The OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung – the senior German HQ) deployment directed the XV AK to the north-west of Strasbourg, with XIV AK and XIV RK side-by-side on the right bank of the Rhine in the area Lahr–Neu-Breisach–Lörrach.30 Since the Seventh Army commander anticipated an early French attack from Belfort and across the Vosges to the north of Belfort, he decided to prepare to counter-attack by moving XIV AK north to Neuenburg–Burkheim and XIV RK north to Burkheim–Lahr, with covering force units in the Vosges.31 In the Seventh Army area there were fortresses on the left bank of the Rhine at Strasbourg, Neu-Breisach, fortified bridgeheads at Neuenburg and Hüningen and the right-bank fortress at Istein. Three bridgeheads with field fortifications were also established.32 Between Fortress Kaiser Wilhelm II (KW II), on the foothills of the Vosges, and Fortress Strasbourg, field fortifications were dug behind the Breusch River to form the ‘Breusch position’.
Between the fifth and tenth mobilisation days, two Italian cavalry divisions were expected to arrive at Strasbourg; and as of the seventeenth mobilisation day, an entire Italian army of three corps was due on the Upper Rhine. These forces never appeared.
The first, albeit temporary, mission for Seventh Army was the protection of the Upper Alsace and Upper Rhine against a weak French attack during the German deployment. In the event of a major French attack, Seventh Army was to withdraw to Strasbourg and across the Rhine.
Until 6 August only weak French forces appeared on the border in the Vosges, and were not very active. The French XXI Corps was identified east of Rambervillers, south of the French VII Corps. Both units were stationed in this area in peacetime. On 7 August the German XV AK and XIV AK were still deploying when the French VII Corps of the French First Army attacked from Belfort towards Mühlhausen in southern Alsace, with the mission of destroying the Rhine bridges south of Neuf-Breisach, or blocking the crossings, then turning north towards Colmar–Schlettstadt. By the evening of 8 August the French 41 ID was reported in the area of Sennheim, 14 ID in Mühlhausen and 8 Cavalry Division (Div.) to the south at Altkirch. The German covering force units from XIV AK had conducted a fighting withdrawal to Neuenburg.
On 7 August the Seventh Army commander decided to attack in order to drive the French into Switzerland if possible. On 8 August XV AK was sent in motion towards Colmar, XIV AK to Neu-Breisach and Neuenburg, while the Strasbourg reserve, 30 RD, was sent to reinforce the covering forces in the Vosges passes and guard the XV AK right flank and rear. XXI AK, which was providing the covering force in Lorraine, was asked to advance towards Baccarat and Raon l’Étape to fix those French forces in place. By midday, after a 60km forced march in the burning sun, both corps were approaching Mühlhausen. By evening, XV AK took Sennheim, while XIV AK reached the area north and east of Mühlhausen in close proximity to the enemy. On 10 August XIV AK liberated Mühlhausen and the French withdrew, sometimes in panic, towards Belfort.33 While the mass of XV AK and XIV AK held the positions they had taken, mixed detachments pursued the French, who had left German territory by 13 August. The commanders of the French VII Corps and 8 Cavalry Div. were immediately relieved of their duties. In the Vosges, the Germans fought off French attacks on the passes west of Schlettstadt.
In any war the first victory is important and the French would have made a great deal out of an unopposed march into Mühlhausen. It was understandable that the German Empire would not want to leave the Alsace, such an old bone of contention, in French hands. However, XIV AK and XV AK, which had been thrown into battle precipitately, required some time to recover from their exertions and the effect of their first day in combat, and were late redeploying to Lorraine. If the Germans had restricted themselves to the defence of the east bank of the Upper Rhine and the Strasbourg–KW II line, abandoning Alsace, then the Seventh Army would have been available on a timely basis for the main battle.
Bavarian III Corps (III b. AK) deployed on the right to the south of Metz. Next left was II b. AK, then XXI AK, with I b. AK on the left at Saarburg. I b. RK was in reserve at Saargemünd. The Sixth Army Rear Area HQ was at Zweibrücken, with 5 Landwehr Brigade (Bde) providing security.
The army troops included:
II/Bavarian Foot Artillery R 3 (21cm mortars), 2 Batteries; HQ, II and III/Foot Artillery R 18 (21cm mortars) each Battalion with 2 Batteries
Heavy Coastal Artillery Mortar Battery 2 (30.5cm)
Naval Cannon Battery 1 (42cm)
Bavarian Engineer R, with 6 Companies; Engineer R 19, with 6 Companies
Bavarian Non-Rigid Airship Section
Aviation Section 5
The total strength of the Sixth Army was 131 battalions, 39 squadrons, 133 batteries (24 heavy) with 746 guns (92 heavy) and 27 engineer companies.
HKK 3 was attached to Sixth Army. It deployed the 8 Kavalleriedivision (KD) in the II b. AK sector, the Bavarian KD and Jäger Battalions 1 and 2 b. in the XXI AK sector and 7 KD in I b. AK sector. HKK 3 included Jäger battalions 2, 72 squadrons and 9 horse artillery batteries (36 guns). Its initial mission was to reconnoitre towards Pont-à-Mousson–Lunéville–Blâmont–Baccarat.
Since the declaration of ‘Period Preparatory to War’, XXI AK and XIV AK, which were stationed near the border, provided security with units in peacetime strength and uniforms. These were relieved on 4 August by a covering force brigade (two infantry regiments, a cavalry squadron and an artillery section) in each corps area, which prepared defensive positions. The unit advance parties arrived in the deployment areas on 3 August, followed in the next two days by the cavalry divisions and, from 8–12 August, the active army corps. During the deployment, the covering force brigade was spread thinly over a corps-wide sector, and had to anticipate either a French attack in force or large-scale cavalry raids.
The II b. AK and III b. AK were facing the French XX Corps, reinforced by the French 2 Cavalry Div., heavy artillery and forestry officials, which limited themselves to occupying the Selle bridges, although, on 6 August, two batteries of Bavarian horse artillery conducted a forty-five-minute duel with French artillery. On the heights, which rose 200m between the Selle and the Moselle, the French had already constructed field fortifications in peacetime, which from 8–11 August they reinforced. I b. AK was faced by the French XXI Corps. The covering force, divisional cavalry and HKK 3 continually sent out reconnaissance patrols, which were hindered by the Selle River, the Rhine–Marne Canal, and the French cavalry and infantry security screen. The Bavarian KD had soon lost 200 horses, though the cavalry took French prisoners and captured documents.
On 8 August the HQ of the German XXI AK and HKK 3 received the request from Seventh Army to attack in the direction of Baccarat–Raon l’Étape to support Seventh Army’s attack on Mühlhausen. At this time XXI AK had only the covering force available, 3 Bavarian Infantry Bde in Saarburg, so it was the first unit to cross the French border, occupying Blâmont; 3 Bde continued the advance on 9 August against light resistance, but the Bavarian KD and 7 KD were not able to support because pursuing the French cavalry in the intense heat had already exhausted the horses.
On 10 August the available units of I b. AK attacked towards Badonviller–Raon l’Étape to support the Seventh Army. The corps had only partially deployed, however, with many combat, munitions and supply units still on the rails or at home station. The troops had just been mobilised and completed their rail movement and were not marching fit, and along with the heat there were many march casualties. The Bavarians continually took fire from men in houses, often in civilian clothing, and responded by shooting the men and burning the houses down. The Bavarians lost 30 Killed in Action (KIA) and 120 Wounded in Action (WIA). On 11 August it was clear that the French had been defeated at Mühlhausen and I b. AK was ordered to halt in place. The last combat units of I b. AK arrived and the units rested.
Early in the morning of 9 August the Sixth Army HQ arrived in the sector. On the evening of 10 August Crown Prince Rupprecht was given the overall command in Alsace-Lorraine, including Sixth and Seventh Armies and HKK 3.
On 10 August the French 59 Infantry Bde had driven the German outpost company, 8/IR 131, out of the town of Gerden, on the border in the middle of the German XXI AK sector. The Bavarian cavalry patrols had been unable to penetrate the French border covering force screen, so it was decided to conduct a reconnaissance in force at Gerden, in conjunction with the 42 ID. On the right, the 65 Infantry Bde of 42 ID, supported by Prussian (Pr.) Field Artillery Regiment (FAR) 8, would attack south from Ley and Ommery (off the map to the upper left), while in the centre the Jäger Battalion (Bn) 2 b. and 8/IR 131 attacked along the Bortenach–Gerden road, supported by 5/FAR 8. Meanwhile, 59 Bde would attack on the left on Remoncourt and Vaucourt (off the map to the left), supported by Pr. FAR 15 against the enemy flank and rear. The Bavarian KD would be held in reserve.
At 1000hrs 2 b. Jäger entered the Chantal-Holz (Chantal Wood), where it took bursts (rafales) of fire and casualties from French artillery located 500m north of Gerden. The French had placed hats and packs on the edge of Gerden to deceive the Germans, while in fact they had prepared the interior of the town for protracted defence. Machine guns (MG) were installed in the church tower. At about 1km from Gerden, the Jäger took up the firefight with 1, 4 and 3 Companies on line, and 2 and 8/IR 131 in reserve. 5/FAR 8 opened fire against the French artillery from a position south of Bortenach, as did the Bavarian KD horse artillery battery (R/FAR 5) from a position west of Wald Bortenach.
Key
Feindl. Schutzen – enemy infantry
“ Batterien – enemy batteries
While 65 Infantry Bde (not shown on map) advanced over Hill 265, north of Gerden, under the burning sun, Jäger 2 advanced slowly by bounds across the open ground in front of Gerden while taking casualties. At 1200hrs, when the French artillery north of Gerden was silenced, 5/FAR 8 and the 2 and 3/FAR 5 displaced forward to positions on Hill 282, only 1km from Gerden.
At 1115hrs the commander of the Bavarian KD ordered the 4 (Uhlan) Cavalry Bde to attack the French artillery, which had been suppressed and would probably attempt to withdraw. It would be followed in support by 1 Cavalry Bde, and MG Section (Sec.) 1 was also ordered forward. The Uhlan Bde used the low ground south-west of Bortenach as a covered and concealed avenue of approach to the attack position on Hill 265, passing to the left flank of the French infantry in Gerden. Movement was hindered by marshy meadows and barbed-wire fences which enclosed pastures. From Hill 265, looking across rolling terrain and fields of high grain, the brigade commander could discern the French artillery. Uhlan R 2 deployed to the right of the road to Gerden behind the north slope of Hill 265, Uhlan R 1 to the left of the road, each with two squadrons forward and one in the second line, with the brigade occupying a front of 500–800m. The squadrons advanced in open-order waves. Enemy fire and the press of time did not permit a careful reconnaissance of the terrain, however. High standing grain, as well as unexpected wet ditches and barbed-wire fences, sometimes slowed movement, but, nevertheless, the advance picked up speed. South of Hill 265 the Uhlans passed through a thin skirmisher line of IR 131. Soon the first groups of French appeared; they fled through the grain, hid in the bushes or played dead in order to shoot the Uhlans in the back. They were ridden down, taken prisoner or speared with lances. The Uhlans then reached the two shot-up French batteries; the surviving French gunners surrendered.
The advance continued to gather speed, but the brigade was still in good order when it encountered a 3m-high steep cut on the north side of the road leading west from Gerden. On the road itself, and in the small strip of land covered with hedges, trees, bushes and fences that separated the road from the Rhine–Marne Canal, were groups of withdrawing French troops. French troops at Gerden fired into the left flank of the Uhlans. All of these obstacles brought the wave of cavalry to a halt. Here and there Uhlans steered their horses down the steep slope, while others found easier ways down. In this manner, 4 and 5/Uhlan R 2 reached the road. The horses were by now out of control and the herd swung down the road to Gerden. 4/Uhlan R 1 followed them. French troops in the way were overrun or jumped in the canal. The Uhlans took fire from the town, the south side of the canal and MGs positioned in the church tower. Horseless Uhlans fought on foot with their carbines. Part of the stream of Uhlans broke into the town and dismounted to fight house-to-house, while other Uhlans followed the brigade commander to the orchards at the north-west edge of Gerden, where the road cut was no longer so steep and where they were joined by 1/Uhlan R 1.
3/Uhlan R 1 stopped at the top of the road cut and, under the leadership of the regimental commander, attacked French infantry on a small hill near the canal bridge 1km to the west of Gerden, capturing most of them. 2/Uhlan R 2 had been held up by terrain obstacles, swung to low ground south of the Kreuzberg Forest, attacked a third French battery and then took both ends of the bridge west of Gerden on foot, bringing in 120 prisoners of war (POWs).
The entire wild and bloody ride took place between 1135 and 1200hrs. Neither MG Sec. 1 nor 1 Cavalry Bde had the opportunity to become engaged. The fragments of the two Uhlan regiments were rallied by their commanders and withdrawn to Hill 265, the POWs turned over to the Prussian infantry. Jäger Bn 1 and a battalion from 65 Infantry Bde drove the French out of the Kreuzberg Forest and pushed on to the Rhine–Marne Canal.
In the meantime, Jäger Bn 2 had approached to within 200m of Gerden, bounding by half-platoons, squads or individuals, taking casualties from both enemy fire and the heat. 2/Jäger 2 reinforced 2/Jäger 1. At 1245hrs the Jäger assaulted the town at almost the same time that IR 131 did so from the north, pushing the French back from house to house, though defending themselves both bravely and cunningly. Fire fell on the Jäger from upper-story and attic windows, as well as the church tower. Many prisoners were taken. Corporal (Cpl) Drees from 1/Jäger 2 captured a French standard. 59 Infantry Bde drove into Gerden from the south, and the battle was over by 1500hrs. The enemy had withdrawn or fled in panic, for the most part during the charge of the Uhlan Bde. There was no pursuit. The Germans bivouacked in towns a short distance to the east.
The casualties were:
KIA |
WIA |
MIA** |
TOTAL | ||||||||
OFF |
EM |
H* |
OFF |
EM |
H |
EM |
H |
OFF |
EM |
H |
|
Jäger 2 |
1 |
32 |
- |
4 |
129 |
- |
3 |
- |
5 |
164 |
- |
Uhlan 1 |
4 |
31 |
29 |
3 |
61 |
13 |
20 |
87 |
7 |
112 |
129 |
Uhlan 2 |
3 |
34 |
20 |
4 |
27 |
11 |
14 |
135 |
7 |
75 |
166 |
Total |
8 |
107 |
49 |
11 |
217 |
24 |
37 |
222 |
19 |
351 |
295 |
*Horses
**Probably KIA
The commander of 4 Cavalry Bde was seriously wounded and his adjutant killed, and there were also a large number of heat casualties.
The Uhlan’s losses were similarly heavy. A critic could certainly say that the attack had achieved its objective when it arrived at the canal in that dismounted troopers holding the heights west of Gerden would have cut off the French as well as, or better than, wild masses of cavalry storming into the town. But this does not consider that long peacetime training had inculcated the offensive spirit into the troops, nor does it reckon with the maddened horses. The arrival of the Bavarian Uhlans in and behind Gerden, with hurricane force, had undoubtedly spread fear and panic among the enemy, shaking his morale, and contributed to the quick capture of the town, which spared greater losses among the attacking Prussian and Bavarian infantry and increased the scope of the victory.
In addition to numerous dead and wounded, the enemy lost eight guns, six MG, a standard and 1,467 POWs. Important documents were captured, including a French Second Army operations order found on the body of a dead French brigade commander, which showed that at least six French corps were assembled between Toul and Épinal.
Reconnaissance aircraft from Bavarian Aviation Sec. 1 reported one to two French divisions opposite the I b. AK sector.35 At 1800hrs 2/IR 3, which was on outpost duty, was attacked by superior French forces coming from Badonviller. The commander of I/IR 3 reinforced with 3 on the left and the 4 on the right. 4 took fire in the right flank from French forces in a wood, then attacked and drove the French from the wood in close combat. 1 attacked through 4 and engaged the retreating French with pursuit fire. The French were thrown back along the entire front, at the cost of a number of casualties.
By 11 August reports led Sixth Army HQ to believe that the enemy had assembled strong forces between Nancy and Épinal. Since the French might launch an offensive soon, the corps, which were still deploying, were instructed to hold their positions along the border.
The French fortress of Manonviller, 12km east of Lunéville, supported the French covering force and would disrupt any advance by the Sixth Army. The Sixth Army engineers were therefore ordered to begin measures to take the fort, and were given operational control over the Bavarian Foot Artillery Brigade HQ and the HQ of I b. Foot Artillery R 1 and Foot Artillery R 18, as well as the Bavarian Engineer Regiment (Eng. R) with the Engineer Siege Train. Bavarian Rail Construction Company (Co.) 1 was already at work on the rail lines for the 42cm mortars.
The Sixth Army order for 12 August instructed I b. AK to defend a line on the Vezouse River, between Blâmont and Cirey, and to begin the reconnaissance of Fort Manonviller. However, in order to spare the troops the march back to the Vezouse, the corps HQ ordered them to remain in position north of Badonviller and remain strictly on the defensive.
On the night of 11/12 August, 6/Household IR occupied an outpost position on the road from Les Carrières. At 0600hrs they were discovered and engaged by French infantry – the position was untenable. The tradition and training of the Household IR allowed only one course of action: attack. The company commander was reinforced in this decision by reports that night patrols had been able to traverse Badonviller, which was weakly held. Then II/Household IR followed 6/Household, as did I/Household R on the left. The regimental commander gave his approval and committed III/Household through the woods south of Bréménil with orders to take Badonviller from the east. II/FAR 7 opened fire at 0630hrs. The Household attack gathered steam quickly, particularly II/Household R, and 6/Household, deployed in very open order, took the heights north of Badonviller at 0620hrs, in spite of enemy fire in the left flank and serious casualties. 5/Household followed on the right, 8/Household on the left, while 7/Household, which had outpost duty at Battant Mill (on map, Battant-M.), moved in the direction of the Badonviller rail station. Aided by high grain and not bothering to return the enemy fire, by about 0800hrs the skirmisher line of II/Household had reached the edge of Badonviller and moved into the gardens and houses. The French must have been deeply asleep because it was not the initial troops, but rather the following platoons and companies that met resistance. I/Household bypassed the town centre to the east, delayed by underbrush, walls, fences and hedges, while III/Household swung even further east along the roads in the woods. 9/FAR 7 galloped forward to the heights on the north-west edge of Badonviller at 0900hrs, followed by 4/FAR 7, while 5/FAR 7 took up a position 1km south of Les Carrières. The Household regimental commander moved to Badonviller, while bringing the MG Company (MGK) to the north edge of the town. The commander of I b. AK moved forward to Blâmont, while specifying Badonviller as the limit of advance, in order to keep the fight from expanding.
Key
Vorposten – outposts
L – Leibregiment (Household Regiment)
Soon after 0800hrs the Household Regiment called for help: the fight inside Badonviller had escalated. II/Household had advanced to the end of the main street when it took fire from all sides, particularly from an MG in the cemetery or the church to its rear, opening a bitter house-to-house battle in which II/Household bored its way through the centre of Badonviller. Where French resistance was particularly strong, the Household infantry would bring up a platoon of MGs.
At 0900hrs I/FAR 7 unlimbered on the heights south of Les Carrières, while 3/FAR 7 was soon brought forward to the north side of Badonviller. At 1000hrs 1, 2 and 5 displaced forward to Haut d’Arbre and drove off French artillery that had been firing from south of Badonviller.
At around 0900hrs the French were fleeing Badonviller, which could be considered in the control of the Household IR, but was by no means cleared. French soldiers found all sorts of hiding places from which they fired on the Bavarian troops, even on stretcher-bearers and the wounded. There can be no doubt that civilians of both sexes took part in these underhand attacks, for there were gunshot wounds that could only have been caused by hunting rifles, shotguns and similar non-military weapons.
5/Household had quickly pushed through Badonviller to the south edge of the town, and the rest of II/Household followed. I/Household attacked on the left, suffering numerous casualties while taking Fenneviller. The remaining two platoons of the MGK were committed in these two battalions’ sectors and engaged the French with pursuit fire. III/Household attacked across the hill to the south of Fenneviller against French infantry, who were well concealed in the standing grain and fields of potatoes. The battalion commander was killed. A French MG on the treeline north-west of Fenneviller and artillery south of Pexonne inflicted further casualties, destroying a platoon of 4 Co. III/IR 16 was brought forward to the hill south of Neuviller to cover the right flank. The order to halt the attack finally reached the front lines at 1200hrs and the firing died down.
5/IR 1 and 6/Household now began systematically clearing Badonviller. At 1600hrs it was discovered that a French MG had been firing from the church tower and it was set on fire by German artillery, which eventually consumed the entire town.
The Household IR held its positions at Fenneviller until relieved in place at 2000hrs by IR 2, then withdrew to Neuviller. IR 16 had been brought forward to Le Chamois (south of Brémenil). It unsuccessfully tried to extinguish the fires in Badonviller, hindered by a lack of equipment and the bad faith of the populace. III/IR 2 took fire from houses while marching through the town, the combat trains of I/IR 16 was ambushed from the city hall, and troops and horses wounded by fire from small-calibre weapons. A search of the houses turned up an unusual number of young, fit men with papers that showed they had been mobilised then released from duty. It was obvious that their mission was to conduct guerrilla warfare in civilian clothes in areas near the border.
The Battle of Badonviller developed out of an outpost battle, against the intentions of the higher leadership. The casualties suffered by the Household IR − 8 officers and 90 enlisted men KIA, 14 officers and 300 enlisted men WIA − might appear at first glance to have been pointless. This was not the case. The French 25 Infantry Bde had been providing border security at Badonviller. In particular, the Household IR had been engaged with the French Light Infantry Battalions 17, 20, 21 and IR 17, and had taken 800 POWs. The first victory, even one fought without a higher purpose, reinforced the morale and confidence of the Bavarians, and reduced that of the French.
The tradition and training of the German Army emphasised the honourable offensive, which showed itself from the very beginning of this great test of arms to be superior to the cunning, underhand methods of the French. The Household IR had fought masterfully, worthy of its noble history.
The batteries of FAR 1 and FAR 7 had provided exemplary fire support. They moved right behind the skirmisher line and unlimbered in the open to provide close fire support. In peacetime this had been practised zealously, although criticised by many as out-dated. Now this technique had proven itself once again, even in the face of modern weapons. Above all, during the offensive battles at the end of the war, it would once again be used successfully.
Doubtless the offensive conducted by I b. AK ran considerable risk and could have had serious negative consequences. The corps could have been encircled and destroyed by superior forces. The cohesion of the newly mobilised unit, which was not yet marching fit, had been seriously tested, particularly since the logistics system had not yet been established. All of these dangers were clear to the commanders, particularly the Sixth Army command group, which ordered the offensive, and the I b. AK commander, who initially opposed it. In this case, the situation justified the risk. That it succeeded without any negative consequences was due to the morale of the troops and the character of the leaders.
By 13 August the mass of the Sixth Army ammunition and supply units had deployed. The army was now fully prepared for combat. III b. AK on the right flank had been digging in since 11 August, with 6 ID on the right flank, nearest Metz, and 5 ID on the left. The enemy was quiet. II b. AK deployed 4 ID in a strong position on the heights at Delm, and 3 ID on the dominating terrain on both sides of Château Salins. The security detachments on the Selle were engaged occasionally with French outposts and patrols. In one of these battles, 7/IR 16 fell into an ambush, took considerable casualties and its company commander was killed. XXI AK was assembled in the sector, with 31 ID on the right and 42 ID on the left. I b. RK completed deployment in Saargemünd.
I b. AK began to construct field fortifications. Since the left flank at Badonviller was far forward and exposed to an attack from the Vosges, 1 ID was pulled back to high ground 4km to the rear, leaving only a security detachment in Badonviller, with 2 ID on its right. As a precaution, the supply units were moved back over the Vezouse River, and the troops did not occupy their positions, but were dispersed to assembly areas to the rear. The corps was therefore positioned to withdraw in the face of an attack by superior French forces and, in fact, French strength in the corps area increased to the point that the security detachment in Badonviller was withdrawn.
HKK 3 cavalry reconnaissance patrols had great difficulty penetrating the screen established by the enemy covering force, reinforced by Fort Manonviller and the water obstacles of the Selle and Rhine−Marne Canal. HKK 3 decided not to conduct a reconnaissance in force, conscious of the fact that Lorraine was unsuited for the employment of large bodies of cavalry and large-scale offensives would only lead to high casualties, if not outright defeat. So far as possible, on 12 and 13 August, HKK 3 preserved the strength of its units.
On 13 August 2/Heavy Cavalry R 1, led by Rittmeister Prince Heinrich of Bavaria, was covering the reconnaissance of Manonviller by the staff of Foot Artillery R 18 when it encountered two French squadrons, one in front and one on the flank. Prince Heinrich charged one of these and both fled. The Bavarian cavalry chased after the French and slowly closed the gap, until the terrain forced the French to turn and fight. Prince Heinrich, far ahead of his squadron, reached the French first and was surrounded and lightly wounded, but was quickly supported by his troopers, who overwhelmed the French, some of whom dismounted and surrendered, then fired at the Bavarians’ backs. Such underhandedness quickly received its just desserts: the French squadron was soon destroyed, the few survivors pursued until they reached the safety of their own infantry.
The concept of the German war plan, the foundation of which had been developed by Field Marshal von Schlieffen, was that the mass of the German Army would advance through Belgium and Luxembourg in order to go around the French fortress line at Belfort–Verdun. Five armies (first to fifth) would march from the area of Liège–Diedenhofen (Thionville) and swing in a great arc towards Paris. While the right wing, the First Army, would march towards Brussels and set the pace, the left wing, Fifth Army, would maintain contact with Diedenhofen and therefore move slowly, because this was the point at which the enemy could pry the attack off its hinges. The farther the Fifth Army moved west, the more dangerous the enemy attack originating from Verdun became. An even more serious danger would occur if the enemy succeeded in breaking through in Lorraine, between the fortresses of Metz and Strasbourg and to the Lower Moselle. Metz had been expanded to the north-east with a fortified line behind the Nied River (the ‘Nied Position’) to the Saar at Molsheim, garrisoned by seven Landwehr brigades and eight batteries of 10cm cannons, which would only delay a strong enemy for a limited time and not prevent him from crossing the Saar. The left flank of the forces advancing in Luxembourg and Belgium needed to be reliably protected in depth from Verdun to the Rhine.
This was the principal mission for Crown Prince Rupprecht and the Sixth and Seventh Armies. In addition, he was to fix strong enemy forces in place in Lorraine by advancing on the Moselle above Fort Frouard and on the Meurthe; this was no longer a consideration if the French attacked between Metz and the Vosges with superior forces. If Rupprecht’s forces were forced to withdraw, they were to do so in the direction that would prevent the French from outflanking the Nied Position to the east, as well as reinforce the Nied Position itself. If Rupprecht’s armies were not opposed by numerically superior French forces, then Rupprecht might attack to the west bank of the Moselle at and south of Metz. A French attack that included the Upper Alsace was favourable for the Germans, so long as it did not pass north of the line of KW II−Breusch Position−Strasbourg.
Rupprecht was therefore placed in a complex situation. A French attack into Alsace-Lorraine, the old bone of contention between France and Germany, had to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, this attack might either have limited objectives or be designed to penetrate to the Rhine and the Upper Moselle. The Chief of the German General Staff, Moltke, also expected that the French might commit the mass of their forces in Lorraine and that the decisive battle would be fought there.
Rupprecht could not allow his armies to be defeated by superior French forces, uncovering the left flank of the main body. Conversely, he could not allow himself to be deceived by equal French forces, or even inferior French forces acting aggressively. In the first case, he had to withdraw or meet the French in a prepared position. In the second, in order to fix the French forces in place, he had to attack, perhaps as far as Toul-Épinal. If the French attacked the left flank of the main body, Rupprecht might have to counter-attack from Metz. Until the German right wing began its advance, Rupprecht had to fix the greatest number of French forces in Lorraine. But if the French attacked with superior forces, then Rupprecht could expect no relief until the right wing began its advance.
The situation therefore contained many possibilities and dangers. It could change often and quickly, and there were many gradations in each possibility. To accomplish such a mission, leaders and troops had to possess a high degree of flexibility. The shifting mission might cause morale and aggressiveness to suffer unless they were supported by the discipline and enthusiasm of the troops and by the cool presence of mind of the leadership, which avoided precipitate action and overexertion of the troops. There would be no rapid victorious advances, such as those that beckoned the right wing. The danger of losing the initiative to the enemy was great.
The deployment of the Sixth Army prescribed by OHL did not correspond to the multiplicity of missions it gave to Rupprecht. The corps were deployed too close to the border and the enemy, and were distributed too evenly on line. There was insufficient space outside enemy range to manoeuvre and mass for a concentrated thrust against an enemy weak point. Against an early French offensive, the army would be forced to fight on the border in an over-extended position. In either case, in order to obtain room to manoeuvre freely, the army had to move to the rear, which at the beginning of the war was best avoided.
While still in Munich, Rupprecht sent a memorandum to OHL explaining his concept of the operation.36 The principal mission was to guard the flank of the main body as it conducted its right wheel. The way to execute this mission was to gain time by conducting a feint attack, making Sixth Army appear stronger than was actually the case. Sixth Army would then advance in a broad and deep formation on Pont-à-Mousson–Baccarat, and Seventh Army from the Rhine Valley across the Vosges on St Dié–Gérardmer. Of course, there was some doubt that the French would be fooled. If the enemy attacked with superior forces, Rupprecht intended to withdraw to the Saar between Saarlouis, Saarburg and the Donon hill mass, supported on the right by the Nied Position and on the left by the Breusch Position. This line was a good 120km long, a considerable distance for the forces available. If the French succeeded in taking the Donon, they could roll up not only the Saar line but also the Breusch Position. The entire Seventh Army would therefore defend the Donon, while the Sixth Army defended the Saar. From here Rupprecht hoped, after a time, to be able to conduct a decisive offensive, in the best case in conjunction with other forces attacking from Metz. The memorandum also considered the possibility of a withdrawal to and over the Moselle, and requested that operational control of Metz be given to Sixth Army.
The premature attack by Seventh Army into the southernmost corner of the Alsace immediately compromised Rupprecht’s plans. Sixth Army had to commit I b. AK, not fully deployed and isolated, to an attack to support Seventh Army, dislocating the Sixth Army’s deployment in the process. Seventh Army was exhausted, weakened and far out of position. Thus the first requirement was to pull Seventh Army out of Mühlhausen and nearer to Sixth Army.
It was known only that the French had a considerable head start and could attack as of about 11 August. Since they did not attack by 13 August, it was possible that they intended to remain on the defensive, which meant that Rupprecht had to consider going on the offensive towards Nancy and Épinal.
It had originally been intended that, as the Sixth Army attacked in the direction of Lunéville, the Seventh Army would attack from Colmar–Barr to both sides of St Dié to take the French forces facing Sixth Army in the flank. However, it became apparent that the French VII Corps at Belfort was still capable of offensive operations and could threaten the Seventh Army left flank on either side of the Vosges. There was also doubt that Seventh Army could quickly take the mountain passes. Rupprecht decided on 13 August to pull Seventh Army all the way back to the Breusch Position, from where it would cover the left flank of the Sixth Army advance against Lunéville. XIV AK would move by rail to Saarburg, XV AK by rail to the south-west of Strasbourg and XIV RK by foot march to the Breusch Position. If XIV RK advanced over Schirmeck with XV AK south of it, they would be in a position to threaten the French left flank while guarding the right flank of Sixth Army. The general advance on the Meurthe River could only begin when the Seventh Army had completed movement and was fully assembled.
The French had also completed their deployment. The French First Army under General Dubail assembled on the west slope of the Vosges between Belfort and Baccarat. On the army right flank, VII Corps and 8 Cavalry Div., along with the Belfort garrison, had conducted the unsuccessful attack on Mühlhausen. VII Corps was now north of Belfort, and 8 Cavalry Div. was on the army right flank, south of the fortress. There was a considerable gap between VII Corps and the next unit to the north, XIV Corps, which was south of St Dié. XXI Corps, on the left of XIV Corps, north of St Dié, had already taken some of the Vosges passes. Alpine Battalions 12, 13, 22, 28 and 30, with their attached artillery, had arrived from the border with Italy and were attached to 41 ID on the XXI Corps right; Alpine Battalions 7, 11 and 14 reinforced XIV Corps. XIII Corps was north of Raon l’Étape, VIII Corps west of Gerbéviller, 6 Cavalry Div. in the area of Fort Manonviller. 57 RD was the mobile reserve for Belfort, 71 RD for Épinal. Reserve Division Group 1, consisting of 58, 63 and 66 RD, was at Vesoul. 2 Colonial Brigade was also attached to First Army.
The French Second Army under General de Castelnau deployed between Lunéville and Pont-à-Mousson with, from east to west, XVI, XV, XX, and IX Corps. XX Corps with 2 Cavalry Div. and, later, 10 Cavalry Div. provided the covering force. In the second line at Toul were XVIII Corps and the Reserve Division Group 2 (59, 63, 70 RD). Light Infantry Battalions 6, 23, 24 and 27 were also attached.37 IX Corps, reinforced by 70 RD, began work on 12 August on digging field fortifications around the heights east of Frouard. 79 RD constituted the reserve for Toul.
The French Third and Fifth Armies completed their deployment along the Meuse, east of St Mihiel and Charleville, with a flank detachment at Vervins and Hirson. Behind them the Fourth Army assembled on the Upper Aisne, east of Châlons. The Italian border was watched by a few divisions, as the French were sure that no danger threatened from this direction.
The French General Staff was not certain that the German right wing would march through Belgium, but if it did, it would stay south of the Meuse and Sambre. The French may also have underestimated the combat power of the German RK and may not have expected them to be employed immediately with the active army corps. Strong German forces were expected in Alsace-Lorraine, particularly in the area of Metz–Diedenhofen.
General Joffre, the French commander in chief, intended to attack with all his forces as soon as possible – simultaneously with the Russians. There was, however, probably no firm plan for the conduct of the attack. An advance with the mass of the army on both sides of the Vosges and then along the Lower Moselle to the Rhine had been seriously considered. Joffre himself, and the generals Pau, de Castelnau and Foch, advocated such a course of action, and, in particular, an attack into Lorraine. To counter a German advance into Belgium, it was intended to attack from Verdun−Charleville to the north-east into the Ardennes, which was designed to produce a decisive victory by cutting off the German right wing and pushing it to the north. But Joffre made his final decision only when he had clarity concerning the form and direction of the German advance. Nevertheless, the French deployment allowed the main attack to be made in Lorraine, or on both sides of Metz, or in the Ardennes. In the event, the French attacked in both Lorraine and the Ardennes, with the main point of effort in the Ardennes, where on 20 August Third Army attacked north of Metz, with a heavily reinforced Fourth Army on its left. The Fifth Army moved into the angle between the Sambre and Meuse, in order to advance in conjunction with the British Army (two corps, one cavalry division) and the Belgian Army (six infantry divisions, one cavalry division), which was deployed between Antwerp and Brussels, to block the German right wing swinging around Namur.
The First and Second Armies were also given offensive missions, to advance to Saarburg and Saarbrücken. According to Barthelemy Edmonnd Palat (perhaps the most famous late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century French military historian, who also wrote under the pseudonym of Perre Lehautcourt), the purpose was not so much to gain a decisive victory as to fix the greatest number of German troops in Alsace and Lorraine, and protect the French right flank. They would therefore attack before the offensive into the Ardennes. Both armies soon gave up troops to the French left wing: the XIX Corps from Africa, which was originally to go to First Army, was diverted to the left wing; XVIII Corps from the Second Army was sent to Fifth Army on 16 August; and IX Corps was diverted to the Fourth Army on 18 August.
It is remarkable that, until 22 August, the French thought that the German XIII AK was on the right flank of Seventh Army,38 while they failed to identify XIV RK. This may have been due to the fact that 26 RD, a XIV RK unit, had been established by XIII AK. Aside from this, the French had an accurate picture of the German order of battle in Alsace-Lorraine.
The French First and Second Armies had the same mission as the German Sixth and Seventh Armies. This was due to the fact that in Lorraine, the Vosges and Alsace there was only room for secondary operations. There was too little manoeuvre space between the Rhine and the Moselle for quick and decisive actions. A German attack quickly ran into the French border fortresses at Verdun–Toul–Épinal–Belfort. The gap in this line at Charmes was a trap. Even if the French got across the Saar, they would encounter the forested hills of the Hunsrück and the Haardt, which were significant barriers to movement and easy to defend. The French flanks would be threatened from the west by the fortresses of Metz and Diedenhofen, and from the east by Strasbourg and Germersheim. Blocking these and protecting the flanks would probably occupy so many forces that the main attack would lose momentum even before it encountered the Rhine, a serious obstacle itself. South of Strasbourg, the Rhine was reinforced by fortifications at Neu–Breisach, Neuenburg, Istein and Hüningen, while to the east of the river was the Black Forest, another significant obstacle. The French command saw these difficulties and eventually – though perhaps not initially – recognised that the decisive battle would be fought north of Verdun in the Ardennes or on the Belgian border.
It is necessary to examine the concept of the German war plan in Lorraine to determine if it was justified. The German left wing in Lorraine had to be protected, but the success of the German right-wing attack was not predicated on fixing strong French forces in Lorraine, helpful as that might be. The right-wing attack could succeed even if the French drew their troops out of Lorraine. The open terrain between Brussels, Paris and the English Channel coast permitted the quicker and more efficient employment of the numerically superior and more combat-effective German masses than Alsace-Lorraine with its mountains and fortresses. If the French made correct use of the Verdun–Toul–Épinal–Belfort fortifications, it was a certainty that the Germans could not fix significant French forces in Lorraine. It was a fundamental error to push Sixth and Seventh Armies towards the strong French fortifications on the Meurthe without an appropriate level of siege artillery and equipment. To accomplish the necessary mission of initially fixing a portion of the French forces between Toul and Belfort, it would probably have been necessary to merely deploy the two German armies in Alsace-Lorraine. Then they should have been moved as quickly and in the greatest strength as possible, either by rail or foot through Metz, to the west side of the Meuse and Moselle to take part in the decisive battle. Rupprecht wanted to do this from the beginning. The defence of Alsace-Lorraine, assisted by natural obstacles, the fortifications at Metz, Strasbourg and the Upper Rhine, could have been entrusted to a limited number of troops, with extensive use of Landwehr and Landsturm units. Of course, this would not prevent a French advance into Alsace-Lorraine, which was actually to be desired, and which would be ineffective so long as it did not extend to the Lower Moselle. As Frederick the Great said: ‘He who defends all, defends nothing’. If the right-wing attack succeeded, Alsace and Lorraine would be regained.
Both the French and Germans therefore wanted to fix as many opposing forces in the secondary theatre of operations in Lorraine. The side that did so successfully would initially commit fewer forces there and not allow enemy actions to force it to send reinforcements to Lorraine. The mission of guarding each army’s flank in Lorraine could be solved by standing on the defensive, while attempting to fix enemy forces in Lorraine required the offensive. Rupprecht was therefore correct in his initial intention to go on the offensive and, if the enemy attacked in strength, his armies would turn to the defensive. It would, however, be difficult to establish how strong the enemy actually was, and the enemy could also withdraw forces from Lorraine. Again, clarity could be established only by choosing the proper time to go from the defensive to the offensive.
In order to renew the attack on Mühlhausen, the French formed an army detachment under General Pau, the armée d’Alsace, on 10 August. To VII Corps, 8 Cavalry Div. and 57 RD (the Belfort reserve) were added the Reserve Division Group 1 (58, 63, 66 RD), 44 ID was brought from the Italian border and Alpine Battalions 12, 13, 22, 28 and 30, which were already in the Vosges, were also incorporated. Assembling these forces took time, and the detachment was not ready to move until 16 August, this time to make a ‘decisive effort’. The French command, in view of the uncertain situation at Liège and in Belgium, obviously wanted to fix German forces in Alsace, as well as support the offensive into Lorraine. The mission of the armée d’Alsace was to attack through Mühlhausen to Colmar and Schlettstadt, blockade Neu-Breisach and destroy the Rhine bridges.
The attack into Lorraine began on 14 August. The French First Army, reduced to the XIV, XXI, XIII, and VIII Corps, had as its first objectives Saarburg, the Donon hill mass and the Breusch Valley. General Dubail, concerned for his right flank, ordered XIV and XXI Corps and 71 RD to attack over the Vosges passes between Diedolshausen and the Donon, though he hoped to be able to divert one corps towards Saarburg.
The French Second Army was to maintain contact with Nancy on the left flank, and with First Army on the right, while attacking through Duß–Château Salins to Saarbrücken (off map, north of Saargemünd). At first the direction of march was east, then north. XVIII Corps was kept at Toul under control of GQG (Grand Quartier Général – the French senior HQ).
In order to cover the movement of XIV and XV AK north, on 12 August Seventh Army HQ ordered 30 RD to block the French attack at Urbeis, Bavarian 1 and 2 Landwehr Brigades and the 55 Landwehr Brigade, reinforced by the garrisons of Neu-Breisach and Neuenburg, Landwehr IR 110 and 119 (on the map, ‘Mathy’, the 55 Landwehr Brigade commander) to guard the other passes of the Vosges from Strasbourg to the Swiss border.
Between 8 and 12 August the French had unsuccessfully attacked the passes at Urbeis, Markirch and Diedolshausen. On 10 August the French XXI Corps had taken the Col du Hantz (Hantz Pass) 12km south-west of Schirmeck and, on 14 August, XIV Corps finally took Urbeis.
The commander of 60 Bde was sent to Diespach on 13 August to stop the French attack at Col du Hantz with a truly unusual mix of units: Bavarian RIR 15, RIR 99 (I/RIR 99, half of II/RIR 99, IV/RIR 99), Strasbourg Fortress MG Sec. 1, 2/Mounted Jäger R 3, the Ersatz Sec./FAR 15 (a horse and a field artillery battery), a platoon of 5/Foot Artillery R 10 (sFH), and one from 1 Ersatz/FAR 51.
On 14 August this force was prepared for battle on the high ground above Diespach. III b. RIR 15, reinforced by Fortress MG Sec. 1, held the centre on an 800m front west of Diespach and oriented to the west. South of this position was I/RIR 99 (with two platoons of the RIR 99 MGK) and then two companies of II/RIR 99 (with one MG platoon), oriented south. On the far left was I b. RIR 15. II b. RIR 15 and IV/RIR 99 were in reserve north of Hill 581. Ersatz Sec./FAR 15 and the platoon of 1 Ersatz/FAR 51 were in the centre at Hill 558, while 5/Res Foot Artillery R 10 (sFH) was behind Hill 581. The position was extraordinarily unfavourable, for the ridge from Hill 581 to Hill 558 was small, while the long slopes to the east and west could be swept by flanking fire from the south. Most importantly, the position was dominated by wooded hills, which offered the enemy concealed avenues of approach and superior firing positions.
At 0730hrs French artillery opened accurate fire from a dominating hill 2.5km to the south-west. French infantry advancing in close formation were destroyed by the MG attached to II/RIR 99. The French artillery fire increased in intensity, wounding the 60 Bde commander and killing the commander of III b. RIR 15. At 1100hrs French artillery appeared 6km south-east of Breusch-Urbach. The Diespach detachment was now being hit by artillery – probably eight batteries – firing from two directions. The French infantry began to manoeuvre along the treeline north-west of Blen and over the hills east of Heiligenblasien to take the Diespach detachment in both flanks. By 1100hrs they had approached to within 600m. II b. RIR 15 extended the left flank, 5/RIR 99 the right. In the middle the MGs with I/RIR 99 had brought the French infantry to a halt at a range of 700–900m. However, the French artillery gained fire superiority and, by 1400hrs, the German artillery had been silenced. 5/Res Foot Artillery R 10 (sFH) was able to save the guns, but the rest of the artillery was lost. Around 1600hrs the German commanders ordered a withdrawal. I b. RIR 15 provided the rearguard while II b. RIR 15 covered its movement from Hill 581 and the high ground north-east of Breusch-Urbach. Both units broke contact with relatively little difficulty. III b. RIR 15 apparently did not receive the order and pulled back with great difficulty and heavy losses, leaving their packs and moving up the hillside individually in complete view of the enemy. Some of the battalion could not vacate the position until 2000hrs. All the MGs of Fortress MG Sec. 1 were lost. IV/RIR 99 began to withdraw between 1500hrs and 1600hrs. I/RIR 99 and the two companies of II/RIR 99 withdrew at 1800hrs, taking considerable casualties. The four MGs in their sector held on until dusk, by which time they were practically encircled; the MGs were lost and the crews took heavy casualties. The disorganised remnants of the Diespach force withdrew by foot and rail that night to Lutzelhouse (not on map, 20km to the east of Diespach, only 12km west of Fort Kaiser Wilhelm II (‘KW II’) at Molsheim) to reorganise. The enemy did not pursue.
The border security at Schirmeck and b. RIR 15 had suffered a serious defeat. This was due to the poorly chosen position and superior enemy forces. In addition to strong artillery, the French committed at least an infantry brigade from the XXI Corps, which also took the Donon on 15 August. Nevertheless, the Diespach detachment had held its position until late afternoon. RIR 15 lost 1 officer and 61 enlisted men KIA, 5 officers and 105 enlisted men WIA, 2 officers and 231 enlisted men MIA. The French claimed to have taken a standard, 12 guns, 8 MG and 537 POWs.
On 15 August III/RIR 15 was brought to Lutzelhouse. The French had advanced to Schirmeck and were feeling towards Lutzelhouse, as well as 7km east of the Breusch and south of Lutzelhouse, and were capable of outflanking Lutzelhouse through the mountains. The troops at Lutzelhouse therefore fell back to KW II at Molsheim.
On the night of 14–15 August 13 b. RIR 4 was driven out of Sennheim, but retook the town on 15 August with the assistance of armoured train No. 9. By 1200hrs reports and rumours made it likely that the French were close to Thann, Sennheim and Gebweiler, and the commander of the 55 Landwehr Bde ordered an evacuation of Mühlhausen and a withdrawal over the Rhine at Neuenburg. The German population of Mühlhausen fled.
The order to rail-march XV AK to the south-west of Strasbourg and XIV AK to Saarburg on 14 August was issued on 13 August at 2120hrs. Contrary to orders XV AK, positioned at Sennheim, foot marched all but one brigade; the situation in the Vosges seemed so threatening to the corps commander that he did not think a rail movement west of the Rhine to be safe. By the end of 14 August the mass of the corps had reached Colmar.
The withdrawal of the covering force to KW II caused considerable concern at Seventh Army HQ. Fortress Strasbourg and KW II were not ‘armed’; that is, the field fortifications between the permanent fortifications had not been completed, and a great part of the fortress reserve, 30 RD, was no longer in the fort. As a precaution, 56 Infantry Bde (XIV AK), which was moving by rail, was diverted to KW II along with a cavalry squadron and three artillery batteries on 14 August. The sole brigade of XV AK that was moving by rail, 60 Bde, had reached Obernai (not on map, 6km north of Barr). XIV RK at Schlettstadt, which was to have foot marched to Wasselnheim, north-west of Strasbourg, was turned west towards the Vosges and spread out from Epfig (not on map, 5km south of Barr) in the north to Colmar in the south.
The 30 RD, 8km north-west of Schlettstadt, was ordered to march north-west to relieve the pressure on KW II. However, the heat forced a long halt after only 3km. The division was then placed under the operational control of XIV RK, which returned it to its start point with orders to defend in place and to allow the French to come to them. 2 Landwehr Bde was moved by rail to the north-east of Markirch on 14 August. 1 Landwehr Bde reached Colmar by narrow-gauge rail that evening.
Although the Seventh Army was moving north, considerable forces swung west towards the Vosges on 14 August and, as units were being broken up and intermixed, the chain of command was becoming confused. There was a danger that the corps would disappear into the mountains. Rupprecht was forced to intervene sharply in order to get operations back on track and unite both armies at Saarburg. It was becoming apparent that this goal, and the advance on the Moselle and Meurthe, could hardly be achieved before 17 August.
In the meantime, OHL had gained the impression from intelligence reports that the French had gathered extraordinarily strong forces from Pont-à-Mousson to Raon l’Étape, perhaps the mass of their army. In the first wave were twelve corps and five cavalry divisions; in the second, west of Charmes, another three corps; and behind each wing at Toul and Épinal, a group of reserve divisions (each with four to six divisions), with VII AK and 8 KD at the minimum (there could have been more than VII Corps (not AK) and the French 8 Cavalry Division) at Belfort. The main French attack between Metz and Strasbourg that Moltke had expected seemed to be coming to pass.
Rupprecht received this OHL estimate on the morning of 14 August. It now appeared that the situation and mission had been clarified. Previously it seemed necessary to attack a tentative enemy who was at most of equal strength; against this massively superior enemy the only course of action was to withdraw. The enemy would be first confronted on the Saar at Saarlouis−Saargemünd, in the Vosges between Pfalzburg and Molsheim, and on the Breusch Position. The Sixth Army would maintain contact on its right flank with the Nied Position and extend left as far as Metting (not on map, 6km north-west of Pfalzburg). The Seventh Army had the mission of holding the Breusch Position and, above all, to prevent a breakthrough on the middle Vosges at Pfalzburg and Molsheim. The entire Seventh Army would be assembled north of the Breusch; Alsace was to be left to the enemy. On 15 August XIV RK reached Barr−Schlettstadt and XV AK arrived at Colmar. XIV AK was in rail movement. 56 Bde, at KW II, was sent to Wasselnheim (not on map, north 14km north of KW II) and was replaced by 42 Landwehr Infantry Bde at KW II on 16 August. The units in the Vosges continued to provide security for the Seventh Army movement north.
The French positioned in the Vosges hardly moved in the following days. Rather, the commander of the French First Army intended to reinforce the advance of his left wing, where he expected the strongest resistance or, indeed, a German counter-attack. Therefore, on 16 August, he ordered the XXI Corps to hold the Donon and the Breusch Valley at Wisches (not on map, 13km west of KW II) with 13 ID, but move 43 ID north towards St Quirin. The French XIV Corps was to extend its left flank north and limit its activities to the defence of the Vosges passes. These northward movements occupied the two corps for the following days. The only forward movement was made by XIV Corps, which occupied Markirch on 16 August and Weiler the next day.
Thanks to French inactivity, the rearguard of the Diespach detachment was able to maintain itself in the Breusch Valley immediately south of KW II on 15 August. 3 Res. Bde dug in on the Breusch Position. 30 RD shifted its defensive position north, to a location just south of Barr, which allowed the French to occupy Weiler.
On 15 August 2 Landwehr Brigade, which had neither MGs nor artillery, blocked the Leber Valley, 2km east of Markirch. At 1600hrs II/ b. Landwehr IR 12, while defending a hilltop devoid of cover, was attacked by a battalion of French Alpine troops supported by MGs and artillery. Nevertheless, the Landwehr men delivered well-aimed fire, which kept the French Alpine infantry at the respectful distance of 1,200m until dark, when the firing ceased. The brigade commander decided to withdraw from the valley. During the day it had begun to rain, and the night withdrawal was conducted in a downpour, with mist and fog filling the valleys illuminated by lightning. By morning on 16 August the brigade had taken up position at the mouth of the valley, 6km west of Schlettstadt, to cover the last rail movement out of Schlettstadt, and remained there on 17 August. The French approached to within 5km, but did not attack. At Colmar, between 15 and 17 August, 1 Landwehr Bde marched and counter-marched, but did not make contact.
By noon on 17 August the redeployment of Seventh Army had practically been completed, undisturbed by the enemy. XIV AK was at Pfalzburg. The mass of XV AK did finally rail-march from Colmar and Schlettstadt to Wasselnheim, while XIV RK had arrived at the area between the Breusch, Barr and Erstein.
In Lorraine, the French began their attack on 14 August. On the left flank of the French First Army, XIII Corps advanced on Cirey and VIII Corps on Blâmont. This was the French main point of effort, aiming for a breakthrough at Saarburg. The Second Army was in an echelon left formation: XVI Corps advanced from Lunéville towards Elfringen, XV Corps on Duß, and XX Corps from Nancy on Château Salins. IX Corps and 70 RD held the high ground east and south of Pont-à-Mousson and protected the left flank. 59 RD and 68 RD were south of Nancy.
The two French armies formed a wedge aimed at Saarburg and the left flank of the German Sixth Army, particularly I b. AK, which was far forward. It had been ordered on 13 August to withdraw if seriously attacked, in preparation for which it had moved its supply units to the north side of the Vezouse and deployed in depth. At 0800hrs on 14 August French infantry was sighted, and at 0900hrs I b. AK was attacked unsuccessfully by the lead elements of the French VIII and XIII Corps, supported by artillery. At 0930hrs I b. AK ordered a withdrawal across the Vezouse to Cirey−Elfringen, which, thanks to the prior preparation, was conducted smoothly, and by 1600hrs was in its new position, with 1 ID on the left and 2 ID on the right. The French followed cautiously and did not make contact with infantry; their artillery often bombarded empty positions, and in the resulting artillery duel the German 15cm howitzers gave first proof of their effectiveness, quickly silencing the opposing guns.
Superior French forces, XV and XX Corps, also attacked the German XXI AK on 14 August. The only significant combat occurred when the French 29 ID (XV Corps) was caught in march column and handled so severely that it did not advance the next day. In the II b. AK and III b. AK sectors the day passed in complete quiet.
When OHL informed Sixth Army HQ that the French main attack was going to be made in Lorraine, Sixth Army decided to withdraw over the Saar. During the course of 14 August, Sixth Army made its concept known in general terms to the subordinate commands, as well as the intended routes of withdrawal, rearguard positions and defensive sectors on the Saar. The supply trains were to be moved across the Saar early. There were to be no rail demolitions in the area formed by Metz, Saarlouis and Saarburg. Firm orders were not issued. Planning for the attack on Fort Manonviller was suspended
Since the enemy had kept his distance from II b. and III b. AK, Sixth Army saw no need to order them to move on 15 August. XXI AK and I b. AK, which were already in contact with strong enemy forces, were to withdraw. I b. AK, which was to cover the disembarkation of XIV AK, was required to gain as much time as possible, and therefore had to conduct a delay on successive positions without becoming decisively engaged. 7 KD was attached and given the mission of guarding the corps’ left flank.
On the afternoon of 14 August, 2 Bde, on the left flank of I b. AK, had occupied a position at Cirey, reinforced by 1/FAR 1 and II/FAR 7, with 1 Bde on its right. I/IR 2, with II/FAR 2 immediately behind it, was near the churchyard on the north side of the Vezouse, while II/IR 16 and two platoons of the MGK and III/IR 2 with a MG platoon were dug in on the south side of Cirey; houses and trees restricted the fields of fire. In reserve were II/IR 2, 600m north of the cemetery, and I and III/IR 16, in a wood 1km north-east of Cirey. 2/IR 16 was later positioned in the cemetery while 10/IR 16, in the castle park, covered two batteries of I/FAR 1. II/IR 2 was corps reserve.
An artillery duel was already in progress when, at about 1700hrs, enemy skirmishers, supported by artillery, began a firefight with III/IR 2, and at 1900hrs launched a more serious attack on II/IR 16. Initially the French attack gained little ground, particularly due to the fire support of 2/FAR 1 and 3/FAR 1 in the castle park. By dark, however, the French had approached to within 500m. Since the French were also attacking the Bavarian left flank from Chatillon, at 1900hrs III/IR 2 extended the line left, while 3/IR 16 was inserted in the centre. After dark I and III/IR 16 were ordered to extend the left flank further. This did not proceed smoothly: there were considerable delays in transmitting orders and the direct route crossed a hillside totally devoid of cover and concealment, so the two battalions moved east to descend a path through a wood, which soon disappeared into dense bushes. The combat trains and MG vehicles stuck fast. There was heavy firing to the front and, as the battalions finally arrived, they too opened fire, causing the French to withdraw, leaving equipment and weapons on the field and in the villages of Chatillon and Petitmont (1km south). II/IR 16 withdrew to its original position by marching through Cirey and was apparently fired upon from the houses, which led to a confusing, noisy firefight.
The French also continued to advance after dark in the 2 ID sector. Due to its exposed position in the valley, Blâmont was evacuated. The French occupied the town and, at 0300hrs on 15 August, heavy firing broke out north of the town. It appeared that the French were attempting to break through between 4 and 3 Bde. On the left flank of 4 Bde the French hit II/IR 15, and 6/IR 15 in particular, which threw back the French attack. At daybreak three French officers and numerous men were found dead in front of the company position. IR 20, on the right flank of 3 Bde, was also threatened. II/IR 20, which was in reserve, moved forward in column, which drew heavy French fire, resulting in considerable confusion and mixing of the units (the chain of events here was never clarified). In any case, the advance guards of the French VIII and XIII Corps did not break through at Blâmont or Cirey.
However, the commander of I b. AK could expect renewed French attacks at both towns on 15 August, along with a manoeuvre to turn his right flank, and consonant with his mission he decided to avoid combat and conduct a withdrawal. Preparations were made during the night, and the supply trains sent to the rear. Only the most important points were to be held, and those with weak forces. Artillery rearguards would delay the French, particularly the long-range mortars of II and III/Pr. Foot Artillery R 18. 7 KD guarded the left flank. At 0500hrs the corps HQ ordered each division to form two marching columns, with movement to begin between 0600hrs and 0700hrs, and a rearguard position located halfway to Saarburg. Preparations were made to cross the Rhine−Marne Canal, and the dominating heights south of Saarburg were fortified by a battalion from each division and the Eng. R. The music of the regimental bands sweetened the bitter taste occasioned by the withdrawal, and the French did not disturb or follow the movement. There was a traffic jam where five roads connected at St Georges (10km north-east of Blâmont), but by noon the rearguard position had been occupied (primarily by artillery) while the troops were ready to march along the Rhine–Marne Canal. 7 KD patrols found no enemy forces on the roads to the Donon. Sixth Army HQ, which was in telephonic contact with I b. AK, directed that serious resistance be offered only behind the Saar. Although the French were still nowhere in evidence, the corps HQ ordered the withdrawal to continue over the Rhine−Marne Canal at 1430hrs, with rearguards to remain on the canal. The troops continued their movement until they bivouacked at Saarburg and to the west. The main bodies of the French VIII and XIII Corps reached Blâmont and Cirey.
On the I b. AK left, the b. KD and 8 KD fell back about 22km from the border at Elfringen. The French XVI Corps, tired out and restricted by the lack of progress of XV Corps on its left, only reached the border at Elfringen. The French XV Corps had evidently not overcome the damage suffered by 29 ID the previous day, for it hardly budged, nor did XX Corps on its left. The German XXI AK was therefore able to stand fast. The same was true in the II and III b. AK sectors, which also did not move. I b. RK took position behind I b. AK.
The Generalquartiermeister (executive officer) at OHL, General von Stein, advanced the idea, which reached Sixth Army on 15 August, that the French should be lured into a sack between Metz, the Nied and the Saar and destroyed there: the Sixth and Seventh Armies would then counter-attack from the east, and the Fifth Army would move through Metz to attack from the west. Even the participation of Fourth Army was considered. Moltke had favoured such an operation from the beginning, and in the last few days it had taken on firmer contours. Such an operation might even decide the campaign. But there was no guarantee when, or if, the French would enter the sack. The French advance had been conducted cautiously. On 15 August the French Second Army commander prescribed that his troops advance carefully, step by step, from one piece of terrain to the next, similar to siege warfare. If the post-war statements by French officers are correct, the French recognised before the war the dangers and difficulties awaiting them in Lorraine. The French would have to be very self-confident or very careless to fall into the German trap. In any case, this plan granted the French the initiative and they could advance where and when they wished, which was not consonant with Rupprecht’s mission to fix the greatest number of French forces in Lorraine. The mission also stated that, if the French were inactive in Lorraine, then by the time the German right wing began to advance, Rupprecht had to attack. For the immediate future, Rupprecht’s only justifiable course of action was to withdraw behind the Saar.
General von Stein also relieved Sixth Army from the requirement to maintain contact on the right with the Nied Position at Saarlouis. He recommended that the right wing should extend only to Saarbrücken. On 15 August OHL decided to fill the gap between the Nied Position and Sixth Army with Ersatz troops. OHL communicated directly with Seventh Army to emphasise the need to quickly assemble strong forces at Pfalzburg. That evening Rupprecht repeated to Seventh Army the requirement to evacuate the Upper Alsace, not engage in secondary operations, and to assemble the mass of its forces as soon as possible between Molsheim and Zabern.
To conduct the decisive battle in Lorraine, Moltke ordered the six and a half uncommitted Ersatz divisions there on 15 August. It had originally been intended to send these units to the right wing.40 4, 8 and 10 Ersatz Divisions (ED) were assigned to Sixth Army and would arrive at Saarlouis and Saarbrücken on 17 August to fill the gap between the Nied Position and the right flank of Sixth Army. The Guard ED, Bavarian ED and 19 ED were assigned to Seventh Army and would move to Strasbourg, while 55 Ersatz Bde assembled at Mühlheim.
At noon on 15 August, Sixth Army HQ thought that the enemy was advancing all along the front, maintaining contact on the left with his fortifications at Nancy while pushing forward his right, doubtless with the intention of breaking through at the Donon and outflanking both the Saar and Breusch Positions. Although at no point was the Sixth Army involved in close combat, Rupprecht decided to withdraw Sixth Army to the Saarbrücken−Saarburg Position on 16 August. The right flank of Seventh Army, XIV AK, would maintain contact with the left flank of Sixth Army. HKK 3 would withdraw to the area between the Nied Position and Saarbrücken to prevent penetration there by enemy cavalry, while 7 KD would continue to protect the left flank of I b. AK.
The Sixth Army order of 16 August covered the entire period required to withdraw to the Saar and establish a defensive position there. To maintain morale, the troops were to be informed of the purpose of the withdrawal. The units had to be prepared to go over to the attack if enemy actions required it. The degree of resistance during the delaying movement had to provide enough time to adequately fortify the Saar Position; advance parties would begin the defensive work. Phase lines for the rearguards were specified. For 16 August this was the French Nied–Finstingen. All units were to be on the Saar Position by 18 August. 5 RD would constitute the army reserve.
On 16 August I b. RK (minus 5 RD) began to fortify its sector north of Finstingen. The rearguard of I b. AK on the Rhine−Marne Canal was weak in infantry but contained most of the artillery. The mass of the infantry was south of Saarburg, prepared to withdraw or occupy a position on the canal. The first steps had been taken the previous evening to fortify the Saar. During the morning, strong enemy columns appeared and an artillery duel developed in which II/FAR 4 suffered from the fire of enemy heavy artillery, until the 21cm mortars of II/Pr. Foot Artillery R 18 arrived and silenced it. After dark 2 ID, the right-flank division, was withdrawn over the Saar to the north of Saarburg. In spite of all the preparation, there were considerable march delays in the pitch-black night and pouring rain, so that some troops did not reach their positions until morning. An infantry regimental combat team and 1 Bde were left west of the river as rearguards. 2 ID bivouacked around Saarburg. Work began on the I b. AK position north of Saarburg, principally clearing fields of fire. The Engineer Regiment supported the 2 ID, three companies of corps engineers supported the 1 ID. Three days of withdrawal had severely fatigued the troops, particularly the artillery, which had continually moved from one rearguard position to the next. Jammed roads, conflicting routes for marching columns and rain added to the difficulties. The staffs had many problems to solve and spent sleepless nights. 7 KD guarded the left flank, but was unable to penetrate the French counter-reconnaissance screen. The French XIV Corps had contact with the I b. AK left at a point 3km south-east of Saarburg. The French XIII and VIII Corps were 15km to the south, and had barely crossed the border.
The two cavalry divisions of HKK 3 were on the I b. AK right flank, about 11km north of the border and the Rhine−Marne Canal. The French XVI Corps had carefully pushed elements across the canal, but had gone no further. The German XXI AK had pulled back about 25km from the border, with its right flank at Bensdorf, and begun digging in, but had left a rearguard at Duß, only 14km from the border. The French XV and XX Corps also advanced carefully and penetrated only 3km across the border at Wich, and to the south. II b. AK began its withdrawal to the area south-east of Falkenberg, with rearguards about 6km south of the main body. III b. AK withdrew over the German Nied at and northwest of Falkenberg, with rearguards on the French Nied. The French IX Corps remained on French territory and did not cross the Selle.
The Bavarian air reconnaissance was suffering from a lack of aircraft. Aviation Sec. 1, from I b. AK, had already lost two aircraft by 15 August. The II b. AK aviation element, Aviation Sec. 2, had lost enough aircraft by 16 August that its effectiveness was severely restricted.
The French had advanced timidly and only a short distance. While the French First Army moved towards Saarburg, for the last two days Second Army had moved in echelon left on the First Army left flank. Second Army now began to swing north-east. The Second Army right flank had three corps on an 18km front, while on the left flank, which had hardly budged, it positioned two corps on a 21km front; one of these, XX Corps, was obviously deployed in depth.
Early on the morning of 16 August OHL informed Sixth Army by telephone that further intelligence reports had shaken its conviction that the French were going to make their main effort towards Saarbrücken. Enemy strength in Lorraine had been seriously overestimated. OHL now had doubts that the French would enter the trap between the Nied and Saar. At the very least the Sixth Army withdrawal had to slow down. The French were now thought to have ten to twelve corps in Lorraine, which was still too strong for Sixth and Seventh Armies to attack. However, Rupprecht and his chief of staff, Krafft, thought that nothing to this point prevented the French from deploying fewer forces in Lorraine; the character of the French advance did not allow the Germans to say whether the French were in earnest or just conducting a feint. There were reports of French forces withdrawing from the Moselle. In addition to covering the left wing, Rupprecht’s mission was to fix strong enemy forces in Lorraine, which now moved into the foreground, and could only be accomplished by attacking. The Germans were numerically inferior and Rupprecht recognised that the offensive involved risk: a defeat at the beginning of the war would be especially damaging. But a favourable opportunity presented itself to attack the French in front of their fortress line and fix them in place. The German superiority in tactics and morale, which had been demonstrated in the initial engagements, gave favourable prospects if the offensive were conducted against equal or even superior numbers. Therefore, on the morning of 16 August, Rupprecht decided to attack.
A decisive envelopment was not possible. The French had anchored their left flank on the field fortifications at Nancy, and the Vosges protected their right against a surprise attack in strength. Rupprecht was therefore forced to attack frontally; the force of the attack and surprise would replace envelopment. The French corps did not advance in a continuous front, but in numerous small columns deployed in depth; the Germans could hope to overrun the lead elements before support arrived. If the French continued to advance in the Vosges, a shallow envelopment might be feasible there.
It was advantageous to attack as soon as possible, while the French would be surprised and restricted by the ponds, watercourses and forests in the Duß−Saarburg area. The overall situation required the attack in Lorraine be conducted before that in Belgium, to prevent the French from reinforcing their left. Due to excellent prior planning, the Sixth Army was well positioned to go over to the offensive. On the morning of 16 August the corps had been instructed to suspend rearward movements and halt in place. The rearward movement had given the army enough distance from the enemy to allow it to mass at the decisive point. This also argued for immediate action, before the enemy closed in. Rupprecht initially intended to attack on 18 August. However, the cooperation of the Seventh Army was essential, and Seventh Army reported that it would be ready on 20 August at the earliest. There was no choice but to delay the attack.
The Sixth Army order for 17 August therefore said that the army would remain in its 16 August positions. I b. AK and XIV AK were to continue to dig in; XXI AK was to begin digging in. The remaining corps would hold themselves ready to march. The 16 August rearguard positions were to be held if attacked.
On the Saarburg−Pfalzburg road flowed a stream of civilians moving east who had been driven by fear of the impending great battle to load their moveable possessions on wagons and abandon their homes and farms.
(Map c) On 17 August the French once again approached the I b. AK sector slowly and cautiously with the lead elements, about 5km to the west and south of the Bavarian position. Indeed, the commander of the French First Army thought the troops required rest and made only a short day’s march, so that at the end of the day the divisional main bodies were only 2−3km across the border. General Dubail viewed the withdrawal of the I b. AK as a trap, and feared that it would turn around south of Saarburg and attack, in conjunction with two corps that he thought just arrived in the Bavarian rear. He held VIII and XIII Corps back and considered reinforcing them with elements of XXI Corps and, if necessary, XIV Corps. Joffre gave his assent, for he was also of the opinion that the withdrawal of Seventh Army from Mühlhausen was merely the prelude to an attack from Zabern. This removed the basis for any hope that the French could be drawn into the well-known trap between Metz, the Nied Position and the Saar.
I b. AK continued work on the Saar Position. Sixth Army HQ sent I b. AK barbed wire, pioneer tools and sandbags by rail from the depot at Germersheim. The Bavarian Siege Train was divided between I b. AK and 1 RD.
There was no change on the Sixth Army front. 7 KD reported that its horses were completely exhausted and, except for one brigade, remained in place. 1 RD dug in behind the Saar, while XXI AK, II and III b. AK prepared the rearguard positions for a determined defence and reconnoitred positions behind the Saar. During the withdrawal a gap had formed between II b. AK and XXI AK, which was filled by HKK 3.
In front of III b. AK the enemy only crossed the Selle with patrols. The advance guard of the French 17 ID had moved to the border due west of Château Salins. Otherwise the French IX Corps and 70 RD on the heights of Nancy had not budged. On the other hand, the French XX Corps had reached Château Salins, XV Corps Duß and XVI Corps had advanced to the Saar−Kohlenkanal (Saar−Coal Canal) just south of Mittersheim. The French Second Army swing to the north was even more pronounced than on the previous day. It was led by the XVI Corps, with the left flank of the First Army, XIII and VIII Corps, considerably to the rear south-west of Saarbrücken. The French were moving in wedge formation, aimed at the gap between XXI and XIV AK. In fact, the French commanders judged that they had already broken through the German line, and wanted to widen this supposed breach. On the basis of statements from the local inhabitants, they assumed that the German withdrawal was at least in part disorderly.
Rupprecht reported his decision to attack to OHL on the morning of 17 August. Late in the evening, Lieutenant Colonel von Dommes arrived from OHL and reiterated that the principal mission of the Sixth and Seventh Armies was to cover the left flank. OHL was concerned at the consequences of a defeat in Lorraine for the decisive right-wing attack. OHL thought that the French were numerically superior and displayed a tendency to dig in, so that even a successful attack would be costly and did not promise decisive results; if the French followed their doctrine, they would bring forwards units held in depth to counter-attack and a German defeat might still be a possibility. In addition, the enemy could not be enveloped and, if attacked too soon, would be in position to withdraw. OHL had not entirely given up the idea of trapping the French between the Nied and the Saar, even though the right-wing advance would begin the next day. In order to protect the right wing, OHL now desired the right wing of the Sixth Army to withdraw to the Nied Position, as originally intended, not to the Saar. Nevertheless, Dommes was only expressing OHL’s point of view; he did not bring binding orders.
Rupprecht and Krafft carefully considered OHL’s arguments, but their determination to attack remained unshaken. The troops of Sixth Army were burning to fight. Nevertheless. Rupprecht had unhesitatingly ordered them to withdraw in order to gain significant advantages. Now withdrawal was a sin against the morale of the troops, and he was absolutely convinced that the attack would be completely successful. He did not hide his opinion from Dommes, who was in agreement. OHL left the decision to attack up to Rupprecht.
Thanks to the training and morale of the troops, and thorough planning, the withdrawal had led to no discernible reduction in combat power. However, it did have some negative consequences. Some immobile vehicles and stockpiled ammunition had to be abandoned, while stragglers and immoveable wounded and sick, and the attending medical personnel, fell into enemy hands. This also provided the enemy with valuable intelligence information.
Frequent traffic jams had characterised the initial movements and the withdrawal. Traffic control had been a subject of careful peacetime training, but it was impossible to prepare for the masses of vehicles which only appeared after mobilisation, many of them difficult to move and turn. Traffic was often completely gridlocked. Officers carrying important orders had to leave their vehicles and mount horses. The solution was to require all stationary vehicles to leave the road. The initial marches, despite these difficulties, did acclimatise the troops to operations under wartime conditions.
By 17 August the Seventh Army had completed its redeployment. XV AK and XIV RK were on the right flank in the Rhine Valley west of Strasbourg, with 30 RD and 1 and 2 Landwehr Brigades between Barr and Colmar. Three brigade task forces, named after their commanders (Mathy, Dame and Bodungen) guarded the Upper Rhine; they consisted of between four and nine Landwehr battalions. The three Ersatz Divisions had also arrived by rail in the Rhine Valley.
Rupprecht had informed Seventh Army on the morning of 17 August of his decision to attack. Since the troops, above all XV AK, had been tired out by the battles and marches of the last ten days, and the Ersatz Divisions would not be ready for operations until 19 August, the Seventh Army commander proposed to delay the attack until then, while pushing all available forces into the Vosges. On 17 August Rupprecht agreed to this plan.
Seventh Army issued its operations order on the morning of 18 August. XIV AK, reinforced by Strasbourg’s heavy artillery, would initially defend in place east of Saarburg. XV AK was ordered to secure the Vosges passes north-west of Dagsburg and, on 19 August, attack to turn the enemy flank just north of St Quirin. XIV RK, reinforced by the 19 ED and 30 RD, was to attack up the Breusch Valley on 18 August and cross the Donon. The Guard ED was to assemble at Zabern and the Bavarian ED 12km south-west of Strasbourg, under Seventh Army control. The two Landwehr brigades and the three detachments on the Upper Rhine were placed under XIV RK control and would support by advancing towards the border.
At midnight on 17 August 30 RD was ordered to advance into the Vosges to Triembach, just east of Weiler, and on the next day advance east to the border. Including the attached 5 Ersatz Bde, 30 RD had nine battalions, six 7.7cm batteries and one battery of 10cm canons. 10 Res. Bde was to advance before dawn to Triembach and organise it for defence, followed by 5 Ersatz Bde. The division commander then decided to attack the French forces reported at Weiler before noon. This required that 30 RD conduct a difficult night march. 2 Landwehr Bde on the left was asked to support 30 RD by advancing.
By 0400hrs 10 Res. Bde had marched over muddy roads to Triembach, with RIR 11 on the right, north and east of Triembach, two battalions of RIR 14 on the left at St Petersholz and Thannweiler, and III/RIR 14 and Fortress MG Sec. 2 in reserve in Hohwart. 3/Foot Artillery R 14 (10cm cannons), 1 and 2 Ersatz/FAR 80, and 1 Ersatz/FAR 84 were in support, covered by the Bicycle Co./RIR 60 (all Prussian units). 5 Ersatz Bde arrived at 0900hrs. The rain stopped and the day became humid.
The 30 RD commander thought that the French were deployed in loose groups on the hill north of Weiler, in the town itself and on the west side of the Gießen Valley as far as Gereuth. He intended to turn the French left flank with 5 Ersatz Bde, and he counted on 2 Landwehr Brigade to attack the French right, while RIR 11 fixed the French frontally. He issued his order at 0940hrs.
Steep terrain, a traffic jam caused by supply units, the need to sweep the woods for enemy troops and, finally, 600m of roads blocked by fallen trees delayed 5 Ersatz Bde’s movement, so that the advance guard did not reach open terrain until 1330hrs. It was then discovered that the main body was far behind.
The firefight in the 10 Res. Bde sector had started at 0730hrs when French artillery shelled the outposts of RIR 11, and the German artillery replied. At 1100hrs the brigade commander ordered III/RIR 14 to attack towards Triembach, while I and II/RIR 14 attacked Neukirch, and 5 and 6/RIR 11 would support by fire from their trenches. The attack was only to begin when 5 Ersatz Bde was in position.
Between 1300hrs and 1400hrs the French guns, deployed in depth and directed by forward observers (and largely immune to counter-battery fire), began to win the artillery duel; particularly effective was the French fire from the south of Gereuth into the German flank. The crews of both batteries south of the Hohwart−Triembach road (1 Ersatz/FAR 84 and 1 Ersatz/FAR 80) were forced to take cover several times, while 2 Ersatz/FAR 80 had to move 1km and 3/Res. Foot Artillery R 14 (10cm cannons) lost three guns to direct hits and was reduced to one gun, which continued to fire. The limbers and the town of Hohwart, which was packed with supply vehicles, were also hit and some of the horse teams panicked.
Under these circumstances, the commander of 10 Res. Bde saw that the only possibility was to attack, even without 5 Ersatz Bde, and he ordered the attack telephonically at 1400hrs. Reserve MG Sec. 3 was attached to III/RIR 14, Fortress MG Sec. 2 to I and II/RIR 14, and RIR 11 was to join the attack. 2 Landwehr Bde reported that it could not assist 30 RD. The 30 RD commander decided that he could delay no longer; he had to attack before the French did. The attack he conducted was contrary to all the rules of German doctrine: due to the late hour, there would be no envelopment of either French flank; it would be conducted on a 6km front with no coordination; and, far from enjoying artillery support, the attack was made in order to save the artillery from destruction.
III/RIR 14 attacked by bounds immediately after receiving the order at 1400hrs, with 11/RIR 14 on the right, 12/RIR 14 in the middle, 9/RIR 14 left and 10/RIR 14 following. Although it was advancing in a valley under fire, it took Weiler by 1800hrs, with fire support from a platoon of Res. MG Sec. 3 south-east of Triembach and two in the vineyards to the north. 9/RIR 14 took fire from the high ground west of Neukirch and swung in that direction, joined by 5 and 6/RIR 11, took this ground and engaged in a firefight with French troops to the north of Breitenau.
RIR 11 attacked immediately, with 1 and 2/RIR 11 on line, 3/RIR 11 following and 4/RIR 11 echeloned left, 7/RIR 11 and 8/RIR 11 in the second wave. RIR 11 soon took artillery fire, as well as rifle and MG fire from the high ground east and north of Weiler. 3 and 7/RIR 11 were committed to the firing line, while 4/RIR 11 extended the line on the left. At 1515hrs the high ground was assaulted, and RIR 11 pushed into Weiler, where it became intermixed with RIR 14.
5 Ersatz Bde advanced at 1500hrs with Ersatz Battalions V and VI, supported by Ersatz MGK 5. 2 Ersatz/FAR 2 got stuck in the woods and had to hack a path to the treeline, where it set up. With this fire support, the infantry climbed the hill south of Erlenbach at 1700hrs and took up the firefight with well-hidden infantry and MGs on the opposite treeline. French artillery deployed here was driven off. The 30 RD commander had decided that the main effort was to be on the left flank, so there was no assault.
1 and 4/RIR 14, supported by 9/RIR 14 and 5 and 6/RIR 11, assaulted Neukirch and then Hill 370 to the west of the town, taking six abandoned French guns, an observation wagon, thirty-six horses and seventy POWs.
By 1700hrs II/RIR 14 had reached the cover of the slope 500m south-west of Thannweiler, with 5/RIR 14 on the right, 7/RIR 14 in the middle, 8/RIR 14 on the left and 6/RIR 14 behind the left wing. It was not strong enough to attack the French forces by Gereuth, which consisted of Alpine troops and riflemen from two infantry regiments. At 1810hrs Fortress MG Sec. 2, which had been moving forward since 1400hrs, arrived at the firing line. Since 1300hrs 1 Ersatz/FAR 2 had been engaged in an artillery duel from east of St Petersholz against French guns south of Gereuth. In order to engage French infantry, it moved first to the Scheiben-Berg (Scheiben Hill) south of the town, then to an open position directly behind II/RIR 14.
In order to bring a decision, between 1600hrs and 1700hrs the commander of 30 RD committed Ersatz Bn VIII on Diefenbach, with 1 and 2/Ersatz Bn VIII on line, 4/Ersatz Bn VIII behind the centre and 3/Ersatz Bn VIII echeloned left. As it reached the same level as II/RIR 14, it extended that battalion’s right flank. The infantry attack provided relief for the German artillery, which, reinforced by the Ersatz batteries, resumed the artillery duel, reduced the French artillery fire and put fire on the French infantry.
2 Landwehr Bde was watching the exits from the Vosges at Rappoltsweiler and 4km west of Schlettstadt. On 17 August the French, estimated at division strength, had advanced to within 6km of the forward German units. However, on 18 August the French did not budge. The commander of 2 Landwehr therefore did not decide until 1600hrs to send II and III/Landwehr IR 3 and I/LIR 12 to take the enemy artillery at Gereuth, which was only 4km north-west of his forward elements, and he did not actually receive permission to do so until 1700hrs.
III/LIR 3 crossed the 3−4m wide and ½m deep Glessen stream and the wet valley at a run at 1800hrs, under late and weak artillery fire, and drove off a few French infantry from the woods south of Gereuth. 4/LIR 12, on outpost duty, attacked on the left flank. I/LIR 12 moved north on the Gereuth road at 1740hrs, 2/LIR 12 in the lead, followed by 10/LIR 12 and 3/LIR 12. Led by a local Gendarme, in order to avoid the open valley it turned left towards the sound of French artillery firing through the woods, where the thick undergrowth slowed movement. The packs were dropped, bayonets fixed and the Landwehr men moved in groups up the last 200m of the steep, heavily wooded hill. 2/LIR 12 on the left and 10/LIR 12 on the right charged straight into the French battery, which had set up on a forest road in the middle of the woods. Two guns were able to limber up and get away, but the crews of the other two were shot or bayoneted and the guns taken. It took considerable effort for the leaders to get the elated Landwehr men under control and lead them north through the woods, taking a few prisoners as they went. 3 and 4/LIR 12 came up and linked up with III/LIR 3 on the right. Both battalions made contact with French infantry, which had failed to protect their guns and were apparently trying to take them back. Some French appeared in the flank and rear. A wild firefight began at point-blank range, becoming hand-to-hand in places. As dusk fell, there were surely incidents of friendly fire. The battle swung back and forth and, in order to keep the French from retaking a gun, it was rolled downhill into the woods. Finally, the French were beaten and retreated. The two Landwehr battalions were completely intermixed and it took every means available – shouts, whistles and signals – to cease the firing and re-establish control. The enemy left a large number of dead, wounded and about 100 prisoners. It was now dark. As though it were a peacetime manoeuvre, the Landwehr men left the woods, taking the wounded with them, and formed up on the valley road. There they met II/LIR 3, which had moved straight north on the road and taken artillery fire; the battalion deployed and fired on the guns at 1.5km range and they quickly withdrew. Elements of 6 and 7/LIR 3 had joined in the I/LIR 12 fight.
The attack of the Landwehr battalions, which took the French by surprise, added impetus to the attack on Gereuth. In addition, 1 Ersatz/FAR 12 went into battery on the high ground south-west of St Petersholz and engaged French infantry and MGs in front of Gereuth. At about 2000hrs II/RIR 14 and Ersatz Bn VIII and VI, supported by Fortress MG Sec. 2, drove the French back into the woods.
The troops were now out of control, and although the division ordered them to defend in place, they streamed back into the towns looking for food and shelter. The enemy did not use this opportunity, but contact with him was lost, as well as some of the captured enemy equipment. After dark in St Moritz, troops on the streets received fire from, as it was later determined, French stragglers in the houses, doubtless aided by the inhabitants. The troops evacuated the town, which was then burned to the ground.
The combat trains moved nearer or further from the battlefield, according to the rumours that circulated, some of which reached Strasbourg, saying that the entire 30 RD staff had been captured. In fact, the enemy had lost 400 prisoners and eleven guns. Often they had been unable to stand against the fire, bayonets or shouts of ‘Hurrah’ of the Bavarian troops. From an order found on the body of a French officer, it was learned that the entire French XIV Corps was advancing, with 27 ID on Markirch and 28 ID on Weiler. The French corps was swinging left and soldiers from both divisions were captured. The French had apparently been deployed in assembly areas on a broad front and in groups between Weiler and Gereuth, and were surprised by the 10 Res. Bde attack, for nowhere had they prepared defensive positions, although they had time to do so.
The Germans had also apparently defeated superior enemy forces. Second-rate German units, which had been formed during mobilisation and had limited unit cohesion, had defeated elements of the active army French XIV Corps and Alpine battalions. 30 RD had actually been formed on the battlefield and had only received operational control of 10 Res. Bde the previous evening. The division commander did not know the names of the 5 Ersatz Bde leaders, or even the unit designations. This significantly increased the difficulties of command and control. 10 Res. Bde had been moved hither and thither for the last ten days, 5 Ersatz Bde had just completed a two-day rail-march, and before the fight both units conducted a night march in the hills and humidity. Nevertheless, the troops found the strength to conduct an attack that the enemy could not withstand. Outstanding training and morale overcame physical exhaustion. According to the testimony of the 30 RD commander, who was from Württemberg, in spite of the difficult terrain, the Bavarian attack was conducted ‘just like in training’, in successive loose skirmisher lines that coalesced to form a firing line behind cover, which minimised casualties.
1 Landwehr Bde was to relieve the covering force, 82 Bde (XV AK). The front was so wide that the Bavarians were reinforced by the Württemberg (Wü) Landwehr IR 121 (still in blue peacetime uniforms), II/Wü Landwehr IR 123, a MGK and three 9cm cannon batteries. The artillery was of questionable value, as it consisted of the completely obsolete Model 1873 gun, which lacked a recoil brake and armoured shield. It could only be fired from open positions and few of the gunners had actually trained on the gun. Each battery had four guns and four rickety open wagons, which had no brakes, to carry 140 shells per gun, plus fourteen wagons per battery as a light munitions column. In Colmar it was possible to requisition six horses per gun, but the wagons were pulled by two old, tired, often broken-down farm horses with plough harness and led by farmers, sometimes boys. The gunners and citizens of Colmar regarded the batteries as a bad joke.
Sending the Landwehr to combat in the Vosges was practically an act of desperation. Their Landsturm artillery batteries and engineer companies had not arrived. They had no MGs, field kitchens, field telephones, pack animals or supply units of any kind. They had not been trained for mountain warfare. These units, organised on mobilisation out of older married men, were to fight against French Alpine troops: crafty, resourceful, superbly trained and equipped for mountain warfare.
1 Landwehr Bde was not ready to move out until 19 August. The French were at Diedolshausen and Münster. The brigade was to enter the mountains in three groups. In the north, Landwehr IR 1, with two MGs, was to occupy Urbach and Urbeis (6km east and south-east, respectively, of Diedolshausen) The centre column, I/LIR 2, 5 and 6/LIR 2, two MGs and 9 Battery (Bty) 8 was about 2km south of Urbeis. The southern group, III/LIR 2, LIR 121 (minus II) II/LIR 123, three MGs, 9cm Batteries 9 and 10 and 6/Pr. Foot Artillery R 18 (sFH), had already moved to halfway between Colmar and Münster on 18 August. 1/Landwehr Squadron (Sqn)/I b. AK and II/LIR 121 were brigade reserve. The covering force, 82 Bde, returned to XV AK.
On 18 August the detachments of the Generals Mathy, Dame and von Bodungen crossed the Rhine at Neuenburg, Istein and Hüningen and advanced to the area of Mühlhausen to attack the right flank of the armée d’Alsace, which was also advancing, leading to a series of meeting engagements. The French were massively superior (VII Corps, 44 ID, 66 RD – forty-eight French battalions versus seventeen German), so by evening the Germans were forced to withdraw back over the Rhine. The French reoccupied Mühlhausen, but did not continue the advance north towards Colmar.
The Bavarian ED consisted of three infantry brigades, each with a MGK of four MGs, and four artillery sections of three batteries each, one with light howitzers. Like the Landwehr, it was poorly suited for field operations. The division HQ was established only on 14 August and inadequately staffed. On 8 August the Bavarian War Ministry began organising a medical company, two field hospitals, three infantry ammunition columns, three artillery ammunition columns and three supply columns, plus three more light munitions columns on 13 August, but they did not arrive until 25 August–1 September; one supply column never arrived at all.41 Until then, as far as supply was concerned, the division was on its own. It used the time to 18 August to requisition vehicles from the towns in which it was billeted, which proved to be poorly suited to mountain operations, being too heavy and with a large turning radius. For a considerable period in the future, it would also lack a field telephone section, bridging, a field bakery, remount section and MP section. The absence of field telephones was felt keenly, for transmitting reports and orders by mounted and bicycle messenger in mountainous terrain was time consuming and difficult. The troop units lacked the regimental pioneer tool wagon, company field kitchens, range estimators and signal lamps, binoculars and individual entrenching tools. There were few artillery aiming circles which were necessary for firing from covered positions. The division did not get tactical maps until 26 August. During the night of 18/19 August OHL attached the Bavarian ED to XIV RK and ordered it to Schlettstadt, where it would assume operational control over 2 Landwehr Bde.
On 17 August Rupprecht and the commander of the Seventh Army, Heeringen, had agreed to attack on 19 August. On 18 August, however, the French had become more aggressive against Sixth Army than previously. The hope that they would concentrate there and leave a weak flank facing Seventh Army could not be disregarded. Heeringen therefore recommended delaying the Seventh Army attack, and Rupprecht agreed.
On the far left flank of the armée d’Alsace the French 81 Bde and Alpine Infantry Battalions 13 and 30 had advanced from Diedolshausen and Münster across the Vosges, where they encountered 1 Landwehr Bde, which was awaiting the arrival of reinforcements before resuming movement that afternoon. The leftmost Landwehr column had deployed III/LIR 121 on the west edge of Weier im Thal (Weier in the Valley), I/LIR 121 and 9cm Bty 10 on the spur north-west of Weier, 6/FAR 13 (sFH) on the east side of Weier, and III/LIR 2 and 9cm Bty 9 about 4km to the rear. II/LIR 123 was expected to arrive soon. At 1000hrs four French companies attacked north of Günsbach, but were halted 500m east of the town by German infantry and artillery fire. At about 1050hrs the Landwehr detachment commander received the order from the brigade commander to prevent the French, estimated at a division, from withdrawing to the north. The detachment commander therefore attacked with III/LIR 121 on the right and 5 and 7/LIR 123 on the left, which initially made good progress, pushing into and north of Günsbach. French resistance stiffened on the east edge of Münster (2km west of Günsbach), and a standing firefight developed, the Landwehr men receiving support from the heavy howitzers and 9cm cannon. Then French Alpine troops were reported advancing on Sulzbach from the south, and III/LIR 2, which had just arrived 500m east of Weier, moved to block the threat. At the same time, French infantry advanced through the woods north of Günsbach and threatened the right flank of III/LIR 121. Every available Landwehr man was thrown against them and they were pushed back, sometimes only after close combat with the bayonet. I/LIR 121, guarding the 9cm cannons north of Günsbach, was attacked by French Alpine troops, while the guns came under artillery fire. The farmers driving the ammunition wagons immediately fled. Two wagons were found in pieces down the hill behind the gun position. 6 and 8/LIR 123 went to the aid of I/LIR 121, helped drive back the French and move off the guns. In view of the danger to both flanks, at 1430hrs the detachment commander, with the approval of the brigade commander, decided to withdraw 6km to Türkhiem, which proceeded in perfect order, undisturbed by the enemy. At 1700hrs a detachment of French Alpine troops, accompanied by mountain artillery, appeared in Sulzbach – the Landwehr detachment had left just in time.
(Sketch 7) The middle Landwehr group was cooking lunch when it received a request for assistance from the column on the left. With empty stomachs, the detachment set out, with 3/LIR 2 as the advance guard and the main body made up of I/RIR 2, the MGs, 9cm Bty 8 and 5, and 6/LIR 2. The point had just reached the Weier Kreuz (Weier Cross) when it took fire from the woods on all sides, principally from snipers in the trees. 3/LIR 2 deployed immediately, followed by 1/LIR 2. On the right, 2/LIR 2 was sent into the woods, while 4/LIR 2 climbed the hill to the left to outflank the French. The companies had had no time to train, and these movements were conducted with a good deal of confusion. A disorganised, heavy and loud firefight ensued. At the same time, the fire from hidden French artillery (presumably only 2km to the west) blocked the saddle at Giragoutte. Nevertheless, this was the only position where the 9cm battery could go into action. Since he did not have a mounted messenger, the detachment commander had to personally order the battery to set up there. The battery had no aiming circle to lay the guns for indirect fire, so it was forced to fire from the open. It was possible, with the assistance of the infantry, to bring one gun into position, which was able to fire only three shells before being smothered by rifle, MG and artillery fire and rendered inoperative. Several shells landed near the rest of the guns in the rear and some of the horses bolted, along with the civilian drivers. Nevertheless, another gun was brought into action behind the hill, which fired a few shells and at least drew the enemy’s attention away from the infantry. The French were well concealed and practically invisible. I/LIR 2 had nearly expended its basic load of ammunition and had to be resupplied from II/LIR 2 ammunition vehicles. Individuals and groups of I/LIR 2 began moving to the rear, so the detachment commander withdrew I/LIR 2 through 5 and 6/LIR 2 and the MGs, which had deployed on the Klein-Hohenack Hill, to a new position at Rochette. The French did not pursue. The detachment commander decided that the French were trying to move through the woods to the south in order cut the road about 2km to his rear (which turned out to be true), so he withdrew to the edge of the Vosges about 4km north-west of Colmar.
Key
Mittags – Noon
30 RD was completely exhausted by the previous day’s fighting and the units were thoroughly intermixed. Command and control in a division that had been formed on the battlefield was rudimentary. The officers summoned on the evening of 18 August to receive the division order arrived the next morning, poorly or completely uninformed and concerned about the condition and location of their units. The division commander therefore delayed the continuation of the attack until 1530hrs. The French had obviously been badly handled on 18 August and left weak rearguards at St Martin, with stronger forces digging in 2.5km to the west of Weiler at Meisengott.
During the day 5 Ersatz Bde deployed Ersatz Bn V at Breitenbach, VII at St Martin, and at 1800hrs attacked towards Meisengott–Weiden-Berg, with VI and VIII following. Ersatz MGK 5 opened fire from St Martin at 1815hrs and drove the French from Meisengott. At the same time, 2 Ersatz/FAR 2, which had moved over small, rocky paths to the high ground between Erlenbach and Breitenbach, opened fire on trenches at Weiden-Berg. It also suppressed French artillery there, which had just opened fire on 5 Ersatz Bde infantry. By 2200hrs the brigade took Meisengott and Weiden-Berg without making contact. Most of the brigade bivouacked in Meisengott.
10 Res. Bde attacked at 1530hrs with RIR 11, moving west from Weiler towards the woods. II/RIR 11 pushed the French back and took Hill 613 south of Meisengott. I/LIR 11 moved in the heat up and down steep slopes covered in thick underbrush. The rations could not be brought forward and the battalion bivouacked in the open on a cold and damp night. The French held the spur of the hill immediately to the front.
A task force made up of I/RIR 14, 6/RIR 14, an understrength 8/RIR 14 and Res. MG Sec. 3 attacked at 1700hrs from Hill 370 west of Neukirch, supported by 1 Ersatz/FAR 2, 1 Ersatz/FAR 12 and 1 Ersatz/FAR 84 on Hill 370. By 1900hrs it had driven the French from Grube and Lach. The rest of RIR 14 was in reserve in Neukirch.
The Bavarian ED defended the area around Schlettstadt, while 19 ED marched to Barr after suffering from the heat. The Guard ED arrived in Pfalzburg.
XIV RK attacked along the Breusch Valley, driving the French before them and taking 1,000 POWs and eleven guns. 28 RD occupied Schirmeck and advanced towards the Donon. XV AK established itself on the west side of the Vosges.
The flank corps of the French First Army, XXI Corps and XIV Corps, were inactive on 19 August. XIV Corps was reinforced by 115 Bde (half of the 58 RD) and the Épinal reserve, 71 RD, at St Dié. XIV Corps was now ready to concentrate on the Breusch Valley, leaving the Vosges passes to the 71 RD and 115 Bde.
The rain of the past few days gave way to sun on 18 August. XIV AK and I b. AK (minus 1 Bde, corps reserve) continued to dig in. A regiment of French cavalry appeared that morning, in the 1 ID sector, on the corps left, followed by large bodies of cavalry south of Saarburg that moved so carelessly that they were initially taken to be the German 7 KD. They could not be reached by the field artillery, but were engaged by the 21cm mortars of II/Foot Artillery R 3, whose shells landed in the middle of their formation, scattering them. The mortars also silenced or drove off the French horse artillery. In the 2 ID sector, on the corps right, 3/FAR 4, which was deployed with the outpost line, pushing the guns right up to the German infantry positions, also successfully engaged French cavalry and artillery. Before noon numerous French all-arms columns marched towards the Saar and the German security screen was forced to withdraw. By evening I b. AK had gained the impression that the French were strong south of Saarburg, but weak to the west.
In fact, only the French VIII Corps on the First Army left had reached Saarburg, with XIII Corps on its right. On the other hand, the right wing of the French Second Army, XVI Corps, was pushing into the gap between I b. AK and XXI AK. The Second Army commander was convinced that the Germans were in full retreat and did not restrain his troops as he had previously done. Indeed, pursuit was now the watchword, which was, however, not transformed by the troops into action.
Sixth Army HQ ordered 7 KD from the left flank of I b. AK to fill the gap. Sixth Army HQ also ordered 1 RD to send a regimental task force to Mittersheim with the mission of holding the town to prevent a breakthrough between the two corps.
1 RD formed this task force from RIR 2, 1/Res. Cavalry R 1 and 1 and 2/RFAR 1 under the commander of 1 Res. Bde. Shortly after 1200hrs the task force reached the open ground east of the town, which was held by Dragoon R 7. It deployed and oriented south-west, with III/RIR 2 on the high ground north of the town, II/RIR 2 and the MGK on the high ground to the north-east, with the cavalry on its right, the artillery behind it and I/RIR 2 in reserve. Security detachments were sent to the north and west of the town, and on the rail bridge south of it. At 1500hrs combat noise was heard from the direction of XXI AK and the Bavarians began to dig in. The noise increased, and at 1600hrs the brigade commander sent an officer to 42 ID on the XXI AK left to ask if they needed help. This officer did not return until 1825hrs to report that the French had taken Lautersingen (4km south-west), were attacking the 42 ID left flank, and 42 ID wanted RIR 2 to drive the French out of Lautersingen. The regiment was preparing to do so when it was reported that several French battalions were advancing from Lautersingen to Mittersheim. The Saar–Kohlencanal was a significant obstacle, and the rail bridge directly west of Mittersheim was being held by only a half-platoon of infantry. Given the changed situation, the commander of RIR 2 immediately sent forward 12/RIR 2 and MGK/RIR 2 to hold the west side of the bridge. While they were deploying there, they took fire from the woods 700m to the front. 12/RIR 2 and MGK/RIR 2 took up the fight, with express orders not to attack in isolation. I/RIR 2 was already moving forward, deployed down Hill 248 to Mittersheim. The streets of Mittersheim were blocked with supply vehicles, so the battalion commander led most of 2 and 3/RIR 2 around the south side of the town and over the footbridge next to the rail line to the west side of the canal, picking up 5/RIR 2 on the way, and they deployed to the left of 12/RIR 2 and attacked, with 4/RIR 2 covering the left flank. In the middle of the firefight the day’s burning heat was replaced by pouring rain, thunder and lightning. 1/RIR 2, with elements of 2 and 3/RIR 2, arrived and was committed on the right of 12/RIR 2, north of the road, to turn the French left. I/RIR 2 attacked by bounds, led by the battalion commander, and quickly closed on the right flank to within 200m, although casualties mounted. The French tried to extend their left flank, but in doing so left the cover of the woods and took heavy losses, in particular from MG fire. II/RIR 2 began to arrive, and 8/RIR 2 crossed the bridge and reinforced the firing line. With difficulty the brigade commander kept 6 and 7/RIR 2 in reserve on the east side of the canal.
The Bavarian artillery could not support from the position on Hill 248 and Mittersheim lay under French artillery fire, so the artillery went back north to the bridge to cross the canal and then turned south-west, sometimes at a gallop, along the north bank to set up in open positions on the high ground north of the town and engage the French at close range at 1900hrs. As RIR 2 closed on the French position the unit, and 12/RIR 2 in particular, was in danger of friendly fire from the German artillery. This was averted by the actions of determined infantrymen, who informed the artillery, which lifted its fires into the wood, then ceased fire altogether, at which point the infantry assaulted the French position. The French ran, leaving dead and wounded behind. The pursuit began immediately and some detachments may have advanced as far as Lautersingen, but the darkness forced the Germans to stop 500m west of the Mittersheim rail station (HP Mittersheim).
From the beginning of the fight a platoon of 4/RIR 2, at the rail bridge 1.5km south of Mittersheim, held off superior forces before being forced to withdraw across the pond (Weiher). III/RIR 2 was supported by fire and advanced with the rest of the regiment. XXI AK had retaken Lautersingen. Late in the afternoon, 7 KD horse artillery, MGK and the bicycle company of Jäger Bn 1 were able to engage thick enemy columns with concentrated fire as they emerged from the woods south of Lautersingen. RIR 2 returned to Mittersheim.
RIR 2 had lost 50 KIA and 123 WIA, including 6 officers. About 70 French KIA (including a lieutenant colonel and three other officers) were found outside the woods, which could only be swept the next afternoon, the wounded evacuated and the dead buried. Captured documents showed that the enemy had been two battalions of the French 31 ID, which had the mission of taking Mittersheim. The French appeared at the treeline, already deployed, 700m to the German front, while RIR 2 had to cross the bridge and deploy. That RIR 2 was able to do so was a real accomplishment, in particular because the unit had just been formed a few days previously and, in addition to reservists, contained a significant proportion of Landwehr men. RIR 2 was aided by the MGK, which was in position at the start of the fight and suppressed the French fire. The assault was conducted an hour and a half after the beginning of the firefight. The men of 12/RIR 2, which had lost almost all its officers, were permitted to nominate the awardees of the first Iron Crosses.
II b. AK continued to dig in. Strong French marching columns were seen advancing, but they stayed out of range. The Bavarian KD covered the corps left flank, 8 KD the right, whose commander decided to conduct a reconnaissance in force. III b. AK continued to dig in south of the Saar; only weak French detachments appeared in the sector. 8 ED had arrived north of St Avold, 10 ED at Saarlouis and 4 ED 15km south-west of Saarlouis.
Krafft, the Sixth Army chief of staff, called OHL at midday to make Sixth Army’s determination to attack clear. He spoke with Moltke’s number two, Stein, who repeated the reservations that Dommes had presented the previous day, but also made clear that Rupprecht had freedom of action and OHL would not interfere.
In the French Second Army, only XVI Corps had collided with the Germans, at Mittersheim−Lautersingen. XV and XX Corps hardly advanced. The army commander recognised that the Germans to his front had stopped, but still believed that the Germans were conducting a delay. The line of advance for 19 August was set just short of the Metz−Saarburg rail line. On the left flank of Second Army, 17 ID of IX Corps was ordered to pull out of line to be sent to Fourth Army on 19 August. It would be replaced by 68 RD. 64 RD and 74 RD would replace 18 ID, but they were still at Lunéville.
The French First Army commander still felt that his right flank was threatened. On 19 August only half of VIII Corps (16 ID) on his left flank, supported by Conneau’s Cavalry Corps, would attack north of Saarburg. The other half of VIII Corps (15 ID), plus XIII and XXI Corps, would remain on the defensive.
The French may have supposed that they were only going to encounter rearguards on 19 August. Instead, they met an opponent who was determined to hold his positions. Nevertheless, the French maintained their slow and careful advance, so that there was only limited and local combat. The skies on 19 August were cloudless and sunny.
In the I b. AK sector French skirmisher lines appeared south of Saarburg, in front of 1 ID, at 0900hrs and again at 1600hrs, but did not attempt to cross the Saar and were engaged by FAR 1. French batteries that went into action were engaged by the 21cm mortars of II/Foot Artillery 3 and the heavy howitzers of 5 and 8/Foot Artillery R 1 and were silenced or forced to withdraw. In the 2 ID sector to the north, French infantry drove the Bavarian outposts back across the Saar, but were stopped by the fire of 2 FA Bde. French artillery that appeared was put out of action by the heavy artillery of both Bavarian divisions; the French crews abandoned their guns. The accuracy of the German artillery was due, above all, to the observation balloons of the Non-Rigid Airship Sec. With this help, II/Pr. Foot Artillery R 18 (21cm mortars) was able to beat down a French artillery section, forcing them to pull the guns back to a wood or abandon them outright. The artillery duel reached great intensity by noon. The French shelled the German trenches (or FAR 1) without being able to disrupt their work. The night was spent combat ready in the position. Reconnaissance by Aviation Sec. 1 revealed strong enemy forces directly in front of the corps. The weak attack, which 2 ID had easily beaten off, had been made by the French 16 ID. Conneau’s cavalry failed to come anywhere near its objective of Saar−Buckenheim.
In the German XIV AK sector, left of I b. AK, the day passed quietly as the French XIII Corps was largely inactive. So too was the French XVI Corps in the German XXI AK sector to the right of I b. AK. Sixth Army used the pause to completely fill the gap between I b. AK and XXI AK with I b. RK, reinforced with units from Germersheim: Landwehr IR 8 and 10 and Res. Foot Artillery R 1 (I with four batteries of heavy howitzers, II with four batteries of 10cm guns) and 1/Landwehr Eng. R. Both Landwehr IR were fortress units and unequipped for mobile warfare.
The inactivity of the French XVI Corps on 19 August may have been due to the fact that it was waiting for the assistance of the XV Corps, but the attack of that corps’ 29 ID was stopped by the effective fire of the German XXI AK artillery.
The other division of the French XV Corps, 30 ID, was directed at the Bavarian KD and Jäger Bn 1, which held the gap between XXI AK and II b. AK. XXI AK was concerned for the security of its right flank and, at 0700hrs, asked II b. AK for support. The commander of II b. AK sent a regimental task force composed of RIR 5 and III/IR 23, 3/Cheveauleger R, I/FAR 12 and a medical platoon, under the 5 Bde commander, in march to defend the Fuchs Holz (Fox Wood) north of Liedersingen (Lidrezing, 3km south-west of Bensdorf). The march in the heat, cross-country and up and down hill, tired the troops considerably. At 1100hrs the troops were in position and digging in, with I/RIR 5 on the right and III/RIR 5 and the MGK on the left along the road heading south-east from Liedersingen, a reserve consisting of III/IR 23 in the centre and II/RIR 5 distributed behind the front, along with the gun positions of I/FAR 12. Jäger Bn 1 was on the left. When the Bavarian KD commander learned that the task force had moved south, he sent 1 Cavalry Bde, reinforced with MG Sec. 1, the Bicycle Co./Jäger Bn 2 and Horse Artillery Bty/FAR 5 to guard the right. In spite of reports of strong approaching French forces, patrols from the forward battalions found nothing.
At 1430hrs the staff on Hill 337 drew fire, which did not cause casualties but bolted the horses. The task force commander immediately ordered an attack on the high ground to the front. I/FAR 12 opened fire on the treeline 700m in length and only 650m away. The two forward battalions opened the firefight from thick skirmisher lines with some intermixing of units. The horses of the Cheveauleger had also bolted, so the cavalrymen joined the firefight on foot. In long bounds they soon reached the farm road in the middle of the hill. The troops were so enthusiastic that they neglected to take cover and fired too fast, so that ammunition began to run short, and the ammunition wagon and 5/RIR 5 had considerable difficulty coming up the steep hill. The II/RIR 5 commander led the half of his battalion (6 and 7) forward on his own initiative, with battle standards waving (and with extra ammunition), to the right flank of I/RIR 5; at 1530hrs his personal example drove the attack forwards. The enemy also received reinforcements and, between 1530hrs and 1600hrs, they repeatedly advanced against the left flank of III/RIR 5, where the woods offered an avenue of approach, but the MGK stopped them. At 1630hrs hidden French artillery south-west of RIR 5 fired straight into the right flank, causing considerable loss. German counter-battery fire suppressed the French guns. As the fire died down at 1800hrs, the task force commander committed III/IR 23 to envelop the French right flank. In places the battalion met with resistance, which it broke with cold steel, while RIR 5 assaulted frontally. The French dead and wounded lay in heaps, the Bavarians took about 400 POWs and the French withdrew. The Bavarians had been opposed by the French 59 Bde, which had already suffered a reverse at Gerden.
Key
Fr. Geschützfeuer – French artillery fire
The exposed position of the task force did not permit pursuit. The troops were not even given the satisfaction of remaining on the terrain they had won, for at 2145hrs the Bavarian KD ordered the task force to withdraw to its assigned position: the Bavarian KD commander was not aware until 2000hrs, after the withdrawal order had already been sent out, of Sixth Army’s intention to attack the next day. The enemy used the opportunity to reoccupy the heights south-east of Liedersingen during the night.
RIR 5 lost 5 officers and 105 enlisted men KIA, 10 officers and 314 enlisted men WIA, 40 MIA and 8 POWs. The regimental commander and the commanders of I and III Battalions were wounded, the commander of I Battalion later dying of his wounds.
The Battle of Liedersingen was unnecessary and warned the enemy of the blow that was to be struck the next day. The casualties were unfortunate, but the French had suffered significantly greater casualties and, once again, had been made painfully aware of their tactical inferiority, even when faced by reservists and Landwehr men, this time factory workers from the Palatinate: Ludwigshafen, Kaiserslautern and Pirmasens. The military tasks placed upon the reservists and Landwehr men had not been great, but being unaccustomed, had worn the troops down considerably. Numerous footsore men had been sent to the supply units for transport. However, as it became known that there would be a fight on 19 August, not a man fell out, in spite of the heat.
During the fight at Liedersingen the French also advanced against the reinforced 1 Cavalry Bde on the right. The bicyclists of Jäger Bn 2, a platoon of MG Sec. 1 and the division horse artillery section were able to engage marching columns and thick skirmisher lines and clearly inflict heavy losses. But the enemy committed even stronger forces and his artillery fire became troublesome, so that in the evening the 1 Cavalry Bde was withdrawn 3−4km.
In the II b. AK sector there were no enemy forces in front of 4 ID on the corps left, but the entire French XX Corps deployed in front of 3 ID on the right. The only attack occurred at 1400hrs, in a 700m section of line located behind the little Rotte River and held by I and II/IR 2, reinforced by the MGK and supported by II/FAR 12. German fire soon forced the French to break off the attack. A few French squads and platoons that continued to press forward suffered heavy losses or were destroyed. In the rest of the division sector there was only artillery fire.
8 KD reported that its horses were exhausted and practically immobile, and occupied an assembly area far to the rear, at Lixingen, 8km south of St Avold. III b. AK continued work on its positions, and the enemy, presumably the advance guard of the French 68 RD, appeared only that evening. The Ersatz Divisions were united into the Ersatz Corps.
Notes
30 108 battalions, 28 squadrons, 81 batteries (9 heavy) with 468 guns (36 heavy), 11 engineer companies.
31 Both of these units were stationed in peacetime in south-west Germany.
32 2 Landwehr Bde at Rheinau, 1 Landwehr Bde at Markolsheim (as of 12 August), Landwehr IR (Wü) 110 at Neuenburg and Istein, 55 (Pr.) Landwehr Bde at Hüningen, 60 (Pr.) Landwehr Bde rear-area security.
33 This battle is described in more detail in the German official history: Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg I, pp. 159−68.
34 Gerden (Lagarde) is on the Rhine–Marne Canal about 17km south-east of Château Salins, south of the D 953.
35 This is the first specific mention made of Bavarian air reconnaissance.
36 The memorandum was actually written by Krafft von Dellmensingen, the Sixth Army chief of staff, and can be found at the Bavarian Army Archive Nachlass Dellmensingen 145. A translation is available in Zuber, German War Planning, 1891−1914. Sources and Interpretations (Boydell and Brewer, 2004), pp. 231−9.
37 In Alsace-Lorraine on 13 August, twenty-six French active and reserve divisions against eighteen German.
38 It was actually in the middle of Fifth Army, north of Metz.
39 Sketch 4 was not used in the original.
40 This is incorrect – it had originally been intended to send them to East Prussia.
41 A ‘division slice’ of the support units in a reserve corps was a medical company, three field hospitals, two infantry and two and a half artillery munitions columns, three and a half supply columns, a field bakery, a bridge unit and two engineer companies.