1. Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), p. 1299. The reference is to Anwar Sadat.
2. Samuel Eliot Morison, “History as Literary Art,” in By Land and By Sea: Essays and Addresses by Samuel Eliot Morison (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 298.
3. Edmund Wilson, “Re-examining Dr. Johnson,” in Classics and Commercials: A Literary Chronicle of the Forties (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1944), p. 248.
1. Livy, Histories, Book XLIII, Alfred C. Schlesinger, trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), Vol XIII, pp. 159–63.
2. Bill Gertz, “Ex-commander in Somalia hits second guessing,” Washington Times, 22 October 1993, p. A8.
3. Washington Post, 21 October 1992, p. B1.
4. Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Politican as Operational Commander,” Army (March 1996): 36.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).
6. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, Never Despair (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1988), p. 1329.
7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).
8. Ibid., 1:1, p. 87; emphasis added.
9. Ibid., VIII:6, p. 608.
10. For one example see Eliot A. Cohen, “Playing Powell Politics,” Foreign Affairs 74:6 (November/December 1995): 102-10.
11. See S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea (London: HMSO, 1954), Vol. I, pp. 457–58.
12. War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, minutes of meetings to 1946. CAB 79/88. C.O.S. (43) 325, 130th meeting, 23 June 1943.
13. Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 19. See also Stephen P. Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 266 ff.
14. Ariel Sharon with David Chanoff, Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), p. 286.
15. Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword, trans. Gerard Hopkins (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), pp. 98–99. This book was first published in French in 1932. A perceptive and generally similar set of perceptions may be found in Pat C. Hoy, “Soldiers and Scholars,” Harvard Magazine (May-June 1996): 64–70.
16. Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 462. Churchill continued, “During the war, as will be seen, I forced long staff studies of various operations, as the result of which I was usually convinced that they were better left alone.”
17. Scott Cooper, “The Politics of Airstrikes,” Policy Review 107 (June/July 2001). Web version, http://www.policyreview.org/jun01/cooper.html
18. The regular practice of placing soldiers on active duty as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs dates to the appointment of Vice Admiral John Poindexter in the Reagan administration. On the use of military officers for political tasks in Congress (including writing “an operation manual for new Republican members”), see Dana Priest, “Pentagon to Review Hill ‘Fellowships,’” Washington Post (10 October 1996), pp. 1, 19.
19. Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, Kent D. Lee, ed., trans, unknown (1927; Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1991), p. 145.
20. Harry D. Train, “An Analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands Campaign,” Naval War College Review 41:1 (Winter 1988): 50. Emphasis in the original.
21. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 496.
1. Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953–55), Vol. VII, p. 324.
2. T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Knopf, 1952), pp. 7–8, 13.
3. Charles A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil War: With the Leaders in Washington and in the Field in the Sixties (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898), p. 188. Lincoln asked Dana to head for the field on 6 May 1864.
4. See James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 68–89. Joseph T. Glatthaar, in his Partners in Command: The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1994), on p. 265 takes issue with the Williams thesis, but only briefly.
5. Basler, ed., Works, Vol. IV, p. 316.
6. This interpretation of Lincoln, treated more broadly, may be found in a recent scholarly biography: David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
7. See General Scott’s Memorandum for the Secretary of War, 17 March 1861, in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 volumes, 128 books (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1881–1901), Series I, Vol. I, pp. 200–201; henceforth cited as OR.
8. On Meigs’ role in the attempted relief of Fort Sumter see Russell Weigley, Quartermaster General of the Union Army: A Biography of M. C. Meigs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 138–53.
9. Abraham Lincoln to Lyman Trumbull, 10 December 1860, in Basler, ed., Works, Vol. IV, pp. 149–50.
10. For a good analysis see Steve E. Woodworth, “Davis, Bragg, and Confederate Command in the West,” in Gabor Boritt, ed., Jefferson Davis’s Generals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 65–83.
11. Basler, ed., Works, Vol. VI, pp. 78–79; emphasis in the original. The letter appears to have been given to Hooker at a personal interview at the White House.
12. Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 499, letter to Ulysses S. Grant, 23 August 1864.
13. Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 357. “Order of Retaliation,” 30 July 1863.
14. See Webb Garrison, The Lincoln No One Knows: The Mysterious Man Who Ran the Civil War (Nashville, Tennessee: Rutledge Hill Press, 1993), pp. 124–25.
15. Dana, Recollections, p. 183.
16. William H. Herndon, Life of Lincoln [1888] (New York: Da Capo Press, 1983), pp. 269–70.
17. A. Lincoln, “Opinion on the Draft,” in Basler, ed., Works, Vol. VI, p. 445. This entire document is a cold assessment of the need and case for conscription by the Union. It may have been intended to serve as the basis of a speech, but it was never used for that purpose.
18. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), I: 6, p. 118.
19. Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, Vol. IV, pp. 75–76.
20. See J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1929), pp. 43–62, for some of the earliest debates about the impact of the rifle on the war. These are brought up to date by Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1982). A contrary view may be found in Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). See as well Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
21. Roger Hannaford at the battle of Waynesboro, 2 March 1865, quoted in Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, Vol. II, The War in the East from Gettysburg to Appomattox, 1863–1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), p. 373. Note that the cavalry charged on foot, as occasionally occurred. See also Starr’s description (p. 123) of a Union cavalry brigade’s defense against Kershaw’s infantry division at Cold Harbor, which was decided in five minutes by the fire of repeating arms. More generally, see the discussion on p. 89.
22. The standard account, on which I have relied here, is Robert V. Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).
23. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), Part II, p. 731. The standard work on the subject remains George Edgar Turner, Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place of the Railroads in the Civil War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1953).
24. For a good account see Charles R. Shrader, “Field Logistics in the Civil War,” in Jay Luvaas and Harold W. Nelson, eds., The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Antietam (Carlisle, PA: South Mountain Press, 1987), pp. 255–84.
25. Turner, Victory Rode the Rails, p. 280.
26. See also Thomas Weber, The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861–1865 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952).
27. Ibid., pp. 282–96.
28. Jack K. Bauer, The Mexican War (New York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 237, 396.
29. Robert L. Thompson, Wiring a Continent: The History of the Telegraph Industry in the United States, 1832–1866 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 217. The discussion of the growth of the telegraph is drawn from Thompson, including the charts in Wiring a Continent, pp. 241, 394, 408.
30. The standard source is William R. Plum, The Military Telegraph During the Civil War in the United States, 2 vols. (Chicago: Jansen, McClurg, & Co., 1882). Plum says that in 1871 the Prussian forces in France operated barely one tenth of that amount of military telegraph wire.
31. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 141, 238.
32. Report to the Secretary of War by the Chief, U.S. Military Telegraph, 31 October 1864, OR, Series III, Vol. IV, p. 842.
33. Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, Vol. IV, pp. 352–54.
34. David Homer Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office: Recollections of the United States Military Telegraph Corps During the Civil War (New York: The Century Co., 1907), pp. 94, 134–36. Bates was manager of the telegraph office in the War Department from March 1862 to the end of the war. His superior, Thomas T. Eckert, was chief of the telegraphic staff and was subsequently made assistant secretary of war.
35. Report to the Secretary of War by the Acting Signal Officer of the Army, 31 October 1864. OR, Series III, Vol. IV, p. 820.
36. Bates, Lincoln in the Telegraph Office, pp. 42, 123.
37. For an example, see the discussion of Halleck’s communications with Hooker in Kenneth R Williams, Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War, 5 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1949–1959), Vol. II, pp. 635–36.
38. An excellent brief discussion of Civil War logistics is C. R. Shrader, “Field Logistics in the Civil War,” in J. Luvaas and H. W. Nelson, eds., The US. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Antietam, pp. 255–84.
39. Letter to Orville Browning, 22 September 1861, in Basler, pp. 531–33.
40. Letter to James C. Conkling, 26 August 1863, in ibid., Vol. VI, p. 407.
41. Letter to Joseph Hooker, 10 June 1863, in ibid., Vol. VI, p. 257.
42. See, for example, his memoranda for a plan of campaign of 27 July 1861 and 1 October 1861, in ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 457–58, 544–46.
43. Letter to Horace Greeley, 22 August 1862, in ibid., Vol. V, p. 338.
44. McPherson, Lincoln, p. 41; emphasis in the original.
45. For a discussion of the role of raiding in Civil War strategy see Archer Jones, Civil War Command & Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat (New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. 84 ff. and passim. Jones takes this argument too far, however.
46. See Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991) and Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians 1861–1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
47. McPherson, Lincoln, pp. 91 ff.
48. Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (New York: Greenwood, 1968), p. 236 (reprint of 1904 edition, published posthumously).
49. On Butler and technology see Robert V. Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), pp. 72–73, 137, 122–23, 290, 283–84 and passim.
50. The inclusion of Sherman in this indictment may seem strange to some, but see Albert Castel, Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992).
51. Proclamation Revoking General Hunter’s Order of Military Emancipation of May 9, 1862, in Basler, ed., Works, Vol. V, pp. 222–23.
52. Letter to General Joseph Hooker, 10 June 1863, in ibid., Vol. VI, p. 257.
53. Letter to Major John J. Key, 26 September 1862, in ibid., Vol. V, pp. 442–43.
54. Letter to Major John J. Key, 24 November 1862, in ibid., p. 508.
55. Endorsement concerning John J. Key, 27 December 1862, in ibid., Vol. VI, p. 20.
56. Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, Vol. VII, p. 278.
57. Letter to George G. Meade, 14 July 1863, in Basler, ed., Works, Vol. VI, p. 328.
58. See Gabor Boritt, “‘Unfinished Work,’” in Gabor S. Boritt, ed., Lincoln’s Generals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 81–120.
59. Lorenzo Thomas and Ethan Allen Hitchcock to Edwin Stanton, 2 April 1862, in OR, Series I, Vol. 12, Part I, pp. 228–29. See also Hitchcock’s report to the president of 30 March 1862, pp. 229–30.
60. See Lincoln’s memorandum for the record of 8–9 July 1862 on these conversations in Basler, ed., Works, Vol. V, pp. 309–12.
61. See Abraham Lincoln to Joseph Hooker, 14 May 1863, in ibid., Vol. VI, p. 217.
62. See the discussion in R. M. Epstein, “The Creation and Evolution of the Army Corps in the American Civil War,” Journal of Military History 55:1: 21–46.
63. Dana, Recollections, p. 1.
64. Ibid., p. 20. It should be noted that Stanton made it clear that Lincoln, and not the secretary of war alone, read Dana’s reports closely. Other evidence corroborates this, including the fact that Lincoln personally dispatched Dana to Grant a second time in May 1864. See also P. H. Watson to C. A. Dana, 27 November 1863, OR, Series I, Vol. XXXI, Part III, p. 256, informing Dana that “both [Stanton and Lincoln] receive your dispatches regularly and esteem them highly.”
65. Dana, Recollections, p. 33.
66. Ibid., p. 235.
67. Charles Dana to E. M. Stanton, 12 October 1863, OR, Series I, Vol. XXX, Part I, p. 215.
68. On Grant’s alcohol problem see William S. McFeely, Grant: A Biography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), pp. 132 ff.
69. Charles Dana to John Rawlins, 15 July 1864, as quoted in John Y. Simon, ed., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Vol. XI, June 1–August 15, 1864 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), p. 253.
70. Edwin M. Stanton to Ulysses S. Grant, 3 March 1865, in Basler, ed., Works, Vol. VIII, pp. 330–31.
71. Sherman’s account, including the original terms and his subsequent snub of Stanton, may be found in William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman (New York: Library of America, 1990), pp. 842–66.
72. According to Dana, who was there, Stanton did not offer his hand either. Rather he merely made a “slight forward motion of his head, equivalent, perhaps, to a quarter of a bow.” Dana, Recollections, p. 290.
73. There is an interesting description of Lincoln’s guidance to Grant in advance of that speech, given in Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, Vol. VIII, p. 341.
74. Ulysses S. Grant to Abraham Lincoln, 19 July 1864, in Simon, ed., Grant Papers, Vol. XI, p. 280.
75. See, inter alia, OR, Series I, Vol. XXXVII, Part II, pp. 65 ff.; Dana, Recollections, pp. 229–32; Basler, ed., Works, Vol. VII, pp. 424–76.
76. This episode is well covered in Glatthaar, Partners in Command, pp. 211–16.
77. Letter to Ulysses S. Grant, 3 August 1864, in Basler, ed., Works, Vol. VII, p. 476.
78. See, for example, his concise and insightful dispatch to General David Hunter, 23 July 1864, in ibid., p. 456.
79. Quoted in Stephen Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln’s Chief of Staff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), p. 157.
80. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, Vol. V, at pp. 271–82 has an interesting assessment of Halleck, of whom the author declares he has altered his views (for the better) more than his views of any other Civil War figure. See also a generally favorable biography: Ambrose, Halleck, cited at note 82 below.
81. Howard K. Beale, ed., Diary of Gideon Welles, 3 vols. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), Vol. I, pp. 216, 364.
82. Halleck rarely receives kind treatment from students of the war. See, however, two biographical studies: Stephen E. Ambrose, Halleck: Lincoln’s Chief of Staff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), and Curt Anders, Henry Halleck’s War (Carmel, Indiana: Guild Press of Indiana, 1999).
83. Ulysses S. Grant to Julia Dent Grant, 30 April 1862, in Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (New York: Library of America, 1990), p. 1006.
84. The best biography is Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln’s Secretary of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962).
85. Quoted in ibid, at p. 385. For a general assessment of their relationship, see pp. 381–91.
86. Ibid., pp. 402–18.
87. See William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955).
88. Ulysses S. Grant to Charles A. Dana, 15 July 1864, in Simon, ed., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Vol. XI, June 1-August 15, 1864 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967–2001), p. 251. “I am sorry to see such a disposition to condemn a brave old soldier as Gen. Hunter is known to be without a hearing.” Yet one author describes him as “a prime example of Lincoln’s inability … to select officers for high command”; see Ezra Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), p. 244.
89. Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, pp. 359–60.
1. Winston S. Churchill, Amid These Storms: Thoughts and Adventures, “A Day with Clemenceau” (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932), pp. 173–74, 176.
2. Quoted in David S. Newhall, Clemenceau: A Life at War (Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellen, 1991), p. 318.
3. I have used two reference works for most of the statistics in this chapter: Patrick H. Hutton, Amanda S. Bourque, and Amy J. Staples, eds., Historical Dictionary of the Third French Republic, 1870–1940, 2 vols. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), and Randal Gray with Christopher Argyle, Chronicle of the First World War, 2 vols. (New York: Facts on File, 1990).
4. See Alistair Home, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (London: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 327–28.
5. See the scathing summary in John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), pp. 367–69.
6. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Clemenceau (Paris: Fayard, 1988) p. 108.
7. Newhall, Clemenceau, pp. 48–50.
8. Duroselle, Clemenceau, p. 445.
9. André Beaufre, “Foch,” in Michael Carver, ed., The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 126.
10. Duroselle, Clemenceau, p. 596.
11. Quoted in Newhall, Clemenceau, p. 322.
12. Quoted in ibid., p. 195.
13. Jere Clemens King, Generals & Politicians: Conflict Between France’s High Command, Parliament and Government, 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1951), pp. 11 ff. On the state of French civil-military relations before the war, which is indispensable to understanding the tension between civilians and generals during it, see Douglas Porch, The March to The Marne: the French Army, 1871–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
14. Ibid., pp. 115 ff.
15. Edward Spears, Prelude to Victory 1917 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), p. 435.
16. Figures on death and prison sentences from Guy Pedroncini, Pétain: Le Soldat, 1914–1940 [The Soldier, 1914–1940] (Paris: Perrin, 1998), p. 122. Total numbers of mutineers from Gray and Argyle, Chronicle, Vol. 2, p. 40.
17. Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1994), p. 385.
18. Jean Jules Henri Mordacq, Le Ministère Clemenceau: Journal d’un Témoin [Minister Clemenceau: Journal of a Witness], Vol. I, Novembre 1917–Avril 1918 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1930), p. 13.
19. Ibid., p. 205.
20. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 54.
21. Ibid., p. 62.
22. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 233.
23. This and other data taken from Anne Blanchard et al., Histoire Militaire de la France [Military History of France], Vol. 3, De 1871 à 1940 ed. Guy Pedroncini, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992–1994), Chapter 7, “L’armée française et la Grande Guerre,” [The French Army and the Great War,”] pp. 161–202).
24. Ibid., p. 170.
25. Much of what follows is based on the journal of General Mordacq, who kept a detailed diary throughout the war and beyond. Since Clemenceau destroyed his own papers, Mordacq’s are our primary souce for the Tiger’s activities.
26. Mordacq, Journal, Vol. I, p. 6.
27. Edward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe, Vol. II, The Fall of France 1940 (New York: A. A. Wyn, 1955), p. 98. Spears was serving, as he had in World War I, as a liaison officer with the French.
28. Quoted in Bertrand Favreau, Georges Mandel ou la passion de la République (Paris: Fa-yard, 1996), p. 476.
29. See Mordacq, Journal, Vol. I, pp. 174 ff.
30. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 55. He describes this process, pp. 70–72.
31. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 148, 174 ff.
32. Ibid., pp. 114 ff.
33. Ibid., p. 141.
34. Ibid., p. 172.
35. His receipt of the bouquet is described in Mordacq, Journal, Vol. II, p. 105.
36. Guy Pedroncini, Pétain le Soldat, p. 226.
37. Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War, trans. J. de Morinni (New York: H. K. Fly, 1918). For a very perceptive analysis see Gideon Y. Akavia, Decisive Victory and Correct Doctrine: Cults in French Military Thought Before 1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1993).
38. Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans. T. Bentley Mott (New York: Doubleday, 1931), p. 179.
39. For a useful revisionist view of Foch, see Damien Fenton, “Unjustly Accused: Marshal Ferdinand Foch & the French ‘Cult of the Offensive,’” WaiMilHist 1:4 (July 1999). WaiMilHist is an electronic journal of military history produced by the History Department of the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. Its Web site is www.waikato.ac.nz/wfass/subject/history/waimilhist/1999/contents.htm.
40. See Jean Autin, Foch, ou le triomphe de la volonté [Foch, or the Triumph of the Will] (Paris: Librairie Académique, 1987), p. 129 passim.
41. Quoted in ibid., p. 192.
42. Ibid., p. 129.
43. Jean-Jules-Henri Mordacq, Clemenceau (Paris: Les Éditions de France, 1939), p. 209.
44. Ibid.
45. Quoted in Donald Smythe, Pershing: General of the Armies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 73.
46. Foch, Memoirs, p. 185.
47. Ibid., p. xiv.
48. Ibid., p. xxvi.
49. Pétain’s biographer, Guy Pedroncini, emphasizes this side of his subject, perhaps to excess. See Guy Pedroncini, Pétain: le soldat, pp. l0ff. and passim.
50. Quoted in Alastair Home, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 134. There is a good summary of Pétain’s career and character at pp. 132–41.
51. Pedroncini, Pétain le soldat, pp. 117–22.
52. Foch was picked at the Doullens conference on 26 March 1918 to coordinate the activities of the Allied armies; he acquired the title of supreme commander on 14 April, with his responsibility extended to include Italy on 2 May and the Belgian army—anomalously left out of his scope of control—on 9 September.
53. William Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen 1914–1918, 2 vols. (London: Cassell, 1926), Vol. II, pp. 296–97.
54. For an interesting account of this see the memoir of the ubiquitous Maurice Hankey, who as secretary to the War Cabinet knew all about it: Maurice Hankey, Supreme Command 1914–1918, 2 vols. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 775–84.
55. For a good description see G. C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (1940; Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1976).
56. For accounts see Jean-Jules-Henry Mordacq, Le commandement unique: comment il fut realise [The Unified Command: How It Was Achieved] (Paris: Éditions Jules Tallander, 1929), pp. 46–47 and passim; Pedroncini, Pétain le soldat, pp. 197 ff.
57. For a general discussion see Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900–1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
58. Interestingly, Foch admired Germany’s monumentally complex and audacious Schlieffen Plan even after World War I; see Raymond Recouly, Foch: My Conversations with the Marshal, trans. Joyce Davis (New York: D. Appleton, 1929), p. 15.
59. Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, trans. F. M. Atkinson (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930), p. 76.
60. Mordacq, Journal, Vol. II, p. 8.
61. Raymond Poincaré, Au Service de la France: Neuf Années de Souvenirs [In the Service of France: Nine Years of Memories] (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1928), Vol. X, Victoire et Armistice 1918 [Victory and Armistice: 1918], p. 213.
62. See Mordacq, Journal, Vol. I, p. 115.
63. Ibid., pp. 139–41.
64. For the dispute seen through American eyes, see David F. Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917–1918 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), pp. 33–36.
65. See Autin, Foch, pp. 214–16.
66. See the discussion in Foch, Memoirs, p. 440.
67. See Pedroncini, Pétain, Général en Chef [Pétain: General in Chief] pp. 210–30.
68. Mordacq, Journal, Vol. I, p. 240.
69. Described in ibid., Vol. II, pp. 38–77.
70. Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery, p. 48.
71. Ibid., p. 61.
72. Ibid., p. 75.
73. Foch, Memoirs, p. 185.
74. Quoted in ibid., pp. 434–35.
75. Recouly, Foch, pp. 39–40.
76. Ibid., p. 436.
77. Smythe, Pershing, pp. 237, 229 passim.
78. Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery, p. 124.
79. Mordacq, Journal, Vol. II, p. 284.
80. Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914–1918 (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 425 ff.
81. Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace: Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers 1917–1924, 2 vols., edited by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (New York: Harper, 1927), Vol. I, pp. 161–62.
82. Mordacq, Journal, Vol. II, p. 293.
83. Recouly, Foch, pp. 39–40.
84. See King, Generals and Politicians, pp. 196 ff.
85. See Mordacq, Journal, Vol. II, pp. 284–85; see also Mordacq’s study of the armistice negotiations, La Vérité sur l’armistice [The Truth About the Armistice] (Paris: Éditions Jules Tallandier, 1929), pp. 70 ff.
86. Recouly, Foch, pp. 39–40.
87. Quoted in Foch, Memoirs, p. 456.
88. Mordacq, La Vérité, p. 71.
89. Quoted in Recouly, Foch, p. 45.
90. Ibid., p. 41.
91. Mordacq, Journal, Vol. II, p. 339.
92. Recouly, Foch, pp. 176–77.
93. The main work on the subject is Jere Clemens King, Foch versus Clemenceau: France and German Dismemberment, 1918–1919 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). See also Newhall, Clemenceau, pp. 447 ff.
94. See Recouly, Foch, pp. 193–99.
95. William Maxwell Aitken, Men and Power 1917–1918 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956), p. 150 and passim.
96. Miquel, Clemenceau, p. 318 ff.
97. This episode is described at Mordacq, Journal, Vol. Ill, pp. 226–31.
98. G. Ward Price, “Historic Interview with Marshal Foch,” The Daily Mail, April 19, 1919.
99. Miquel, Clemenceau, pp. 360 ff.
100. Ibid., p. 362. Miquel’s account rests heavily on André Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty (Bloomington: Bobbs Merrill, 1921), available at the Web site: www.ukans.edu/~libsite/wwi-www/treatytruth/tardieuOOtc.htm. For the specific discussion, see Chapter 5, “The Left Bank of the Rhine,” at www.ukans.edu/~libsite/wwi-www/treatytruth/tardieu05.htm#V.
101. Mordacq, Journal, Vol. Ill, p. 259.
102. Paul Mantoux, The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919): Notes of the Official Interpreter Paul Mantoux, 2 vols., trans, and ed. by Arthur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), Vol. II, p. 466.
103. Ibid., p. 468.
104. Ibid., pp. 474–75.
105. Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery, p. 11.
106. Ibid., p. 7.
107. Maxime Weygand, Le Maréchal Foch (Paris: Flammarion, 1947), p. 293.
108. Mantoux, Deliberations, Vol. I, p. xxviii. (From Link’s Introduction.)
109. Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery, p. 239; emphasis in the original.
110. Ibid., pp. 403, 405.
111. Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, Vol. II, Unity, 1942–44, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), p. 351.
1. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume II, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), pp. 184–85.
2. Ibid., p. 185.
3. R. V. Jones, The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945 (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978), pp. 107–8.
4. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 386–87. See as well F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. I (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1979), pp. 550–56.
5. G. R. Elton, Political History: Principles and Practice (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 71.
6. John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993).
7. Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Alan Brooke Papers, 5/9, entry of 10 September 1944.
8. Bernard Fergusson, ed., The Business of War: The War Narrative of Major-General Sir John Kennedy (New York: William Morrow, 1958), p. 115.
9. Sir Hastings Ismay to Sir Leslie Hollis, 18 February 1957, Ismay papers, King’s College, London, 1/14/60.
10. David Fraser, Alanbrooke (New York: Atheneum, 1982), p. 532; Alex Danchev, Very Special Relationship: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance 1941–44 (London: Brassey’s, 1986), takes a similar view.
11. David Reynolds, “1940: The Worst and Finest Hour,” in Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., Churchill (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 255.
12. Martin Kitchen, “Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union During the Second World War,” Historical Journal 30:2 (June 1987): 435.
13. Sheila Lawlor, “Greece, March 1941: The Politics of British Military Intervention,” Historical Journal 25:4 (December 1982): 933.
14. Kitchen, “Winston Churchill.”
15. Warren F. Kimball, “Churchill and Roosevelt,” in Robert Blake and William Roger Louis, eds., Churchill (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 306.
16. Fergusson, The Business of War, p. 60.
17. Ibid., p. 157.
18. John Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries, 1939–1945 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), 23 October 1940 entry, p. 275.
19. Alex Danchev, “‘Dilly-Dally,’ or Having the Last Word: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and Prime Minister Winston Churchill,” Journal of Contemporary History 22 (1987): 37.
20. Ibid., p. 29.
21. Michael Howard, “The End of Churchillmania? Reappraising the Legend,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 1993), p. 145. This extended review essay stresses, interestingly, the negative portrayals of Churchill over the positive.
22. Charles Wilson, Churchill Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran: The Struggle for Survival 1940–1965 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966).
23. John Colville, The Churchillians (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), p. 191.
24. The scholarly view began to shift against Churchill with such works as A. J. P. Taylor, ed., Churchill Revised: A Critical Assessment (New York: Dial Press, 1968), and continues with more recent studies—including even the more moderate Robert Blake and William Roger Louis, eds., Churchill (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993).
25. Quoted in Martin Gilbert, In Search of Churchill (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), p. 216.
26. Ibid., p. 184.
27. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols., Vol. I, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), p. 421. Jeremy Campbell, Winston Churchill’s Afternoon Nap (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp. 210 passim, describes the physiology of circadian rhythms that made (and make) hour-long naps of this type a natural recourse “to enter the ancient sleep-ability gate as soon as it opened.”
28. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, memorandum to General Sir Hastings Ismay, chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Sir Edward Bridges, 19 July 1940, pp. 17–18.
29. Lecture to Imperial Defense College, October 1949, Ismay Papers III/4/12.
30. Ismay letter to Anthony Eden, 7 January 1964, Ismay Papers IV/Avon/16a.
31. Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 6 vols., 1933–38, Vol. I (1933), p. 94. Churchill described Halifax as “the foremost statesman of these times.”
32. Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life, Winston S. Churchill, Painting as a Pastime (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 331.
33. See Churchill’s essay, “Consistency in Politics,” in Winston S. Churchill, Amid These Storms: Thoughts and Adventures (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932), pp. 39–50.
34. Churchill, Marlborough, Vol. II, p. 35.
35. Winston S. Churchill, The River War, rev. ed. (London: Longmans Green, 1902), p. 162.
36. Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. I, 1911–1914 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1924), pp. 125–48.
37. Those interested should read on this subject, Maurice Ashley, Churchill as Historian (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1968).
38. Churchill, Marlborough.
39. Churchill, Marlborough, Vol. V, p. 246.
40. Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, 4 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1956), Vol. IV, pp. 149–263.
41. Churchill, Second World War, Vol. Ill, The Grand Alliance, p. 608.
42. Winston S. Churchill, speech to Congress, 19 May 1943, in Robert Rhodes James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, Vol. VII, 1943–1949 (London: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), p. 6783.
43. Winston S. Churchill, Painting as a Pastime (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950).
44. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VII, Road to Victory, 1941–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), p. 20.
45. Paper of 16 December 1941, composed for Churchill’s first wartime meeting with Roosevelt, in Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Vol. I, p. 303.
46. Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. I, 1911–1914, p. 174.
47. Churchill, Marlborough, Vol. VI, p. 600.
48. I have discussed Churchill’s view of strategy in “Churchill at War,” Commentary 83:5 (May 1987): 40–49.
49. Harold Macmillan diary entry of 16 November 1943, as quoted in Gilbert, The Road to Victory, p. 554.
50. Gilbert, Road to Victory, p. 759.
51. James Leasor, War at the Top (London: Michael Joseph, 1959), p. 173.
52. Norman Brook to Hastings Ismay, 27 January 1959, Ismay Papers 1/14/8. Liddell Hart Centre.
53. Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. IV, 1916–1918, Part II (1927), p. 247.
54. See, for example, Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900–1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
55. Churchill, World Crisis, Vol. III, 1916–18, pp. 194–95.
56. Churchill, World Crisis, Vol. II, 1915, p. 284.
57. Ibid., p. 164.
58. Personal Minute D185/3, 14 October 1943. Prime Minister’s Office, Operational Papers 3/336/3; henceforth cited as PREM.
59. Brooke Diary, entry for 5 June 1944.
60. C.O.S. (41) 334, Minute 4, 26 September 1941. CAB 79/86 (confidential annexes to COS meetings).
61. See R. Stuart Macrae, Winston Churchill’s Toyshop (Kineton: The Roundwood Press, 1971). Macrae’s discussion of Churchill on pp. 166–69 is of particular interest, and supports a number of the points made above. Macrae, then a colonel in the British Army, was the deputy director of this operation (M.D. 1) throughout most of the war.
62. Winston S. Churchill, speech of 15 February 1942, Winston Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897–1963, ed. Robert Rhodes James (London: Bowker, 1974), Vol. VI, p. 6584.
63. Winston S. Churchill, Minute of 8 April 1943, quoted in Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV (London: HMSO, 1970), p. 369.
64. Winston S. Churchill, Minute to the Cabinet, 16 December 1939, quoted in Churchill Prime Minister’s Office: Operational Papers, The Second World War, Vol. I, p. 547.
65. Hastings L. Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay (New York: Viking, 1960), p. 166.
66. Prime Minister’s Serial D 114.1, PREM/3/496/4.
67. Prime Minister’s Serial D 136/1, PREM 3/496/4.
68. This in part on the strength of Cunningham’s memoirs; admirals and generals, no less than prime ministers, have benefited from well-written recollections of their service in government.
69. S. W. Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals (New York: William Morrow, 1978), p. 188.
70. For other discussions of Churchill and the admirals see Arthur J. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).
71. PREM 3/322/5/6.
72. Note from paymaster general to prime minister, “The Post-War Fleet,” 5 July 1944, reprinted as WP (44) 764, 29 December 1944, PREM 3/322/5/6.
73. Prime Minister Personal Minute M 767/3 to First Sea Lord, 1 November 1943, PREM 3/322/5/6.
74. See the data in S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol. I (London: HMSO, 1954), p. 576. In June 1943 the Royal Navy and Royal Marines together numbered 660,000; in the same month of the following year they numbered 778,000, the peak for the war. By November 1943, the date of the controversy described here, they were probably somewhere in between these two numbers; moreover, since some of the increase occurred in the Marines, who were not covered by Churchill’s strictures, it would appear that he won a considerable victory.
75. See the memoranda, which are reprinted in John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Volume V, August 1943-September 1944, pp. 398–403.
76. Gilbert, Road to Victory, p. 865.
77. Norman Brook in John Wheeler-Bennett, ed., Action This Day: Working with Churchill (London: Macmillan 1968), p. 22.
78. Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War, 21.11.42, PREM 3/54/7. All of the correspondence referred to on this matter is taken from this file.
79. John Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), p. 433.
80. F. H. Hinsley et al. British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 655–57.
81. See, for example, Ismay’s comment on Dill’s 6 May 1941 memorandum arguing against sending tanks to the Middle East: letter to John Connell, 13 September 1961 in Ismay Papers/IV/Con/4/6a.
82. Ibid.
83. Quoted in Danchev, ‘“Dilly-Dally”’: 27.
84. See Philip Warner, “Auchinleck,” in John Keegan, ed., Churchill’s Generals (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), p. 138.
85. Letter of 26 June 1941, cited in J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. II, September 1939-June 1941 (London: HMSO, 1957), pp. 530–31.
86. Walt W. Rostow, Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower’s Decision of March 25, 1944 (Auston: University of Texas Press, 1981).
87. PREM 3/334/4.
88. Churchill, Second World War, Vol. VI, Triumph and Tragedy (1953), p. 456.
89. Warren F. Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Vol. II, pp. 389–402.
90. Dwight D. Eisenhower to George Catlett Marshall, FWD 18345, 30 March 1945. In Alfred Chandler, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), Vol. IV, p. 2561.
91. Americans as well as Britons were “kept in the picture,” it should be noted. See the remarkable tribute by Edward Mead Earle in his introduction to his seminal edited volume, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. vii.
1. Quoted in Michael Bar Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Biography, trans. Peretz Kidron (New York: Adama Books, 1978), p. 198.
2. Ben-Gurion knew, with varying degrees of fluency, Hebrew, Yiddish, Russian, Polish, English, German, French, Turkish, and Arabic. His military-history library comprised, as one might expect, an extensive collection on World War II, but also on other conflicts, including an impressive group of books about the American Civil War, featuring standard works such as Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants and the collected works of Lincoln.
3. See Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the Holocaust (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996).
4. Michael Bar Zohar, Ben-Gurion: The Armed Prophet (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 129 ff.
5. Figures on the Arab population vary, and much depends upon one’s definition of Palestine: All of the Mandate area? The area assigned to the Jewish state under the partition plan? Or the area that subsequently became Israel? (The remnants of the portion assigned to Palestine’s Arabs were absorbed by Egypt and Jordan.)
6. A short account of the end of the British Empire after World War II is Wm. Roger Louis, “The Dissolution of the British Empire,” in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. IV, The Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 329–56.
7. The most comprehensive biography of David Ben-Gurion is appearing in multiple volumes by Shabtai Teveth. The first volumes have been translated into English as Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion: The Burning Ground, 1886–1948 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987). Despite its title, the book ends early in the Second World War, but it is a magnificent study nonetheless.
8. A particularly useful scholarly edition of Ben-Gurion’s war-of-independence diary is Gershon Rivlin and Elchanan Oren, eds., The War of Independence: Ben-Gurion’s Diary, 3 vols. (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1982), which covers the period October 1947 to July 1949 (Hebrew). The Ben-Gurion Research Center is publishing edited versions of earlier parts of the diary, as noted below.
9. See Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War (Oxford University Press, 1985), passim.
10. See, for example, Ben-Gurion’s remarks on 3 April 1947: David Ben-Gurion, Chimes of Independence: Memoirs (March-November 1947), ed. Meir Avizohar (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1993, in Hebrew),. p. 150. Note that this work is not a memoir but rather an edited version of Ben-Gurion’s diaries.
11. Ben-Gurion, Chimes, p. 198.
12. The organization of the Haganah is described in Meir Pa’il, The Emergence of ZAHAL (I.D.E) (Tel Aviv: Zmora, Bitan, Modan, 1979, in Hebrew); see in particular organization chart 5 at the end of the book. Note that the translation of the title is incorrect: more accurate would be “From the Haganah to the Israel Defense Forces.”
13. Data from Susan Hattis Rolef, ed., Political Dictionary of the State of Israel, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 136–37.
14. Ben-Gurion, Chimes, p. 142. A two-paragraph summary of his assessment of both problems and remedies is to be found in the entry for 27 May 1947, p. 192.
15. Ibid., p. 148.
16. See, for example, the diary entry of 4 June 1947, p. 290.
17. Ibid., 10 April 1947, p. 159.
18. Ibid., 10 April 1947, pp. 171–72.
19. Ibid., 22 April 1947, p. 176.
20. Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, Army Intelligence Document File 1944–1955. National Archives at College Park, College Park, Maryland. File 435169, “Foreign Report,” 28 January 1948. See also File 456080, “Arab and Jewish Military Forces in the Middle East, 25 January 1948,” and File #455109, “Preliminary Report on Palestine Visit,” 20 March 1948. Deliberate deception may well have been at work.
21. Ben-Gurion, Chimes, 2 May 1947, p. 181.
22. Ibid., 30 May 1947, p. 201.
23. See Yosef Avidar oral history, 13 March 1977, Ben-Gurion Archives—Oral Histories, Ben-Gurion Research Center, Ben-Gurion University, pp. 12–13. Henceforth cited as BEN-GURION-OH.
24. Ben-Gurion, Chimes, 30 April 1947, p. 180; 2 May 1947, p. 181.
25. David Ben-Gurion, The War of Independence: Ben-Gurion’s Diary, Gershon Rivlin and Elhanan Oren, eds., 3 vols. (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1983), Vol. I, p. 53 (Hebrew: henceforth cited as War Diary).
26. For a generally unsympathetic but interesting view of Ben-Gurion’s relationship with Galili, see Anita Shapira, The Army Controversy 1948: Ben-Gurion’s Struggle for Control (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1985, Hebrew), pp. 12–13.
27. War Diary, Vol. I, 23 October 1947, p. 421.
28. Neil Asher Silberman, A Prophet From Amongst You: The Life of Yigael Yadin: Soldier, Scholar, and Mythmaker of Modern Israel (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1993), pp. 82 ff.
29. Ibid., pp. 80–82.
30. Ben-Gurion, Chimes, 4 June 1947, pp. 290–91, 8 June 1947, p. 300.
31. See Mordechai Naor, Laskov (Jerusalem: Keter, 1989, Hebrew), pp. 169–85.
32. Ibid.
33. The standard work is Yoav Gelber, The Kernel of a Regular Jewish Army: The Contribution of British Army Veterans to the Creation of the IDF (Jerusalem: Yitzchak ben Zvi Foundation, 1986, Hebrew).
34. A very interesting discussion of this comparison may be found in Jehuda Wallach, Called to the Colours: The Creation of a Citizen Army in War Time (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1997, Hebrew).
35. Zahava Osterfeld, An Army Is Born: Main Stages in the Buildup of the Army under the Leadership of David Ben-Gurion, 2 vols. (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1994, Hebrew), Vol. II, p. 821.
36. Ibid., p. 835.
37. This speech, like others of this period, is reprinted in David Ben-Gurion, When Israel Fought in Battle (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1950, Hebrew; reprint 1975).
38. See diary entry for 18 October 1947 in Ben-Gurion, Chimes, pp. 406–7.
39. Wisdom of the Fathers, 2:1, trans. Avrohom Davis (New York: Metsudah, 1986), p. 41.
40. Ben-Gurion, Chimes, p. 503.
41. In fact Israeli aircraft shot down five RAF Spitfires in one aerial clash during this fighting.
42. On the complicated Arab politics of the time, see Uri Bar Joseph, The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1987), and R J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921–1957 (London: Frank Cass, 1967).
43. Jon and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill: Britain and the Palestine War (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1960), p. 12.
44. War Diary, Vol. I, p. 415 (entry of 14 May 1948).
45. Ibid., pp. 196 ff. (entry of 31 January 1948).
46. Ibid., pp. 330–31 (entry of 31 March 1948).
47. There is an account of this episode in Silberman, Prophet, at p. 119. He doubts that it happened as Yadin described it.
48. For a brilliant account of the memory of Latrun—extraordinarily contentious to this day—see Anita Shapira, “Historiography and Memory: Latrun, 1948.” in Jewish Social Studies: The New Series (Fall 1996) 3:1, pp. 20–61.
49. See Ben-Gurion’s 16 June 1948 speech to other members of the government, “In the Days of the Truce,” in his When Israel Fought in Battle, p. 129. At this point, when the road to Jerusalem had been secured, the city was demoted to a second priority, after the Negev desert.
50. For a description of this episode see Bar Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 181 ff., War Diary, Vol. Ill, p. 712.
51. David Ben-Gurion, speech to the Cabinet, 27 September 1948, in his War Diary, Vol. Ill, p. 726.
52. “How shall we deal with coming things?” 11 September 1948, in Ben-Gurion, When Israel Fought in Battle, p. 230.
53. Yitzhak Rabin, Service Notebook, 2 vols. (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1979, Hebrew), Vol. I, p. 79.
54. War Diary, entry of 18 June 1948, Vol. II, p. 534.
55. Ibid., pp. 528–34.
56. A detailed account of the absorption of the IZL into the IDF may be found in Ostfeld, An Army is Born, Vol. II, pp. 622–79.
57. For an overall view of the Altalena affair see Shlomo Nakdimon, Altalena (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1978, Hebrew).
58. The Altalena affair still reverberates in Israeli politics. See Menachem Begin, The Revolt, trans. Samuel Katz (Tel Aviv: Steimatzky, 1951), pp. 154–176 for his account; Bar Zohar, Ben-Gurion, pp. 170–75 gives what is, in essence, Ben-Gurion’s view.
59. Ben-Gurion, Chimes, diary entry of 5 November 1947, p. 464.
60. The best account is Yoav Gelber, Why the Palmach was Dissolved: Military Power in the Transition from Yishuv to State (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1986, Hebrew).
61. Shapira, Army Controversy, pp. 33–36.
62. See Ben Dunkelman’s interesting autobiography, Dual Allegiance (New York: Crown, 1976).
63. Ibid., p. 206.
64. The best account of this investigation is Shapira, Army Controversy.
65. Ibid., p. 103.
66. David Ben-Gurion, “Letter to a comrade in the Palmach,” 17 October 1948, in Ben-Gurion, When Israel Fought in Battle, pp. 273–82.
67. See for example Yitzhak Rabin’s account in his Service Notebook, Vol. I, pp. 83–88.
68. The two best books on Israeli civil-military relations are Yoram Peri, Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), and Yehuda Ben Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
69. Rabin, Service Notebook, Vol. I, pp. 150 ff.
70. Ben-Gurion, “From the Haganah in the Underground to a Regular Army,” 19 June 1948, in his When Israel Fought in Battle, p. 151.
71. Ibid., p. 152.
72. Ben-Gurion, speech to Mapai secretariat, 30 October 1947, in his Chimes, p. 446.
73. See the fascinating reprint of his conclusions in David Ben-Gurion, “Army and State,” Ma’archot (May 1981, Hebrew): 2–11.
74. Ibid., p. 2.
75. Ben-Gurion, When Israel Fought in Battle, p. 11.
1. See Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times, 6 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1938), Vol. VI, p. 600.
2. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989). I have relied heavily on this excellent work.
3. The most recent work on this subject is Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
4. William M. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 388.
5. Taken from Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), pp. 112–13.
6. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 147.
7. Charles G. Cooper, “The Day it Became the Longest War,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute (May 1996): 78. Cooper was then a young Marine officer in charge of holding the map for the JCS.
8. Clodfelter, Limits, pp. 100–101.
9. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983), p. 555, interview with former secretary of defense Clark Clifford.
10. See, inter alia, Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), and Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982). For good overall summaries of the debate see Jeffrey Record, “Vietnam in Retrospect: Could We Have Won?” Parameters 26:4 (Winter 1996–1997): 51–65, and Dale Andrade, “Rethinking the Years After Tet,” Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1999–2000), pp. 107–8, or see www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/2123.pdf.
11. Clodfelter, Limits, p. 85.
12. See Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 35. Palmer was the number two commander in Vietnam, and later vice chief of staff of the Army.
13. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 331.
14. The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Senator Gravel edition, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), Vol. IV, pp. 424–25.
15. George Allen, None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), p. 99.
16. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972), R-967-ARPA, pp. 40 passim. A slightly revised version is Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986).
17. Komer, Bureaucracy at War, p. 34.
18. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday, 1976), p. 307.
19. Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1995), p. 203.
20. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 171. See the vehement disagreement by his civilian deputy, Robert W. Komer, in his study, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, see also the book version of this report, Bureaucracy at War.
21. Julian J. Ewell and Ira A. Hunt, Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974), pp. 227, 228.
22. Stephen Peter Rosen, “Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War,” International Security 7:2 (Fall 1982): 83–113.
23. Jeffrey Record judges the war unwinnable in his thoughtful article, “Vietnam in Retrospect.
24. Quoted in Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 364.
25. www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil/ecampus/gpc/prework/strategy/use.htm; speech given at National Press Club 28 November 1984; reprinted from Defense (January 1985): 1–11.
26. General Howell Estes, Jr., in “Give War a Chance,” FRONTLINE, PBS Program #1715, aired: May 11, 1999; see also www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/etc/script.html
27. George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 354.
28. Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 167.
29. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
30. Colin Powell with Joseph E. Pérsico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 465–66. For a critical look at Powell’s fascinating memoir, see my “Playing Powell Politics,” Foreign Affairs 74:6 (November/December 1995): 102–10.
31. Ibid., pp. 238–39.
32. Henry Rowen, “Inchon in the Desert: My Rejected Plan,” The National Interest 40 (Summer 1995): 34–39. Rowen was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.
33. For a description of this period, see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 123–58.
34. Bob Woodward, The Commanders, p. 79.
35. Powell with Pérsico, My American Journey, p. 503.
36. For a short summary of this episode, see Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 58–59, also pp. 130, 185, 214, 222. This book summarizes Eliot A. Cohen, ed., Gulf War Air Power Survey for 1991–93, 5 vols. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993).
37. See Williamson Murray et al., Operations, in Cohen, ed., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. II, Parti, p. 221.
38. In retrospect it is far from certain that Israeli participation in the war would have caused the coalition to fall apart; even if several members had withdrawn, it is not clear that the United States would have had to terminate the war.
39. Keaney and Cohen, Revolution in Warfare, pp. 74–78.
40. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, p. 234 and passim.
41. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 486.
42. George H.W. Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia,” 8 August 1990; see also bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1990/90080800.html.
43. Bush admitted his mistake ten years later. See Jeff Franks, “Ex-President Bush Says He Underestimated Saddam,” Reuters, 23 February 2001, and user.tninet.se/~qkl782y/report5/z0224e 14.htm.
44. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam, 1992), pp. 479–80.
45. Ibid., p. 484.
46. Ibid., p. 473.
47. President George H. W. Bush, “Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council,” March 1, 1991; See www.bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91030102.html. (Note: In many accounts the word “kicked” is rendered “licked.”)
48. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 484.
49. Ibid., pp. 484–85.
50. Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, “The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians, and Their Mutual Misunderstanding,” The National Interest 61 (Fall 2000): 29–37.
51. Bradley Graham, “Joint Chiefs Doubted Air Strategy,” Washington Post, 5 April 1999.
52. See Rowan Scarborough, “Chiefs Sound Bosnia Alarm; Chaos Seen for U.S. troops,” Washington Times, 12 August 1992.
53. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 118.
54. David Halberstam, War in Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001), p. 416.
55. Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 341.
56. See R. Jeffrey Smith, “A GI’s Home is His Fortress: High-Security, High-Comfort U.S. Base in Kosovo Stirs Controversy,” Washington Post, 5 October 1999.
57. Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” Armed Forces & Society 22:1 (Fall 1995): 7–24.
58. See a series of articles on the theater commanders in chief by Dana Priest in the Washington Post, 28–30 September 2000.
59. Anthony C. Zinni, “A Commander Reflects,” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute (July 2000): 34. Zinni was at the time commander in chief of Central Command.
60. For an interesting account of how a less Vietnam-dominated theater commander felt these pressures, see Clark, Waging Modern War.
61. See Steven Lee Myers, “Gore’s Service Does Not Keep Vets from Bush,” New York Times, 21 September 2000.
62. Quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Vol. 3, Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945 (New York: Viking, 1973), pp. 458–59.
63. The most comprehensive recent study of American civil-military relations is Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
64. Palmer, The 25-Year War, p. 201.
65. Remarks of Senator Gordon Smith (R.-Oregon), “The War in Kosovo and a Postwar Analysis,” US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., 1st sess., April 20, September 28, and October 6, 1999 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), p. 77.
66. Powell, My American Journey, p. 109.
67. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), II: 4, p. 154.
1. Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, trans. F. M. Atkinson (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930), p. 404.
2. John Colville, The Churchillians (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), p. 143.
3. Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), Vol. VIII, pp. 330–31.
4. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (New York: Library of America, 1983), p. 818.
5. Isaiah Berlin, “Political Judgment,” in Henry Hardy, ed., The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and their History (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1996), p. 45. See also Berlin’s “The Sense of Reality” in the same volume.
6. Ibid., p. 46.
7. Berlin, “The Sense of Reality,” in Hardy, ed., The Sense of Reality, p. 24.
8. In Winston S. Churchill, Clemenceau, in Great Contemporaries (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1937), pp. 311–12.
9. Basler, Collected Works of Lincoln, Vol. VII, p. 281.
10. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 537.
11. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), p. 15.
12. Quoted in Lord Beaverbrook (William Maxwell Aitken), Men and Power 1917–1918 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956), p. 151.
13. Lord Beaverbrook (William Maxwell Aitken), Politicans and the War (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1960), pp. 238–39.
14. Winston S. Churchill, “Consistency in Politics,” in his Amid These Storms: Thoughts and Adventures (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932), p. 39.
15. Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, intro. and trans, by T. Bentley Mott (New York: Doubleday, 1931), p. xxv. Mott was Foch’s American liaison officer.
16. See, for example, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Book II.
17 Jean-Jules-Henri Mordacq, Le Ministère Clemenceau: Journal d’un Témoin Vol. II, Mai 1918–11 Novembre 1918 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1930, French), p. 61.
18. Robert Rhodes James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897–1963 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), Vol. VI, p. 6249.
19. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 232, 238.
20. Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Bros, 1948), p. 149.
21. Quoted in Jean-Jules-Henri Mordacq, Clemenceau (Paris: Les Éditions de France, 1939, French), p. 209.
22. Quoted in Colin R. Coote, ed., A Churchill Reader (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954), p. 386. Coote ascribes this quotation to Churchill’s Great Contemporaries.
1. Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1968), Book II, 375a-d, pp. 52–53.
2. Quoted by “Brutus,” one of the leading anti-Federalists, in “On the Calamity of a National Debt that cannot be Repaid, and on Standing Armies,” New York Journal, 10 January 1788, reproduced in Bernard Bailyn, ed., The Debate on the Constitution (New York: Library of America, 1993), p. 734.
3. Richard Kohn, “The Constitution and National Security,” in Richard Kohn, ed., The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989 (New York: New York University Press, 1991), p. 87.
4. For evidence of the durability of Huntington’s views, see, for example, Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr., The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace and Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1999), and Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, “Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century” (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1999). A particularly interesting document, largely Huntingtonian in tone, is the US Army’s Field Manual 100–1, The Army, periodically revised and now available on the World Wide Web (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-l/toc.htm); the current edition is dated 14 June 1994.
5. Samuel R Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 8–11.
6. Samuel R. Huntington, “Power, Expertise, and the Military Profession,” Daedalus (Fall 1963): 785–86.
7. Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 68.
8. Ibid., pp. 80 ff., 351–60.
9. Ibid., p. 83.
10. Ibid., p. 74.
11. Ibid. p. 308.
12. Ibid., p. 76.
13. Ibid., p. 13.
14. Ibid., p. 315.
15. See United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Senate Print 99–86, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985).
16. United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. Washington, DC: GPO, 1985, p. 36, quotes Huntington on World War II. For a list of the broad problems the Senate staffers—who played the largest role in drafting the legislation—saw, see the list on pp. 3–10.
17. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, J. R Mayer, ed., George Lawrence, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), Vol. II, Part III, Ch. 22, p. 653. Chapters 22–26, pp. 645–666 treat this issue more broadly.
18. See Allen Guttmann, “Political Ideals and the Military Ethic,” American Scholar 34:2 (Spring 1965): 221–37, and Allen Guttmann, The Conservative Tradition in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), Ch. 4, “Conservatism and the Military Establishment,” pp. 100–122.
19. Ibid., p. 108.
20. The story is told in Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1943), Vol. I, p. 424, emphasis in the original. Guttmann is not entirely fair, since Jackson was nothing if not punctilious in his treatment of federal wounded, prisoners, and civilians—rather more important marks of military chivalry.
21. See Sam Sarkesian, “Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West,” International Political Science Review 2:3 (1981): 283–97.
22. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 15.
23. Ibid., p. 418.
24. Ibid., p. 21.
25. Charles C. Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization,” Armed Forces and Society 4:1 (Fall 1977): 41–54.
26. Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” Armed Forces & Society 22:1 (Fall 1995): 7.
27. Ibid., p. 12.
28. Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 144. Liberal military policy is, he said, the blunt injunction to the armed forces: “Conform or die,” p. 155.
29. Note, however, that the military coup theme continues to be a vehicle for serious discussion of civil-military relations. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” Parameters 22:4 (Winter 1992/93): 2–20.
30. Gene M. Lyons, “The New Civil-Military Relations,” American Political Science Review 55:1 (March 1961): 53.
31. Defense Organization, p. 42. Note that this report defined three types of threat to civilian control: “the man on horseback” seizing power; the “benign takeover” when civilian government collapses; or the “commander taking actions on his own initiative,” as in Stanley Kubrick’s classic movie, Dr. Strangelove—a particular anxiety of the nuclear era—see p. 28. As we shall see, this narrows excessively the scope of the problem of civilian control.
32. See, for example, Lyons, “The New Civil-Military Relations.”
33. S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 7–10.
34. Ibid., pp. 207 ff.
35. Ibid., p. 72.
36. See the discussion in Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin, “Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits,” Armed Forces and Society 19:1 (Fall 1992): 7–26.
37. See the gripping, if perhaps overdrawn, description of the tension between “frocks” and “brass hats” in Lord Beaverbrook (William Maxwell Aitken), Men and Power 1917–1918 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956), in particular pp. 186 ff.
38. See Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953), for an able defense of Tolstoy as a philosopher of history.
39. Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Anne Dunnigan (New York: Penguin, 1968), III.2.21, pp. 915–16.
40. Ibid., III. 1.11, pp. 774–75.
41. Ibid., III. 1.1.
42. Ibid., III. 1.1.
43. Ibid., p. 128, excerpt from an 1868 essay by Tolstoy.
44. See the discussions in Berlin, Hedgehog and the Fox, also James T. Farrell, “Leo Tolstoy and Napoleon Bonaparte,” Literature and Morality (New York: Vanguard, 1946), pp. 103 ff.
45. For a masterly survey of this debate, brought up to date, see Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security (Fall 2000): 5–50.
46. Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, trans. Heinz Norden (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969–1973), Vol. Ill, p. 486.
47. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 70–75. Note that much of Ritter’s judgment of the military striving for maximum achievement applies chiefly to the German military of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
48. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 68.
49. See Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth, trans. Andrew and Eva Wilson (New York: Praeger, 1958).
50. Ibid., p. 91, and Ritter, Sword and Scepter, Vol. II, p. 210.
51. The citation is to Ritter, Sword and Scepter, Vol. I, p. 49.
52. Russell Weigley, “Military Strategy and Civilian Leadership,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1976), p. 69. For a critique of Weigley see Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 24 and passim.
53. Russell Weigley, “The Political and Strategic Dimensions of Military Effectiveness,” in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. Ill, The Second World War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), p. 341.
54. Ibid., p. 39.
55. Ibid., p. 42.
56. Russell Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 536.
57. Ibid., p. 539.
58. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 7.
59. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), p. 21.
60. Ibid., p. xvi.
61. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking, 1976), p. 336.
62. William James, “The Moral Equivalent of War” (1910), reprinted in William James: Writings 1902–1910 (New York: The Library of America, 1987), pp. 1281–93; for examples of the latter, see Forrest E. Morgan, Living the Martial Way: A Manual for the Way a Modern Warrior Should Think (Fort Lee, NJ: Barricade Books, 1992), and Richard Strozzi Heckler, In Search of the Warrior Spirit (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1992),. An older but no less useful account, published in Japanese in 1905, is Inazo Nitobe, Bushido: The Soul of Japan (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle, 1969).
63. John Keegan, letter to the editor, Times Literary Supplement (UK), 23 April 1993, p. 15.
64. Ibid.
65. Thomas E. Ricks, “The Great Society in Camouflage,” Atlantic Monthly (December 1996): 24.
66. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking, 1976), p. 336.
67. See Edward Layton Jr., The Revolt of the Engineers (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western University, 1971), p. 4. On professionalism more generally, see Talcott Parsons, “Professions,” in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), Vol. 12, pp. 536–57. Parsons says that the rise of the professions “probably constitute [s] the most important change that has occurred in the occupational system of modern societies.”
68. See, for example, Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 56, 255.
69. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1915 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923), p. 6.
70. See A. J. Bacevich, “The Use of Force in Our Time,” Wilson Quarterly 19 (Winter 1995): 50–63.
71. See, for example, Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle (New York: Free Press, 1985), pp. 281–90. Holmes makes the standard arguments against ideology as a motivating force, but (a) excludes counterexamples, and (b) identifies ideology only in terms of the hatred of the enemy, which is surely too simple a description of its effects.
72. See in particular Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), and among the volumes of the German official history of the Second World War a particularly powerful essay: Jürgen Forster, “Das Unternehmen ‘Barbarossa’ als Eroberungs- und Vernichtungskrieg” [“The ‘Barbarossa’ Campaign as a War of Conquest and Destruction”], in Horst Boog et al., Das Deutsche Reich undder zweite Weltkrieg [The German Government and the Second World War], Vol. IV, Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion [The Attack on the Soviet Union] (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), pp. 413–47.
73. The classic article, published shortly after the war, was Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” reprinted in Morris Janowitz, Military Conflict: Essays in the Institutional Analysis of War and Peace (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975), pp. 177–220. Extremely influential too was Martin van Creveld, Combat Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939–1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982).
74. A careful reading of some of the older literature would have made this point as well. For example, Shils and Janowitz note that the primary groups of the Wehrmacht were built around a “hard core” of committed men—many of them dedicated Nazis.
75. Bartov, Hitler’s Army, p. 96.
76. See Jürgen Fôrster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft: The Effectiveness of the German Military Establishment in the Second World War,” in Millett and Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. Ill, pp. 180–220.
77. Charles W. Sydnor, Jr., Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death’s Head Division, 1933–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 274.
78. Think, for example, of the outstanding Israeli commander of the 1948 war of independence, Yigal Alon, former commander of the Palmach, or for that matter Leon Trotsky, the Russian Revolution’s “organizer of victory.”
79. On the management of violence as the essence of military professionalism, see Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 11; Huntington estimated that 80 percent of regular officers and 20 percent of reservists fit that criterion (“Power, Expertise, and the Military Profession,” p. 785), but this greatly underestimates the number of officers whose expertise is nonmilitary (logisticians, doctors, lawyers, communicators, chaplains, air-traffic controllers, and the like).
80. For a capsule biography see Malcolm Falkus, “Monash,” in Michael Carver, ed., The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century (Boston: Little Brown, 1976), pp. 134–43.
81. Ian Hamilton, The Soul and Body of an Army (New York: George H. Doran, 1921), p. 25.
82. John Gooch and I have discussed this at some length in our book, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Free Press, 1990).
83. See Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
84. Clausewitz, On War, 1:7, p. 120.
85. Ibid., VIII:3, p. 593.
86. Snider, Nagl, and Pfaff, “Army Professionalism,” p. 38.
87. John Hackett, The Profession of Arms (London: Times Publishing Co., 1963), p. 47.