ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book was written at the Center for a New American Security, a small and collegial refuge in the middle of Washington, D.C. I am indebted to its recent leaders, Nate Fick, John Nagl, and Richard Fontaine, as well as its founders, Kurt Campbell and Michèle Flournoy. Other colleagues there have helped me with various aspects of this book, among them Kristin Lord, Shannon O’Reilly, Dana Stuster, Tiffany Sirc, David Barno, Andrew Exum, and Nora Bensahel. At a time when I felt I was at a dead end, Richard Danzig, a former secretary of the Navy and now the chairman of CNAS, wrote a particularly incisive critique of my second draft that helped me see the way forward. Robert Killebrew was in many ways the mentor for this book, beginning with his admonition several years ago that I should learn more about George Marshall. All were generous in sharing their thinking, but, in keeping with CNAS’s policy of not taking corporate positions, none necessarily agree with the arguments made nor the conclusions reached in this book.

I am especially indebted to the squad of first-class researchers provided by CNAS: Michael Zubrow, Peter Henry, Kyle Flynn, Matthew Irvine, Jessica Glover, Gregory McGowan, Brendon Mills, and J. Dana Stuster. Without their energetic and thoughtful help and their long hours in archives and libraries, this book would be less than it is and also would have taken years longer to produce. I did not realize as I began this project what a sprawling effort it would be. Their help was essential. Dana Stuster in particular did a wonderful job in the long and difficult task of assembling the photo insert.

I will forever appreciate the people who gave the first draft of this book a critical review: Vernon Loeb and Mary Kay Ricks worked mightily to help me restructure the first one hundred pages of the book. Rick Atkinson gave the chapters on World War II a good wire-brushing. Andrew Wylie, Tom Donnelly, Eliot Cohen, Roger Cirillo, Conrad Crane, Richard Kohn, John Cushman, Henry Gole, Volney Warner, Michael Bayer, T. X. Hammes, and David Fuhrman also brought their many areas of expertise and experience to a critical reading of the manuscript. Mark Stoler read the entire manuscript twice without even being asked to do so, making helpful comments both times. Robert Killebrew and Robert Goldich also deserve special notice for endurance as two-time reviewers of my drafts. I was especially impressed by the comments of two retired Army officers—Col. Stuart Herrington, who, by serving in the Army for thirty years, might have missed a great career as a book editor, and Lt. Gen. James Dubik, whose thirty-seven-page critique of the first draft spurred me to make major revisions in my manuscript and who then reviewed the second draft incisively.

I am deeply indebted to four military archives that welcomed me and even made suggestions for additional research. I remember particularly one day when an Army archivist said, while handing me the files of an obscure general, “If you’re interested in this general, you also need to read the papers of Dandridge Malone—heard of him?” I spent several weeks working at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and am grateful to Conrad Crane and his colleagues there—Richard Sommers, Robert Mages (formerly), Rich Baker, Rodney Foytik, Guy Nasuti, Gary Johnson, Terry Foster, Tom Buffenbarger, Steve Bye, Monica Duke, Shannon Schwaller, Carol Funck, and Martin Andresen. Erik Villard, at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., was especially generous in sharing his research files with me. I also appreciate the assistance given me by Brian Shaw and his colleagues Paul Barron and Jeffrey Kozak at the George C. Marshall Research Library, in Lexington, Virginia. Mark Stoler went the extra mile in policing my work on Marshall. My thanks as well to the archivists and librarians of the Marine Corps University library, in Quantico, Virginia. Timothy Nenninger, chief of modern military records at the National Archives, pointed me to some particularly helpful files on the management of general officers in World War II.

Lt. Gen. John Cushman (U.S. Army, Ret.) not only served as a critical reader but also shared his privately published memoirs and a variety of documents. In addition, he showed a good deal of patience in dealing with my questions. Col. Henry Gole (U.S. Army, Ret.) was generous in helping me to understand William DePuy. Brig. Gen. John Johns (U.S. Army, Ret.) aided my research on the history of operational effectiveness in the Army and provided supporting documentation. Robert Goldich and Donald Vandergriff were repeatedly helpful in explaining the intricacies of personnel and promotion policies. I owe thanks also to Wade Markel of the RAND Corporation for generously sharing his insightful work on Army promotion policies and their relationship to risk averseness in the post–World War II officer corps—and thanks, too, to RAND’s David Johnson for sending me to Markel.

I also appreciate the weekly encouragement given me by the Dow Road Choir.

In publishing this book, I feel I once again have the best team in the business: Scott Moyers, Andrew Wylie, and the wonderful gang at The Penguin Press—Ann Godoff, Elisabeth Calamari, Tracy Locke, and Mally Anderson.

And, as always, I am deeply grateful to my wife. Without her, this all would mean nothing.

The mistakes are of course my own.