Now, what are the destructions? There are three repeating destructions: by fire, water, and wind. [III.100a–b] Since in one absorption [dhyāna], living beings equally come together there, it is the “coming-together” [saṃvartanī, i.e., destruction]. The heat destruction is from seven suns; the water destruction is from rainwater; the wind destruction is from a tumult of wind. And thereby, not even the subtle parts of the receptacle worlds [bhājana] remain.
But with respect to this some non-Buddhists accept: “Atoms are eternal. They remain then.”
Why do they accept this?
“Lest there be the appearance of coarse things without seeds.”
Surely the seed is said to be the wind that has sentient beings’ distinctive powers, born from karma. Or, the wind that is associated with the destruction will become its cause. The Mahīśāsakas cite a sūtra, “The seeds were carried by the wind from other worlds.”
Even so, they do not accept that the arising of a sprout, etc., is from a seed, etc.
What then?
From just their own parts, and from theirs in turn, and so on down to atoms.
What is this capacity of a seed, etc., in a sprout, etc.?
Nothing anywhere aside from drawing together their atoms.
And why, again, do they accept this?
Because it is not logical to have an origin from a different class.
Why is it not logical?
Because it would have no rule [aniyama]. It will not come about because of a rule of capacities, as in the arising of sound and what is cooked. For the variegated is a quality but not a substance, because things of a similar class are seen to arise from substances of a similar class, such as a mat from grass, and a cloth from thread.
This is illogical.
What is illogical about it?
That something unproven is taken for the reason.
What about it is unproven?
“That a mat is from grass, whereas a cloth is from thread.” For as they are brought together, they are taken as an idea [saṃjñā], like a line of ants.
How can that be?
Because one does not conceive of a cloth when there is contact with a single thread. For what in that case prevents the existing thing being conceived of as a cloth?
Given that it is incomplete, a part of a cloth should not be a cloth.
In that case, a cloth must be only an assemblage. What, other than a thread, is a part of a cloth? When looking at the contact among multiple things, where the contact is only among ten, one should conceive of a cloth—or never. For the sensory organ does not come into contact with an intermediary power. And when coming into contact by stages with parts that are being touched by the eye, there should not be cognition of parts. Therefore, because coming-into-contact by stages engages with parts, the thought is also with respect to parts, like a firebrand circle. The form of a thread does not appear in cloths that are manufactured out of different forms (colors), etc. If it has the nature of a variegated form, then there is an origin from a different class;1 and if it is not variegated, one either does not see the thread among those next to it, or sees variegation.2 Where the manufacture is also variegated, there is extreme variegation. Furthermore, given the difference in the shining of the glow in the beginning, middle, and end of a fire’s radiance, it does not appear from contact with its form.3 Also, given that atoms are imperceptible, perception is of assemblages [samasta], like their causal origin,4 and like the perception of a mass of hair for those with diseased eyes. A singular, atom-like hair for them is imperceptible.
And since the specific idea of the atom applies only to the forms, etc., the destruction of the atom is established when they are destroyed.
Since the atom is a different substance from the substance of the forms, etc., its destruction is not established when they are destroyed.
Its being different does not make sense, as long as there is no way to differentiate earth, water, and fire from their forms, etc., and those things that are grasped through touching the eye are perceived. And since there is no thought of wool, cotton, safflower, and saffron [kuṅkuma], etc., when they are burnt,5 the thought of them applies to differences of form, etc. The ascertainment of a pot with respect to what has arisen as cooked is due to the formation generality, like a line. Because there is no ascertainment for one not seeing the mark. What is the point of this childish prattling? Let it stand just so, uncontradicted.
