WHEN EQUATORIAL GUINEA JOINED OPEC in 2017, it was like taking a seat at the global equivalent of the adults’ table. The nation—Africa’s fourth-largest oil producer that year1—would finally have a say when decisions affecting the world’s oil economy, and its own destiny, were made.
OPEC members control more than 40 percent of the world’s oil production, some 39.4 million bbl/d in 2017.2 Of that, Equatorial Guinea’s output is just a small fraction, about 195,000 bbl/d.3 But oil’s value to the national economy can’t be understated: It accounts for 80 percent of Equatorial Guinea’s total exports and 90 percent of government revenues.4 With OPEC determined to see prices settle in what they call a range comfortable and acceptable for all market players, just being part of the conversation—being heard—is of considerable significance for Equatorial Guinea.
“It gives us a voice,” Gabriel Mbaga Obiang Lima, Equatorial Guinea’s Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons, told S&P Global Platts in a 2019 interview. “We do have the belief that joining OPEC has been a good thing. It has definitely provided us with information that otherwise we would not have had, but also joining OPEC and joining this new initiative has achieved what we wanted, which was to stabilize the oil price. Any new ideas that will maintain this stabilization will be welcomed by the government.”
The initiative Lima referred to is OPEC’s landmark Declaration of Cooperation, which members agreed to in 2016, and OPEC recently extended. I think it’s safe to say that the agreement’s production cuts rescued the oil industry from collapse, boosted interest in African oil investment, and returned economic security to oil-independent nations, many of which are in Africa. And it’s unlikely those achievements would have occurred without Africa’s participation, something OPEC Secretary General Dr. Mohammad Barkindo acknowledges.
At a gathering of oil producers in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in April 2019, Barkindo credited Africa with moving the Declaration forward. He reminded the audience that more than one-third of the 24 countries working together under the negotiated framework are from Africa, and that African nations comprise half of OPEC’s membership. The numbers, he said, “Underscore the vital role this great continent plays within OPEC, within the Declaration of Cooperation, and within the global oil industry.”5
With 130 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves—a figure that is 50 percent higher than the total at the end of the 1990s—and proven natural gas reserves doubling since the mid-1980s, Africa represents a frontier filled with promise, he added.
“It is irrefutable evidence of the petroleum potential of Africa, the exciting and abundant opportunities, and the role that this industry can play in unleashing tremendous economic development and prosperity across the continent,” Barkindo said.
The Africa-driven Declaration is already having an effect on the continent as a whole. When the oil market is in crisis, the path to dignity and prosperity is closed off to many African families. It leaves many Africans, particularly those without advanced degrees, to chart their own course where clear and attainable paths to a meaningful and prosperous life once existed. But when the market is stable, the benefits extend across all nations, even those without their own petroleum resources, as we’ll see when we talk about OPEC’s aid programs.
As for Equatorial Guinea, it now anticipates a significant increase in offshore drilling, and its expectations are well-founded. In recent years, the country has secured $2.4 billion in foreign investment,6 and 10 exploration wells are planned.7 The country believes these discoveries will not only reverse a recent production decline but may also lead to a five-fold production increase by 2025—proving that OPEC membership can be a powerful force for transformation.
But beyond the material effect on markets and investment, the Declaration of Cooperation also demonstrated something else: the importance of taking a unified stand.
In fact, unity underpins everything OPEC does. OPEC speaks for the common interests of its members, but it also takes their individual needs and opinions seriously and advocates on their behalf. For his part, Barkindo repeatedly encourages the continent’s countries to build alliances to make the most of their hydrocarbon resources, whether they are OPEC members or not. Barkindo has proven himself to be the leader and the champion OPEC needs at this time, with withering attacks coming from some in Washington’s executive and legislative branch of government. His ability to manage the exit of Qatar, handle the issues around Iran and Libya, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and bring Russia on board has been revolutionary. I have had an opportunity to watch him close up. He has been remarkably cool under fire, refreshingly articulate, and demonstratively intelligent; he has shown he has the savviness to build coalitions and keep a difficult organization together. This kind of common sense and charismatic leadership needs to be cherished in Africa and worldwide.
I am still amazed by his humility and breathtakingly well-executed drive to bring Russia and others to make a deal to rescue the oil industry, which greatly benefited African economies. Listening to his skeptics and taking the blistering attacks from many, he has stayed committed to the goals of OPEC and fights daily for OPEC in the face of a hurricane.
In OPEC, the notion of strength in numbers is very real. The organization says that every new member adds to the group’s stability and strengthens members’ commitment to one another. Different perspectives create a rich culture where colleagues can learn from one another, anticipate and respond to the complexity of today’s oil markets, and, ultimately, influence prices. OPEC also has said that new members bring fresh insights into regional social, economic, and political developments. Above all, OPEC is evidence of what careful stewardship of oil and gas riches can achieve, particularly within a complex global framework.
Equatorial Guinea isn’t the only newcomer to recognize the appeal of OPEC membership: Gabon rejoined the group in 2016 after a long hiatus, and, at Lima’s urging, Republic of Congo came aboard in 2018. They bring the number of African OPEC members to seven, half of the organization’s total of fourteen.
With Africa being one of the world’s remaining oil and gas frontiers, where big discoveries are still possible, it’s no wonder the balance is shifting: Adding African nations to its roster means OPEC has more control over the world’s energy output and the increased political capital that comes with it.
That’s just one part of the equation. As we all know, the Middle East has been the heart of OPEC’s dominion since the start. But with reservoirs there maturing and production declining, expanding its geographic range is one way OPEC can bring its overall production profile into equilibrium. When OPEC allies with African producers, it’s like they’re taking out a market share insurance policy, with even small producers adding incrementally to OPEC’s dominance.
To open the door to nations like Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, and Gabon, OPEC needed to rethink its membership strategy and get rid of its long-held production quota. For years, only countries that produced a minimum of 500,000 bbl/d could even dream of OPEC membership. That doesn’t mean all producers who qualified became part of the group: The United States isn’t ever likely to join, and Russia—which set aside its animosity toward de facto OPEC chief Saudi Arabia to participate in the historic, price-stabilizing production cuts of 2017—remains independent as well.
Now, with the production standard out of the way, OPEC is being even more aggressive in its membership bid, extending invitations based on potential rather than just history. For evidence, we only have to look at the December 2018 meeting in Vienna, where OPEC asked several small Africa producers to sit in. For Chad, Ghana, Cameroon, Mauritania, and Côte d’Ivoire—which together pump out only about 600,000 bbl/d—and Uganda, which has yet to begin production, this may be a sign that membership is on the way.8
And while their addition would benefit OPEC, it would help the continent even more. To be taken seriously in OPEC—to have more negotiating effectiveness within the organization—Africa needs more representation. It’s really rather simple—the more African members, the higher the total production they account for, the more likely they will be heard. If we want to increase the influence Africa has within OPEC and improve our profile in the world oil economy, more African nations need to join in.
When President Vladimir Putin agreed to cut Russian oil production in 2017 to align with OPEC’s goals, it was another significant step in an increasingly valuable partnership between the two parties. With daily oil output hovering around 11.34 million bbl/d,9 to suggest Russia is anything less than a global powerhouse is laughable. And there’s no joking when it comes to Russia throwing around its considerable weight: The December 2018 extension of price-boosting production cuts might never have happened without Russia’s promises—as well as its ability to hammer out a deal that would stop Saudi Arabia and Iran from quarreling and satisfy their demands.
It wasn’t the only time Russia has come to OPEC’s aid. In the mere three years it has been allied with OPEC, Russia has helped the group through tough times, including price instability, regime changes in member countries, and the usual internecine bickering—not to mention criticism from America’s tweeter-in-chief. But the benefits are hardly one-sided: Russia can now exert previously untold influence over the world’s massive oil markets and, by extension, the Middle East.
There’s speculation that Russia could be on the verge of formalizing its relationship with OPEC. But whether that happens or not, its affiliation with the group is excellent news for African producers. After all, if you are measured by the company you keep, being on Russia’s side is the right place, indeed.
An increasingly large bloc in OPEC isn’t the only measure of Africa’s emergence on the global oil and gas stage, nor is it the first time the continent’s producers have banded together for a common goal. That honor goes to the group now known as the African Petroleum Producers’ Organization (APPO), which was established in Lagos in 1987.
APPO’s goal is to maximize the economic benefits of petroleum activities through the cooperation of its 18 member countries: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan. APPO provides everything from technological to workforce support for exploration, production, and refining.
It also supports OPEC’s efforts to stabilize prices, even if that means capping production. After all, the two groups have many members in common, and with what Barkindo calls the intensification of OPEC’s engagement with Africa, collaboration between OPEC and APPO seems almost instinctual.
In fact, the value of their partnership was top of mind when Barkindo spoke at the APPO CAPE VII Congress and Exhibition in Equatorial Guinea in April 2019.
“It can often appear that our industry is subject to forces beyond our control,” he said. “Geopolitical events, natural catastrophes, technological breakthroughs or other critical uncertainties: We are all aware of the impact they can have. However, as Equatorial Guinea, APPO, OPEC and the Declaration of Cooperation shows, there is another force alive and well in our industry. This is the desire of producers, consumers, and investors to have sustainable stability in the oil market. This force thrives in the hearts and minds of decision-makers who know that collaboration and teamwork remain the most effective problem-solving techniques this industry or indeed any industry knows.
“This force can lead us out of any darkness and into the light,” he continued. “It is based on the principles of transparency, fairness, equity and respect among nations.”
Barkindo concluded his address with one of his favorite African proverbs: “If you want to go quickly, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.”
To me, nothing speaks of cooperation more than that.
Throughout the years I spent as an undergraduate and law school student in the U.S., one of the things I truly admired was American ingenuity. I loved following news stories about U.S. startups that scraped together enough money to go overseas, explored for oil, and, despite overwhelming odds, achieved success.
These companies were creating opportunities both for Americans and the people in their host countries. It was the American Dream playing out before my eyes. There is no doubt in my mind that those stories inspired my career trajectory in Africa, where I have had a chance to advise many African governments on oil matters and improving relations with one another.
Needless to say, it is disheartening to see a country like the United States, which is responsible for innovation, simultaneously proposing legislation that undermines innovation in places overseas. And that is just one of the unintended consequences the proposed No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act (NOPEC) could have. In the end, the U.S. House of Representatives bill could likely produce the opposite result of the business ventures that inspired me as a student: It would lead to fewer opportunities for Americans and for the countries they partner with.
Equatorial Guinea is the fifth OPEC member from sub-Saharan Africa—and OPEC’s smallest producer. But even before the ink was dry on Equatorial Guinea’s membership card, Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Gabriel Mbaga Obiang Lima was making ambitious plans. His goal is to see oil production increase to around 300,000 bbl/d by 2020, which would represent a return to pre-2014 market crash levels. Longer term, he’d like to see production reach 500,000 bbl/d by 2025.
One unknown that may stand in the way of such progress is NOPEC. The legislation, which is pending in the United States at the time of this writing, would allow the United States Department of Justice to sue a foreign crude producer for coordinating production and manipulating price, citing antitrust violations. Foreign companies would be stripped of their sovereign immunity protections.
The legislation is not new: It was first introduced in 2000, and former presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both opposed it. President Trump, however, could support it. After all, he has used his Twitter platform repeatedly to blame OPEC for artificially driving up the price of oil.
American frustration with OPEC is understandable. Because it has historically controlled as much as 80 percent of the world’s oil production, OPEC has been able to influence the market, and the U.S. has been forced to live with the consequences.
But attempting to take OPEC down with punishing lawsuits is not in America’s best interest. In 2007, when a nearly identical version of NOPEC was under consideration, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget warned that legal action against OPEC and its members could result in oil supply disruptions. Instead of lowering gasoline prices, the lawsuits likely would cause prices to surge upward. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said that the mere passage of NOPEC would threaten foreign investment in the U.S.: OPEC nations might withdraw assets to prevent them from being seized.
Those weren’t unreasonable claims, and the same risks hold today.
OPEC has already warned the United States that if the legislation goes through, the organization will “stop working.” In other words, the production cuts now in place would disappear, and OPEC nations would begin pumping as much oil as they can. The price would fall, which could have serious consequences for American shale producers who require a certain level to break-even.10
NOPEC would put foreign investments in the U.S. oil and gas sector, from exploration projects to infrastructure, at risk, too.
For example, earlier this month, UAE-based Gulftainer received the U.S. government’s go-ahead to operate the Port of Wilmington in Delaware, a fully serviced deepwater port and marine terminal, for the next 50 years. Gulftainer already has announced plans to develop the port’s cargo terminal capabilities and enhance its overall productivity. How likely are more deals like this after NOPEC?
America’s lost partnership and investment opportunities could extend beyond OPEC members. Non-OPEC members may wonder if the precedent set by NOPEC puts them in legal jeopardy, especially in a litigious country like the U.S. Other countries may think twice before partnering or investing in U.S. oil and gas projects to protect their own relationships with OPEC nations.
Then there’s the matter of U.S. oil and gas companies that operate overseas. Foreign countries may begin restricting their access or ordering them to leave altogether. Not only would these lost opportunities affect E&P multinationals like ExxonMobil, VAALCO Energy, Chevron, Murphy, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, Apache Corporation, Marathon Oil, Occidental Petroleum, Noble Energy, Kosmos Energy, but oilfield services providers like Halliburton, Schlumberger, Stewart & Stevenson, McDermott International, MODEC, Nalco Champion, National Oilwell Varco, Oceaneering International Inc., Precision Drilling, Weatherford International, and Baker Hughes could be hurt.
Any of these scenarios could damage the U.S. economy in the form of fewer jobs, reduced oil supplies, and higher gasoline prices.
Of course, I cannot help but consider NOPEC’s potential to harm my home continent. America’s renewed interest in anti-OPEC legislation comes at a time when African involvement and influence in OPEC is at an all-time high.
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon became members of OPEC in 2016 and 2017, respectively. When the Republic of Congo joined OPEC in June 2018, it increased the number of African nations in OPEC to seven—compared to six from the Middle East—and gave the African continent unprecedented dominance in the organization, at least in terms of membership.
This shift could be seismic in terms of African growth and stability.
For too many years, the presence of oil in African nations has been more of a curse than a blessing, contributing to the wealth of foreign investors while indigenous populations endure socioeconomic hardship and political unrest.
Today, a new generation of Africans is stepping forward in countries throughout the continent. They are looking to themselves to make positive changes in their communities through entrepreneurship and technological innovations with their American partners. Those efforts to create a stronger, more stable continent must include the strategic capitalization of natural resources like oil. And the opportunity tap into the resources and influence of a major organization like OPEC and the African Energy Chamber—as a large, united voice—could be just the boost African producers need.
But if NOPEC were to pass, a moment of opportunity would be replaced with further instability in Africa, as much needed American investment dries up. While Africa is on the verge of a bright new future, African nations and cities easily could swing in the direction of greater crime and bloody conflicts: scenarios that could even result in American troops and dollars being called in to fix them.
Much of Africa is changing for the better. Policy that pushes Africa toward civil unrest flies in the face of American ideals.
America needs OPEC countries in Africa and the Middle-East to assist with the Arab-Israeli peace process, fighting Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab rebels, and promoting American values. Litigating against these countries will make trial lawyers like me very rich but put American national security and economic interest on a collision course.
America has a legacy of creating opportunity. Criminalizing OPEC won’t get at the root causes of increased American gasoline prices, and instead, will only inflict economic harm domestically and internationally. Overall, this would introduce unpredictability, volatility, and the kind of boom and bust cycles that OPEC has worked so hard to avoid. There’s no wondering why the American petroleum industry is against NOPEC. It’s bad for everyone all around.
Understanding why OPEC is interested in Africa is one thing. But aside from much-needed market clout, increased global prominence, and enhanced opportunity to coordinate with other global oil producers—which are admittedly huge advantages—what else do African nations gain by joining OPEC?
One potentially overlooked benefit of access to OPEC is access to information. When oil prices dropped beginning in 2014, many smaller producers were caught off guard. This was largely because they lacked the market insight to understand the potential effect of American shale or the eventual repercussions of oversupply. For OPEC members, the days of being blindsided are over. And while recent history shows that membership can’t completely protect producers from global swings, it does offer an opportunity to participate in a thoughtful, coordinated response built upon relationships, dialogue, and well-founded research.
What’s more, OPEC members can seek and share information with others who have experience being successful and, perhaps, just as important, being unsuccessful. There is a huge reservoir of lessons learned that operators can exploit and expand upon as they develop their growth strategy.
OPEC membership can even help finance that strategy by opening the door to direct foreign investment, including Middle Eastern countries with substantial sovereign wealth to spread around. Obviously, an influx of capital can accelerate exploration, development, and production—which we hope will generate revenue that trickles into the economy as a whole. But even the mere act of qualifying for capital can be beneficial, especially as it requires rigorous reporting, which is something many African producers struggle with. As a matter of fact, being in OPEC is an exercise in compliance and reporting: The organization upholds extremely strong standards for both. Many times, the reports wind up in the hands of Wall Street financial institutions, where they can improve a country’s credit rating and, in turn, the prospects for financing new projects.
If status, stability, information, partnerships, and regulatory discipline were the only things OPEC offered, to some, that might be enough.
But that would be overlooking one of the organization’s flagship programs: the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID).
A finance institution established in 1976, OFID promotes financial cooperation between OPEC member states and developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe—whether they are members or not. Aimed primarily at bolstering socioeconomic development, under their “united against poverty” flag, the fund provides everything from loans and balance of payments support to grants for humanitarian emergency relief.
Over nearly 50 years, the fund has provided assistance for initiatives in nine focus areas: energy, agriculture, education, financial services, health, telecommunications, water and sanitation, industry, and transportation. Among the most recent beneficiaries are four “partner” countries:
Burkina Faso, which received $19 million to upgrade a 94-kilometer (58-mile) stretch of road that will improve trade between rural areas and the capital city of Ouagadougou. The project is also expected to enhance access to social services for a quarter of a million people.
Ethiopia, which will use the $22 million it received for road improvements in a region where agriculture is a primary income source. Nearly three-quarters of a million people will have improved access to social services and marketplaces.
Guinea, for a project expected to help alleviate poverty and enhance food security for more than 450,000 people. The country received $25 million for its Family Farming, Resilience and Markets in Upper and Middle Guinea Program.
Malawi, which received $15 million earmarked for its Shire Valley Transformation Program. Expected to help about 56,000 families, the program provides irrigation, drainage, and wetlands management to improve agricultural productivity.11
It’s worth mentioning that none of these nations is currently an OPEC member; in fact, Burkina Faso doesn’t even have oil or natural gas reserves, although the other three are in various stages of exploration or early production.
Looking at the projects OFID supports, it’s easy to see how their approach differs from the typical Western way of providing aid, which often involves throwing money at a problem and hoping for the best. Yes, conventional capitalism has achieved miracles—there’s no denying it—and building a school or setting up a food bank have their place. But OFID is more interested in creating enabling infrastructure—roads that connect people to markets and water management that overcomes yield-limiting factors and increases crop production—to help raise people out of poverty.
Like other investors, OPEC is concerned about a “return”—but not in the usual interest-bearing or revenue-building sense. OFID funds are directed only toward programs that are sustainable and likely to grow. They want to see that the programs they support yield real change, real results, with outcomes measured not only by the number of people serviced but how far they’ve come. At the end of the day, it’s OPEC’s reputation on the line: If a project fails, conditions deteriorate rather than improve, and people suffer, OPEC will have to take the hit. To avoid that risk, their research and oversight are thorough and complete.
The OPEC of today is a far cry from the decades when the only African members were long-time producers Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria—countries whose combined output was dwarfed by that of OPEC heavy-hitters Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran.
Even though they aren’t members, both Sudan and South Sudan participated in the group’s effort to prop up prices through production cuts. Actually, South Sudan, the world’s newest nation, is considering membership, and OPEC is likely to welcome it with open arms. Although the country’s output has suffered as the result of security concerns and political violence, its 1.5 billion barrels of proven reserves—the third-largest total in sub-Saharan Africa—make it a key OPEC candidate.
As I mentioned, Uganda is also mulling OPEC membership, even though production there isn’t planned to commence until 2022. Although Uganda won’t be accepted until it starts producing, it will be a good strategic move for the country, as it will be able to learn from others who followed a similar path, right from the start.
And it appears that African representation within OPEC is nowhere near cresting: As Mozambique, Kenya, Senegal, and Mauritania enter the oil economy, joining OPEC might not be far behind.
This makes perfect sense, of course. As I told Footprint to Africa in 2018, African nations cannot afford to not be at the negotiating table when the great decisions about their future are made.12
At the same time, OPEC will benefit from the rise in African political voices. An enhanced sector outlook, coupled with new discoveries and strong leadership by younger and more capable leaders, is rapidly attracting the interest of investors across the world.
Many people look at African nations and think they are too small or too fragile to have a role in OPEC. And it’s true that most of them don’t have the reserve size or wealth funds of the historic OPEC members. When there’s market volatility or a breakdown in talks that will create economic volatility, they will suffer the most. If the group agrees on production cuts, Saudi Arabia can withhold 400,000 bbl/d and manage, while most African countries would go bankrupt and fall into economic recession. It’s also important to understand that the fundamentals and dynamics are different between OPEC’s Middle East leaders and Africa. While the Saudis can produce a barrel of oil for $7, it costs most African countries $30 to $50. Even the contracts differ: Saudis have service contracts where everyone works for them, while African countries have production sharing contracts where investors need to recover their money. Only by keeping the investors happy can those oil economies continue to grow.
Yet, when all is said and done, I believe that OPEC and Africa can work together to create a stronger, more stable oil and gas industry.
It will take time. African countries are not going to see a lot more power within OPEC until they start producing more. At its core, this is a numbers game. You have to explore more. You have to produce more. A great example is the United States, which is better able to raise its voice today after becoming one of the largest producers of petroleum and a net exporter.
For Africa, having a place at the table is half the job. There’s value in knowing OPEC colleagues who started small transformed themselves into powerhouses. It changes your thinking. You start seeing big things and believing in them. There’s no mountain you can’t climb.
Having a voice doesn’t always mean hitting the same note as everyone else, of course. In every group, there’s potential for discord. Members often have contradictory goals, which can make it hard to find common ground.
Since 2016, credit for orchestrating OPEC—and minimizing conflict—goes to Secretary General Mohammad Sanusi Barkindo.
Barkindo’s rise from the small Nigerian town of Yola to OPEC leadership exemplifies how someone can come from a small place and do great things.
Barkindo has significant industry experience: He was managing director of Nigeria’s national oil company NNPC and also served as Nigeria’s national representative for OPEC. Since 1991, Barkindo has headed Nigeria’s technical delegation to UN climate negotiations.
In addition to his professional achievements and academic credentials—he was educated in Africa, the United States, and Britain, where he earned a postgraduate diploma from Oxford—Barkindo is a master at fostering collaboration. In fact, the biggest deal that OPEC put together in recent years was the Declaration of Cooperation that brought resource-rich Russia together with OPEC members and allies to rescue the oil market. This was no easy task: When you look at the countries involved, you see all kinds of characters. Not everyone gets along, regardless of shared heritage, national proximity, or common goals—and the recent departure of Qatar from the OPEC rolls is a telling example.
Producing just 600,000 bbl/d, Qatar ranked near the bottom of OPEC’s production in 2018: It was number 11, in fact. However, the Arab nation, which joined OPEC nearly 60 years ago, in 1961, is the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG). It also has the world’s third-largest natural gas reserves, behind only Russia and Iran.13
Qatar’s oil minister, Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi, told The National—which is published in the United Arab Emirates—that the country was withdrawing from OPEC to produce unfettered amounts of oil and focus on its plans to increase LNG to 110 million tonnes per year from the current 77 million tonnes per day.14 However, it’s interesting to note that Qatar has been in a diplomatic crisis since a Saudi-led coalition severed ties with the country over its alleged support of terrorism, making its retreat from OPEC seem less about oil than other things.
That isn’t the only conflict Barkindo has dealt with during his tenure as OPEC chief. He’s had to broker peace between Iran and Iraq, whose on-again/off-again relationship is legendary. Libya has issues. In short, it can be a real challenge to make this union work. But, Barkindo maintains his cool, mediates like the pro he is, and pulls together a forceful agenda. The potential for Africa to thrive under his leadership is tremendous.