Which of the eighteen dhātus are views [dṛṣṭi] and which are not views?1 Both the eye and the dharmadhātu are indicated to be views. [I.41a–b1]
If you ask how many this is: of eight kinds. [I.41b2] Eight kinds of dharmadhātu are views: The five views starting with the view with respect to the existing body; worldly right view; the trainee’s [śaikṣī]; and the post-trainee’s [aśaikṣī] views. The rest are not views. Among these, the view with respect to the existing body, and so on, will be addressed in its time in the chapter on defilements [anuśaya].2 The worldly right view, furthermore, is a good, defiled discrimination [prajñā], associated with the mental consciousness.3 The trainee’s [view] is [glossed as] the undefiled view of a trainee, and the post-trainee’s is that of a post-trainee. Seeing dharmas through the views of defiled and undefiled ordinary persons, trainees and post-trainees is like seeing forms in clouds, without clouds, at night, and at daytime, [respectively.]
Now, why is the worldly right view said to be associated with the mental consciousness? Because: a thought produced with the five consciousnesses4 is not a view, because of being indeterminate [atīraṇa]. (41) [I.41c–d] For a determinate [santīrika] view is arisen from close consideration [upadhyāna]. And this is certainly not the case for discrimination [prajñā] produced with the five consciousnesses. Therefore it is not a view. So too for the others: neither defiled nor undefiled discrimination [prajñā] is a view.
In that case, how is the eye, which is indeterminate, a view?
In the sense of seeing a form. For The eye sees forms. [I.42a]
If the eye sees, then so also the other sufficient conditions for consciousness should see.
Certainly not every eye sees.
Which does, then?
One with a corresponding [consciousness].5 [I.42b1] It sees when it is accompanied by consciousness; otherwise it does not.
Then it should be said that just that consciousness sees, with the eye as the support.
It’s not that with it as support, the consciousness [I.42b2–c1] sees, so it can be able to be unaware.6
Why?
It does not see form, they say, where there is something intervening. (42) [I.42c2–d] For, they say, it does not see a form covered by a wall, etc. For if the consciousness were to see, since it is not subject to resistance [pratigha], there would be no resistance where there is a wall, etc., so it would see even a covered form.
No, the eye consciousness does not arise with respect to something covered, so how will it see what does not arise?
How then does it not arise?
Since the eye is subject to resistance, the state of seeing something does not come about with respect to what is covered. So for the consciousness, too, it does not arise; it operates by means of a single sensory object, which joins it as support [āśraya].7
Why then would you say that the eye, like the bodily sense organ which meets its object, does not see it to the extent it is covered?
Because it is subject to resistance.
And how is something seen which has an interposition by glass, fog, veil, or water?
That is not a case where, because it is subject to resistance, an eye fails to see a covered form.
What is then?
The eye consciousness does arise in the case where sight has no impediment even with respect to a covered form. But where there is an impediment, it does not arise. In that case, because it does not arise, the covered thing is not seen.
What then of the sūtra that says, “Having seen forms with the eye … “?
Here the intent is [that one sees forms] with this as support—just as he says, “One should know dharmas with the mind [manas],” and the mind is not cognizing dharmas, because it is past.
What does then?
The mental consciousness. Or, the supported action is referred to figuratively as the support, as in “The stands cried out.” And as in the sūtra that says, “Known by the eyes, forms are desired, beloved,” and they are not cognized by the eyes. And it is said in the sūtra, “The eye, O Brahman, is the doorway for seeing forms”; by this is meant that by the doorway that is the eyes, the consciousness sees. In this case he does not say “doorway into seeing,” because it does not make sense8 to say, “The eye is the seeing for seeing forms.” [31]
If the consciousness sees, what cognizes [vijānāti], and what is the difference between them?
Consciousness of a form just is “seeing” it. In this way, if it is said that some discrimination [prajñā] “sees,” it also “discriminates”; and if it is said that some consciousness “sees” it also “cognizes.”
Others say: If the eye sees, then what else, aside from the eye that is become the agent, may be called the “action of seeing”?
This is unacceptable.9 For if it is granted that the consciousness cognizes, and in that case there is no difference between the agent and the action, then for the other case it should be accepted just as it is in that case. It is said that the eye “sees,” because it is the support for the seeing eye-consciousness. Just as, it is said that a bell “resonates” because it is the support for the resonance.
But then it obtains that the eye cognizes, since it is the support for the consciousness.
This does not obtain. “The seeing consciousness” is a convention in the world. For when it has come about in this way, it is said that the “form is seen,” not that it is “cognized.” Also, the Vibhāṣā says, “ ‘Seen’ [dṛṣṭa] is said when the eye, completed, is experienced by the eye consciousness.” Therefore it is said just that the eye sees, not that it cognizes.
But it is said that the consciousness “cognizes” form by the mere fact of its presence [sānnidhyamātreṇa], as the sun is the “maker of the day.”
On this, the Sautrāntika says: Why carve the ether? For, conditioned by the eye and forms, the eye consciousness comes about. In that case, what sees, and what is seen? For it is passive [nirvyāpāra], merely dharmas, and merely cause and effect. With regard to this, figurative terms are used by choice with a conventional meaning: “Eye sees, consciousness cognizes”—one should not be attached to them. For the Lord said, “Do not be attached to the popular etymology, nor rush to accept the world’s ideas.”10
But this is the established position of the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika: The eye sees, the ear hears, the nose smells, the tongue tastes, the body touches, the mind cognizes.
