When the Lord says in the Paramārthaśūnyatā[sūtra], “Although karma exists and results exist, no agent is apprehended,” what is this, ultimate or conventional?
What comes of this?
If it is ultimate, then all dharmas are without substance. If it is conventional, then since the agent too exists conventionally, it should not be said that the agent is not apprehended. If you say this:
Some ask: What is “conventional”? What is “ultimate”? Thereby, what exists conventionally? What exists ultimately?
Suppose we say that word and speech and imputation and designation [tha snyad] are convention [kun rdzob], and the specific character of dharmas is ultimate?1
Then, since karma and results both exist just as words, and also they exist just as their specific character, you have the problem of how their two existences are accepted. I exist conventionally as a person but not substantially, because of the imputation of that upon the aggregates. Karma and results exist substantially, conventionally. They do not exist ultimately, because they are objects of mundane knowledge. [237] Supreme [dam pa] is wisdom beyond the mundane, and its object [don] is the ultimate [don dam pa]. That object is not the specific character of those two, because that object is an inexpressible general character.2
Here, if you ask whether mundane and beyond-the-mundane awarenesses are epistemic means [tshad ma]:
What is beyond the mundane is only one. The mundane has divisions. Whatever is attained via the beyond the mundane, that is means of knowledge.3 Other than that is not means of knowledge. As the verse of the Mahāsāṅgika says:
Eye and ear and nose, too, are not means of knowledge.
Tongue and body, too, are not means of knowledge.
If the sensory organs were means of knowledge,
There would be nothing to do on the noble path.
And other similar statements.
Also, for some Mahāyānists who say that whereas all things, in their natures as a specific character, simply do not exist, this argument will also arise: What is being taught, conventionally, in those expressions where the Lord speaks of the existence of a thing just as it is, in the words, “The very existence of dharmas is taught”?4
End of chapter 8.
As to what is expressed in “conventional” [kun rdzob]: whatever it is, where it is associated with the afflictions in every way, it is “speaking wrongly,” and where it is associated with purification, it is “well spoken.” If you say this:
If we limit ourselves just to the expression, is it well spoken or wrongly spoken? It must be definitively stated. Even if it is conventional, someone must definitively state it. Otherwise, it is being said that it has conventional existence even though it does not exist. Overall, since to denigrate all the afflictions and the purifications fails to settle what is definite and indefinite, [238] and since one would contradict one’s own expressions oneself, it should not be said. If one says that it is a special intention [dgongs pa can], it will not purify this fault.
Now, if one does not accept that “conventional” is a mere word, how is the following verse established, which comes from the Mahāyāna?
All of these are mere words.
They are settled in ideas alone.
Outside of being expressed,
What is expressed does not exist.
If you ask this, we say:
Here there is the rejection that outside of being expressed what is expressed does not exist, but there is no substance to the inexpressible character. Therefore, that [passage] is just like this:
They are settled in ideas alone.
And saying this, what are called “ideas” are ideas arising from the mind. For, as the sūtra says:
It is conventionally designated just as it arises from an idea.
It is not suitable that the word itself resides within the word. This is also said, immediately after [the above]:
In whatever words
Whatever dharmas are expressed,
In them they do not exist.5
That is the true nature [*dharmatā] of dharmas.
If there were no dharmas with an inexpressible character, without saying “In them,” he would say only the part, “they do not exist.” [239] In the character of conceptual constructions—in just those expressible dharmas as they are conceptually constructed by fools—in those there is no existence. In them they do not exist [means that] in words they do not exist. As it is said:
In them they do not exist.
And as for:
That is the true nature [*dharmatā] of dharmas—
Whatever is said, here the inexpressible nature of the true nature is intended. Outside of mere words, there must be a true nature of some dharmas. Nonetheless:
Words themselves are empty of words, as well.
How is it acceptable that one says this, given that with the idea, “All this is only words,” it is said that “Words too do not exist”? If you say this:
Where one has refuted the substantial nature of what is conceptually constructed, since the refutation is some expression which is conceptually constructed as having the self-nature of an expression, there will be a substantial nature to the reasoning. This too is not accepted:
All dharmas are without words, and
Are expressed with words.
If what is said here is simply nonexistent, what are those non-existent dharmas and words? Where all dharmas are inexpressible characteristics, by speaking as with the conceptual constructions of fools, following their understanding, it is suitable even for the Āryas to express with words what has no words. In this way, the following passage from the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra applies:
Noble son, “conditioned” is a term designated by the teacher. This term designated by the teacher is a conventional expression arising from [240] conceptual construction. And that which is a conventional expression arising from conceptual construction is a conventional expression of various conceptual constructions that is not thoroughly established. Therefore, it is not conditioned. As with the conditioned, so it applies in the same way to the unconditioned as well.6 Also, whatever is said about anything not included within the conditioned and unconditioned will also be like this. Moreover, an expression is not simply without substance. And what is that substance? It is that to which the Āryas, with Ārya knowledge and Ārya vision, are inexpressibly, perfectly and completely awakened.7
