Initially, the enemy had stayed on the defensive, but he soon began to turn both open flanks. A platoon of 2/Ersatz Bn IX soon ended the threat to the right flank, while Ersatz Bn IX sent the rest of 2 and 1/Ersatz Bn IX to the left flank of Ersatz Bn X. An advance by 9 Ersatz Bde north on St Dié no longer seemed advisable and it remained behind 1 Ersatz Bde. 9 Ersatz Bde, joined by LIR 71, engaged in close-quarter combat with the French in the dark. There was considerable confusion and incidents of friendly fire. Ersatz Bn XI was committed south of the road, while Ersatz Bn XII on the right of it reinforced the firing line. In spite of local reverses, there was no cause for serious concern, and the enemy withdrew at 2100hrs. It seemed too risky to the 9 Ersatz Bde commander to leave the disorganised troops in the woods, so between 2200hrs and 2300hrs he withdrew them to Saulcy. The night march was characterised by stops, missed turns and intersecting marching columns, so that the troops arrived late, tired, wet and cold. Ersatz Bn IX and 1 Ersatz/Eng. Bn 3 provided security west of the Meuse, and stragglers and lost units from LIR 71 also spent the night west of the Meuse.
In the night the Bavarian ED lost its only ammunition supply column (Artillery Munitions Columns 1 and 3, Infantry Munitions Column 1 and Field Hospital 1). At 1900hrs it had halted at the west end of Mandray. The vehicles of the division staff and of 1 Ersatz Bde joined them. French Alpine troops were seen west of Mandray and the column commander had just turned the vehicles around when they took fire from the slopes south of Mandray; horses were killed or bolted, vehicles crashed together. Some of the drivers fled, others returned fire. Darkness fell and the French Alpine troops used it to move between the vehicles. The remaining drivers, who had fired off their small supply of ammunition, fled or were captured. The German stragglers assembled in a house near the church of Basse Mandray, while the French collected 300 POWs in the school and other buildings of Haute Mandray. The senior doctor began recovering and treating the wounded, but was soon locked up with the other prisoners.
30 RD and the Bavarian ED had cut off the withdrawal of the brigade of the French 58 RD, which the French XIV Corps then ordered to turn around. The French 8 Dragoon Bde had found the open left flank of the Bavarian ED and its attached Light Infantry Battalion 13 had carried out the raid at Mandray.
XIV RK had drawn a difficult mission: break through the Vosges. These second-line units had insufficient cohesion and were inadequately trained and equipped. Their performance of duty must be measured with this consideration in mind. The capture of the Col de St Marie by the Bavarian ED, although the left flank was completely unprotected, was a signal accomplishment.
The Governor of Strasbourg had to defend against a possible advance by the French armée d’Alsace north down the Rhine Valley. To prevent this, from 23 to 26 August a detachment held a position north-west, west and south of Bergheim, 6km south of Schlettstadt. On 24 August a French column was reported moving on Markirch against the rear of the Bavarian ED; to block this, II/RIR 60 was sent through Ruppoltsweiler into the mountains, encountering French Alpine troops on 25 August and throwing them back.
The XIV AK Rear HQ was in charge of the security of the Upper Rhine between Marckolsheim and Hüningen. 1 Landwehr Bde, with III/LIR 121, II/LIR 123 and 10cm Bty 10, was dug in on the east side of the Ill River, east of Colmar. 2 Landwehr Bde, with III/LIR 3 attached, was 10km north of Colmar at Illhausen. On the night of 23/24 August, XIV AK Rear HQ received reports that the enemy at Mühlhausen was being reinforced and was advancing 10km north of Mühlhausen and on Neu-Breisach, and ordered a withdrawal to the east side of the Rhine. 1 Landwehr Bde moved to the north of Neu-Breisach, joined by 1 Landwehr Bn/I b. AK and 1 Landwehr Eng. Co./I b. AK. III/Landwehr IR 121 and II/Landwehr IR 123 returned to Fort Neu-Breisach. 2 Landwehr Bde stayed on the west bank of the Rhine, 19km north of Neu-Breisach. 5 and 6/Foot Artillery R 13 (sFH) and 9cm Bty 10 returned to Neu-Breisach. On 25 August 1 Landsturm Bde moved back to the east of Colmar. The French were on the foothills of the Vosges opposite Colmar. 2 Landwehr Bde used 25 August to conduct field training. From 22 to 25 August the situation at the Upper Rhine garrisons of Neuenburg, Istein and Hüningen was unchanged. On 26 August 55 Ersatz Bde was transferred to Lorraine.
In the armée d’Alsace 8 Cavalry Div. was at Remiremont, 41 ID in the Munster Valley, 63 RD north-west of Belfort, 57 RD (Belfort reserve), 66 RD and 14 Dragoon Bde (8 Cavalry Div.) at Belfort, 116 Res. Bde (58 RD) at Thann.
End of August to Beginning of September (situation map g)
On 26 August it was clear that the pursuit in Lorraine had failed; it was, however, unclear if the force of the French counter-offensive had been broken. The situation was serious and tense. It might have been prudent to reinforce the threatened right flank of the Sixth Army between Metz and Lunéville with troops drawn from the middle and left, but the morale of the troops forbade any movement that appeared like a withdrawal unless absolutely necessary. Then there was the order of the previous day to break through between Toul and Épinal, plus an order received that afternoon to bombard the fortified positions at Nancy, although these operations could not be conducted immediately. It therefore seemed best to defend in place, even though the units had come dangerously close to the French fortress line, with its heavy artillery, which Sixth and Seventh Armies had no means to counter. The first priority was to restore the troop units’ combat effectiveness. Rupprecht reported this decision to OHL, with the recommendation to break off the pursuit. Late that evening this was approved, and the appropriate orders issued.
The German troops were in terrain that the French artillery doubtlessly knew intimately and had carefully surveyed, and was also directed by aircraft, a procedure unknown to the Germans due to the lack of aircraft, experience and practice.
Crown Prince Rupprecht directed the troops to adopt the procedures of German fortress warfare doctrine: dig concealed, dispersed positions; institute personnel rotation in three shifts – outpost, reaction force and reserve. Trench warfare began in Lorraine at the end of August.
First priority was to support II b. AK. The neighbouring corps, I b. RK and XXI AK, were ordered to assist, and 8 KD and 7 KD to act as backup. 28 ID was moved from Seventh Army to Sixth Army. On 27 August, only the left wing of the French First Army continued the attack, and even this attack had little force, particularly since rain and overcast skies diminished the effectiveness of the French artillery. Concern for II b. AK was reduced, and the reinforcement of the Sixth Army right was no longer necessary. The three cavalry divisions were united under HKK 3 at Delm. The Guard ED, reinforced by the arriving 55 Ersatz Bde and troops from Strasbourg, were to hold the high ground north-west of Château Salins. The three mortar battalions freed up by the fall of Manonviller were divided among II b. AK, XXI AK and I b. AK, with strict instructions to save their ammunition for engaging clearly identified enemy artillery. The situation on 27 August was far less tense. The positive situation on the German right wing would lead to further easing.
OHL maintained the pursuit with the German right wing, believing that the French would fight for time but not surrender Paris; it was unnecessary to transfer forces from the Sixth and Seventh Armies to the right flank. These two armies were to engage the enemy, whether he should attack again or withdraw; both were possible. OHL was inclined to think that the enemy in front of Sixth and Seventh Armies would withdraw and open the route for them to pursue on both sides of Charmes. This was the precondition for the 25 August order to Rupprecht to conduct the breakthrough here, even though it was not expressly stated in the order. This mission was repeated in writing on 27 August, in the order ‘General Instructions to First through Seventh Armies for the Continuation of the Operation’, which arrived on 28 August:
The Sixth and Seventh Armies and HKK 3 are to prevent the enemy from penetrating into Lorraine or Alsace. Sixth Army has operational control over Metz. If the enemy withdraws, Sixth Army and HKK 3 will cross the Moselle between Toul and Épinal in the general direction of Neufchâteau. In this case Sixth Army is responsible for the protection of the army left flank. Nancy–Toul is to be encircled, with adequate security against Épinal. Sixth Army will be reinforced by XIV AK, XV AK and an Ersatz division from Seventh Army; 10 and 8 ED are to be transferred to Fifth Army. The Seventh Army will then be independent.
Seventh Army initially remains under the operational control of Sixth Army. It continues to have operational control over Fortress Strasbourg and the upper Rhine fortifications. In the case above, Seventh Army prevents an enemy penetration between Épinal and the Swiss border. It is recommended that field fortifications be constructed opposite Épinal, and from there to the border, as well as in the Rhine valley in conjunction with Neu Breisach, and that the main body be deployed behind the right wing. XIV AK, XV AK and an Ersatz division will be detached to Sixth Army.
The commanders of both the Sixth and Seventh Armies had severe reservations concerning the breakthrough between Toul and Épinal, recognising the difficulty of this operation, which would be siege warfare, and that they did not have the necessary heavy artillery. The exhausted troops needed several days’ rest, and the supply situation had to be improved. Both Rupprecht and his chief of staff thought that the gap at Charmes would be opened by the advance of the right wing. In contrast, OHL became increasingly impatient, contrasting the fluid advance of the right wing with the deadlock on the left.
The difference in outlook first became clear in a telephone conversation between Krafft and Tappen at noon on 29 August, with Krafft maintaining that the enemy had not weakened his forces in front of the Sixth and Seventh Armies, and that the situation was not ripe for a penetration between Toul and Épinal. OHL did not issue a formal order to attack. Instead, an LNO from OHL (Major Bauer) reported at Sixth Army HQ on 30 August that OHL expected serious resistance in front of the right wing between Paris and the French border fortifications, and it wanted the Sixth Army to launch the decisive attack through the gap between Toul and Épinal, striking the enemy in the right flank; the mission for Sixth and Seventh Armies were reversed, from being secondary to decisive. The OHL LNO emphasised that the breakthrough operation had to begin by taking the advanced position at Nancy. He characterised the operation as an easy one and placed the heavy artillery at Metz and Strasbourg at the disposal of Sixth Army.
Rupprecht recognised that he had been given an entirely new mission, whose importance was clear. The gap at Charmes between the fields of fire of the fortress artillery at Toul and Épinal was only 40km wide. The Nancy Position, which extended 20km east of Toul, restricted this gap further and gave the fortifications in the north depth, and had to be taken first. There was also a considerable French bridgehead over the Moselle at Charmes. It was essential to bring forward the artillery of Metz and Strasbourg, but these had neither horse teams nor ammunition columns and were nearly immobile. They would have to be transported by rail and the guns and ammunition could be moved forward from the railheads by using horse teams from other units. In the presence of the LNO, Rupprecht gave the initial orders for the attack on the Nancy Position.
Whether Major Bauer had the authority to give such a clear-cut order to Rupprecht is debateable. He seemed to be confused concerning the exact nature of his mission. When Rupprecht reported later on 30 August concerning the measures he had taken to begin the attack, OHL thought he meant the attack against Toul–Épinal, while Rupprecht meant Nancy. The confusion grew when Sixth Army sent an LNO (Major Xylander) to OHL on 31 August, who returned with the following written instructions:
1. Metz fortress reserve [33 RD] and foot artillery are not under operational control of Sixth Army
2. Sixth Army retains the [6 and 8] Ersatz Divisions
3. A 10cm battalion and half a 15cm battalion, with horse teams, will arrive from Mainz
4. The Sixth Army must maintain contact with Metz under all circumstances
5. Sixth and Seventh Armies must fix in place enemy forces of at least equal strength
6. A prior or simultaneous attack on Nancy is not necessary. Sixth Army must only be so strong opposite Nancy as to prevent an enemy breakthrough threatening contact with Metz
7. If the Sixth Army does not think it can in a short time conduct a successful attack over the Moselle [at Charmes], it should consider if it is not better to disengage a part of the army and send it through Metz to the Fifth Army. The remaining elements of Sixth and Seventh Armies must then pull back later. Addendum: In this case, the possible severe negative effect on troop morale must be seriously considered
OHL was not so hopeful that the enemy would soon withdraw, followed by a breakthrough between the fortresses. The mission for Sixth and Seventh Armies was reduced to fixing equal enemy forces in place, which was also Krafft’s reading of the situation. But OHL could not completely bury its desire for a breakthrough at Charmes and expressed it again verbally.
Rupprecht had been given a completely free hand and saw no reason to revise his decision to attack the Nancy Position. Since the enemy had not budged, there was no reason to attack to fix him in place. Rupprecht intended to rest his troops and begin the advance on the Upper Moselle and the attack on Nancy at the earliest on 2 September. A breakthrough between Toul and Épinal would be very difficult, but not impossible. The option of redeploying the Sixth and Seventh Armies elsewhere was rejected. Since OHL thought that the enemy had actually withdrawn forces from Lorraine, on 1 September Rupprecht ordered the advance to begin the next day, but countermanded the order because the army was not ready.
On the morning of 2 September, Rupprecht went personally to OHL. Moltke acknowledged that the breakthrough at Charmes needed planning and could not be rushed. In any case, OHL estimated that thirteen enemy corps were in Lorraine. Sixth and Seventh Armies could count it a real success if they fixed such superior forces in place and pressure from the German right wing forced them to retreat between Toul and Épinal. Only when this occurred would it be possible to attack over the Moselle. Recognising when that had occurred would be difficult. Even when the enemy withdrew, it would be a work of art to push through the gap quickly enough to appear on the other side of the Moselle in time to deliver a decisive attack. It would be irresponsible to attempt such a step without strong heavy artillery. But the immobile fortress artillery, lacking horse teams (the use of motor vehicles to move artillery was still in its infancy) was like a ball and chain on Sixth Army operations. Moltke thought that the gate between Toul and Épinal would soon be open. Krafft made no secret of his opinion that it would not be possible to fix equal forces in Lorraine, for the French could withdraw to their border fortresses and hold off far superior German forces, while transferring the mass of their troops elsewhere.
Rupprecht had recently rejected redeploying the mass of Sixth and Seventh Armies elsewhere in favour of attacking the Nancy Position. On 2 September Krafft went to OHL to say that there was no longer time to move Sixth and Seventh Armies from Lorraine, for then they would arrive too late to take part in the decisive battle. OHL regarded the attack on Nancy as a method of preventing the transfer of French forces to Northern France.
From 27 August to 2 September it had not been possible to discern the enemy’s intentions, which he concealed well. At times he appeared to withdraw in places, in other places to mass for an attack, and II b. AK in particular was struck frequently. But it was not possible to establish whether these attacks merely served to screen the enemy’s withdrawal.
Joffre had decided to withdraw in front of the German right wing with the intention of reinforcing his left and forming a counter-attack force there. On the night of 25/26 August he issued a general operations order: Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies and the BEF in his centre and left were to withdraw if necessary and form a line, from the Somme opposite Peronne to Verdun. A new army was to form on the far left flank at Amiens to counter-attack against the German right. First and Second Armies were to fix the German forces in Lorraine, which could only be accomplished by taking the offensive, which Second Army conducted on 28 August. However, Second Army was cautious; only XV and XVI Corps carefully put feelers across the Meurthe at and south of Lunéville, covered on the left by XX Corps. The six battalions of 73 RD were returned to Toul. First Army was more determined: the offensive missions of VIII, XIII and XXI Corps were unchanged, while a brigade from 58 RD and 8 Dragoon Bde were to hold the Meurthe at St Dié. 41 ID was to assemble at Gérardmer to attack the German left flank.
The enemy in Lorraine was far from thinking of withdrawing. To be sure, his attack lacked determination and unity. Joffre’s instructions to Second Army emphasised holding on (durer) more than holding the enemy in place (fixer). The German troops were subjected to repeated and heavy, but uncoordinated, attacks.
Quiet North of Lunéville49
On 27 August the Bavarian KD was bivouacked on the Sixth Army right at the far north corner of the Delm Ridge. Elements of the division began to dig in, assisted by civilian labour. It was joined by 8 KD and Jäger Bn 1 and 2. 7 KD moved to Château Salins. On 28 August HKK 3 was united at Delm and given responsibility for the security of the Sixth Army right flank, with 8 KD digging in on the Delm Ridge. On 30 August 8 KD was relieved in place by 7 KD and sent to East Prussia. After 28 August the Bavarian KD conducted training, local security and practised occupying its defensive positions. On 30 August a reconnaissance in force with three squadrons was conducted to capture prisoners, but the target village was found to be empty.
Left of HKK 3 was the Guard ED, which had arrived at Château Salins on 27 August and then dug in to the north-west, together with 55 Ersatz Bde. On 30 August concern for II b. AK caused Sixth Army to move the Guard ED as army reserve to east of Lunéville, leaving the defensive sector to 55 Ersatz Bde, plus RIR 60, LIR 82 and a 10cm battery, which had just arrived from Strasbourg. To their left the Ersatz Corps dug in, with 10 ED on the right, 4 ED on the left and 8 ED in reserve.
III b. AK was on their left with 5 ID on the right, Landwehr Div. Wenning in the centre taking considerable artillery fire, and 6 ID on the left. The III/IR 10 position was very broad, and on the night of 26/27 August a French battalion penetrated it, but were thrown out in close combat. 3/IR 10 on their right also beat off an attack. The situation more and more approximated siege warfare, with regular reliefs of troops on the front line. The heavy artillery took up the fight with well-hidden long-range enemy guns, whose continual fire was obviously directed from aircraft. On 1 September a captive balloon from Fortress Airship Sec. 1 was set on fire by an enemy aircraft and the observer was killed. The troops dug trenches and underground shelters. On 29 August the Landwehr Div. was pulled out of the line to conduct training. Between the German and French outposts was a broad no-man’s-land contested only by patrols. Wounded were recovered from the battles of 25 August at Serres and St Libaire. The French position consisted of seemingly random groups of trenches. On 1 September the French occupied Hoéville, the Bois St Libaire and the east side of the Bois d’Einville and pushed forward artillery. The Bavarian artillery in the Bois Saussi, particularly I/FAR 6, at times suffered serious casualties from enemy artillery fire, especially in the evening when the setting sun illuminated the forest. Foot Artillery R 3 (sFH) reinforced 6 ID on 29 and 30 August.
HKK 3 and the Ersatz Corps were opposed, as before, by the French 59 and 63 RD and three brigades of IX Corps, which were now designated 18 ID. In front of III b. AK was 70 RD in St Libaire and 39 ID (XX Corps) in the Bois d’Einville.
I b. RK dug in north of Lunéville. RIR 13 and Res. Jäger Bn1 were reinforced by close support platoons of 1 and 6/FAR 5. On 26 August II/Res. Foot Artillery 14 (sFH) was attached and took up positions east of Lunéville; the town was fortified. At 0600hrs on 27 August 2 Res. Bde was ordered to relieve 4 ID, which, according to rumours, had been half destroyed, and whose troops, still under the influence of the stress of the preceding days, described the situation as extremely serious. A 2 Res. Bde staff officer asked a group of about 100 4 ID men, ‘Where is II b. AK?’ and was told, ‘This is all that is left of II b. AK! The enemy is following close behind us!’ In fact, 2 Res. Bde spent 27 August digging in undisturbed; the reports of 4ID’s destruction had been exaggerated. Although 27 August was quiet, French artillery fire cost I b. RK 300 casualties.
I b. RK dug in. Decomposing or partially buried bodies were a health concern, as were the civilian latrines common to the area, which drew innumerable flies. Cases of diarrhoea appeared everywhere. The enemy crept generally closer and dug in. His well-concealed artillery fired particularly in the afternoon, when it had the sun at its back, and engaged every target that its aviators identified with flares. The German artillery was helpless. The German infantry, thanks to its deep trenches and the numerous French duds, suffered only moderate casualties, but the effect on morale was serious. On 28 August the corps lost 400 men. The corps HQ ordered the units to adopt reverse-slope defences, only occupying the crest with OPs, which surely reduced casualties significantly.
In the 5 RD sector, the high ground at Friscati, which was held by RIR 13 and Res. Jäger Bn 1, was shelled heavily: the troops’ exhaustion reached such a degree that some became indifferent. 11 Res. Bde established a rotation whereby RIR 10 and Res. Jäger Bn 1 relieved RIR 13 at two-day intervals. On the morning of 1 September, well-aimed fire from I/RIR 13 at Friscati drove off an enemy attack with heavy losses. In the 9 Res. Bde area, RIR 7 relieved RIR 6 on the night of 30/31 August. The forward platoons of RFAR 5 on the high ground at Friscati supported the infantry, but suffered from enemy artillery fire. I/Res. Foot Artillery 10 (13cm cannons) was attached to I/b. RK on 28 August, but was forced by counter-battery fire to change position on 30 August. II/Res. Foot Artillery 14 (sFH) frequently changed position, from the Lunéville barracks to gardens to parks and sometimes inside buildings, firing through the windows. The Bavarian Field Airship Sec. was also attached, and was also forced several times to shift position a short distance due to enemy fire.
1 Res. Bde continued to hold Lunéville, directly subordinate to I b. RK. II/RFAR 1, 1 Res./Eng. Bn 1 and a number of MGs from Fortress Germersheim were attached. From 29 August RIR 2 defended the south half of the city, with RIR 1 positioned in the north. On 1 September 1/RFAR 1 was attached and took up a position in the courtyard of the Dragoon barracks. Enemy activity was limited to snipers in the trees on the east side of the Forêt de Vitrimont. The only French attack was on 1 September against the right flank of II/RIR 2, but this was thrown back; the French then shelled the town.
The Bavarian Landwehr Div., with Fortress MG Sec. 4 and 5, 1 Landsturm Eng. Co./II b. AK and the Fortress Searchlight Platoon attached, moved to the woods east of Lunéville and, in the course of the next days, relieved 1 Res. Bde in Lunéville and dug in.
I b. RK was opposed by 11 ID of the French XX Corps, which had occupied the Forêt de Vitrimont and the heights north of Vitrimont town. It did not attempt to attack.
On 1 September the army group under III b. AK was dissolved and the major units returned to direct Sixth Army control. 55 Ersatz Bde and HKK 3 were placed under the operational control of the Ersatz Corps.
II b. AK, the Sixth Army Problem Child (map 17, sketch 25)
On 27 August the enemy occupied the terrain east of the Mortagne, south of Rehainviller, so slowly and carefully that 4 ID was afforded time to re-establish its units. 3 ID took artillery fire and dug in. 28 ID arrived at St Clement, behind II b. AK, with nine battalions, twelve field artillery and four heavy howitzer batteries. II and III/Baden Household Grenadier Regiment (GR) 109 were attached to 6 Bde (3 ID) at 1800hrs. It became apparent that casualties on 25 and 26 August were far fewer than had appeared and the troops re-established cohesion more quickly than expected. Many stragglers came in. By 28 August 7 Bde in Lunéville was combat-ready with good morale and had an infantry strength of 3,000 men.
On the morning of 28 August the approach of strong enemy forces on Gerbéviller and in the woods west of Fraimbois was detected. At 1000hrs the enemy began to bombard the 3 ID positions, in particular the left flank, with light and heavy artillery, and attacked at 1000hrs with infantry from Gerbéviller and the Bois de la Reine against IR 17. While I/IR 17 on the right flank and II/IR 17 in the centre, supported by MGs and I/FAR 5 (particularly 1/FAR 5 1km north-east of Gerbéviller) stopped the French quickly, III/IR 17, under fire from heavy artillery, was forced off Hill 288. Although themselves under heavy and effective artillery fire, II/FAR 5 on the south-west side of the Bois des Rappes, and 3/FAR 5 far forward on the south side of the Bois du Fey, stopped the French infantry with rapid fire. II and III/GR 109, in an assembly area in the Bois des Rappes, counter-attacked, pulling IR 17 with them, pushed the French off Hill 288 and pursued them into Gerbéviller, where the French took significant casualties in street fighting, and threw the French back over the Meurthe. This terrain could not be held, and the IR 17 right flank was pinned down by flanking fire from the Bois de la Reine, so the 6 Bde commander ordered the troops to return to their old positions that evening. Due to a misunderstanding, II and III/GR 109 returned directly to the Bois de la Rappe and the enemy retook Hill 288. But two companies (11 and 12) of the recently attached III/IR 23 pushed the French back off it again. During the night GR 109 reoccupied the hill. Gruppe Weiss (made up of five companies of IR 18, two from IR 17 and the MGK IR 17), on the left of IR 17, was not attacked and engaged the enemy with flanking fire, while I/IR 18 was only attacked by weak enemy forces.
The French XV Corps had crossed the Mortagne between Mont and Xermaménil, and XVI Corps (reinforced by 74 RD) between Xermaménil and Gerbéviller. According to French sources, the German artillery severely hindered the attack. 74 RD was stopped by 6 Bde, but eventually held onto Gerbéviller, while 31 and 32 ID, in front of 5 Bde, withdrew to the south side of the Mortagne. In front of 4 ID the French XV Corps had occupied the Bois de St Mansuy with 29 ID, Rehainviller and the Forêt de Vitrimont with 30 ID.
4 ID had a generally quiet day on 28 August. Hériménil was shelled heavily, which set the town on fire and caused serious casualties among the supply columns that filled the streets. French infantry sneaking forward were thrown back by III/RIR 3. 7 Bde, resting in Lunéville, was alerted to assist 3 ID, but marched no further than Moncel when it received word that the attack on Gerbéviller had been defeated. In the meantime, French artillery fire was falling on Lunéville, so that 7 Bde had to bivouac in the farms to the east. 28 ID returned to XIV AK control.
7 Bde relieved the left wing of 2 Bde on 29 August, with IR 9 on the right and IR 5 on the left. The staff of 4 ID retook control of the division, under the former 2 Res. Bde commander. 5 Res. Bde remained division reserve and dug in south of Moncel. III/RIR 3 and II/RIR 12 from 2 Res. Bde remained south-west of Hériménil. Entrenching was significantly disrupted by French artillery fire; Hériménil was severely shelled. Although the enemy infantry did not launch a serious attack, it threatened to do so and continually pushed forward. On the previous day it had occupied Chaudfontaine and threatened the far right flank of 4 ID with envelopment. This was averted by the determination of 10/RIR 3 and 3/FAR 11, reinforced by I/RIR 3, MGK/RIR 3 and 10 and 11/RIR 12, which by evening extended the right flank.
As soon as the fog lifted, 3 ID was also shelled. The indicators of an enemy attack multiplied, and by evening the corps moved RIR 8 to Fraimbois, RIR 5 to Beaupré and III/IR 23 (probably also I/IR 23) to 6 Bde. 28 ID was called back by night march and arrived 5km south-east of St Clement at 0700hrs on 30 August. The commander of 3 ID suspected that the enemy was conducting a deception and, at 2300hrs, conducted a reconnaissance in force with two companies of IR 17, which did not make contact until they reached the north side of Gerbéviller.
The II b. AK position grew steadily stronger as the troops, assisted by the engineers, continued to dig in, but here were still difficulties to be overcome. Under cover of the morning fog, strong enemy forces attacked from the Bois de la Reine and the Mortagne Valley on both sides of Gerbéviller against the left flank of 3 ID. I/IR 18, I and II/IR 17, and the attached companies of I/RIR 8, stopped the enemy attack, but GR 109 was in great difficulty on Hill 288. At 0530hrs 6/IR 17 was relieving 8/IR 17 in place in the south-west corner of the Bois du Haut de la Paix when the enemy suddenly appeared out of the fog and broke into the position. However, together with 7/IR 18, the two companies attacked the equally astounded French with the bayonet and threw them back to the Mortagne. MGK/IR 18 appeared just in time to cover the enemy with fire at point-blank range. The French approached to with 300m of the south side of the wood, but were just as quickly thrown back by an attack conducted principally by 10/IR 17. 500 to 600 French dead covered the battlefield. The situation had been quickly stabilised, but disquieting reports were received. The 6 Bde commander even issued a withdrawal order at 0900hrs, but quickly countermanded it as these reports were shown to be false. The I/IR 17 commander simply ignored the order, as the enemy was only 300m to his front. II/IR 17 reoccupied its old positions and was reinforced by III/IR 17. As the fog lifted, GR 109 received intolerable enemy artillery fire, but was supported by II/RIR 8. The commander of 3 ID sent strong elements of IR 23 into the Bois du Four and Bois des Rappes and assembled all available elements of IR 22 from the position at the Bois de la Haye to support 6 Bde. The corps moved 28 ID to Moyen to flank attack the enemy in front of 6 Bde and XXI AK was asked to send forces in the direction of Gerbéviller. However, 3 ID defeated the enemy attack by noon, before these measures became effective. The 28 ID movement was stopped about 4km north-east of Moyen.
Near dawn on 31 August, and on 1 and 2 September, heavy firing broke out in the 5 Bde sector: the enemy appeared to prefer to conduct a wild firefight from the edge of the Bois de Bareth and Bois de Coyard rather than attack. The enemy artillery continually shelled the open high ground west and south of Fraimbois. In spite of being in good dug-in positions, 3 FA Bde took serious casualties, but with the aid of aerial observers conducted counter-battery fire. Forward observers provided with telephone lines and other means of communication moved into the front-line trenches. Thanks to excellent visibility, on 2 September MGK/IR 22 observed strong enemy forces far in the distance, moving west. On 31 August 28 ID was again released and replaced by the Guard ED at Laronxe. Two Ersatz battalions relieved GR 109, while the Guard Ersatz Bde relieved 2 Res. Bde (4 ID).
The 4 ID position was poorly suited for the defence. There were extensive, thick forests directly to the front, which concealed the enemy, while the Meurthe, a serious obstacle, was directly to the rear. The position had no depth: infantry and artillery were practically collocated so that the enemy bombardment could engage them simultaneously. Nevertheless, after the effects of the previous battle had been overcome, the entire division was confident it could hold the position; the infantry and artillery encouraged each other.
7 Bde, primarily IR 9, was attacked weakly in the early morning on 31 August, and on 1 and 2 September; these were easily and bloodily repulsed with the support of the artillery. The enemy limited himself to attacks by fire in front of IR 5 and did not appear at all in front of 2 Res. Bde. Scheduled reliefs of the front-line troops were conducted; an attack on Hériménil during a relief was easily beaten off.
The French artillery thoroughly exploited its superiority, continually shelling the newly constructed trenches as well as roads and towns. It engaged 4 FA Bde from positions that were masterfully hidden, impossible to locate and unreachable. Fire from Forêt de Vitrimont flanked the entire Meurthe position, forcing the artillery to move to the east side of the Meurthe to escape it. On 31 August II/Foot Artillery R 18 (21cm mortars) was attached to 4 ID, and on 1 September 4/Foot Artillery R 1 (sFH) also joined them; they were sorely needed.
After 30 August the situation in the II b. AK sector became quieter, though the troops still had to accommodate themselves to the difficulties of positional warfare, principally the continual artillery fire and the little-loved trench digging. Only the regularity of the shelling and the poor quality of French shells, which were often duds or burned rather than exploded, kept the casualty rate low. There was a shortage of water on the Fraimbois highlands and elsewhere. Dysentery was widespread. Unburied bodies of men and animals fouled the air, especially in front of 6 Bde, where German MG fire had mown down the French in rows; attempts to bury them were prevented by French artillery fire. The corps commander declared II b. AK combat-ready on 30 August, but at half-strength; considerably more than half the officers were casualties, although replacements began to arrive.
The concern expressed after 26 August by Sixth Army for II b. AK was justified. The French XV and XVI Corps, reinforced by 64 and 74 RD, had repeatedly attempted to push to the Meurthe. Opposed by such superior numbers, II b. AK, reduced in strength and standing directly in front of the river, prevented the French from doing so.
On the night of 26/27 August XXI AK had evacuated the west bank of the Mortagne and dug in south of Moyen. Opposed by the French VIII Corps in the north and XIII Corps in the south, XXI AK had to continually expect an attack by superior enemy forces. On 27 August, 42 ID on the corps left wing came under heavy artillery fire and strong enemy forces were reported approaching Rambervillers, so XXI AK asked its neighbour on the left, I b. AK, to assist by launching an attack.
I b. AK at Xaffévillers−Anglemont, 27−28 August (maps 18 and 21, sketch 26)
While the left wing of Seventh Army continued the attack at St Dié on 27 August, I b. AK, with operational control over 29 ID, was instructed to defend in place. On the night of 26/27 August, I b. AK had shifted far enough to the right that it established contact with XXI AK in the Bois de la Horne, north-east of Xaffévillers. This march was conducted in pitch darkness and pouring rain; many vehicles became stuck in the mud marching through the Grands Bois de Glonville and blocked the already narrow road. In Bazien, which was still burning and being shelled, march columns crossed and traffic came to a halt. Some units took a detour through Fontenoy. The troops arrived wet and tired, and many had to bivouac in marching column in the open.
On the morning of 27 August only weak enemy skirmisher lines moved carefully towards 2 ID, but enemy artillery, directed by aircraft and two captive balloons, reopened fire. The infantry of I b. AK had already constructed some cover and had learned how to avoid the fire. Nevertheless, there were casualties. With Sixth Army permission, at 1230hrs I b. AK ordered an attack over the Belville stream in order to assist XXI AK, which the troops greeted it as a means of avoiding the enemy artillery fire. The rain stopped around noon and the troops were in motion at 1500hrs. 29 ID, attached to I b. AK, slowly gained ground in the direction of Ménil.
In the 1 ID sector the artillery conducted preparatory firing against Anglemont and the woods west of the town. The infantry jumped off somewhat late at 1600hrs. On the 2 ID left, III/IR 16 turned hard right from the high ground north of Ménil towards Anglemont with 11 and 12/IR 16 in front, 10 and 9/IR 16 behind the left flank. They were received by lively artillery fire as they rose from the trenches and moved towards the Belville Valley, west of Ménil. There they took rifle fire from the village into the left flank, which forced them to engage in that direction, along with the attached MG platoon. The enemy fire was silenced and the battalion resumed the march, pushed away weak enemy infantry lying north-east of Anglemont and reached to within 200m of the village by 1730hrs. But the 2 ID artillery continued to hammer the village, and all means of communication were unable to stop the fire, which ceased only at dusk. Finally III/IR 16 could approach the west side of Anglemont, which was burning at several places, but did not enter, bypassing it to the left and right.
IR 12 attacked on the right of IR 16, with I and III/IR 12 forming the first line and II/IR 12 the second, but the units became intermixed and dispersed: the skirmisher line advanced, right to left, 3, 1, 9, 11 and 12/IR 12. Fire from Ménil seems to have drawn off 2/IR 2 to the left and 10/IR 12 joined the right. 7/IR 12 was attached to I/IR 12 as a reserve. The regiment avoided the artillery fire on the trenches north-west of Ménil and reached the bottom of the slope north-east of the Bois de la Grande Coinche, but took fire from the woods, while the German artillery did not lift its fire there. Nevertheless, the treeline was stormed at 1900hrs, which led to a furious close-range firefight and heavy losses; 7/IR 12 was committed. The enemy moved off, but it did not seem prudent to follow him into the dark wood, so the regiment bivouacked in the open 200m from the treeline.
To the right of IR 12 was the Household IR (minus I/Household), which moved out from Nossoncourt, II/Household on the right and III/Household on the left. Followed by enemy fire, the skirmisher lines crossed the broad Belville Valley as if they were on a training exercise. The fight began on the north-east side of the Bois de la Grande Coinche. As the last rays of the sun set, the Household IR assaulted the enemy and took the treeline; the commander of III/Household was killed and prisoners taken. But the fight went on in the wood against a crafty enemy. He fired close-range salvoes, which usually went high, and slipped through the woods to fire into the Bavarians from the rear. It was finally dark, the companies had pushed deep into the woods and, to assemble them in the open south of Doncières, the regimental commander ordered ‘The Watch on the Rhine’ be sung. The French responded by singing the ‘Marseillaise’.
In the 2 ID sector the artillery also prepared the way for the infantry, particularly by engaging the French artillery at Deinvillers, south of Xaffévillers, and the Bois de Roville, as well as infantry on the ridge between Xaffévillers and Doncières. The commander of 9 FA Bde was badly wounded near Château de Villers, his adjutant killed.
The 3 Bde objectives were the middle of the Grande Pucelle wood and the high ground south of Doncières. Initially, only II/IR 3 and I/IR 20 were committed in this direction. From Hill 316, north-east of Doncières and Château de Villers, they moved in waves to the Belville Valley, covered by overhead fire from MGK/IR 3, which remained in the trenches, against Doncières and the trenches to both sides. To begin with, II/IR 3 had an easy time of it, particularly because the enemy artillery was little active. Then enemy resistance stiffened and artillery fire began to fall, so that, at 1800hrs, I and II/IR 20 moved forward from the Bois de la Haie la Rousse to assist, through Doncières and onto the small copse on high ground beyond, which could not be held due to artillery fire. I/IR 20 deployed 3, 1, and 4/IR 20 and, moving past the east side of Doncières, was so severely hindered by flanking fire from Bois de la Grande Coinche that 2 and 3/IR 3, in reserve east of the Château de Villers, had to reinforce the firing line at 1600hrs. The enemy fire still could not be suppressed, and 4 and 1/IR 3 were committed at 1800hrs. At 1930hrs they stormed the high ground and treeline south of Doncières. The objective had been taken, although IR 3 and 20 were completely intermixed. The leaders had begun reorganising when, at 2000hrs, the French launched a counter-attack, accompanied by bugle calls. I/IR 3, which had just assembled on the north side of the Bois de la Grande Coinche and was marching to the high ground south of Doncières, quickly deployed on the left flank, received the French with fire at 20m range and blasted them back.
The 4 ID objective was Menu Bois, south of Xaffévillers (I/Household) and the north half of the Grande Pucelle wood (IR 12), with IR 15 in reserve in the Bois de la Horne.
I/Household advanced slowly against alert enemy artillery, but reached the Menu Bois at 1800hrs. The French did not defend Xaffévillers, but a number of prisoners were taken there. At 1500hrs IR 12 advanced from the south treeline of the Bois de la Haie la Rousse with I/IR 12 on the right, II/IR 12 on the left at, III and MGK/IR 12 following behind the centre. It was much less hindered by artillery fire and quickly reached the Belville streambed and climbed the steep slope against weak resistance. I/IR 12, with 4, 2, and 3/IR 12 deployed, reached the high ground south of Menu Bois, and II/IR 12 the west side of the Grande Pucelle wood, when they became involved in a firefight with French infantry in ditches, bushes and hedges at Roville. At 1700hrs masses of French light and heavy shells began to land on I/Household and IR 12. I/Household also took fire directly into the right flank from the high ground north-west of Xaffévillers. The French were reported bringing up reinforcements and IR 12 committed 10, 12 and the MG along the firing line. The MGs were able to engage thick groups at Roville. Nevertheless, the troops felt more and more isolated, for not only did artillery fire fall on them, but it also formed a barrage to cut them off from the rear. At 1900hrs, under cover of darkness, the shaken survivors were withdrawn, I/Household to the Bois de la Horne, IR 12 to the Bois de la Haie la Rousse, covered by 1 and 3/FAR 4, which had moved up to the Bois de la Horne at 1900hrs.
In the course of the afternoon IR 15 moved up to the Bois du Grande Bras. I/IR 15 then moved to the west side of the Bois de la Horne, but was forced back by artillery fire. It deployed skirmishers and began a firefight with French troops on the high ground north-west of Xaffévillers that were firing into the flank of I/Household. When I/Household urgently asked for help, IR 15 was committed at dusk to the attack. I/IR 15 climbed the hill north-west of Xaffévillers, but ran into serious resistance as well as took fire from the Bois des Aulnes into the right flank. II and then III/IR 15 were committed on the right. There was a short delay crossing the Belville stream, which was stomach-deep, and units became intermixed, but in continual movement they reached the ridge north-west of Xaffévillers, while the MGK supported from the treeline of the Bois du Grande Bras. At 1745hrs the corps released IR 1 to 2 ID, which ordered it to relieve I/Household in place on the high ground south of Xaffévillers. It marched through Ménarmont and the burning Xaffévillers, and conducted the relief late at night, facing Roville.
It is difficult to determine whether the I b. AK attack was necessary. When 2 ID began movement at 1400hrs there was not a trace of an attack on XXI AK. The troops had once again demonstrated their aggressive spirit. But I b. AK was now 3km in front of XXI AK, which was on the high ground south-east of Domptail on the right, and 4km in front of 29 ID on the left, which had not reached Ménil. At 2045hrs IR 16 in the Bois de la Pêche was ordered to cover the corps left by moving through Ménil to Anglemont. 3/IR 16 had been sent to clear the town at 1930hrs; first it blocked the exits, and then searched house to house. The company was approaching the south side of the town when a French unit in marching column entered from the south, while shots were fired from the houses near the church on the south side. The company concentrated near the church and blocked all French attempts to penetrate into the town. The firefight lasted for hours and caused several casualties. II/IR 16 reached the north side of the town and sent 5/IR 16 towards the church. The brigade commander forbade the commitment of more troops into the town. I/IR 16 sealed off the town on the north, east and west. Volunteers from 1 and 2/IR 16, along with doctors from II/IR 16, reached the church; the Bavarians held out there until dawn. III/IR 16 was now completely in the air, as contact with IR 2 and 29 ID had been lost. From the Bois de la Grande Coinche on the right were heard cries of ‘Hurrah!’, signals, rifle fire, salvoes, ‘The Watch on the Rhine’, the ‘Marseillaise’ and combat in Ménil. An officer and two squads searching for food in Anglemont encountered a half-platoon of French Alpine troops. It was later determined that IR 2 was only 800m north-west of Anglemont and that the treeline south of the town was unoccupied. But as the fog began to lift at 0630hrs on 28 August, French troops could be seen 1km east of the road to Ménil; 10/IR 16 and the attached MG platoon engaged them in the flank and cut them down nearly to the last man. But the battalion had also revealed their own position and took fire from invisible riflemen in all directions, including the houses of Anglemont, which was suppressed by spraying the roofs with MG fire. Enemy detachments began to penetrate from the south-east into the open ground between Ménil and Anglemont; the battalion was threatened with encirclement. The battalion standard was sent to IR 2 with twelve men, only four of which made it through. III/IR 16 decided to break out to the north at 0800hrs. The companies moved by squads through low ground west of Anglemont. It was possible to suppress the fire from the town so that it could not disturb the movement. The battalion – now only six officers and 270 men strong – assembled between Château de Villers and Nossoncourt.
The commander of IR 16 gained the impression that the enemy planned to attack Ménil with new forces. He pulled I and II/IR 16 back to the old position on the treeline of the Bois de la Pêche astride the road. The attack never materialised. The German artillery set the town on fire and it was occupied by 29 ID.
1 ID intended to continue the attack on 28 August, but the open left flank put an end to that idea. After Anglemont was evacuated, IR 2 could not hold the north-east side of the Bois de la Grande Coinche, particularly since it took artillery fire in the left flank. It withdrew, dispersed in waves of skirmishers, to Château de Villers and Nossoncourt. The Household IR conducted a firefight with French infantry in the Bois de la Grande Coinche, then withdrew that morning to the Bois du Jard, followed by artillery fire, but in perfect order. The enemy did not pursue, but once again squandered masses of shells on the 1 ID positions.
On 28 August 2 ID was determined to hold the positions south of the Belville stream. During the night and morning the units reorganised and dug in. IR 20 assembled on the slopes north-west of Doncières and pushed II/IR 20 to the small wood 1km west of the town. The regiment was split up and understrength: I/IR 20 counted six officers and 400 men. IR 3 held the high ground south-west of Doncières; 9 FA Bde was brought up to Doncières to support 3 Bde.
In the 4 Bde sector, IR 12 occupied its positions on the high ground south of Xaffévillers at 0400hrs. IR 1 and IR 15 were south and north-west of the town in the positions they had held the night before. 4 Bde subordinated itself to 65 Bde (XXI AK) in the Bois des Aulnes on its right. 4 FA Bde took position south of the town. II/Foot Artillery R 1 (sFH) was blocked by artillery fire from moving south of the town (except for 8/Foot Artillery R 1, which set up north of Doncières) and found positions north of Xaffévillers.
At 0900hrs overwhelming artillery fire landed on the 2 ID positions on the ridge south of the Belville stream, which were easily visible, even at great distance. The troops sought to avoid the fire or dig in, but to no avail. The feeling of helplessness spread; nerves were tested by the sight of horrible wounds and the frequent cries of fear and pain. Every calibre of shell landed, from light to 28cm. The bombardment lasted hour after hour. It was no wonder that the lines began to crumble, or that leaders used any opportunity to reduce casualties and pull their troops out of this hell. The artillery could not suppress the French fire. The French infantry, on the other hand, remained quietly at Roville and the Mortagne Valley.
In the 3 Bde sector, shell after shell landed in Doncières, which was burning, and on the bridge over the Belville stream east of the town. At noon the Household IR began to leave the Bois du Jard, and IR 20, in the fields west of Doncières, gave way. The IR 3 commander felt justified, indeed obligated, to pull his battalions out of the artillery fire; the regiment had reached the valley both sides of Doncières when the brigade commander ordered it to reoccupy the positions. The French had taken the high ground south-west of Doncières and I/IR 3 had to fight for it. 5 and 6/FAR 9 left their forward positions south-east of Doncières. The 3 ID commander turned them around and sent them back. Perhaps they arrived just in time to prevent a strong attack against the 3 Bde flank, for they took rifle fire from the Bois de la Grande Coinche, and their return fire into the treeline cut down rows of French troops who had obviously been surprised in their assembly area.
The 4 Bde commander reported to 2 ID early and often that occupying the high ground south of the Belville stream was causing heavy and unnecessary casualties. The same grounds motivated the II/FAR 7 commander to displace his guns from behind the Menu Bois, where he was taking artillery fire from three sides, to the south side of the Bois de la Horne at 0730hrs. 4 Bde and the rest of 4 FA Bde hung on in their positions the entire morning, under continual bombardment. The woods at Menu Bois and Grande Pucelle offered the French an easily visible target. Heavy shells turned the strongest trees into matchsticks. IR 1 and IR 12 had to withstand the severest test and the most serious casualties. The trenches were on the forward slope, only knee-deep and strongly held – man next to man. It was understandable that the troops began to fall back at noon. IR 15 got off easiest – it concealed itself well on the slopes north-west of Xaffévillers. The artillery forward observers on the high ground and the batteries both suffered severely from the artillery fire, to which they could not reply because they could not locate the French guns. Far and wide, there was hardly a target visible.
At noon 9/IR 1 on the regiment left flank took a direct hit, which blew the company commander and a number of other men to pieces. The cry went up: ‘The captain is dead! It’s all over!’ and the company disintegrated. The companies of I/IR 1 in the Menu Bois sought to escape the murderous enemy fire by continually changing position. At the request of the regimental commander, the 1 ID commander permitted a withdrawal to the Bois de la Horne at 1400hrs. I/IR 1 immediately began to pull back in open-order waves. II/IR 1 (except 8/IR 1) and the MGK/IR 1, which did not receive the order, followed. III/IR 1 also did not receive the order and stayed between the Menu Bois and Grande Pucelle wood, except for the remnants of 9/IR 1, which followed the other two battalions. By 1530hrs IR 1, except for III and 8/IR 1, was assembled in the Bois de la Horne.
I/FAR 4 was now unprotected. At 1500hrs the enemy artillery fire was increasing in intensity and there were still no targets; some of the gunners of 1 and 2/FAR 4 were pulled back to Xaffévillers, carrying the breech blocks and sights. After a short time the commander of 2 FA Bde ordered them back to the guns.
At noon the ranks of IR 12 began to crumble into the Belville Valley. Most of II/IR 12 had withdrawn on orders of the regimental commander to the midpoint of the Xaffévillers−Doncières road, hile I and MGK/IR 12 had moved to the south-east side of Xaffévillers. The commander of II/FAR 4 objected that this left his guns without protection, so 1, 2 and 3/IR 12 reoccupied the Grande Pucelle wood. The MGK, which had fired off all of its ammunition, moved to the reverse slope. The commander of III/IR 3 also moved his companies up to the Grande Pucelle wood.
Before 1500hrs the 2 ID commander, who was at Ménarmont, permitted 4 Bde to move the supply units farther to the rear, if necessary. At 1550hrs he allowed all units to withdraw to the old positions on the north side of the Belville stream, so long as strong security detachments remained on the south side. I and MGK/IR 12 were withdrawn to the orchards on the north-east side of Xaffévillers. In the Bois de la Horne, IR 15 relieved IR 1, which pulled back to Fontenoy. In the Menu Bois and Grande Pucelle wood, the commander of III/IR 1 brusquely denied the company commanders’ requests to withdraw. At 1700hrs 12 and 11/IR 1 retreated down the slope to Xaffévillers; the III/IR 1 commander hauled 12/IR 1 back, but was unable to stop 11/IR 1, so 10/IR 1 was moved from reserve into its place.
By means that are not clear, an order reached FAR 4 to abandon the guns and recover them after dark. The limbers moved off, and the breech blocks and sights were removed. Some of the guns were rendered long-term unserviceable by hammering on the elevating screws. Loyalty to the guns soon asserted itself, beginning with the adjutant of 2 FA Bde, who encountered the limbers of 1 and 2/FAR 4 on the bridge at Xaffévillers and turned them around. He also met the commander of 8/IR 1, who had already offered his help to the commander of I/FAR 4, and who agreed to try to save the guns. It became a regular competition, actually encouraged by the continuing enemy artillery fire. Two platoons of 8/IR 1 dragged the guns out of their dug-in positions and rolled them to the limbers, while the third platoon provided protection. The guns were moved off at a gallop through a French artillery barrage behind the position. Officers helped limber up the guns, and drivers dismounted from their horses to assist. All the guns of 1 and 2/FAR 4 were moved, as well as the equipment lying near the gun positions. 3/FAR 4, 400m away, was brought off by its commander. I/FAR 4 only left some shot-up caissons and suffered few losses. Wounded infantrymen were carried off on the limbers and caissons.
The commander of FAR 4 had accompanied the limbers of II/FAR 4 back to the Bois de la Horne. When I/FAR 4 arrived at 1800hrs with its guns, the order was immediately issued to II/FAR 4 to retrieve its guns also. Two lieutenants of the light munitions column of II/FAR 7 at Bois de la Horne had already offered their assistance and apparently had already set to work; all the II/FAR 4 guns were saved.
10 and 12/IR 1 and the III/IR 1 still held out on the high ground between Menu Bois and the Grande Pucelle wood. The artillery fire was practically insupportable: the commander of 12/IR 1 kept his men together by leading them in prayer. At 1800hrs French infantry approached, opened fire at 700m and continued to advance. The III/IR 1 commander did not let his men open fire until the French were at close range (400m) and the French attack was repulsed. When the battalion took what they supposed to be friendly artillery fire at 1910hrs, the III/IR 1 commander ordered a withdrawal, which was conducted in perfect order, carrying the non-ambulatory wounded. The commander of 12/IR 1 was killed and command was assumed by a corporal. The commander of 10/IR 1 formed the rearguard with a handful of men and held off the advancing French. In Ménarmont III/IR 1 assembled – all 100 men.
After dark IR 12 (minus III/IR 12) moved from the Xaffévillers–Doncières road to the Bois de la Haie la Rousse. III/IR 12 and III/IR 3 remained with the numerous wounded that had assembled on the road. III/IR 12 was ordered to outpost the high ground west of Xaffévillers, but it ran into enemy troops on the bridge in the town, and at midnight a bitter close-range fight developed, with neither side being able to cross the stream.
3 Bde pulled its troops back over the Belville stream at 1930hrs, IR 20 (minus II/IR 20) to the wood west of Bazien and IR 3 (minus III/IR 3) to Château de Villers. II/IR 20 held the south treeline of the Bois de la Haie la Rousse to both sides of the Doncières–Ménarmont road, while III/IR 3 was positioned at the fork in the road north-east of Doncières. The wounded in Doncières, which was burning, were successfully brought away. Enemy artillery fire accompanied the march to the old positions north of the Belville stream. Towards evening two mortar battalions, which had been at Manonviller, were attached to I b. AK. The day ended with a tremendous thunderstorm at 2200hrs. The troops spent the night in the open: wet, freezing, exhausted, hungry and shocked by the day’s combat.
I b. AK had obviously moved into an area which the heavy batteries of Épinal had used as firing areas and therefore knew every corner and range. I b. AK and 29 ID had been opposed on 27 and 28 August by the French XIII Corps and XXI Corps, reinforced by 44 ID. On 27 August they had attacked what they thought were withdrawing German troops. XII Corps had moved from Roville in the direction of Ménarmont, initially committing 25 ID. Only after they had lost Xaffévillers and Doncières was 26 ID committed to the right of 25 ID. XXI Corps, which urgently required rest, also only committed 44 ID, but supported it with the artillery of 13 and 43 ID, to attack on both sides of the Ménil road. When I b. AK withdrew, XII AK remained on the battlefield, while 44 ID fell back to rejoin XIII Corps east of Rambervillers.
In the following days strong French forces were detected north of Rambervillers. The enemy did not budge in front of I b. AK, but held a strongly fortified position on the west side of the Mortagne. The high ground between the Mortagne and Belville was sometimes occupied, sometimes not.
On 29 August trench warfare began for I b. AK. There were periods of heavy French artillery fire. The Château de Villers, in which lay 150 wounded under protection of the Red Cross, was ruthlessly bombarded and burst into flames at 1600hrs. Volunteers from I and III/IR 2 rescued the severely wounded, including twenty French, by lifting them through the windows. Ménarmont in particular was often and severely shelled. The troops gradually constructed better cover and learned by being careful, changing positions and using dummy positions to avoid or misdirect French fire. Nevertheless, random direct hits caused painful casualties. The German artillery got revenge with the surprise shelling of trenches and visible troops. Aviators sought out the well-concealed French batteries, which frequently changed locations, but the results of aerial reconnaissance were too general and too slow in reaching the firing batteries to form a basis for the artillery duel. The French exploited the greater range of their guns to fire at long range, so that they could only be reached by the German heavy artillery, which had to move far forward to be effective, and which wasted their precious shells for lack of good observation of the targets. It was soon necessary to conserve shells.
On 29 August XIV AK extended its right to the low ground 800m east of Nossoncourt, so that I b. AK had a sector only 5km wide. This, and the relatively quiet tactical situation, allowed the rotation of major units (regiments, brigades and artillery sections) and a thinning-out of the front line. The construction of trenches and the marching through the bottomless mud of the Bois de Glonville still cost a great deal of energy. The engineers corduroyed the muddy stretches and built entirely new roads. Due to false alarms, the resting troops were frequently alerted and moved forward. Nevertheless, the troops got some rest for the first time since the beginning of the campaign. Combat readiness rose and discipline firmed up through training. Replacement troops arrived, but there was a shortage of experienced leaders, many of whom were dead or wounded. The troops’ health suffered from intestinal disorders, one source of which was the poorly buried bodies; the air at Nossoncourt, Bazien and Château de Villers was foul.
On 1 September I b. AK returned to Sixth Army. On 2 September XIV AK on the left extended its flank to the high ground west of Nossoncourt, so that I b. AK could hold its sector with a single regiment.
Continuation of the Battles at St Dié, 28 August (sketch 20)
Seventh Army intended to pull XV AK out of the line and assemble it at Raon l’Étape. To do so, it was necessary to push the enemy away from the Meurthe north and south of St Dié. XIV RK needed to firmly hold the important Raon l’Étape–St Dié road and cross the Meurthe. On 28 August XIV RK gave 30 RD and the Bavarian ED an absolutely necessary rest day. This order never reached 30 RD, and the troops were held in readiness to march. The troops were packed into the villages and, in the rainy weather, many could not put a roof over their heads. I and II/RIR 14 and Fortress MG Sec. 2 marched to St Dié south of the Meurthe to provide security, and found large quantities of rations in the French barracks there. Towards evening heavy enemy fire made it appear that the enemy was going to attack, so the two battalions pulled back to the north side of the river; when nothing happened by dusk, they reoccupied the south side.
(Sketch 27) By 0600hrs the corps order had not reached the Bavarian ED, so the commander decided to advance on St Dié on both sides of the Meurthe, since the town was the objective of the previous day. The left flank seemed to have been secured by 9 Ersatz Bde at the pass west of Azonel, and reports from Mandray in the south were reassuring. As soon as the division order was issued, the corps order telling it to rest at Entre-deux-Eaux arrived. 1 Ersatz Bde was now ordered to hold the high ground east of Saulcy and south of Entre-deux-Eaux. RIR 15 was attached and ordered to march in this direction. 9 Ersatz Bde was to defend Saulcy and the pass west of Azonel. The artillery occupied positions east of Saulcy. The heavy morning fog led to errors in land navigation and subsequent corrective marches.
In Mandray the chief surgeon received permission from the commander of the French Alpine infantry to recover the wounded. In Basse Mandray the officers of the ambushed munitions column had assembled their troops during the night and, at dawn, cut the dead and wounded horses from the traces, and oriented the vehicles towards Saulcy, aided by the dense fog. However, shots were fired as they began to move.
Due to various difficulties the order to move to Mandray only reached Ersatz Bn IV at the battalion position west of Claingoutte at 0300hrs. As it approached the west side of Basse Mandray at 0600hrs, along the road from Saulcy, it deployed 3/Ersatz Bn IV, with 2 and 4/Ersatz Bn IV in the second line and 1/Ersatz Bn IV in the third, and encountered stragglers from the munitions column, which, if armed, were ordered to accompany the Ersatz men. The battalion passed quickly through Basse Mandray, but took murderous fire from Mandray. 2 and 4/Ersatz Bn IV were immediately deployed on both sides of 3/Ersatz Bn IV and bitter house-to-house fighting began. The French Alpine troops hid themselves masterfully and shot down the Bavarian troops advancing in the open. The fight was particularly hot around the church, whose tower was strongly held, as was the churchyard. The first assault on both failed, even though 1/Ersatz Bn IV was committed. Then the back door to the church was broken open and the steps to the tower were set on fire. The windows to the nave were broken and the church was stormed; some of the French fled at the last minute, but those in the tower burned to death. Soon the town was cleared; the French withdrew east, south-east and south to the nearby wooded high ground. The French had moved the prisoners out of the town at the beginning of the fight. Ersatz Bn IV had taken eighty casualties. It occupied the south side of Mandray, partly along a favourable steep slope, partly along a ridge 100m in front. But the enemy had also recovered and prepared to attack.
RIR 15 marched from Saulcy and arrived at Hill 514, south-east of Entre-deux-Eaux, at 0800hrs. On their own initiative, elements of the regiment had answered calls for help from Mandray. The RIR 15 commander ordered III/RIR 15 to march to Basse Mandray, and I/RIR 15 to Mandray itself. 1 Ersatz/FAR 4 set up on Hill 514. III and I/RIR 15 reached their objectives unopposed, crossed the valley and, as the fog began to lift, ascended the south side and engaged the French Alpine troops who left their trenches halfway up the slope and retreated to the north treeline of the Bois de Mandray, with RIR 15 pursuing. With the arrival of RIR 15, Ersatz Bn IV withdrew to the north side of the road and cooked breakfast, fortified by supplies of wine they discovered. The munitions column marched to Saulcy.
The Alpine troops were reinforced by MG and artillery, and were well hidden in the broom bushes which hindered German artillery support. It is possible that this is why the order was given for RIR 15 to fall back; perhaps the enemy reinforcements were making themselves felt. In any case, at 1500hrs the regiment moved in good order back into the valley; I/RIR 15 moved directly to Hill 514, probably thinking its left flank was threatened. The regimental commander stopped III/RIR 15 halfway down the hill and it was reinforced by Ersatz Bn IV. But the enemy was gaining the upper hand. He engaged 1 Ersatz/FAR 4 in its open position on Hill 514 with artillery and MG fire, and began to put pressure on III/RIR 15 and Ersatz Bn IV, especially against the open left flank. In the evening, 1 Ersatz Bn IV moved to the high ground north of Mandray, followed by III/RIR 15. Mandray fell back into enemy hands, including six vehicles from staff wagons of the Bavarian ED and 1 Ersatz Bde, which contained valuable documents.
9 Ersatz Bde and LIR 71 prepared Saulcy for defence, which was wrecked and otherwise abandoned. Ersatz Bn XI and 2 and 3/LIR 71, which were on outpost duty near Azonel, were withdrawn in the morning as the enemy appeared. From 1 Ersatz Bde, Ersatz Bn I and II moved early in the morning east from Saulcy to the west and south sides of Hill 450. Ersatz Bn III at St Léonard did not receive any orders, but it became aware of the situation as it moved east to Hill 510. RIR 4 left the high ground at Mangoutte and, with Ersatz MGK 1, moved south and south-west of Entre-deux-Eaux.
When the fog lifted at Saulcy, the 9 Ersatz Bde situation became lively. Ersatz FA Sec. I, II and III, and 2 Ersatz/FAR 51, shelled infantry visible at Anozel and Moncel-les-Cours. Early in the afternoon invisible enemy artillery west of Anozel and at les Censes covered the Bavarian ED artillery with overwhelming fire, particularly 15cm howitsers. The Ersatz artillery took up the unequal battle, supported by 3/Res. Foot Artillery R 14 (10cm cannons) attached to 30 RD north-west of Coinches. Ersatz FA Sec. I (minus 1 Ersatz/FAR 4), which had insufficient cover, took serious casualties. 2 Ersatz/FAR 1, which had fired off its ammunition, was pulled out of the position; 1 Ersatz/FAR 1 remained under fire for four hours. At 1600hrs in the Ersatz FA Sec. III area, 2 Ersatz/FAR 12 was able to engage strong enemy cavalry leaving St Léonard and scare it off. A French battery, obviously from this cavalry unit, went into position between St Léonard and Mandray and attempted to take Ersatz FA Sec. III in the flank, but was held in check by 2 Ersatz/FAR 12. Saulcy was also shelled by these enemy batteries, and RIR 4, south-west of Entre-deux-Eaux, was forced to change position several times; Ersatz Bn II had to seek concealment in a small wood.
When the commander of the Bavarian ED learned of the fighting at Mandray and of enemy patrols at La Croix, he moved RIR 4 and 2 Ersatz/Eng. Bn 1 east to the dominating hill, the Tête de Behouille. Ersatz Bn VI was moved to Omégoutte–Algouette, 1 Ersatz/FAR 2 to La Behouille, and Ersatz Bn VIII assumed the security of Laveline.
29 August (map 22)
On 29 August, in order to disengage XV AK, Seventh Army ordered XV RK to cross the Meurthe and hold the high ground on the west bank of the Meurthe at St Michel and Étival (off map, 5 and 10km north of St Dié), which took the entire strength of 28 RD, 19 ED and 26 RD. XIV AK was to hold the east bank of the Meurthe. However, the commander of XIV RK also believed that he had to throw the enemy back across the Meurthe between St Léonard and Anould. He gave this mission to the Bavarian ED, to which he attached 30 RD. The Bavarian ED was to attack at 0600hrs between Saulcy and Entre-deux-Eaux, while 30 RD was to remain available at Coinches. The XIV RK order did not reach the Bavarian ED until 0600hrs. It was scattered over a 6km front and to bring it into position to attack involved long and dangerous flank marches in the face of the enemy. 30 RD was oriented to attack St Dié and north of the Bavarian ED. To bring it into position to attack to the south, either east or west of the Bavarian ED, required considerable difficult and time-consuming marching. The Bavarian ED commander therefore decided to intermix the two divisions. 10 Res. Bde would attack from Entre-deux-Eaux to St Léonard, 1 Ersatz Bde and RIR 15 through Mandray, and 5 Ersatz Bde and RIR 4 over the high ground south-west of La Croix towards Anould. 10 Res. Bde and 1 Ersatz Bde would be under the operational control of the 30 RD commander.
9 Ersatz Bde was already engaged at Saulcy. Ersatz Bn II pushed 1 and 2/Ersatz Bn II to the Meurthe, south of the town, with 3 and 4/Ersatz Bn II echeloned left in a wood on the west slope of Hill 450. To the left, Ersatz Bn I had all four companies on line. Under cover of fog the enemy attacked, but was repulsed; 250 POWs were taken. A second attack at noon was beaten off. Ersatz Bn XII and IX, and Ersatz MGK 9, occupied the fortifications built the previous day; Ersatz Bn XI was behind the town on the right, with Ersatz Bn X and 1 Ersatz/Eng. Bn 3 on the left. When the fog lifted at about 0900hrs the French shelled Saulcy. The Bavarian ED artillery was not immediately able to respond; Ersatz FA Sec. II and III were moving to Hill 520, west of Fouchifol, to support the attack on St Léonard and arrived there at 0900hrs. Ersatz FA Sec. II was called back to its position 700m north-west of La Planchette; as it moved, it offered the enemy batteries on the far side of the Meurthe a wonderful target, but returned their fire in kind. Of Ersatz FA Sec. I, 2 Ersatz/FAR 1 was at La Planchette, and the other two batteries were in Coinches, where they had bivouacked.
During the course of the day the enemy artillery fire at Saulcy caused serious casualties, but it did not seem prudent to pull the troops back from the west side of the village to the cellars and other better-protected areas in the village, because the field of fire to the bushes in the Meurthe Valley was only 300m. It was a severe test of the troops’ nerves, holding out under artillery fire without being able to fire at the enemy. The castle of Saulcy, which served as the aid station and was clearly marked by the Red Cross, was shelled; the surviving wounded could only be rescued with difficulty. The worst hit was Ersatz Bn IX, especially 4 Ersatz Bn IX on the southern bridge over the Meurthe; elements of X and 1 Ersatz/Eng. Bn 3 were sent as reinforcements. Between 1000hrs and 1100hrs the brigade commander ordered Ersatz Bn XII to send a company across the Meurthe Valley to attack the French artillery at Les Cesnes. 4/Ersatz Bn XII slipped across the valley in small groups and assembled on the north side of Les Cours. Just before reaching their objective they were met by overwhelming rifle and MG fire and forced to turn back. In Saulcy the artillery fire finally caused the defence to crumble; individuals and squads snuck away, especially where supervision broke down in the large demolished village. The companies were also intermixed, which reduced cohesion. 2/Ersatz Bn IX had lost all its officers. Nevertheless, Ersatz Bn IX, X and XII continued to hold Saulcy. LIR 71 also had to hold its positions north-east of Saulcy under artillery fire.
At 1000hrs in the 10 Res. Bde sector, RIR 11 at and south-east of Entre-deux-Eaux deployed to attack in the direction of Benifosse with II/RIR 11 on the right and I/RIR 11 on the left. Of RIR 14, only III/RIR 14 had arrived; 12/RIR 14 guarded 3/Res. Foot Artillery R 14 (10cm cannons) on the west side of Remomeix; the rest of III/RIR 14 went into reserve east of Entre-deux-Eaux, along with Ersatz Bn VII. I and II/RIR 14 left Coinches at 0900hrs. It did not appear prudent to begin the attack, since 1 Ersatz Bde, which was to attack on the left, was just arriving. Ersatz Sec./FAR 80 and 2 Ersatz/FAR 51 (with only three guns) had gone into position behind Hill 520, west of Fouchifol, but appear to have fired against enemy artillery at Anozel and Les Censes.
At noon, when the 1 Ersatz Bde attack still had not taken plane, the 10 Res. Bde commander decided that he could not wait any longer and ordered RIR 11 to attack. II/RIR 11 deployed 8 and 6/RIR 11 in the first line, and I/RIR 11 deployed 1 and 3/RIR 11. As the skirmisher line left the woods on the ridge south and south-west of Entre-deux-Eaux, it took heavy fire; the enemy was defending the hilltop south-west of Benifosse, with his artillery behind it, as well as with infantry and MGs on the wooded north-east slope, in Benifosse, and along the road north of the town. Nevertheless, by 1400hrs RIR 11 advanced to the Mandray stream valley and threw back the enemy along the road. At the crossroads halfway to Saulcy, a few men took 200 POWs. 5/RIR 11 seems to have turned in this direction. Now overwhelming fire, principally from MGs on the left flank, brought the attack to a halt. Two officers of II/RIR 11 tried to carry the skirmisher line forward and paid with their lives. At 1300hrs Ersatz FA Sec. IV brought 2 Ersatz/FAR 2 into position east of La Cuche, and 1 Ersatz/FAR 12 at 1500hrs west of Fouchifol, but there was still no sign of 1 Ersatz Bde. Nevertheless, at 1625hrs the 10 Res. Bde commander ordered a continuation of the attack. I/RIR 11 committed 4/RIR 11 to the fight on the left flank. Between 1700hrs and 1800hrs the brigade commander sent III/RIR 14 there, too, with 10 and 11/RIR 14 in the lead, which managed, in spite of heavy fire, to reach the Mandray stream just west of Basse Mandray. 9/RIR 14 initially provided support from Hill 514, then at 1800hrs was sent to the skirmisher line, and Ersatz Bn VII moved onto Hill 514.The enemy at Benifosse defended himself desperately. The Bavarian battalions were involved in a hot firefight, took painful losses and only gained ground step by step. When dark came the Bavarian troops went over to the assault. Enemy troops hanging onto individual houses and woods were overwhelmed. Often the French fled before the Bavarians could close. RIR 11 took Benifosse; III/RIR 14, which had swung to the left, pushed through the forest south-west of the town. I and II/RIR 14 arrived at Entre-deux-Eaux between 1500hrs and 1600hrs, while Fortress MG Sec. 2 and Res. MG Sec. 3 moved forward from Coinches, but were not engaged.
That evening 1 Ersatz Bde arrived, but since Ersatz Bn I and II were fixed in their positions south and south-east of Saulcy, this meant that only Ersatz Bn III and IV, reinforced by RIR 15, arrived. That morning the troops had been on the high ground north of Mandray, but were forced by French artillery fire from the south and south-east to shift position. Misunderstandings and erroneous reports led to all kinds of marching to and fro. At noon the brigade deployed to attack, but the enemy artillery had the upper hand, causing 2 Ersatz/FAR 2 serious casualties; the brigade commander was unwilling to send his troops into the Mandray valley until this fire was suppressed, so it was 1800hrs before they began to advance. The 10 Res. Bde attack had by this time severely shaken the enemy resistance. Fire from Ersatz MGK 1 on the high ground north of Mandray cleared the way for the brigade. 3 and 4/RIR 15 and Ersatz Bn IV took the middle portion of Mandray against weak resistance. 2 and 3/Ersatz Bn III bounded quickly in thin skirmisher lines from one firing position to the next to Haute Mandray and, in thirty minutes, the enemy retreated. Although it was dark, Ersatz Bn III and IV conducted a hasty reorganisation and then pursued the enemy. Ersatz Bn IV reached the wooded hilltop south-west of Benifosse and linked up with III/RIR 14; 2, 3, and half of 1/Ersatz Bn III pushed on to Mangoutte, where it arrived at 2145hrs, having lost contact with both the enemy and German troops.
Ersatz Bn VII and V, along with Ersatz MGK 5, had become 30 RD reserve. The commander of 5 Ersatz Bde had only RIR 4 immediately available on Tête de Behouille, with Ersatz Bn VI and VIII to the north. Early in the morning RIR 4 had occupied the treeline on the south slope of the hill with all three battalions on line. Between 0700hrs and 0800hrs an advance by French Alpine troops from the valley at Haute Mandray was turned back. Concentrating to attack, as ordered by the Bavarian ED, required troop movements which, given the dispersal of the troops and the terrain, required time. RIR 4 left a few companies in loose skirmisher lines on the treeline on the west slope of the Tête de Behouille and moved to the east slope and deployed, with I and II/RIR 4 in the first line, III/RIR 4 following behind the left, and Ersatz Bn VI and VIII in the rear as brigade reserve. The intent was to reach Hill 704, south-west of La Croix, and then to envelop the enemy right flank, pushing through the Bois de Mandray to Anould. The brigade moved out between 1300hrs and 1400hrs. The skirmishers had just reached the open ground in front of the south slope of the Tête de Behouille when they took fire from Hill 704. Enemy artillery there and east of the La Croix road swept the field from the front and left flank. 1 Ersatz/FAR 2 lost its commander and, when it had shot off its ammunition, was forced to retire. By 1600hrs the RIR 4 attack had come to a halt 500m in front of the enemy position, although III/RIR 4 had been committed on the left. Ersatz Bn VIII and VI, which were following, came under a crossfire; Ersatz Bn VI, on the left, took considerable losses. After dark Ersatz Bn VIII relieved RIR 4, which had not been adequately fed for two days, and which was pulled back behind the Tête de Behouille.
The attacks of the Bavarian ED and 30 RD moved in diverging directions, and large uncovered gaps appeared between the brigades. The flanks of 10 Res. Bde, which had pushed far forward, were unprotected. 9 Ersatz Bde could only maintain itself in Saulcy with difficulty. Nevertheless, at 1930hrs the Bavarian ED commander ordered all units to defend that night in place. He intended to determine the situation in Saulcy for himself, but at dusk came into swampy terrain and ended up in Coinches. There he heard (erroneously) that 9 Ersatz Bde had left Saulcy and fallen back 2.5km to the east. He decided to assemble the scattered troops of both divisions, which were also tired and at reduced strength, on the ridge that ran from south-east of Coinches to west of La Croix. The requisite orders were issued at 2100hrs; transmitting them sometimes required considerable time. 10 Res. Bde pulled back from Benifosse after the wounded had been moved, and 1 Ersatz Bde left Mandray.
30 August (sketch 28)
XIV RK ordered 30 RD and the Bavarian ED to defend in place on 30 August. 26 RD would attack towards Anozel to relieve the pressure on them. The Bavarian ED commander ordered 9 Ersatz Bde to defend along the ridge 2km to the west and south-west of Coinches, with 30 RD to its left as far as the hilltop north-west of La Croix, and 1 Ersatz Bde and RIR 15 in reserve.
However, 9 Ersatz Bde still held Saulcy, and the Bavarian ED commander did not know this until 0800−0900hrs. The commander of XIV AK, who happened to be present at division HQ, told him to order the commander of 30 RD, who was also present, to reoccupy Mandray and the ground to the south-east, while 9 Ersatz Bde, Ersatz Bn I and II were to hold Saulcy and Hill 450 to the south-east. This order could not be executed, however, for in the meantime 9 Ersatz Bde had carried out the orders of the previous night and evacuated Saulcy, taking up the position 2km west of Coinches and beginning to dig in. When the fog lifted at 1000hrs the French artillery laid massive fire everywhere.
This fire disrupted the entrenching work of 9 Ersatz Bde. The units were intermixed, the companies shrunken. Ersatz FA Sec. II set up behind the brigade, but was silenced for the entire day by enemy artillery fire. The duel with the enemy artillery west of Anozel was taken up by Ersatz FA Sec. I, 3/Res. Foot Artillery R 14 (10cm cannons) and 2 Ersatz/FAR 8. The other two batteries of Ersatz FA Sec. III were kept in reserve south-west of Coinches. The enemy occupied Saulcy, but only pushed patrols beyond it.
1 Ersatz Bde assembled 1.5km south-west of Coinches, with only Ersatz Bn IV (now shrunk to company strength), Ersatz MGK 1, 2 Ersatz/Eng. Bn 1 and RIR 15. Ersatz Bn III, which had pushed forward to Mangoutte the night before, had lost contact with the brigade. On the morning of 30 August it moved to the high ground 800m south-west of Mangoutte and observed a French battalion assembling halfway between St Léonard and Anould, as well as three squadrons riding towards St Léonard. As the French battalion began to attack, Ersatz Bn III withdrew towards Mandray. On the way a half-platoon of French hussars appeared on the flank at a distance of 250m and was shot to pieces; in turn Ersatz Bn III was taken under fire by the pursuing French infantry, which had climbed the Mangoutte hill. The battalion passed through Mandray without incident, but while climbing the slope on the north side of the town the battalion took artillery fire from all sides and dispersed, the fragments later making contact with other units. I and II/LIR 71 linked up with 26 RD and was employed as the garrison of St Dié; Ersatz Bn III moved to the Col de St Marie.
In the 30 RD sector 10 Res. Bde began digging in on the high ground south of Coinches, with Ersatz Bn VII and Fortress MG Sec. 2 in the village of Fouchifol, RIR 11 to the west and RIR 14 to the south-east; II/RIR 14 and Res. MG Sec. 3 were held in reserve 500m behind 10 Res. Bde. The trenches were located on the reverse slope directly behind the crest, so that an attacking enemy would immediately become engaged in close combat. Four artillery batteries set up behind the infantry. Except for security outposts, RIR 11 and 14 were withdrawn from the trenches, which were either ready or half ready, to assembly areas in the rear. This proved to be wise, for when the German artillery opened fire on St Léonard and the Bois de Mandray, the French opened a massive bombardment on this area, which lasted all day. Only when enemy infantry appeared near evening were the trenches partially or completely manned. There was no attack. 5 Ersatz Bde held the south slope of the high ground north-west of La Croix with Ersatz Bn VIII and VI; RIR 4 was on the reverse slope behind them. The 30 RD commander designated Ersatz Bn VII and V division reserve 1km south of Coinches. 1 Ersatz/FAR 2 attempted to resume its old position on the high ground behind 5 Ersatz Bde, but took effective enemy artillery fire and suffered considerable damage. It moved to Hill 577, north-east of Coinches, and began a duel with French artillery. At 1500hrs the French shelled and attacked Ersatz Bn VIII and VI, particularly the left flank of Ersatz Bn VI, which began to weaken. Both battalions had to withdraw uphill, except for 4/Ersatz Bn VIII, which held out in its trenches for two hours, beating off three attacks and only withdrawing uphill when threatened in the flanks and rear, taking considerable losses. I and II/RIR 4 had had been moved to Hill 577 to the north-east of Coinchimont, III/RIR 4 to the south-west, but at 1800hrs moved back about 500m behind Ersatz Bn VIII and VI, which were again forced to withdraw at 1900hrs. 11/RIR 4 was committed to the fight, with 7/RIR 4 covering the left flank, and at 2200hrs beat back an attack. The two batteries of Ersatz FA Sec. IV took fire in the left flank and 1 Ersatz/FAR 12 on the hilltop had to withdraw.
In the meantime, the commander of 30 RD had received an order from XIV RK releasing the Bavarian ED from his operational control and directing several days of defence in place. He decided to hold the ridge south of Coinches with outposts from II/RIR 11 and Ersatz Bn VIII and VI, while the rest of the division would be dispersed in a zone 4km to the north-east of Coinches to rest. An enemy attack would be met on the high ground to both sides of Coinches and north of Coinchimont. The orders were issued that evening, but arrived in the course of the night and were executed the next morning.
31 August (sketch 29)
30 RD did not get its rest day. The outposts on the ridge were too close to the enemy and too weak. In the 5 Ersatz Bde sector on the left, they consisted of the remnants of Ersatz Bn VIII and VI (which had been reduced to company strength and attached to Ersatz Bn VIII) on the high ground south of Coinchimont; RIR 4 had moved to rejoin the Bavarian ED. 10 Res. Bde had only II/RIR 11 (reinforced by a platoon of Fortress MG Sec. 2) south of Coinches. There was a wide gap between them. The fog lifted early and, at 0600hrs, 6/RIR 11 on the right flank was under serious attack, which was beaten off with the assistance of Ersatz Bn IV on Hill 520 to the right. 7/RIR 11 on the left was attacked by French Alpine troops, which infiltrated through the wood and turned the open company left flank. The threat was only stopped because 8 and 5/RIR 11, which were the outpost reserve, were committed one after the other by 0930hrs, and because the attached MG platoon fired superbly. At 1000hrs II/RIR 11 had to break contact and withdraw to Coinches. The enemy did not immediately pursue.
30 RD had hardly reached their bivouac areas when the division commander was forced to roust the division out to occupy assembly areas between Coinches and Laveline. At 1600hrs the enemy appeared out of the woods south of Coinches, but was pushed back by fire from I/RIR 11 and Res. MG Sec. 3. The 30 RD troops came under periodic artillery fire.
In the early morning the enemy moved closer to the Bavarian ED, especially against Ersatz Bn I and II to the right of Ersatz Bn IV on Hill 520; they were attacked between 0500 and 0600hrs from Entre-deux-Eaux by perhaps a battalion reinforced with MGs, which they threw back. The French approached carefully from Saulcy against Ersatz Bn XI and X. French detachments also moved from between Saulcy and La Paire towards Remémont, meeting no opposition and apparently gaining the rear of Ersatz Bn XI. While returning from inspecting the troops, the Bavarian ED commander came under fire north of Remémont. The only German troops in this area were Ersatz FA Sec. III, I and II, which had moved during the night to the high ground to the north-west of the town, and indeed Ersatz FA Sec. II had fired on approaching French infantry at 0600hrs. RIR 4, which had arrived early in the morning south of Remomeix, was sent by the division commander to the north of Remémont. II/RIR 4, in the lead, immediately deployed against the woods north of Remémont, from which it took weak fire, and quickly disappeared into it. I and III/RIR 4 swung right to Hill 467 between Saulcy and La Paire without making contact; the French in this area consisted of isolated detachments. The enemy artillery resumed firing, principally against Ersatz Bn X, and during the morning more and more troops left for the rear. Even the troops in reserve positions (Ersatz Bn IX and XI, I and III/RIR15, an MG and two engineer companies) took casualties. Once again the Bavarian ED artillery was unable to locate the French guns.
The position of the Bavarian ED only became serious around noon when the 30 RD outposts withdrew under pressure on the left. Initially, only Ersatz Bn IV (now reduced to company strength) withdrew from Hill 520 to La Planchette in the valley behind it, where I/RIR 15 had already set up. At 1500hrs, due to the withdrawal of 30 RD, or an incorrect order, the Bavarian ED troops, already shaken by continual artillery fire, withdrew in the direction of Remomeix.
With the first reports of the situation in 30 RD, the commander of the Bavarian ED recalled RIR 4 (minus II/RIR 4, consisting of 6 and 7/RIR 4) to the area west of Coinches and himself moved to a good observation point on the high ground north of Remomeix. At 1500hrs he could see groups of his troops leaving the woods at Remémont and moving north; he moved towards them and ordered them back to their positions, which they quickly and willingly did, as did other officers, in particular the commanders of 1 and 9 Ersatz Bde. Ersatz Bn XI did not leave its position at all. The commander of III/RIR 15 turned his unit around in Grands Gonteaux and occupied the south side of the village at the run, just in time to stop pursuing French troops. This allowed the other troops the course of the afternoon to reoccupy the abandoned positions, generally without meeting enemy resistance. Of course, once in the old positions they were greeted with heavy artillery fire. Ersatz Bn XII occupied the trenches of Ersatz Bn X; due to privations, exertions and effects of combat, Ersatz Bn X was nearly wrecked and the remnants were assembled west of Remémont. Everywhere the units were mixed together. La Planchette was no longer occupied. III/RIR 4 (minus 11/RIR 4, but including 5/RIR 4) was sent back to Hill 467, south-west of Remémont, and repulsed a weak enemy attack at 1900hrs. Ersatz Bn III, now the strength of two companies, pulled itself together and assembled behind the high ground north of Coinches on the right flank of I/RIR 11.
During the afternoon and evening the enemy had approached to within 500m and that night began to dig in. The Bavarian troops also resumed digging, which had been continually disrupted during the day. Since the reserve and Ersatz regiments did not have pioneer tool wagons, there were no large shovels or picks. Requisitions in the surrounding villages and St Dié were insufficient and the work proceeded slowly.
A detachment led by Brigadier General Rasch, composed of troops from Strasbourg (LIR 81, II/LIR 120, 1 Ersatz/FAR 15 with two batteries, a platoon of 1 Ersatz/FAR 51), as well as II/RIR 15, IV/RIR 4, II/RIR 60, Fortress MG Sec. 1, 2 Ersatz/FAR 15, Ersatz Sec./FAR 84 (2 Ersatz/FAR 84, 1 Ersatz/FAR 51), 2 Ersatz/FAR 13, 5/Res. Foot Artillery R 10 (sFH), were moved from Markirch to 30 RD on 31 August.
The German XIV RK positions on the west side of the Meurthe did not materially change. It was opposed by the badly shaken French XIV Corps. In front of 30 RD and the Bavarian ED, a brigade of the French 58 RD had established itself on the high ground west of the Meurthe between St Léonard and Anould. The French Dragoon R 8, reinforced by Light Infantry Bn 13 and 30, were operating between St Léonard and La Croix. On 29 August the dragoons left to rejoin 8 Cavalry Div. On 30 August a fresh brigade of the French 41 ID appeared here and pushed in the outposts of 30 RD and the Bavarian ED. The brigade of 58 RD was moved 6km to the south to rest, the gap being filled by XIV Corps and the brigade of 41 ID.
1 September
The commander of 30 RD was determined to retake the high ground south of Coinches. The commander of XIV RK approved and instructed the Bavarian ED to cooperate with the 30 RD attack, but initially to hold its positions. The 30 RD order was issued at 1830hrs on 31 August, in order to make allowance for the time that experience had shown was required to transmit orders in such a newly formed unit; nevertheless, there were friction and delays. According to the order, at 0500hrs 10 Res. Bde was to attack from Coinches and Ginfosse against Hill 520 and Fouchifol, while 5 Ersatz Bde attacked on its left to Tête de Behouille and 59 Bde paralleling the road to Hill 704, south-west of La Croix. The morning fog quickly gave way to scorching heat.
The Rasch Detachment marched from Gemaingoutte at 0315hrs and reached Laveline at 0630hrs. 1 Ersatz/FAR 15 and 2 Ersatz/FAR 84 went into position north-east of the town, protected by II/LIR 120, and opened fire on infantry and guns on Hill 704. 59 Bde took fire from an invisible enemy hidden in the trees and bushes of the woods south of Coinchimont. 2 Ersatz/FAR 15 unlimbered south-east of Coinchimont. LIR 81, supported by Fortress MG Sec. 3, II/RIR 15 and II/RIR 60 deployed south of Coinchimont and became involved in a hot and costly firefight with French Alpine troops, which mainly took place in the woods and resulted in intermixing of units; the enemy was driven back and pursued to the south slope of the Tête de Behouille.
5 Ersatz Bde assembled early in the morning on the Laveline−Coinchimont road, moved out at 0500hrs and also reached the Tête de Behouille. The advance guard, Ersatz Bn VIII, took fire from the wood on the hilltop and first committed 1/Ersatz Bn VIII, then the consolidated 3 and 4/Ersatz Bn VIII; attacked from two sides, the enemy fled. In the middle of the wood, Ersatz Bn VIII and LIR 81 had a blue-on-blue firefight. When this was over, at about 0900hrs or 1000hrs, the brigade assembled at the south-west corner of the wood. Two companies of French Alpine infantry, which had been bypassed 1km east of the hilltop, were detected by 2/Ersatz Bn VIII, attacked and annihilated, even though the Alpine troops were supported by artillery fire from the south of Mandray. French infantry approached from Mandray, but were forced to stop at 900m range.
East of the Tête de Behouille, 59 Bde was attacked at noon, but with the help of I/LIR 80, which arrived on the left flank of LIR 81, the French were driven back. 59 Bde assembled north of the Tête de Behouille.
The commander of 10 Res. Bde moved RIR 14 (minus I/RIR 14) to Coinches and ordered it to attack Hill 520, while the commander of RIR 11 ordered I/RIR 11, I/RIR 14 and Fortress MG Sec. 2 to attack from the south-east end of Coinches to Fouchifol, east of Hill 520. II/RIR 11 and Res. MG Sec. 3 were in reserve at Coinches. The RIR 11 group moved off at 0500hrs and were able to approach in march column to within 50m of the east side of Fouchifol by 0600hrs, when 1/RIR 11, the advance guard, took rifle and MG fire from the town and the high ground to the east. Bitter house-to-house fighting developed, but by 0900hrs the French Alpine infantry had fled and the town was in flames.
RIR 14 deployed III/RIR 14 on the right, with 9 and 11/RIR 14 leading, II/RIR 14 on the left, 6 and 8/RIR 14 forward; the attack began at 0630hrs. It soon became clear that the French Alpine troops were going to give a hard-necked defence of their trenches; nevertheless, the Bavarian attack gained ground. The two battalions clawed their way to the north slope of the hilltop, when heavy artillery fire stopped them and forced a partial withdrawal, then they resumed the attack, which cost considerable time; it was nearly noon before the enemy was forced away and the ridge taken.
Of the 30 RD artillery, only 1 Ersatz/FAR 12 made itself felt, unlimbering south of Coinches and supporting RIR 14 as it climbed Hill 520. The other two batteries of Ersatz FA Sec. IV remained in assembly areas. Ersatz Sec./FAR 80 and 2 Ersatz/FAR 51 were on Hill 571, north of Ginfosse, but fired to the west against Le Paire and Claingoutte. 3/Res. Foot Artillery R 14 (10cm cannons), on the south-west side of Combrimont, fired on Mandray. Once 10 Res. Bde had taken the ridge, Ersatz/FAR 80, all of Ersatz FA Sec. IV, 1 Ersatz/FAR 84 and 2 Ersatz/FAR 51 did not hesitate to come forward, mainly firing on enemy batteries at St Léonard and behind the Bois de Mandray.
Such quick success led the 30 RD commander to continue the attack; at 1030hrs he ordered 10 Res. Bde to take Entre-deux-Eaux and Hill 514, south-east of the town, with the rest of the division orienting on it. Between 1300hrs and 1400hrs 10 Res. Bde moved down the slope in loose lines of skirmishers, taking artillery fire from St Léonard, Mandray and guns 1km to the south of La Croix, but meeting no resistance. III and II/RIR 14 passed through Entre-deux-Eaux at 1530hrs, picking up a number of French stragglers. I/RIR 11, I/RIR 14 and Fortress MG Sec. 2 followed in the second wave.
5 Ersatz Bde had moved before 1300hrs west from Tête de Behouille to Hill 514, south-east of Entre-deux-Eaux, with Ersatz Bn VII on the right, Ersatz Bn VIII (including the attached Ersatz Bn VI of company strength) on the left, Ersatz Bn V behind VIII, and Ersatz MGK 5 following. As it left the woods it took enemy artillery fire from the south-west in the flank and rear, which caused few casualties, and the attack continued. Hill 514 was held by the enemy, and the firefight was taken up from woods about 500m from the hill. Ersatz Bn VIII began the fight with only 2/Ersatz Bn VIII and a company from Ersatz Bn VI, but soon committed 3 and 4/Ersatz Bn VIII on the left. At 1500hrs Ersatz Bn V was committed on the left, but took fire in the flank and rear from Mandray. On the right flank Ersatz Bn VII, which had only 3 and 4/Ersatz Bn VIII on line, made rapid progress; at 1500hrs 3/Ersatz Bn VIII stormed a trench on Hill 514. Soon after 1600hrs 5 Ersatz Bde stood on the hill; it had pushed in front of 10 Res. Bde and surely aided their attack. II and II/RIR 14 moved onto Hills 509 and 514 after 1700hrs; II/RIR 11 and Res. MG Sec. 3 moved up to Fouchifol. Rasch Detachment seems to have received the attack order late and made little contact.
The left flank of the Bavarian ED attacked to the right of 30 RD, principally RIR 15 at Grands Gonteaux to the south of Remémont, which committed III/RIR 15 at 1000hrs. It deployed 11, 10 and 12/RIR 15, with 9/RIR 15 and the attached 2 Ersatz/Eng. Bn 1 following. To the left German skirmishers were visible, but there was no real contact with the neighbouring unit. Nevertheless, the battalion went determinedly against the enemy on Hill 520 to the south. It took heavy rifle and MG fire and soon both 9/RIR 15 and the engineers were on the firing line, supported by Ersatz MGK 1, which had taken position west of Grands Gonteaux, until it could no longer distinguish friend from enemy. The III/RIR 15 commander, who was on the firing line, ordered the assault and was then severely wounded; his companies took the hill in a single movement. The enemy retreated, but his artillery covered the battalion with more fire than it could stand, and it too withdrew to Grands Gonteaux, perhaps at the same time and for the same reason as RIR 14 to the left. I/RIR 15 was ordered to renew the attack; it was now noon and RIR 14 had taken the ridge west of Fouchifol. I/RIR 15 reached the top almost without casualties by 1400hrs and pushed on, accompanied by heavy enemy artillery fire, to the south-west side of Entre-deux-Eaux, with Ersatz Bn XII, which had occupied a position on its right the previous evening, west of La Planchette. From its trenches that morning 3 and 4/Ersatz Bn XII had engaged enemy detachments moving from Entre-deux-Eaux to the ridge west of Fouchifol and caused them heavy casualties. Now 1 and 2, in reserve, moved on their own initiative with I/RIR 15 to the high ground, accompanied by 3/Ersatz Bn IX, which had filled a gap on the left of Ersatz Bn XII the previous day. III/RIR 15 later moved to Entre-deux-Eaux.
The battalions of 1 Ersatz Bde proper attacked at noon from La Planchette towards Hill 450, south-east of Saulcy, from right to left: Ersatz Bn II, I and IV (IV was in company strength, reinforced by 4/Ersatz Bn III and half of 3/Ersatz Bn III). Two batteries of Ersatz FA Sec. III only found inadequate positions in clearings in the wood south-east of Remémont; the third battery, 2 Ersatz/FAR 12, went into position south-east of La Paire. Ersatz FA Sec. I appeared at Grands Gonteaux. As the infantry came into the open in front of Hill 541, it took murderous artillery fire. It reached the houses on the south side of La Planchette, whose walls were splattered with body parts. 3/Ersatz Bn XII was pulled forward. But then the attack stalled; casualties were heavy. Several companies remained in the woods north of La Planchette, while some units that reached the south side of La Planchette went back to the woods. There was a wide gap in the 1 Ersatz Bde position between Grands Gonteaux and Entre-deux-Eaux, which was filled by six companies of RIR 4 (1, 8 and 11).
Near Remémont 9 Ersatz Bde did not participate in the attack. Enemy troops from Saulcy approached, but were easily driven off. The brigade was in poor condition. 2/Ersatz Bn IX only consisted of fragments which were attached to Ersatz Bn IV. Ersatz Bn X had 200 men divided into two companies. Enemy artillery fire fell all day and caused painful casualties.
2 September
XIV RK planned to finally give the troops a rest day and ordered that strong outposts be established while the mass of the troops bivouacked. The Bavarian ED was to be disengaged completely; security between Saulcy and Tête de Behouille was the responsibility of 30 RD. Although these orders were issued on the preceding evening and night, friction and delays occurred due to the general exhaustion of the troops and the intermixed units. The terrain was hilly and wooded, there was a lack of maps and communication equipment, and the units had been formed during mobilisation, which caused poor reporting: the senior leaders lacked reliable information concerning the troop’s locations, the tactical situation or the enemy.
The commander of 30 RD did not think that he could relieve the Bavarian ED in place and redeploy his troops in depth until he had attacked to break contact with the enemy, which meant attacking in the Rasch Detachment sector, south of the Tête de Behouille. 5 Ersatz Bde and 10 Res. Bde were instructed to join the 59 Bde attack in a timely manner. From early morning onwards, the good sunny weather facilitated the enemy artillery fire. In particular, I and II/RIR 14 and Ersatz Bn V took serious losses, and the fire caused confusion and casualties in the supply units and artillery battery vehicles at Fouchifol.
Elements of the Bavarian ED (RIR 15, I, 8 and 11/RIR 4, 1 Ersatz Bde and Ersatz Bn XII) did not wait to be relieved by 30 RD before marching off to their bivouac areas at Neuviller−Raves, maintaining that they could see 30 RD units to the south of them, or knew that they were there. Ersatz FA Sec. I and III also left their positions. On the other hand, 9 Ersatz Bde (with the exception of Ersatz Bn XII), II and III/RIR 4 (except 5, 8, and 11/RIR 4) and Ersatz FA Sec. II held their positions under artillery fire until relieved. The diary of Ersatz Bn IX, in reserve on the steep slope west of Remémont, was frank:
The battalion waited for the announced relief or a cancellation of the last order. Troop morale was extremely low; the French artillery fire was very effective. It was possible to escape it only to a limited degree by digging small holes. The repeated waves of French shells resulted in many men leaving to help evacuate the wounded, sometimes at night, and never returning. In addition, rations were completely inadequate; above all, there was no bread. The ration vehicles never came close enough to the troops, but unloaded someplace or another that was inadequately guarded. By the time the ration carriers arrived, the greater part of the food had been stolen by the masses of stragglers wandering around in the rear area. Men sent to the rear often never came back. Cooking was not possible, because the rising smoke attracted artillery fire. Depression and unreliability were rampant. Many men reported sick for trifling reasons; others were so deadened as to be completely indifferent. The reason was not only the daily heavy casualties caused by artillery fire, against which they were helpless, and the inadequate rations and daily battles, but also sentry duty and combat readiness in the open; the rucksacks [which had been taken off and lost on 21 August] with the coats and ponchos had for the most part not been replaced. Not enough was done to round up stragglers in the rear areas and return them to their units. These circumstances show that effective artillery fire, especially in woods, has an extraordinarily negative effect on morale, especially on units that lack cohesion and combat experience.
It was probably the same in the other 30 RD and Bavarian ED units, which had been created at mobilisation, even sometimes on the battlefield, from older year groups, and were inadequately equipped. They were then given combat tasks that were not reasonable. The weak Ersatz cavalry sections attached to the Ersatz brigades were not even adequate to provide the HQ with mounted messengers. Day after day small numbers of riders were sent into the mountains on reconnaissance; they produced exceptional results, but eventually the horses were completely worn out. 30 RD and the Bavarian ED had more difficult missions and time in combat than the regular divisions in Lorraine. The responsibility for this state of affairs rested not with the Army or with the troop leaders, who were forced to use such units so ruthlessly, but with the false economy of the people’s representatives in the Reichstag, which forced the Army to make do with such inadequate equipment and military readiness.
The position that 30 RD and the Bavarian ED took up on 2 September was a half-circle, on all sides of which, at St Léonard, in or behind the woods south of Mandray or south of La Croix, were enemy batteries that brought death and destruction anywhere they detected life or movement, and it was not possible to find or suppress them. Fortunately, on 2 September Airship Troop 14 (from Strasbourg) arrived and its captive balloons ascended at Benifosse; even though it was forced in the next few days by enemy artillery fire to continually shift its position, it provided the artillery, especially 3/Foot Artillery R 14 (10cm cannons) with target locations, which relieved the situation somewhat.
It was noon and 9 Ersatz Bde waited in vain for relief from 30 RD, which was not even able to disengage from the enemy on its own front, much less relieve its neighbour on the right.
The Rasch Detachment commander of 59 Bde had decided to avoid the open slopes by La Behouille, north of La Croix, which the painful experience of the previous day had shown to be dominated by the French artillery, and move the troops assembled at Coinchimont−Fouchifol over the Tête de Behouille. During the morning the woods on the hilltop were swept out and troops deployed on the south treeline. On the far left flank, II/RIR 15, with 8, 5 and 7/RIR 15 on line, had advanced by noon, partly in the wood, partly in the open, through La Behouille. As 2 Ersatz/FAR 15 and 1 Ersatz/FAR 51 moved into Les Planches Prés, they were shelled and suppressed. The troops in the wood on the Tête de Behouille and at Les Planches Prés suffered from the artillery fire so severely that the order was given to withdraw to Coinchimont after noon. It is possible that the Landwehr units did not execute this movement with the desired calm and discipline, especially in the woods. Fortress MG Sec. 3 drove immediately all the way back east to Col de St Marie. But determined and ruthless leaders prevented more serious damage. The battalions that had not held their ground were brought back to the south side of the woods on the Tête de Behouille. The brigade commander appeared in the skirmisher line. The Governor of Strasbourg had come to the battlefield and intervened several times. 2 Ersatz/FAR 15 moved to the high ground south-east of Fouchifol; 1 Ersatz/FAR 51 had to leave the guns in place, while, due to a misunderstanding, the limbers and vehicles moved to Markirch. They were recovered by 2/RIR 11. II/RIR 15 pushed halfway to Hill 631, south of Tête de Behouille, and resumed the attack at 1500hrs and took it. But the rifle ammunition began to run low, the intensity of the artillery fire increased and the battalion was completely isolated; at 1530hrs it withdrew to the east slope of the Tête de Behouille. II/RIR 60 did not budge from Les Planches Prés and towards evening beat back a serious French attack. After dark it was pulled back to Laveline for redeployment elsewhere. The situation in the 59 Bde sector caused 1 Ersatz Bde to move during the night to the south of Coinchimont. The Governor of Strasbourg took command of the Bavarian ED, 30 RD and the troops of the Strasbourg garrison. The attack by the brigade from the French 41 ID had caused 30 RD and the Bavarian ED great difficulties, but they had fended off a dangerous thrust against their open left flank.
Advance into the Vosges West of Colmar and into the Upper Alsace (map g, sketch 16)
To 26 August the enemy did not budge from the east side of the Vosges south of Colmar and at Mühlhausen; indeed, he seemed to have moved troops away. On 27 August the deputy commander of XIV AK saw an opportunity to retake the east side of the Vosges and the Upper Alsace. The French held the foothills west of Colmar. At 0500hrs on 28 August, 1 Landwehr Bde at Colmar was to attack Ingersheim, 3.5km to the north-west, while, 8km to the north at Ostheim, 2 Landwehr Bde would attack at 0430hrs. The two brigades were subordinate to the 1 Landwehr commander. At Bergheim, 5km north of Ostheim, a detachment would advance from Rappoltsweiler on Urbach, 10km north of Munster, which had been taken by the Rasch Detachment on 27 August. On the left, 51 Landwehr Bde would attack towards Egisheim, about 3km south of Colmar.
Between 0500hrs and 0600hrs, 1 Landwehr Bde deployed LIR 1 on the garrison training area north of Colmar, and LIR 2, with Landsturm Bty 1 and Landsturm Eng. Co. 1 on the west side of the town. 1 and 2/Landwehr Foot Artillery Bn 20 (sFH) went into battery on the south side of the training area and opened fire at 0815hrs. The 1 Landwehr Bde attack was dependent on the progress made by the Rappoltsweiler detachment to the north. Reconnaissance established that the French in front of 1 Landwehr Bde were in the meadows east of the Fecht. Noon arrived, and nothing was known of either the Rappoltsweiler detachment or 2 Landwehr Bde. 51 Landwehr Bde reported that it had taken Winzenheim, 3km south of Ingersheim.
The 1 Landwehr Bde commander could delay his attack no longer; he committed I/LIR 2 on the right of the Ingersheim road, and III/LIR 2 on the left. Landsturm Bty 1 joined the fire preparation from Logelsheim. LIR 1 sent III/LIR 1 directly west towards Ingersheim, while II/LIR 1 swung to the right and I/LIR 1 was in reserve at Colmar. The enemy quickly withdrew. At 1730hrs the Germans entered Ingersheim, which was prepared for defence but showed the effect of the German artillery fire. The bodies of Landwehr men who had died on 22 August were found in the vineyards north of Logelbach. The regiment bivouacked in Colmar and Logelbach, with security at Ingersheim.
On the right, 2 Landwehr Bde and the Rappoltsweiler detachment advanced carefully behind a thorough artillery preparation. However, the French had already been driven off by the Rasch Detachment attacking out of Urbeis. 51 Landwehr Bde, south of Colmar, took the strongly held village of Wettolsheim by 1200hrs (off Sketch 16 to the south) and Winzenheim by 1300hrs – the enemy had fled – and bivouacked at Winzenheim and Egisheim (off sketch to the south).
The Landwehr attack had driven the French back into the Vosges with little trouble; it was tempting to consider continuing the attack, but Crown Prince Rupprecht had decided to rest the troops in Lorraine and the Vosges, which is what, only interrupted by some marches, the Landwehr men did from 29–31 August. The enemy did not disturb them, but held the east side of the Vosges, with a strong group of forces at Zell (La Chapelle) and Drei Ähren (Les Trois Epis), 8km north-west of Colmar.
On 1 September the Landwehr troops were to renew their advance into the Vosges to relieve the pressure on 30 RD and the Bavarian ED. 1 and 2 Landwehr Bde were to attack towards the Col de Bonhomme (Diedolshausen), and 51 Landwehr Bde down the Munster Valley and over the Schlucht Pass to Gérardmer. On their right, the Rappoltsweiler detachment (two battalions of RIR 70, plus a Landwehr cavalry squadron and two artillery batteries) would move west. But completing and transmitting the orders took so much time that it was not possible to move far on 1 September. 2 Landwehr Bde received the order at 1445hrs, but the troops could not begin movement until after dark. III/LIR 12 was moved by rail to Urbach. The lead element of the main body, LIR 12, reached Kaysersberg (8km north-west of Colmar) between 2100hrs and 2200hrs.
1 Landwehr Bde required the entire afternoon to assemble at Ingersheim. An all-arms battle group built around LIR 2 began the climb into the mountains at 1730hrs, gaining 450m elevation and moving 7km by 2000hrs, when it bivouacked. Neither brigade made contact.
Eschelmer–Zell–Drei Ähren, 2 September (sketch 30)
The commander of 1 Landwehr Bde intended to attack the high ground west of Zell at 0800hrs from the east and north simultaneously. The two heavy howitzer batteries (half of Landwehr Foot Artillery Bn 20) were ordered to start the artillery preparation at dawn. Since midnight, II/LIR 2 had outposts on the high ground at Évaux, from which they could see that there was a strong enemy position from Kapelle to the Klein-Hohnack. I/LIR 2 was to deploy at Meyerhof, south of the road, while III/LIR 2 was in reserve west of Drei Ähren. The howitzers were marching to their positions west and south of Évaux. Before the German troops had arrived at their assigned places, II/LIR 2 moved prematurely onto the hill at Évaux and immediately became involved in a firefight. Soon enemy artillery began falling and the battalion took heavy casualties; entire squads were cut down, especially in 6/LIR 2, and the line began to waver. Then an enemy attack from Zell hit the open right flank; 6/LIR 2 was enveloped and partly encircled, its leaders captured. Its remnants and 7/LIR 2 fled. 8/LIR 2 withdrew south over the road, pursued by enemy fire, and stopped 800m west of Drei Ähren. 5/LIR 2 on the far left also had to withdraw. The enemy occupied the Évaux hill with MGs and mountain artillery. This defeat completely upset the attack plan. It seemed initially advisable to hold the treeline 800m west of Drei Ähren, where I and 5/LIR 2 deployed to the left of the remnants of II/LIR 2, with III/LIR 2 (minus 10/LIR 2) on the Frauen-Kopf hill to the right. 11/LIR 2 was held in reserve, while 10/LIR 2 reinforced II/LIR 2. The units were thoroughly intermixed. The howitzer batteries had to turn around on the narrow road west of Drei Ähren and set up in the village. They fired using the map against enemy artillery assumed to be at Place, as well as on the high ground at Zell, and later found a good spot for forward observers on the Frauen-Kopf. The officers and some NCOs of the Landsturm Eng. Co. 1, charged with protecting the guns, made useful fire direction observations from the roofs of Drei Ähren. Landsturm Bty 1 set up on the road east of the village and fired on Gross-Hohnack.
The remains of II/LIR 2, supported by 10/LIR 2, made several attempts to take the hill back, but were stopped by the fire of several heavy batteries there. At 1100hrs II/LIR 1 arrived and moved between II and III/LIR 2. Around noon there were indications that 2 Landwehr Bde was approaching north of Zell, and the commander of LIR 2 gave the order to attack the hill, but the enemy had established himself so well that he could not be driven out. In particular, it was not possible to suppress the enemy MG or the mountain guns, which continually changed position. An order from the 1 Landwehr Bde commander to renew the attack at dark changed nothing. LIR 2 had taken serious casualties.
The commander of 2 Landwehr Bde planned to attack the enemy forces on Hill 885, north-west of Zell, with LIR 3, reinforced by Landsturm Bty 2 and Landsturm Eng. Co. 2 (minus 3 Platoon) coming from the east, and LIR 12, reinforced by 3 Platoon/Landsturm Eng. Co. 2, simultaneously from the north. LIR 3 moved out at 0500hrs; since the morning was unusually hot, the packs were carried on carts. III/LIR 3, which consisted of only 9 and 12/LIR 3, with the artillery battery and engineer company, moved up the Wal-Bach and then climbed the stony, often heavily forested slope to the top of Hill 676, east of Zell. Since the north-west slope was under artillery fire, the battalion deployed behind the hilltop. On the northeast slope of the hill beyond Zell, terraces of occupied trenches were visible; Landsturm Bty 2 had set up three guns where the two streams came together and shelled the trenches, as well as Zell, as probably did the two howitzer batteries at Drei Ähren.
I and II/LIR 3 moved through the wood and hills, led by local guides, getting shot at by Alpine snipers, to reach Hill 885 at 0900hrs, where it deployed to attack Kapelle. II/LIR 3 on the right had 6 and 8/LIR 3 on the front line, with 7/LIR 3 behind the centre and 5/LIR 3 behind the right flank; I/LIR 3 on the left had 4/LIR 3 on the right and 2/LIR 3 on the left, 1/LIR 3 behind the left (3/LIR 3 was still coming up, because there were not enough vehicles to carry its packs). II/LIR 3 moved out first; it had hardly left the woods when it took murderous fire from the trenches, and French artillery fire swept the open slope and treeline. 6 and 8/LIr 3 took up the firefight with the invisible enemy, and were soon reinforced by 5 and 7/LIR 3, but the artillery fire caused heavy casualties and forced the battalion back into the wood. II/LIR 3 took cover behind rocks and dug in. The enemy also took casualties from German rifle and artillery fire. At 1400hrs the two platoons of Landsturm Eng. Co. 2 advanced to the north of Zell after an hour-long firefight, followed by a platoon of Landsturm Bty 2, which pushed forward to conduct direct fire. By evening, I and II/LIR 3 had expended their basic load of ammunition. II/LIR 3 had 30 KIA and 100 WIA. III/LIR 3 left its position after 1800hrs to rejoin the regiment, but following an incorrect order moved to Drei Ähren, it arrived there at 2200hrs.
Landwehr IR 12 moved out at 0700hrs, with III/LIR 12 moving fully deployed, as patrols had already taken fire. Eschelmer was reported as occupied and the battalion moved to attack it at 0930hrs, with 11/LIR 12 in the centre; 12/LIR 12 forded the stream to attack on the right flank, but took such heavy fire that it took cover in the woods on the north side of the valley. 9 and 10/LIR 12 remained at the fork in the road, while I and II/LIR 12 turned left. II/LIR 12 soon stopped to serve as regimental reserve, but I/LIR 12 climbed Hill 573. The attack on Eschelmer gained ground; 12/LIR 12 slowly advanced on the wooded slopes north of the road in a continual firefight. At 1100hrs 9/LIR 12 deployed on the left of 11/LIR 12. Between 1300hrs and 1400hrs the skirmisher lines approached Eschelmer; 4/LIR 12 attacked on the left, with 1/LIR 12 avoiding the flat tableland, using the woods as concealment and then moving up from the south. Half of 1/LIR 12 and a platoon of 4/LIR 12 went further west to drive off snipers firing into the left flank. By 1400hrs 11, 9 and the remaining platoon of 1 and 4/LIR 12 swept through Eschelmer; the enemy had abandoned the town, but when the west side was occupied a firefight developed that lasted until 1600hrs. III/LIR 12 held the town while I and II/LIR 12 resumed the march to the south. II/LIR 12 was surprised in a clearing in the woods by mountain gun fire, but was able to run to cover. The two battalions took position behind I and II/LIR 3 on Hill 885. 2 Landwehr Bde bivouacked on the battlefield. The terrain made it extremely difficult to bring up rifle ammunition, rations and water, especially since the cooking gear was in the rear with the packs and the proximity to the enemy made it imprudent to light fires. Fortunately the weather was dry and warm, because the troops had neither coats nor ponchos. Landsturm Bty 2 and Landsturm Eng. Co. 2 returned to Ammerschweier (off map to the east).
51 Landwehr Bde made no progress in the Munster Valley due to enemy artillery fire. It appears that, on 28 August, the Landwehr troops in Alsace were opposed by a few Alpine battalions, plus later a regiment and an artillery section from 41 ID. On 30 August the Landwehr troops at Neuenburg–Mühlheim re-entered Mühlhausen: the French had left.
In order to strengthen the French–British left wing, on 1 September Joffre decided to take troops from the First and Second Armies in Lorraine. It appeared that the Germans had, to a considerable degree, replaced their active army units in Lorraine with reserve and Landwehr. Between 31 August and 2 September, 5, 8 and 10 Cavalry Div. and a brigade of 2 Cavalry Div. were sent from Épinal and Nancy to Châlons-sur-Marne and Épernay. First Army gave up XXI Corps, which on the night of 2/3 September pulled out of its position north of Rambervillers and began rail movement at Épinal. A day later Second Army set XV Corps, south of Lunéville, in march west, while the rest of IX Corps (18 ID) loaded trains at Nancy on the morning of 4 September. The French First and Second Armies were now on the defensive.
Renewing the Offensive, 3–8 September (sketch h)
The French Second Army commander might have at least withdrawn to the Moselle had not the firmness of the First Army commander prevented him from doing so. The German Sixth and Seventh Armies would therefore have to attack, but before they did so, the hopes maintained by OHL for a breakthrough at the gap at Charmes began to fade, particularly since the progress of the right flank in Northern France made it likely that the gap would be opened from the rear. Nevertheless, it was necessary to fix in place the enemy forces in Lorraine, which was the concept of the 2 September order issued by Crown Prince Rupprecht. In view of the strength of the enemy position, reinforced with numerous heavy artillery, the necessity of advancing carefully, step by step, allowing the German artillery to do its work, was impressed on the troops. Seventh Army would attack on 3 September; Sixth Army would complete its preparations.
On 2 September the commander of Seventh Army thought that the situation in the Vosges was so uncertain that only XIV RK, reinforced by 39 ID, would attack on a line from St Dié to Étival, 10km to the north. The progress made here would determine the nature of the XV and XIV AK attacks. The Landwehr troops in the Upper Alsace were to attack to take the French opposing XIV RK in the flank and rear.