore structured the Nicaragua solidarity campaign as a broad and inclusive anti-Somoza alliance.65

One group the FSLN targeted successfully, then, was the radical flank of the Chilean solidarity movement. As most Chilean solidarity activists preferred human rights, exiles and activists who advocated for armed struggle, such as the supporters of the MIR, ended up frustrated and without financial resources.66 While armed revolution seemed increasingly unlikely in Chile, Sandinista guerrillas grew stronger and gained popularity. For some activists, therefore, Nicaragua was proof that guerrilla warfare was still a valuable strategy. In the years before the revolution, these people were the most likely to take up the Sandinista cause. Klaas Wellinga for example, was the Dutch representative of the MIR before he became a founding member of the NKN.67 And George Black and John Bevan, the leaders of British solidarity campaign for Nicaragua, stressed that Chilean exiles from the MIR and other militant groups played a key role in the early British mobilization for the armed struggle in Nicaragua.68

Not all solidarity activists were intrigued by armed struggle; many were drawn to Nicaragua due to a combination of cultural and political reasons. Here, too, the FSLN was able to build on earlier efforts. Indeed, since the 1970s, to encourage European interest in Latin American history and politics, Chilean solidarity committees in Britain, the Netherlands, and West Germany organized many cultural events, such as concerts by Latin American singers, art exhibitions, film showings, and literary nights. In the Netherlands, the Kultuur Kollectief Latijns Amerika (Culture Collective Latin America), which had direct ties to the solidarity committees, translated and distributed literature, poetry, and music.69 These cultural events had a strong political undertone. For example, most musicians who played at the solidarity concerts were part of the popular Latin American Nueva Canción (New Song) movement. Returning to a more traditional folkloric style, New Song musicians such as the Uruguayans Numa Morales and José Carbajal addressed social tensions in their region and delivered political messages to their audiences.70

The Nicaragua solidarity campaign successfully continued the familiar strategy of linking political messages to cultural entertainment. They translated and distributed books by Cardenal, organized art shows, and invited Central American artists to perform at concerts. The Nicaraguan singers Carlos and Luis Enrique Mejía Godoy were particularly popular. They sang about social issues and romanticized guerrilla warfare. In “Guitarra Armada,” for instance, the Godoy brothers explain how make explosives, handle small arms, and disassemble and reassemble an M1 Carbine, a weapon commonly used by the National Guard. And in the song “Venancia,” Luis Enrique Godoy tells the story of a young female guerrilla from the mountains, whose brother was murdered by the army for joining a labor union. Next to records, Nicaragua solidarity committees also sold copies of the Costa Rican–made movie Nicaragua: Patria Libre o Morir (1979), which chronicles the FSLN’s military struggle against Somoza.71

Thus, Sandinista representatives in Western Europe were able to build on existing networks of solidarity activists and capitalized on the frustrations and tensions that existed within these organizations. When Sandinistas started to broaden their horizon in the late 1970s and looked toward Western Europe for political and financial support, they encountered many left-wing activists with a strong interest in Latin America. After many years of fruitless solidarity activism against the anti-Communist dictatorships of the Southern Cone, these activists wanted, quite simply, a win. That the FSLN was able bring together such a diverse range of supporters from the radical Left, student unions, human rights organizations, and mainstream political parties, demonstrates the success of their pragmatic strategy. It also brought them in contact with Western European social democrats.

Social Democrats and the FSLN

Sandinista leaders considered Western European politicians an important target for their diplomatic campaign, as they believed European government policy could pressure the United States into an agreement with the FSLN. Although European politicians and activists had historically not been particularly involved in Central America, developments in Nicaragua slowly started to catch their attention in 1978 and 1979. Key in this context was the role of the Socialist International, through which the FSLN established contacts with prominent social democrats, such as François Mitterand (France), Olof Palme (Sweden), and Felipe González (Spain). Most important, however, was the influence and charismatic leadership of Willy Brandt, the leader of the Social Democrat Party, who was elected leader of the SI on a platform of human rights and North-South cooperation in 1976 and shifted the focus of the SI towards Latin America.72

The SI, founded in 1951, was an influential international organization that brought together socialist, labor, and social democratic parties. The SI aimed to challenge the bipolarity of the Cold War by presenting Western European social democracy as a “third way”—a suitable alternative to both Soviet communism and U.S. capitalism.73 In the 1960s and 1970s, the SI’s principal focus had been on Southern Europe, and the organization played a particularly important role in the democratic transitions in Spain and Portugal. Under Willy Brandt’s leadership, the SI rapidly grew in membership and in scope. Stressing the need for greater economic cooperation between rich and poor countries, the organization started to develop activities outside of Europe, and this was particularly well received in Latin America.74 Prominent Latin American leaders such as Carlos Andrés Pérez (Venezuela), José Francisco Peña Gomez (Dominican Republic), and Daniel Oduber (Costa Rica) joined the SI; others, such as Omar Torrijos (Panama) and Leonel Brizola (Brazil) regularly attended SI meetings.75

This was excellent news for the FSLN. As a result of their international campaign, Sandinistas from the Grupo de los Doce had already managed to establish friendly relationships with, among others, Pérez, Torrijos, and Oduber.76 These connections, then, provided the FSLN with a good opportunity to put Nicaragua on the SI’s agenda and, consequently, to increase the international pressure on Somoza. In 1978, Cardenal and several other Sandinista representatives were invited to speak at an SI conference in Vancouver, Canada, where they received a standing ovation.77 In the final resolution of the conference, the SI called for international solidarity with the Nicaraguan struggle against the dictatorship and, implicitly referring to the United States, urged all governments “which have so long maintained the Somoza regime in power” to end their support for the regime.78 Furthermore, the SI adopted concrete plans to assist the Nicaraguan opposition with financial and material aid, medical assistance, and political training.79

Because of the support of the SI for the Nicaraguan opposition, developments in Central America shaped political debates in Western Europe. Not only did European politicians voice their concerns about the Somoza dictatorship in their parliaments, urging governments to break ties with the regime, but some also endorsed the FSLN as the representative of the Nicaraguan struggle.80 On 20 December 1978, the British Labour Party passed a resolution in which they extended “their warmest support to all the democratic opposition forces and particularly the Sandinista National Liberation Front.”81 In the resolution, Labour firmly rejected “the idea that the only alternative to Somoza is communist takeover in Nicaragua.”82 The PvdA, too, promoted the cause of FSLN in the Netherlands, criticizing Somoza, U.S. foreign policy, and Israeli arms shipments to Nicaragua.83 The Dutch Labour leader, Joop den Uyl, emphasizing the “responsibility” of the Carter administration, urged his government to express “sympathy” for the struggle in Nicaragua.84 The PvdA also called on the public to financially support the FSLN, “since you have to help the Frente, and not the dictator Somoza.”85 Through its connections with left-wing politicians, the FSLN could lobby Western European governments more directly. The Nicaraguan brothers Tomás and Humberto Arguello Chamorro, for instance, arranged a secret meeting with the British Foreign Office “through a British intermediary” from the Labour Party.86 In that meeting, the Chamorro brothers asked the British government to break relations with the Somoza regime and recognize the new Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional (Junta of National Reconstruction), a provisional government that the FSLN, in cooperation with other opposition groups, had established in June 1979 to give the military struggle a civilian and moderate face.87

Again, the international strategy of the FSLN was effective. In less than two years, the FSLN was transformed from a marginalized group of guerrillas into an organization with connections to a respectable and influential network of Latin American and Western European politicians. Apart from giving the Sandinistas an international platform to voice their concerns, this shaped government policy. As the final section of this chapter demonstrates, Western European governments in the late 1970s were suddenly forced to engage with Nicaragua, a country where they historically had little direct economic or political interest.

Government Policies and the FSLN

As developments in Nicaragua captured the public’s attention, European governments in the late 1970s became increasingly critical of Somoza. As we have seen above, the general sentiment in Europe was that Somoza’s dictatorial behavior was unacceptable and that Nicaragua deserved democracy. On 29 June 1979, the foreign ministers of the nine member states of the European Community (EC) joined the debate by issuing a statement declaring “their very grave concern over the disturbing developments in Nicaragua and the steadily worsening sufferings being inflicted upon the Nicaraguan people.”88 They therefore called for “an immediate halt to the conflict” so that “free elections can be held without delay.”89

This was the first time the Nine issued a joint statement on a Central American country, a region they considered of little political, economic, and strategic importance. Britain and the Netherlands, for instance, did not have embassies in Managua and depended on their ambassadors in Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama for relevant information on the civil war in Nicaragua. Although this irritated the British ambassador in Costa Rica, who noted in September 1978 that “under the inefficient system of nonresident representation we tend to be two jumps behind events in Nicaragua,” the FCO did not feel the need to change these arrangements.90 John Shakespeare, for example, the head of the British Mexico and Caribbean Department (MACD), stated in November 1978 that Central America was an area where Britain “could close down all our missions without serious harm to the national interest.”91 West Germany did have an embassy in Managua and, according to the British ambassador, “relatively big commercial interests” in Nicaragua.92 Nevertheless, the German Auswärtiges Amt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), like its European counterparts, did not feel the need to become actively involved in the region. In fact, at an Anglo-German meeting to discuss European foreign policy in 1978, the German representative noted that West Germany “had no active policy towards Latin America.”93

It is therefore remarkable to note that, a year later, despite the lack of direct interest, the European governments became opposed to the continuation of Somoza’s regime and issued a joint statement.94 What is more, together with the Netherlands and the FRG, the British government urged the International Monetary Fund to refuse the Nicaraguan government another loan.95 And although Britain could not do much to directly put pressure on Somoza, Owen took the symbolic measure not to accredit the new British ambassador in Costa Rica to Nicaragua.96 Also, Owen urged the United States in February 1979 to “pull the props out from under Somoza,” and even said that he was willing to take “a lead in the EEC [European Economic Community] in support of any U.S. action against Somoza.”97

To a large extent, the rising levels of European governmental interest in Nicaragua are evidence of the impact of Sandinista diplomacy on policy. Certainly, the FCO was aware of the growing public interest in Nicaragua and took this into account when making foreign policy decisions regarding Central America. For example, the MACD recommended that Owen make the U.S. administration aware of the “strong opposition to the Somoza regime within the Labour Party and amongst liberal and human rights groups in the UK.”98 Surely, the memorandum continued, there “would be some parliamentary and public criticism of the U.S. if, in spite of Somoza’s rejection of the mediation proposals, they were to continue to give him any support.”99 In addition, as parliamentarians and the public pressured governments into issuing a statement about Nicaragua, European governments could no longer remain neutral. Even if they disagreed with public opinion, they had to come up with a response to justify this. In the late 1970s, therefore, although initially reluctant to get involved the region at all, European governments had to rethink their approach to Central America, and Nicaragua.

Nevertheless, to understand how European foreign policy toward Nicaragua was subsequently shaped, we need to take note of another actor that pressured Europe to get involved in the Nicaraguan conflict. In June 1979, several European governments, including Britain and the Netherlands, received a secret letter from the American president, Jimmy Carter, asking for European support for the United States’ “general objectives” in Central America, most notably “a reduction of violence and the restoration of peace in Nicaragua.”100 Specifically, Carter asked his European allies to embargo “arms shipments to both sides in the Nicaragua conflict.”101 The letter also reflected the U.S. administration’s fear of a Castroite takeover in Nicaragua, stating that “Western democracies less directly involved in Central American than the United States may have special advantages in helping to develop and strengthen centrist political forces in these countries.”102

The initial European response to Carter’s letter varied from passive to negative. The British diplomat Anthony Parsons’ summarized the situation as follows: “The Americans have got rather a nerve. Since the 19th century they have treated the countries of Central America like a private estate and have resolutely discouraged any other powers from developing their interests on any significant scale there. Now the structure is coming apart and they are turning to us and presumably others for help.”103 The Dutch were equally unimpressed and concluded that the Carter administration was now “relatively powerless” since an “old-school intervention” was no longer politically acceptable. Also, the Dutch rejected Carter’s suggestion that they could directly assist “moderate political groups” in Nicaragua since they considered this a task for political parties, not governments.104

The reluctance of European governments to support Carter’s objectives does not necessarily mean that they were entirely convinced by the FSLN’s argument that the Nicaraguan revolutionary struggle had nothing to do with the Cold War. Although the British foreign secretary, David Owen, wanted Somoza out as soon as possible, the FCO certainly shared some of the American concern about the possibility of Soviet involvement in Central America. The British ambassador, for instance, noted that the Costa Rican security service had discovered Sandinista propaganda and arms in a house in San Jose “not far from the Soviet Embassy.”105 And, in November 1978, a representative from the Overseas Information Department (OID) attended the Nicaragua solidarity event at the LSE. In a memorandum to the FCO, the OID compared Barrajón’s speech to the language of the Cuban revolutionaries and concluded that it was “not clear” whether the FSLN “would follow Cuba’s pro-Soviet party organization.”106 In fact, many in the FCO agreed with Carter that it was in the European interest to “bolster the moderates” in Nicaragua in order to prevent “a Castroite takeover.”107 And the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs also acknowledged that the American fears “for escalation” and the “increase of Cuban/Marxist influence” in Central America were justified.108

This negative response in London and The Hague to Carter’s letter needs to be placed in the wider context of transatlantic relations and the outbreak of the so-called second Cold War.109 To summarize, transatlantic relations were extremely tense during the Carter presidency; European leaders were irritated by Carter’s foreign policy toward the Middle East, the Soviet Union, and East Asia, which they saw as inconsistent, indifferent to the transatlantic alliance, and inconsiderate of European Cold War concerns.110 The German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, in particular, was known to disagree with Jimmy Carter on a wide variety of issues, most notably the correct response to the global economic crisis and nuclear arms control.111 Additionally, as old Cold War tensions and rivalries heightened in 1978–79 and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union crumbled once again, Western Europeans were reluctant to start this new phase of the Cold War and remained committed to the continuation of détente.112

The reaction to Carter’s letter, therefore, is reflective of the increasing frustration of Western European governments with the Carter administration. With regard to Nicaragua, Carter’s apparent shift away from his earlier policy of prioritizing human rights only confirmed what many Western Europeans leaders already believed—namely, that Carter’s foreign policies were vague, inconsistent, and contradictory. Indeed, when Carter showed himself unable to integrate human rights and Cold War concerns into a coherent and effective foreign policy toward Nicaragua, Somoza, and the FSLN, he alienated his Western European allies.113 As the British ambassador in Costa Rica wrote in 1978, “The all-important United States are still obsessed with the fear of a second Cuba and have reluctantly concluded that Somoza is the only figure who can effectively subserve their desire to keep the region quiet.”114 The British ambassador in Washington, too, noted that the United States was once again “haunted by the memory of the Cuban Revolution.”115

Despite these tensions, both sides of the Atlantic recognized that in the global Cold War they were on the same side. Indeed, Parsons concluded his memo by writing that there was “no point in rubbing salt in the Americans’ wound” since “we all share the same objectives.”116 The main point of disagreement between the United States and its European partners was on the right methods for achieving these goals. West European officials believed that Carter’s apparent refusal to push Somoza out would only worsen the situation, as this would bolster the FSLN. The nine EC member states, therefore, wanted Somoza to leave Nicaragua as soon as possible. This was based on the calculation that “the longer Somoza remains, the great the chance of the extreme left wing controlling the next government of Nicaragua and of it coming under Cuban influence.”117 The best strategy to keep Nicaragua away from Cuba and the Soviet Union, they argued, was to make sure Nicaragua’s new regime would feel welcomed by the West.118

The situation in Nicaragua soon outpaced the development of European foreign policies; on 19 July 1979, Sandinista guerrillas succeeded in overthrowing the Somoza regime and installed a new revolutionary government. It is therefore difficult to assess the exact impact of the FSLN’s revolutionary diplomacy on Western European foreign policy before the 1979 revolution. Nevertheless, we can conclude that, on the level of the state, the international campaign of the FSLN, combined with pressure from the Carter administration, put Nicaraguan developments on the West European political agenda and, in doing so, forced Western European governments to look closely at a region they had since the early twentieth century largely ignored. As they did so, these governments agreed with the Sandinistas that Somoza’s regime should be brought to an end. Although they were not entirely convinced of the FSLN’s noble intentions, they were frustrated by the apparent complacency of the United States.

Conclusion

In tracing the Western European mobilization for Nicaragua, this chapter has placed the origins of the Sandinista Revolution in a global context. It has demonstrated that the material, political, and financial support the Sandinistas received from its Western European allies strengthened the FSLN’s position, both in Nicaragua and in the international arena. The solidarity network the FSLN set up in the late 1970s continued to be a valuable asset for it throughout the 1980s. As the new U.S. president, Ronald Reagan, set out to oust the Sandinistas in 1981, the solidarity committees raised large quantities of money for the FSLN, lobbied Western European governments, and presented public opinion with a positive image of the Nicaraguan Revolution. The FSLN’s pragmatic and flexible international campaign in the late 1970s was therefore not only crucial for the international isolation the Somoza regime, but also set the stage for the tumultuous decade of the 1980s.

Regarding the SI, it needs to be mentioned that, although it criticized Somoza and supported the FSLN before the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution, its relationship with Sandinistas became problematic in the 1980s. Brandt, concerned that the Sandinistas were not genuinely committed to democracy, wrote to González in 1981 that “many of our friends are communicating anxious thoughts about the latest developments there.”119 The SI’s complaints about the lack of democracy and press freedom in Nicaragua frustrated the Sandinistas, who believed Western Europeans did not understand that their revolution was under attack. Ramírez, describing the relationship of the FSLN with the SI in his memoirs, concluded that when “push came to shove” the Western European social democrats “always aligned themselves with the United States in the end. They were part of their system.”120

Finally, this chapter has been more than an international history of the Sandinistas’ revolutionary diplomacy. Apart from adding to our scholarly knowledge of the origins of the Nicaraguan revolution, the history of the FSLN’s campaign in Western Europe provides us with a new window into the international history of the late 1970s. By analyzing the impact of Sandinista diplomacy, this chapter has approached the transatlantic relationship from a new perspective. The FSLN’s attempt to transcend the bipolar Cold War narrative was well received by many Western Europeans, who were genuinely frustrated with what they saw as the Carter administration’s indecisiveness and inability to move beyond Cold War concerns. The FSLN’s campaign resonated in Western Europe in a surprising number of ways, which provide insight into the concerns, ambitions, and interests of Western European actors in the final decades of the Cold War. By analyzing Sandinista diplomacy, therefore, this chapter has aimed to complicate and contribute to our understanding of the international system of the late 1970s.

Notes

  1. 1. Flyer, Central America Human Rights Committee (hereafter CAHRC), 27 October 1978, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (hereafter FCO) 99/187, the National Archives, London (hereafter TNA).

  2. 2. Memorandum, Mexico and Caribbean Department (hereafter MACD), 1 November 1978, FCO 99/187, TNA.

  3. 3. Memorandum, MACD, 1 November 1978.

  4. 4. Memorandum, MACD, 1 November 1978.

  5. 5. For more on the early period of the FSLN, see Mathilde Zimmerman, Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000).

  6. 6. For more on national liberation movements and the Third World, see Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York, New Press, 2007); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Matthew Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War of Independence,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000): 739–69.

  7. 7. There has been little historical research into Central America in the 1970s and 1980s. The most recent comprehensive accounts we currently have are William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1990 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) and Dirk Kruijt, Guerrillas (London: Zed Books, 2008).

  8. 8. Several historians have written about Western European solidarity activism with Nicaragua. See, for example, Kim Christiaens, “Between Diplomacy and Solidarity: European Support Networks for Sandinista Nicaragua,” European Review of History: Revue Européenne d’Histoire 21, no. 4 (2014): 617–34; Christian Helm, “Booming solidarity: Sandinista Nicaragua and the West German Solidarity movement in the 1980s” European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire 21, no. 4 (2014): 597–615; José Manuel Ágreda Portero and Christian Helm, “Solidaridad con la Revolución Sandinista. Comparativa de redes transnacionales: Los casos de la República Federal de Alemania y España,” Naveg@merica 17 (2017): 1–27, https://revistas.um.es/navegamerica/article/view/271921/198661; and Eline van Ommen, “La Revolución Sandinista en los Países Bajos: Los comités de solidaridad holandeses y Nicaragua (1977–1990),” Naveg@merica 17 (2016): 1–22, https://revistas.um.es/navegamerica/article/view/271861/198621.

  9. 9. See, for example, Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), and Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).

  10. 10. See Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post–Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Lien-Hang Nguyen, “Revolutionary Circuits: Towards Internationalizing America in the World,” Diplomatic History 39, no. 3 (2015): 411–22; and Ryan M. Irwin, Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

  11. 11. David Close, Nicaragua: Navigating the Politics of Democracy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 67.

  12. 12. Interview with Daniel Ortega by Pedro Miranda, Latin American Perspectives 6, no. 1 (1979): 114–18.

  13. 13. Interview with Ortega.

  14. 14. Telegram, Washington to FCO, 14 September 1978, FCO 99/186, TNA.

  15. 15. The truth about the intellectual foundations of the FSLN probably lies in the middle. As Donald Clark Hodges argued in his Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), the leaders of the FSLN were part of the New Left, influenced by Augusto César Sandino’s writing, liberation theology, and Marxism.

  16. 16. Doc. 234, Telegram from the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State, 28 June 1979, in Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1977–1980, vol. 15, Central America, ed. Nathan L. Smith and Adam M. Howard (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2017).

  17. 17. Memorandum, MACD, 29 June 1979, FCO 99/340, TNA.

  18. 18. “Nicaragua’s Rebels Hobnob with Bankers,” Washington Post, 20 December 1978.

  19. 19. “Siege Gunmen Fly out of Nicaragua,” The Times, 25 Augustus 1978.

  20. 20. Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Panama to SecState, 22 March 1978, Electronic Telegrams, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files (hereafter DOS/CFP), U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Access to Archival Databases (AAD), http://.aad.archives.gov/add.

  21. 21. Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Panama to SecState, 22 March 1978.

  22. 22. Electronic Telegram, AmEmbassy Santo Domingo to SecState, 24 November 1978, DOS/CFP.

  23. 23. Doc. 85, Memorandum of Conversation, 29 August 1978, in FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. 15, Central America, ed. Nathan L. Smith and Adam M. Howard (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2017).

  24. 24. Doc. 85, FRUS.

  25. 25. Doc. 85, FRUS.

  26. 26. Translation of Statement by “The Twelve” as published in La Prensa, 21 October 1977, FCO 99/44, TNA.

  27. 27. See, for more, Stephen Henighan, Sandino’s Nation: Ernesto Cardenal and Sergio Ramírez, Writing Nicaragua, 1940–2012 (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014).

  28. 28. Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama in particular showed enthusiasm for the Sandinista cause and supported the Group of Twelve with money, material, and political backing. Doc. 98, Memorandum from Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), 18 September 1978, in FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. 15, Central America, ed. Nathan L. Smith and Adam M. Howard (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2017).

  29. 29. Doc. 85, FRUS.

  30. 30. Bericht und Ergebnisse des Europäische Treffens der Nicaragua Solidaritätskomitees, May 1979, not catalogued, Informationsbüro Nicaragua Wuppertal (hereafter INW), International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam (hereafter IISH).

  31. 31. Bericht und Ergebnisse.

  32. 32. Memorandum, British Embassy San Jose to McAD, 5 December 1977, FCO 99/34, TNA.

  33. 33. Letter, Barrajón to unknown, 1 December 1978, Ángel Barrajón Private Archive, Managua (hereafter AB).

  34. 34. Letter, Barrajón to unknown.

  35. 35. Letter, CAHRC to David Owen, 8 November 1978, FCO 99/187, TNA.

  36. 36. Flyer, CAHRC, n.d., FCO 99/187, TNA. Although it is impossible to trace the money raised by the CAHRC, it is safe to assume that Ernesto Cardenal, as a representative of the FSLN, used the money to support his organization’s armed struggle.

  37. 37. Doc. 95, FRUS.

  38. 38. Memorandum, 17 May 1979, Inventarisnummer, 11838, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken Archief (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive), The Hague.

  39. 39. Doc. 67, Telegram from the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, 8 February 1978, in FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. 15, Central America, ed. Nathan L. Smith and Adam M. Howard (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2017).

  40. 40. For more information on the FSLN’s relationship with Cuba, see Gary Prevost, “Cuba and Nicaragua: A Special Relationship?,” Latin American Perspectives 17, no. 3 (1990): 120–39.

  41. 41. Henighan, Sandino’s Nation, 129; Debra Sabia, Contradiction and Conflict: The Popular Church in Nicaragua (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997), 60.

  42. 42. See Christian Helm, “Booming Solidarity: Sandinista Nicaragua and the West German Solidarity Movement in the 1980s,” European Review of History: Revue Européenne d’Histoire 21, no. 4 (2014): 597–615, and Jan Hansen, Christian Helm, and Frank Reichherz, eds., Making Sense of the Americas: How Protest Related to America in the 1980s and Beyond (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

  43. 43. Flyer, CAHRC, n.d., FCO 99/187, TNA.

  44. 44. Author interview with Ángel Barrajón, 8 August 2016, Managua, Nicaragua.

  45. 45. Between 1967 and 1974, Schmidt Cuadra lived in West Germany, where he studied and supported the Chile solidarity movement.

  46. 46. Interview with Barrajón.

  47. 47. “Concept Dutch Viewpoint for the 10th European Conference in Brussels,” 23 November 1984, Box 17, Nicaragua Komitee Nederland Archive (hereafter NKN), IISH.

  48. 48. Such as, Munster, Berlin, Wuppertal, Göttingen, Frankfurt, München, Hamburg, Bremen, and Tübingen.

  49. 49. Annual Report, 1984, Box 1, Archive Nicaragua Komitee Amsterdam, Stadsarchief, Amsterdam (hereafter NKA).

  50. 50. Letter, George Black to Doris Tijerino, 30 October 1979, Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign Archive, London (hereafter NSC).

  51. 51. Memorandum, MACD to Keith Hamylton Jones, 22 November 1978, FCO 99/188, TNA.

  52. 52. Author interview with John Bevan, London, 20 March 2017.

  53. 53. Interview with Barrajón; Bericht und Ergebnisse.

  54. 54. “Om opmars Sandinisten te stuiten: Somoza beveelt bombardement van hoofdstad Nicaragua,” Leeuwarder Courant, 12 June 1979; “Voorzorg evacuatie uit Nicaragua: Americkaans leger naar Costa Rica,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 10 July 1979.

  55. 55. See Helm, “Booming Solidarity.”

  56. 56. Letter, George Black to Doris Tijerino, 30 October 1979.

  57. 57. Letter, Council of Churches to David Owen, 20 September 1978, FCO 99/186, TNA.

  58. 58. For these and more letters, see FCO 99/188 and FCO 99/186, TNA.

  59. 59. Circular letter, Deutsche Solidaritätskomitee mit Nikaragua Göttingen, 20 November 1978, AB.

  60. 60. Circular letter, Deutsche Solidaritätskomitee mit Nikaragua Göttingen.

  61. 61. Letter, George Black to Doris Tijerino, 30 October 1979.

  62. 62. Bericht und Ergebnisse.

  63. 63. Letter, Barrajón to Casteñada, 28 February 1979, AB.

  64. 64. See Tanya Harmer, “The View from Havana: Chilean Exiles in Cuba and Early Resistance to Chile’s Dictatorship, 1973–1977,” Hispanic American Historical Review 96, no. 1 (2016): 109–46; Patrick William Kelly, “1973 Chilean Coup and the Origins of Transnational Human Rights Activism,” Journal of Global History 8, no. 1 (2013): 165–86; and Mariana Perry, “With a Little Help from My Friends: The Dutch Solidarity Movement and the Chilean Struggle for Democracy,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, no. 101 (April 2016): 75–96.

  65. 65. Hans Hübner, Werner Ley, Otto Oetz, Klaus Schmidt, Joachim Schmidt von Schwind, Hermann Schulz, and Helmut Wendler, eds., Enrique Presente: Enrique Schmidt Cuadra—Ein Nicaraguaner Zwischen Köln und Managua (Cologne: Schmidt von Schwind Verlag, 2004).

  66. 66. Author interview with Klaas Wellinga and Hans Langenberg, 6 August 2014, Utrecht, The Netherlands.

  67. 67. Interview with Wellinga and Langenberg.

  68. 68. Author interview with George Black, 21 November 2017, Skype; interview with Bevan.

  69. 69. Annual Report, 1984; interview with Wellinga and Langenberg.

  70. 70. Jan Fairley, “La Nueva Canción Latinoamericana,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 3, no. 2 (1984): 107–08.

  71. 71. Letter, George Black to Doris Tijerino, 30 October 1979.

  72. 72. For more information on the SI and Latin America, see Fernando Pedrosa, “La Internacional Socialista y la Guerra de Malvinas,” Latin American Research Review 49, no. 2 (2014): 47–67; and Giuliano Garavini, After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957–1986 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

  73. 73. As quoted in Michele di Donato, “The Cold War and Socialist Identity: The Socialist International and the Italian ‘Communist Question’ in the 1970s,” Contemporary European History 24, no. 2 (2015): 196.

  74. 74. Garavini, After Empires, 236.

  75. 75. Pedrosa, “La Internacional Socialista y la Guerra de Malvinas.”

  76. 76. Pedrosa, “Redes transnacionales y partidos politicos: La Internacional Socialista en América Latina, 1951–1991,” Iberoamericana 13, no. 49 (2013): 37.

  77. 77. Henighan, Sandino’s Nation, 129.

  78. 78. Electronic telegram, AmConsul Vancouver to SecState, 4 November 1978, DOP/CFP; “Willy Brandt: Geweld soms nodig tegen gewelddadige regeringen,” 6 November 1978, NRC.

  79. 79. Electronic telegram, AmConsul Vancouver to SecState, 4 November 1978.

  80. 80. At least nine Constituency Labour Parties wrote the British Secretary of State about the situation in Nicaragua. See FCO 99/346, TNA.

  81. 81. Resolution, Labour Party, 20 December 1978, FCO 99/346, TNA.

  82. 82. Resolution, Labour Party.

  83. 83. Handelingen Tweede Kamer (hereafter HTK), 20 November 1978, Staten Generaal Digitaal, www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

  84. 84. HTK, 5 October 1978.

  85. 85. Letter, Klaas Wellinga to European Solidarity Committees, 15 June 1979, INW.

  86. 86. Memorandum, MACD, 26 June 1979, FCO 99/340, TNA.

  87. 87. Memorandum, MACD, 26 June 1979.

  88. 88. Statement of the EEC Foreign Ministers, 29 June 1979, Archive of European Integration (hereafter AEI), http://aei.pitt.edu/.

  89. 89. Statement of the EEC Foreign Ministers, 29 June 1979.

  90. 90. Letter, Hamylton Jones to MACD, 8 September 1978, FCO 99/186, TNA.

  91. 91. Memorandum, MACD, 8 November 1978, FCO 99/112, TNA.

  92. 92. See, for instance, Thomas Schoonover, Germany and Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821–1921 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1995); Memorandum, British Embassy San Jose to MACD, 5 December 1977, FCO 99/43, TNA.

  93. 93. Record of conversation, 2 June 1978, FCO 99/116, TNA.

  94. 94. Apart from the abovementioned joint statement, however, European states did not coordinate their foreign policies towards Nicaragua in the 1970s.

  95. 95. Brief for EPC Latin America Working Group meeting, 22 September 1978, FCO 98/187, TNA.

  96. 96. Memorandum, David Owen to MACD, 27 February 1979, FCO 99/346, TNA.

  97. 97. Brief for visit by David Owen to Washington, 31 January 1979, FCO 99/350, TNA.

  98. 98. Brief for visit by David Owen to Washington.

  99. 99. Brief for visit by David Owen to Washington.

  100. 100. Letter, Brewster to Carrington, 19 June 1979, FCO 99/266, TNA.

  101. 101. Letter, Brewster to Carrington, 19 June 1979.

  102. 102. Letter, Brewster to Carrington, 19 June 1979.

  103. 103. Letter, Parsons to MACD, 28 June 1979, FCO 99/266, TNA.

  104. 104. Memorandum, Directie Westelijk Halfrond/Noord-Amerika en Caraïbische Zone to Directie Westelijk Halfrond, 19 June 1979, Inventarisnummer 11838, BZ.

  105. 105. Letter, British Ambassador in Costa Rica Keith Hamylton Jones to MACD, 5 December 1977, FCO 99/42, TNA.

  106. 106. Memorandum, Overseas Information Department, 1 November 1978, FCO 99/187, TNA.

  107. 107. Brief for Cabinet Meeting, MACD, 18 July 1979, FCO 99/347, TNA.

  108. 108. Memorandum, Directie Westelijk Halfrond/ Noord-Amerika en Caraïbische Zone to Directie Westelijk Halfrond, 19 June 1979.

  109. 109. See Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz, eds., The Strained Alliance: US-European Relations from Nixon to Carter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

  110. 110. See Mark Gilbert, Cold War Europe: The Politics of a Contested Continent (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015).

  111. 111. See Kristina Spohr, The Global Chancellor: Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

  112. 112. John W. Young, “Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1979–1989,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 289.

  113. 113. William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Westad, The Global Cold War.

  114. 114. Letter, Hamylton Jones to MACD, 28 February 1978, FCO 99/186, TNA.

  115. 115. Telegram, British Embassy in Washington to FCO, 14 September 1978, FCO 99/186, TNA.

  116. 116. Letter, Parsons to MACD, 28 June 1979, FCO 99/266, TNA.

  117. 117. Memorandum, MACD, 22 June 1979, FCO 99/340, TNA.

  118. 118. Memorandum, DWH/NC to DWH, July 1979, Inventarisnummer 11838, BZ.

  119. 119. “Letter by the President of the Socialist International, Brandt, to the Chairman of the Committee of the SI for Defence of the Revolution in Nicaragua, González,” 2 June 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Archives of Social Democracy, Willy Brandt Archive, A 11.15, 21, translated by Dwight E. Langston, published in Berliner Ausgabe, vol. 8, Cold War International History Project e-Dossier #22, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112717.

  120. 120. Sergio Ramírez, Adiós Muchachos: A Memoir of the Sandinista Revolution (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 94–95.