Does a past and future thing really exist, or not? If it exists, then you have to say that conditioned things [saṃskāra] are eternal, because they exist at all times. If, on the other hand, it does not exist, then how is one bound in it or by it, or freed?1
The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept that conditioned things are eternal, because that is the point of being conditioned.2 Instead they clearly accept that all times exist. [I.25a1]
For what reason?
Because it is said. [I.25a2] Since the Lord said, “O monks, if past form did not exist, then the learned, noble hearer [śrāvaka] would not have been indifferent with regard to past form. Since there is past form, the learned, noble hearer is indifferent with regard to past form. If a future form did not exist, the learned, noble hearer would not have been pleased with regard to future form. Since there is future form” and so on.
Because of the two things. [I.25b1] As it is said, “The arising of consciousness is dependent upon two things.” What are the two things? “Eye and forms, up to the mind and mental objects.” Also, were there no past and future thing, the consciousness that has it as its object would not be dependent upon the two. So a past and future thing exists based on scriptural authority and from reason as well.
Because of the existent sense object. [I.25b2] Consciousness is engaged with an existent sense object, not a nonexistent one. And if a past and future thing did not exist, consciousness would have a nonexistent experiential object. Then there would be no consciousness either, because it would have no experiential object.
Because of the result. [I.25b3] And if there were no past, how could the result of virtuous or unvirtuous action come about in the future? For at the time the result comes about, [296] the cause of maturation does not exist. Therefore, according to the Vaibhāṣikas the past and future thing is indeed existent.
And, necessarily, they say, a good Sarvāstivāda must accept this. Because,
Since they say that these exist, they are esteemed Sarvāstivāda (Those Who Say Everything Exists). [I.25c–d1] For, the Sarvāstivādins are those who say that everything exists: past, future, and present. Whereas, Vibhajyavādins (Those who say there is a distinction) are anyone who speaks making the following distinction: “The present and the past karma whose results are not yet given exist, but the past whose results are given, and the future, do not exist at all.”
How many are those called “Sarvāstivāda”?
They are of four kinds, (25) called differentialists of: being, quality, position, and difference. [I.25d2–26b]
Bhadanta Dharmatrāta is a being-differentialist. Indeed, he says: “A dharma proceeding through the times is different in being; it is not different in substance. Just as a golden pot, being broken, when it is changed, is different in shape; it is not different in color. And just as the milk being changed by curdling, loses its flavor, strength, and freshness, but not its color. So a dharma too, when it comes from future time to present time, loses its being in the future; not its being a substance. So when it goes from the present into the past time, it loses its being in the present, not its being a substance.”
Bhadanta Ghoṣaka is a quality-differentialist. Indeed, he says: “A dharma proceeding through the times is past insofar as it is connected to the quality past but not insofar as it is cut off from the qualities future and present; is future where it is connected to the quality future but not cut off from past and present. So it is present, too, where it is not cut off from future and past. In this way, a man desirous of one woman is not devoid of desire for others.”
Bhadanta Vasumitra is a position-differentialist. Indeed, he says: “A dharma proceeding through the times, reaching one position and then another, is taken as being one thing and then another due to its having another position, not another substance. Just as one and the same mark placed in the ones’ space is called ‘one’ and in the hundreds’ space a hundred, and in the thousands’ space, a thousand.” [297]
Bhadanta Buddhadeva is a difference-differentialist.3 Indeed, he says: “A dharma proceeding through the times is called one or the other with reference to what is previous and later, due to it having another position, not another substance. Just as one woman is called mother or daughter.”
These are the four kinds of Sarvāstivādins.
Among them, the first is dispatched by reference to the argument against the Sāṃkhyas, because it advocates [their] view of change. The second leads to a confusion of the times, because everything is connected to every moment. For how is it the same, where the man’s desire is enacted for one woman and only possessed4 for another? For the fourth, too, in any one time the three times obtain. In the past time, the previous moment and the later moment are past and future, and the middle moment is the present. So also in the future.5
Thus among all of them, the third is the best, [I.26c1] which is the position-differentialist. For him, indeed, the times are arranged according to activity. (26) [I.26c2–d] “When the dharma is not doing its activity [kāritra], it is future. When it does it, it is present. When, having done it, it is stopped, it is past.” This encompasses everything.
But this must be said: If what is “future” exists substantially even as past, why is it called “past” or “future”? And, where it is said that “the times are arranged according to activity,” what is the activity of the present tatsabhāga eye?6
Giving or taking the result.
In that case, there is the fallacy of mixing characteristics: even the past sabhāgahetu, etc., since it gives a result, may have its activity or have partial activity.
And this must be said: Where by that very nature the dharma exists eternally, in its doing its activity, what is the obstruction [I.27a1] by virtue of which, sometimes it does [its] activity, sometimes not? Suppose you say the conditions are not in place: no, because you have conceded that they always exist. And when the activity is said to be past, present, and future, how can this be? [I.27a2] [298] Does the activity, too, have another activity? In that case, it is not past, nor is it future or present. Then you would be saying that since it is unconditioned, it is eternal. Thus it cannot be said that a dharma is future when it does not perform [its] activity.
This would be a mistake if the activity were something else other than the dharma. But in fact it is not something else, [I.27a3] so this is not a mistake.
So then that very thing is disconnected from the times. [I.27b1] If the dharma itself is the activity, how can it be that this very dharma, existing by its own nature, is sometimes called “past,” and sometimes “future”? This is not an acceptable arrangement of the times.
What is not acceptable about it? For a dharma is future if it is unborn. It is present if it is born and not destroyed. It is past if it is destroyed.
The response to that is as follows: If the past and the future exist substantially just like the present does, for something existing in this way how can it be unborn or destroyed? [I.27b2–c] For how can a dharma that exists by its very own nature be acceptable as “unborn” or “destroyed”?7 What did it previously lack, by virtue of whose nonexistence it is called “unborn”? And what does it subsequently lack, by virtue of whose nonexistence it is called “destroyed”? Therefore it is not acceptable that it be here in the three times and also eternal.
If one does not want to say that having not existed, it exists, and having existed it does not exist again, and what one does say is, “Because of being joined with the qualities of conditioned things, there is no erroneous entailment of eternality,” this is just words, because it is not connected to arising and destruction. To say that “it is eternally quasi-existent, and the dharma is not eternal” is an unprecedented expression.
Indeed, he also says:
Own-nature [svabhāva] always exists, but its existence is not accepted as eternal.
Nor is there existence other than own-nature—an expression spoken by the Lord.
[299] As to what is meant by “Because it is said”: we too say that there is a past and future thing. But a past thing is what existed before. A future thing is what will exist when there is a cause. Each is said to exist just insofar as this is the case, but not also substantially.
And who says, “It exists as present”?
How else does it exist?
As past and future [atītānāgatātmanā].8
This is also established for you: “How is it called past and future if it exists eternally?”9 Therefore, the Lord says, “the past thing exists, the future thing exists” in order to refute the view that denies cause and effect, and in order that one come to know that a previously existent cause existed, and a subsequently existent result will exist. This is because the word “exists” is used as a particle [nipāta].10 Just as one says of a light that previously it is nonexistent and subsequently it is nonexistent,11 and as in, “The light is extinguished, but has not been extinguished by me,” the past and future thing too, is said to exist. For otherwise the existence of a past and future thing would not be acceptable.
What then of what the Lord said when speaking to the mendicants of the Laguḍṣikīyaka, “Past action lost, destroyed, gone, changed—it exists!” Did he not in this passage intend that each of these actions existed previously?
With regard to that passage too, it was spoken with the special intent [saṃdhāya] that what was deposited within that causal series is capable of giving forth a result. For the alternative, that what is existing by its own nature is past, would not be acceptable.
And this is just what the Lord expressed in the Paramārthaśūnyatā, “The eye, coming into existence, does not come from anywhere, nor, being destroyed, does it go to a dumpsite [saṃnicaya] anywhere. For, O Bhikṣus, the eye, not having existed exists, and having existed goes away.” And if there were a future eye, he would not have said that having existed it does not exist. If you say that “having not existed” refers to its having not existed in the present time: no, because there is no difference in meaning between the existence and the time. If, on the other hand, “having not existed” refers to its having not existed in its own nature, this establishes that the future eye does not exist.
As to the expression, “The arising of consciousness is dependent upon two things,” this, first of all, needs to be considered: in the situation where the mental consciousness arises dependent upon the mind and dharma, is it that the dharmas are a condition as a producer [janaka] of the mind, or that the dharmas are merely experiential objects [ālambana]?12 If, on the one hand, the dharmas are producer conditions, how can what will come about one thousand kalpas in the future, or not, bring about a present consciousness? And nirvāṇa does not make sense as a producer, since it is the elimination of all activity. If, on the other hand, the dharmas are merely experiential objects, we say that the past and the future are also experiential objects.
If they do not exist, how are they experiential objects?
With regard to this, we say: If an experiential object exists in this way, how can it be that that experiential object existed and will come to be? For it is not that someone remembering a past form or feeling sees that “it exists,” but rather that “it was.” For surely one remembers what is past just as one experiences it when present. And the intellect grasps the future just as it will be when present. And if it exists just as it is, you say it is present, otherwise not. It is established that nonexistents too are experiential objects.
If you should say that this means that this [past form] is dispersed [vikīrṇa]: [300] no, because one does not grasp it as dispersed. And if you should say that each and every physical form is divided into atoms, in that case you would be saying that atoms are eternal. And you would be saying that the mere separation and coming together of atoms attains existence. But “nothing comes into being, nor is destroyed” is upheld by the Ājīvikas.13 And scripture [sūtra] opposes this: “The eye, coming into existence, does not come from anywhere,” and so on. How can there be diffusion for feelings, etc., which are not collections of atoms? And they, too, are remembered as they were experienced at their arising. If they exist like that, then you are saying that they are eternal. If, on the other hand, they do not exist, it is established that nonexistents too are experiential objects.
If nonexistents too may be experiential objects, there must be a thirteenth sphere [āyatana].14
For the consciousness “there is no thirteenth sphere,” what is the experiential object?
The experiential object is just those words [nāma].
So then you would accept that as just words [nāma], it does not exist. And for the sound, what is the not-yet-existent experiential object for one who takes it up?15
The sound itself.
Then someone who seeks the nonexistence of sound should just make a sound.16 If you say it is in a future state, why is it not intellected, given that it exists? If you say this is because it is not present: no, because they are the same, except to the degree that they are distinct from one another by one being established as existing, having not existed.17 Therefore, both the existent and the nonexistent are experiential objects for consciousness.
What then of the Bodhisattva’s saying, “That I should know or see what does not exist in the world—this is not a possibility”?
There is a special intention [abhiprāya] here to mean, as in another passage, “They who are prideful see as existent appearances of what do not exist; but I see only what indeed is existent.” For otherwise, with every thought having an existent experiential object, how could one have deliberation or differentiation? This one would be just like that one. If consciousness has an existent object it would also be pointless for the Lord to have said: “This Bhikṣu, my hearer, as to what I have said in the morning he pursues its distinctions until evening, and as to what I have said in the evening he pursues its distinctions until morning.18 And what he knows is is, and is not is not, and is not highest is not highest, and is highest is highest.”
As to the expression, “because of the result”: no, because the Sautrāntikas do not accept that a result arises from a past action.
From what then?
As we will explain thoroughly in the refutation of the doctrine of self,19 from a characteristic of the continuum that precedes it. But what is the capacity of an action, if you say that its past and future exist substantially, and its result exists eternally?
The capacity for production.
Then it is established that not having existed, production exists. Alternatively, strictly everything exists. In that case, what is the capacity of what? Vārṣagaṇya’s position is illustrated thus: “What is is just that. What is not is not. The nonexistent does not come to be. What exists is not destroyed.”
Then it is the capacity to make present.
What is this thing called “the capacity to make present”? Suppose you say it is the change to another state. It is an eternal continuity. And how can that be among the formless which changes it, which is its existence from not having existed?20 If you say it is a difference in nature [svabhāvaviśeṣaṇa], then it is established that not having existed, it exists. Therefore this is not the proper tradition of the Sarvāstivāda, which says that past and future exist substantially.
But it is the proper one. Just as it is expressed in the sūtra, “everything exists,” so it says.21
And how is it expressed in the sūtra that “everything exists”?
“Everything exists,” O Brahman, meaning “the twelve spheres.” Or the three times. But it is expressed just as it is.22 In the case where the past and future thing does not exist, how is one bound [saṃyukta] in it or by it?
Where one has a sensory object due to a defilement because of the existence of an afflictive tendency which is the cause of this coming from that, one is bound to a thing because of the existence of defilements and afflictive tendencies.23
But the Vaibhāṣikas say that a past and future thing simply exists. With regard to which one is not capable, its nature must be acknowledged: the basic nature is indeed profound. (27) [I.27d]
In that case, it is not necessarily indeterminate. It is the way of things that what comes about, perishes. Form comes about, form perishes. It is the way of things that one thing comes about, another perishes. The future comes about, the present perishes. Time also comes about, because coming about is grasped in time. The times, too, come about, because future time is of multiple moments. This is come about through its connection with that, which is gone.
