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ability, fatalism and, 11–12
agency: contingency and, 57; fatalism and, 3–4, 9, 32, 60
All Things Shining (Dreyfus and Kelly, S.), 111–14
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 110
Argument II, for fatalism, 14–15
Aristotle: academic scholarship on, 2; fatalism influenced by, 58; as influence on R. Taylor, 70; metaphysical thought influenced by, 58, 65; modalities for, 80; reality for, 72; synchronic possibility and, 90n13; time for, 80
attention, in narrative theories, 147–48
attitude of enjoyment, 141
“Authority and American Usage” (Wallace), 127n1
bivalence. See principle of bivalence
Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (Wallace), 125
Broom of the System, The (Wallace), vii
cage, as metaphor, 117–25; in Infinite Jest, 122
Cahn, Steven, 7–8, 14–15; correlates of R. Taylor’s presuppositions, 40
“can,” senses of: in Ability Criticism, 95–96; in Grandfather Paradox, 98; for Wallace, 100–101
causality: synchronic possibility and, 81; in R. Taylor’s presuppositions, 40, 42; unidirectionality of, 49
claims: contingency and, 64; future contingent propositions and, 62–63; modalities and, 64
compatibility, diachronic relation of, 81
compatibility relations between worlds-at-times, 46
conclusions: in fatalism arguments, 43–44; in nonfatalist arguments, 43
context of evaluation, 43, 50, 52
contexts of assessment, 51–52
contingency: agency and, 57; Aristotelian argument for, 59; claims and, 64; defined, 57; fatalism and, 57–63; metaphysics of, 77–84, 87, 89; synchronic possibility and, 58, 77–78; for R. Taylor, 59–63
“Depressed Person, The” (Wallace), 149–51
desire-satisfaction theory, of well-being, 164n15
dialectical arguments, for fatalism, 10
Duns Scotus, John, 78; on synchronic possibility, 86
Eliot, George (Mary Ann Evans), vii
Ethica, Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata (Spinoza), vii
“E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction” (Wallace), 120; ironism in, 135, 143
Evans, Mary Ann (George Eliot), vii
Every Love Story Is a Ghost Story (Max), 166n31
fatalism: ability and, 11–12; agency and, 3–4, 9, 32, 60; Argument I for, 5–6, 14–15; Argument II for, 14–15; Aristotelian influences on, 58; conclusions in, 43–44; connotations of, 7; contingency and, 57–63; criticisms of, 1–2, 7; defined, 2–3, 53n1, 57; determinism compared to, 25n5; dialectical argument for, 10; eternalism and, 24–25; future contingent propositions in, 8; future propositions in, 15, 47, 49–50; Grandfather Paradox and, 97–100; idealization and, 25n2; language use and, 11–12, 26n11; logic, 33–35; as logically valid, 42; logico-semantic argument for, 35–38; as metaphysical thesis, 36–37; necessary conditions and, 3, 5–6, 59; past propositions in, 15, 49–50; personal circumstances as factor in, 12; possibility at a moment and, 84–85; possibility from a moment and, 84–85; principle of bivalence and, 53n8, 60; proof of, 47; refutation of, 15, 17, 23, 75–77; revival of, 24–25; Saunders criticism of, 9–14; semantic values and, 32; shock effect in, 6; state of affairs and, 61–62; sufficient conditions and, 3, 59; synchronic possibility and, 82–84; System J and, ix, 18–22; tense and, 13; time as factor in, 3, 40, 42–43; time of evaluation and, 52; time of occurrence and, 52; true/false propositions in, 3; truth and, 60. See also presuppositions, for fatalism; time travel
“Federer as Religious Experience” (Wallace), 129n5
“Fictional Futures and the Conspicuously Young” (Wallace), 166n31
Flesh and Not (Wallace), 166n31
formal logical systems, 22
fraudulence paradox, 125–26; narrative theories and, 149
freedom, alternatives to, ix
future contingent propositions: in fatalism, 8; rejection of claims, 62–63; as true/false, 8
future-tensed propositions, 32
good life, the: concern with public appearances and, 160–61; construction of content for, 146; hedonism and, 134, 141–46; individual control in, 144; ironism and, 134–41; moral theories and, 162–63; narrative theories of, 134, 146–59; objective list theories of, 160; pleasure as part of, 143–44; purpose of fiction and, 133; self-awareness and, 161; self-effacement in, 155, 161; selfishness and, 145, 165n25; for C. Taylor, 165n27
Grandfather Paradox: fatalism and, 97–100; for D. Lewis, 93, 97–100; objective time in, 98–99; personal time in, 97–99; sense of “can” in, 98; System J and, 105–6
hedonism, 134, 141–46; attitude of enjoyment and, 141; individual control in, 144; in Infinite Jest, 142–43; in “Joseph Frank’s Dostoevsky,” 144; pleasure-as-mere-sensation, 142–43; as psychological doctrine, 144; value, 141
“How Tracy Austin Broke My Heart” (Wallace), 129n5
inability-to-love problem, 154
Infinite Jest (Wallace): addiction as theme in, 122; cage as metaphor in, 122; giving oneself away in, 112–14; ironism in, 136–37; pleasure-as-mere-sensation hedonism in, 142–43; worship as theme in, 116
intuition: in Ability Criticism, 96–97; in formal logical systems, 22
ironism, 134–41; in American culture, 135–36; comparisons of, between Rorty and Wallace, 139; in “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” 135, 143; in Infinite Jest, 136–37; original purpose of, 140; for Rorty, 138–40; self-consciousness and, 136; as source of unhappiness, 136–38; values influenced by, 139
“Joseph Frank’s Dostoevsky” (Wallace), 133, 144
linguistic-cum-conceptual modality: in philosophy, 90n14; for state of affairs, 83
logical systems: classical, 53n6; formal, 22; intuitive foundations for, 22; as modality, in philosophy, 64–65
logical vocabulary, 54n13
logic fatalism, 33–38; degree of invariance in, 37; logico-semantic argument, 35–38
meaning: Dostoevsky’s construction of, 143; language use and, 109, 116; for Wallace, 109, 116
metaphysical thesis: fatalism as, 36–37; negation of, 36; vocabulary types in, 54n13
metaphysics: academic revival of, 71–73, 83; arguments for, 64–66; Aristotelian influences on, 58, 65; of contingency, 77–84, 87, 89; modalities and, 64; reality in, 89n5, 89n7; source of necessity and possibility, 63–70; synchronic possibility and, 77–78; for R. Taylor, 71–72; Taylor Inequivalence and, 73–75
Metaphysics (R. Taylor), 8, 26n12
modalities: alethic, 81; for Aristotle, 80; claims and, 64; linguistic-cum-conceptual, 83, 90n14; logical, 81; metaphysics and, 64; philosophical legitimacy of, 83; physical, 41; situational compatibilities, 41. See also nonlogical modalities
modal operators: nonlogical, 41; in R. Taylor’s presuppositions, 40–41
mother-and-daughter relations, 102
narrative theories, of the good life, 134, 146–59, 166n31; as action-guiding, 155; in “The Depressed Person,” 149–51; fidelity to, 154; focus of attention in, 147–48; fraudulence paradox and, 149; in “Good Old Neon” (Wallace), 126, 151–54, 156, 158–59; ideal self in, 156–57; inability-to-love problem in, 154; overvaluation of specialness in, 151–53; personal identification with, 157; psychological features as influence on, 146–47; purposes of, 149; self-awareness in, 161, 167n45, 167n50; strong thesis for, 146, 154, 165n28; in This Is Water, 147–48; unhealthy uses of, 156; weak thesis for, 146, 155; well-being in, 148, 155
necessary conditions: distinctions between, 69–70; fatalism and, 3, 5–6, 59–60; linguistic notion of, 68–69
necessary conditions for, 69–70, 72
necessity and possibility: metaphysics and, 63–70; in temporal world, 71–77
nonfatalism, 33; conclusions for, 43
nonlogical modalities, 41–42; in R. Taylor’s presuppositions, 42
nonlogical vocabulary, 54n13
“Note on Fatalism” (R. Taylor), 94
Notes from the Underground (Dostoevsky), 166n35
objective list theories, 160
“Paradoxes of Time Travel, The” (D. Lewis), 97
past, in Ability Criticism, 96–97
Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein), 160
philosophy: historical climate for, 23; linguistic-cum-conceptual modality in, 90n14; linguistic modality for, 64–65; logical positivism and, 23; logic modality and, 64–65. See also eternalism; metaphysics
“Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” (Wallace), 163n8
physical compatibilities: binary relations of, 45–46; compatibility relations between worlds-at-times, 46
physical possibility, 96; laws of nature and, 101
pleasure-as-mere-sensation hedonism, 142–43
possibility: in Ability Criticism, 94–96; physical, 96; situational physical, 96, 104
possibility at a moment, 84–85
possibility from a moment, 84–85
precognition, time travel and, 99
presuppositions, for fatalism, 3–4, 33–35, 38–42, 48–49, 59–60; ambiguities in, 39; causal considerations in, 40, 42; criticisms of, 25n7; equivocations in, 39; impossibilities in, 41; invalidity of, 38; minimalist interpretations of, 25n1; modal operators in, 40–41; nonlogical modalities in, 42; revisions of, 26n8; time markers in, 40, 42–43
principle of bivalence, 53n8, 60
“Problem of Future Contingencies, The” (R. Taylor), 2
reality: for Aristotle, 72; basal structure of, 65–66; in metaphysics, 89n5, 89n7
“Richard Taylor’s ‘Fatalism’ and the Semantics of Physical Modality” (Wallace), vii, 100–101, 110
Rorty, Richard, ix; on final vocabulary, 138; ironism for, 138–40; “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,” 163n8
Saunders, John Turk: criticism of R. Taylor, 9–14, 17, 26n12, 67–68; Taylor Inequivalence and, 21
selfishness: in the good life, 145, 165n25; as literary theme, 109
semantic system: formal logical systems, 22; logico-semantic argument, 35–38; System J, ix, 18–22; for Wallace, viii
situational physical modality (SPM), 54n19, 101–3; mother-and-daughter relations and, 102; physical situational possibility and, 104
situational physical possibility, 96, 104
state of affairs: fatalism and, 61–62; linguistic-cum-conceptual modality and, 83; necessary conditions of, 69–70; synchronic possibility and, 82
sufficient conditions, fatalism and, 3, 59–60
synchronic possibility: agency and, 58; Aristotle and, 90n13; causal laws and, 81; contingency and, 77–78; as corollary, 86; denial of, 79–80, 82–87; for Duns Scotus, 86; fatalism and, 82–84; metaphysics and, 77–78; possible worlds and, 78; state of affairs and, 82
System J, ix, 18–22, 27n13, 50; alternative presents in, 103–4; exposition of, 20; external circumstantial constraints and, 102; formal logical systems and, 22; future-fatalism and, 50; Grandfather Paradox and, 105–6; mother-and-daughter relations in, 102; objective time in, 105; past-fatalism and, 50; personal time in, 105; physical-modal propositions in, 18–19; rules error in, 27n16; SPM and, 101–3; time travel and, 93, 100–106
Taylor, Charles, ix, 146; Aristotle as influence on, 70; on the good life, 165n27
Taylor, Richard: on Ability Criticism, 94–97; Argument 1 for, 5–6; Brown critique of, 69–70; Cahn’s correlates of, 40; contingency for, 59–63; criticism of, by Wallace, 16–25, 32–33, 37–38; denial of synchronic possibility, 79–80, 82–84; metaphysical influences for, 71–72; Metaphysics, 8, 26n12; “Note on Fatalism,” 94; “The Problem of Future Contingencies,” 2; Saunders’ criticism of, 9–14, 17, 26n12, 67–68; time as ontologically homogeneous for, 60–61, 74. See also fatalism; presuppositions, for fatalism
Taylor Inequivalence, 19–21; defined, 74; metaphysics and, 73–75
“Tennis Player Michael Joyce’s Professional Artistry as a Paradigm of Certain Stuff About Choice, Freedom, Discipline, Joy, Grotesquerie, and Human Completeness” (Wallace), 129n5
tense: fatalism and, 13; future-tensed propositions, 32
time: for Aristotle, 80; eternalism and, viii, 24–25; fatalism and, 3; necessity and possibility and, 71–77; objective, 98–99, 105; as ontologically homogeneous, 60–61, 74; personal, 97–99, 102, 105; temporal reality, 60–61, 88–89, 89n2. See also future contingent propositions; future-tensed propositions; time travel
time markers, in R. Taylor’s presuppositions, 40, 42–43
time travel: Ability Criticism and, 93–97, 106n12; alternative presents in, 103–4; external circumstantial constraints in, 102; Grandfather Paradox and, 93, 97–100, 105–6; objective time in, 98–99; personal time in, 97–99, 102; precognition and, 99; System J and, 93, 100–106
total noise, for Wallace, 117–25; American culture and, 118
true/false propositions: in fatalism, 3; future contingent, 8; valedictory, 24
truth: as absolute, 50; fatalism and, 60; relativization of, 51
unidirectionality of causation, 49
Velleman, J. David, ix, 146
Wallace, David Foster: on addiction, 122; on alethic modality, 100–101; on alternatives to freedom, ix; on American culture, 118, 121–23, 128n4; authenticity for, 125; cage as metaphor for, 117–25; choice and will for, 109, 111–14, 119, 125–27, 127n2; congenital skepticism for, 117–25; on context of evaluation, 43, 50, 52; criticism of “Fatalism,” 1–2; criticism of R. Taylor, 16–25, 32–33, 37–38; on deciders, 118–19; Dostoevsky as literary influence for, 143, 160; fraudulence paradox for, 125–26; freedom of choice for, 31–32; giving oneself away for, 111–17; on hedonism, 134, 141–46; on ironism, 134–41; language and meaning for, 109, 116; on purpose of fiction, 133; refutation of fatalism for, 15, 17, 23, 75–77; Rorty and, 163n8; the self for, 109, 115; selfishness as theme for, 109; senses of “can” for, 100–101; solipsism as theme for, 109; Taylor Inequivalence, 19–21; time of evaluation for, 52; total noise for, 117–25. See also the good life; narrative theories, of the good life; semantic system; System J
Wallace, David Foster, works: “Authority and American Usage,” 127n1; Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, 125; The Broom of the System, vii; “The Depressed Person,” 149–51; “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” 120, 135, 143; Fate, Time, and Language, vii, 27n14, 27n16; “Federer as Religious Experience,” 129n5; “Fictional Futures and the Conspicuously Young,” 166n31; Flesh and Not, 166n31; “Good Old Neon,” 126, 151–54, 156, 158–59; “How Tracy Austin Broke My Heart,” 129n5; Infinite Jest, 112–14, 116, 122, 136–37, 142–43; “Joseph Frank’s Dostoevsky,” 133, 144; “Laughing with Kafka,” 115, 121–22; The Pale King, 115–16, 125, 128n3; “Richard Taylor’s ‘Fatalism’ and the Semantics of Physical Modality,” vii, 100–101, 110; “Tennis Player Michael Joyce’s Professional Artistry as a Paradigm of Certain Stuff About Choice, Freedom, Discipline, Joy, Grotesquerie, and Human Completeness,” 129n5; This Is Water, 147–48, 165n24
weak thesis, for narrative theories, 146, 155
well-being: desire-satisfaction theory of, 164n15; in narrative theories, 148, 155
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 160