Despite its undoubtedly far-reaching success in placing happiness and optimal human functioning at the center of psychological science, positive psychology (PP) has been failing in its vision to deliver adequate prototypes of what constitutes the “good life” – the principal goal of everyone concerned with matters of virtue and well-being. Furthermore, in its approaches to define and promote well-being, PP has been accused of “culture-blindness,” “Western-centricity,” and “middle-classness.” As a consequence of this general disregard for situational context, PP appears to be morally reluctant to make any descriptive evaluations for the phenomena it studies (Kristjánsson, 2013). Although still considered nearly heretical among social scientists, moral exercising within PP is proving increasingly vital in supporting valid claims or proposing viable prototypes pertaining to individual and societal states of flourishing. The Greek meta-virtue of philotimo, as the combination of moral and intellectual virtues necessary for both good character and virtuous action (Pollis, 1965; Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press; Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, & Betancourt, 1985), challenges PP’s reluctance to recognize the importance of meta-virtues and offers a prototype study paradigm in vivo for PP theorists looking to overcome issues that relate to the situational dependency and moral integration of universal strengths and virtues. Furthermore, a detailed situational analysis of philotimo’s past, present, and possible future as a positive cultural narrative at the epicenter of a global socioeconomic crisis supports the need for PP to account for cultural and situational differences while attempting to recognize a gold standard in the study of virtues and well-being.
Evolving from the Aristotelian concept of the good citizen (kalokagathos politis), philotimo as a combination of individual virtues in the aspect of kalos (virtuous, just, truthful, wise) and social virtues in agathos (morally responsible towards the city, benevolent) was categorical and inescapable. Furthermore, integrity (akereotita) was a fundamental quality of citizenship and widely translated as the virtue of philotimo (Ioannou, 2009; Triandis et al., 1985). Vassiliou and Vassiliou (1973) wrote that a person possessing philotimo is polite, virtuous, reliable, proud, has a “good soul,” behaves correctly, meets his obligations, does his duty, is truthful, generous, self-sacrificing, tactful, respectful, and grateful. In summary, a philotimous person behaves towards members of his in-group the way they expect him to behave. This ethos of integrity and credibility of the self resonates well with the central concepts of virtue ethics, namely virtue, practical wisdom, and eudaimonia (Katerinakis, 2010; Kristjánsson, 2013; Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press). In turn, these concepts are aligned with the virtues of wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence that have been identified as universal by positive psychologists (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), alongside theoretical accounts such as the Self-Determination (Ryan & Deci, 2000) and Moral Foundations (Graham et al., 2012) theories at the foundation of eudaimonic or flourishing life, central to positive psychological enquiry.
In considering the relevance of philotimo within the psychological science movement of PP, the following themes concerning conceptual, historical, and recent socioeconomic dimensions need to be are addressed.
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis a decade ago, Greeks have been subjected to unprecedented psychological pressures due to political instability, interim or short-lived governments, and devastating unemployment numbers affecting close to one third of the country’s population (Kirschbaum, 2012). Public debates about Greece’s ability to carry on serving as an EU member state that fulfills its economic responsibilities have also caused distress and concern about the country’s future. Extensive international media attention scapegoating and demonizing Greek citizens and their lifestyle (Salles, 2011) has brought the country into international disrepute, causing phenomena ranging from disruptions of diplomatic relations to national political divisions igniting civic unrest. As a result, among the financially repressed and those neglected by the welfare state, mental illness and suicide rates have increased sharply. Adding to the economic crisis – which served as the predominant factor leading to the country’s destabilization – the outbreak of civil war in Syria and other conflicts in the Middle East region led to a mounting refugee crisis with Greece at its epicenter (Kelland, 2012). For the majority of Greeks, their suffering has been associated not only with economic despair, but also with an equally debilitating sensation of profound shame and loss of self-esteem, causing tremendous blows to their national identity (Moschonas & Panagiotopoulos, 2016; Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press).
As an antithesis and prescribed panacea to the relentless pressure of Greece’s national predicament, an emphatic message about how Greeks should deal with this crisis has been brought up often and explicitly in public rhetoric, by evangelizing the uniquely Greek character virtue of philotimo (Greek: φιλότιμο). Philotimo has been termed the core Greek cultural value and the golden road to the Greek psyche since the foundations of Hellenic civilization. One of the seven sages of antiquity, philosopher Thales of Miletus, famously asserted that “philotimo for Greeks is like breathing, without it a Greek might as well be dead” (Pollis, 1965). It is therefore no surprise that over 74% of Greeks have been known to describe themselves as philotimous (Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press; Triandis et al., 1985; Vassiliou & Vassiliou, 1973).
In the public discourse during these years of crisis, philotimo was heralded as the virtuous vessel on which the people of Greece could aspire to sail out of crisis and into personal and societal flourishing. Philotimo was brought up in public addresses as the way out of the “Greek problem” from the lips of world leaders such as US President Barack Obama, who highlighted philotimo as “the quintessential sense of right and wrong and the duty to do what’s right” (Monteiro, 2010). Interestingly, this incoming rhetoric from out-group members was widely perceived as out of place and offensive by the majority of Greeks, as was apparent from public sentiment across the mainstream and social media.
A few years into the Greek crisis, in addition to the “foreign” voices, the concept of philotimo suddenly gained international momentum through an online video produced by a US-based organization championing the catalytic role played by Greece during WWII. The video features accomplished Greek-Americans attempting to define what was referred to as “The Greek Secret” (OXI Day Foundation, 2013). Among other descriptions, philotimo was defined as “the undercurrent of Hellenism, the commonest and starkest theme that unites all Greeks … duty, loyalty, integrity, honor, love, trust, faith, and, perhaps most important of all, the pride in being decent” (George Logothetis, quoted in OXI Day Foundation, 2013). These words struck a chord with Greeks and non-Greeks alike, as they referred to concepts often thought of as conducive to a thriving society – concepts that to some appear to be in short supply across modern societies. Despite the video campaign’s positive pro-Greek outlook in public diplomacy and the resulting wide praise it received across United States mainstream media, the actual online thread where the video was published attracted a significant amount of vitriolic commentary. More than 700 comments appeared in the first five days after publication, the majority of which were extremely critical of the concept’s undemocratic representation by what was perceived to be a social elite of individuals. This public response went so far as to result in the removal of subsequent comments by channel administrators.
This reaction is perhaps analogous to the extensive criticism received by the positive psychology movement for broadcasting the potential of individuals to transcend their circumstances and achieve the same level of flourishing as the next person, regardless of socioeconomic conditions (Miller, 2008). Similar to the “be happy or perish” pseudoscientific rhetoric from the original international version of “The Secret” (Byrne, 2006), testimonials in the “Greek Secret” video were making claims based on the existence or absence of philotimo, indirectly causing those who didn’t have it or couldn’t reach up to its ideal state to experience feelings of self-blame (cf. Ehrenreich, 2010). This overplayed emphasis on individual abilities, combined with the downplayed impact of prevalent situational factors, jeopardizes scientific efforts by PP to fully explore and define well-being in modern society. There are noteworthy lessons to be learned from such reflexive responses toward what seems to the public to be a form of surreptitious advocacy for psychosocial desiderata as central as philotimo, by an insufficiently representative elite of business, political, and religious leaders.
Going beyond popular claims or time-specific attempts to define the concept of philotimo, or indeed “the good life,” a researcher ought to consider the vital cultural differences ingrained and represented in language in order to approach the concept and theorize about its relatedness to the socioeconomic crises in question. This is particularly relevant when high-profile voices suggest that this concept become the positive counterweight for deep-rooted reform against pressing adoptions of “Western” political and economic institutions and policies. Consequently, such drastic modernization and reform requires changes in values and attitudes towards positive social change that can only come from intrapersonal and intra-group processes (Fenton, 2011).
In analyzing this out-group in-group rhetoric dynamic regarding the psychological realities of philotimo, a historical account of its origins and nuances would add to the understanding of its centrality in Greek culture as well as its relevance as critique within PP scholarship.
To proceed further towards a sound understanding of philotimo’s complex array of virtues and expressions within Greek society, both from the standpoints of a privileged “Western” rhetoric as well as its Greek reaction, one should aim to comprehend culturally occurring particularities that negotiate articles of “positivity” across these two rather disparate cultures in Europe. Without such comprehension, a thorough epistemological approach would stand incomplete if at all reliable. Fundamental to the understanding of cultural-specific “positivity” is the delineation of the Self in society along its discrete individual and social roles, their value orientation, and ecological or individualistic locus (Biswas-Diener, 2011).
In the West, historical social shifts such as the Protestant Reformation, the rise of the middle class, and the intellectual creativity in the arts and sciences brought about the concept of individuality in society, with citizens perceived as autonomous beings. All facets of social life from the religious to the economic and political became atomized and brought forward the type of thinking that led to classical economics and liberal political structures (Markus & Kitiyama, 1991). Moreover, values of personal freedom of choice and responsibility for one’s decisions and actions defined the socializing process in Western society, characterized by a system of behaviors revolving around individual freedom, personal goals, and individual guilt – the penalty of ethical transgression in the West. In the traditionally collectivist culture of Greece, the equivalent psychological punishment that follows a value transgression and ensures conformity is predominantly the emotion of “shame” (Herzfeld, 1980). Instead of “guilt,” which has historically been restricted even within the legal context in Greece, the word “shame” demonstrates the relationship of the self and its responsibility mainly to the group (Pollis, 1965).
The great rift of cultural development between the West and Greece came through the absence of a distinction between freedom in nationalistic terms and freedom in democratic and existential terms through the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods. For instance, after the French revolution there was a clear distinction between the “individual’s relatedness to the state” and the “new concept of man and his position in society” (Gorer, 1950). In contrast, during the liberation struggle of Greece against Ottoman rule, the quests for freedom and national sovereignty became confounded and interdependent. A newly found existential view of the self that was developing in the West was engulfed in the fight for independence and national sovereignty. The total priority that was given to in-group loyalty instead of individual existence – something unfathomable at the time – is characteristically depicted in the nuances lost and found in translation into English of ancient Greek words such as that of “idiot” (idiotis) for someone who leads a private life away from communal affairs (Pollis, 1965).
Controversially, philotimo was not always considered as a source of positive behaviors of the Greek character, let alone a moral virtue. From ancient commentaries on the lives of historic contemporaries such as Pericles, the governor of Athens, and Alcibiades, a powerful politician and venerated war hero, all the way to twentieth-century sociological and anthropological accounts, philotimo appears to encompass contrasting characteristics such as arrogance, self-serving egocentrism, and irrational judgment in detriment to the State (Strantzalis, 2008). Certain noted post–World War II accounts report attributes, especially pronounced in men, where philotimo was translated as inadmissibility of personal responsibility for mistakes or failures. Conversely, when someone was forced into an admission of fault, he was seen as “losing philotimo” and was exposed to a self-debilitating public critique and intense feelings of shame (Pollis, 1965). These attributes – coupled with other associated behavioral characteristics of Greeks at the time, such as an aversion to self-correction, externalized blame, deference towards authority, and determinism – are not typical of citizens in a traditional democratic society. However, they do characterize a peculiar sense of egalitarianism that places philotimo as the absolute measure of individual worth, while it supports behaviors that harbor authoritarianism and nepotism (Mead, 1953, pp. 77–114).
Parallel with the above historical characteristics of self-evolution within national identities, the value orientation of philotimo in Greece appeared to be changing. Philotimo as a cultural script, a pattern of social interaction typical of a cultural group, was deemed as encouraging individual behaviors in line with what in-group members expected – namely, more favorable behaviors towards in-group members than towards out-group members (Triandis et al., 1985). Subsequent psychological accounts of philotimo mainly focused on its regulation of in-group behavior and wider social association along with its contribution to the delineation of the self in society, which is a contributing factor of self-esteem (Adamopoulos, 1977). Vassiliou and Vassiliou (1973) sampled a representative urban population (740 subjects aged 15–64) of Greece using the antecedent-consequent method, and showed that social conduct in an increasingly complex urban environment relied less on in-group norms and more on individualized perceptions and interpretations. In a mixed-methods design, a few years later, Adamopoulos (1977) confirmed the emergence of a separate category in addition to the categories of relationship with one’s social environment (relation to others, family relations, love for others, fulfillment of duty, etc.) and individualism and activity (pride for one’s actions, retaliation when philotimo is offended, superiority, etc.). This new category, involving active and supportive orientations towards the self (self-respect, inviolability of the person, relation to self, personal freedom, etc.), supported a modernization of the concept that emphasized honesty, individual growth, and independence in response to environmental changes, which represented an increase of internally motivated morality. In particular, self-respect as manifested in integrity and dignity is considered a higher order virtue guarding and inspiring the rest, which equips humans with zest for life while demanding justice and revolting against injustice. Most importantly, it shapes the identity of the person, thus inspiring commitment for personal and social development between present and future selves. Self-respect is imperative for humans; as Dillon stated, “to lose one’s self-respect is, in the end, to lose oneself” (1992, p. 126), which echoes Thales’s dictum about the existence of Greeks being pointless without philotimo.
It seems that although Greeks went through a confounded process of individuation during almost half a millennium between fifteenth and nineteenth centuries BCE, a rapid cultural process of normalizing the Greek identity closer to the one of other western counterparts was underway. Yet, since the country’s return to constitutional democracy in the mid-1970s (following the overthrow of the latest military dictatorship of its modern history), there has been a toxic political rush into isolating the individual away from normative in-group/out-group memberships, and into the membership of voluntary associations infested with party politics founded on pseudo-welfare ideals of debt-ridden consumerist lifestyles. Philotimo was then confounded with an otherwise conceptual counter behavior: rouspheti, the widely practiced and enforced reciprocal dispensation of favors between in-group members dating from the post-Byzantine Ottoman rule of Greece, cultural remains of which quite vividly remain in the modern-day country (Clogg, 2002; Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press; St Clair, 2008). Throughout Greek society, the premise of moral equality interacted with strategies to gain advantage among widely separated social or professional classes. As Campbell (1964) suggested, there is a nuance in philotimo, a dependability of moral respect and social asymmetry, which describes the dynamics of exchange between in-group members. This nuance of philotimo distances it from normative meanings and values of true personal and social virtue. Furthermore, Lyberaki and Paraskevopoulos (2002) argued that emphasis needed to be placed on the elusive boundaries between social trust and its Greek substitutive notion of philotimo (or honor), especially in the case of relatively small communities. This type of “honor” is no longer the expression of abstract rules of the group, but it is based on one’s perception of a personal role within that group (Herzfeld, 1987).
Admittedly, the intrinsic cultural characteristic of rouspheti, which appears to have encouraged “clientism” and interlinked interests of kinship systems supported by political patronage, must have played a part in the creation or deepening of the Greek crisis. It seems that the traditional virtue of the self, eager to play a role within the greater whole, is not scalable to the level of the whole country, let alone the European Union. The resulting landscape is often that of a political mentality of conflict and fragmentation based on mistrust, uncertainty, and group determination, instead of personal responsible choice and harmonizing approaches: a system of nation-wide, smaller or larger zero-sum games (Graf, 2011; Moschonas & Panagiotopoulos, 2016).
So what were the dynamics behind this plasticity across alternating historical contexts? To answer this question, a large-scale internet-mediated study sought to explore the concept of philotimo as defined and depicted by Greeks internationally. Data was collected through a long-form questionnaire administered to a randomly assigned sample of over two thousand Greeks, both within Greece and across the diaspora, asking to contribute definitions and narratives of philotimo. In parallel, an international open invitation for definitions, short narratives, and any other type of data was broadcast across online social media, which resulted in hundreds of responses on social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram (Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press).
The resulting body of complex and diverse data was encoded through thematic analysis to allow for in-depth trans-media analysis of nuances in the meaning of philotimo, as evidenced in Greek society both within the country and among a wider diaspora. Preliminary analysis identified strong associations with age, economic status, level of education, geographical proximity to urban or rural areas, and philotimo. More specifically, younger respondents considered philotimo to be in decline in modern society and associated it with justice, solidarity, and good friendship, whereas their older counterparts placed stronger faith in its modern prevalence and associated it with duty, family values, and compassion towards fellow humans. Proximity to urban centers and high economic status were strongly associated with the perception that “philotimo is lost” in modern society.
Relevant to the present discussion, overarching themes presented philotimo as a “quintessential” attribute of a good character which was nevertheless in decline or “lost” today, or “un-reciprocated,” “undervalued,” “disrespected,” and even “taken advantage of” by un-philotimous individuals in society. Terms most associated with philotimo were pride, humility, compassion, dignity, respect, legacy, and integrity. An overarching theme in the data was the perceived decline of the motivation of a person, or society as a whole, to “honor philotimo” by appreciation and reciprocation. Politicians in particular, and people in power or in positions of social and economic advantage in general, were the groups most often accused of tainting the culture of philotimo in Greece and around the world. Notably, a significant minority of accounts included themes such as “only Greeks can have philotimo,” “it cannot be translated into any other language,” and “you can’t teach philotimo, one can only be born with it or without it.” Lastly, there was a clear distinction between philotimo as negotiated between Greeks and philotimo as shared with non-Greeks, with the concept appearing controversial in the case of the former while ubiquitous in the case of the latter (Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press).
Following on from the preceding discussion on what constitutes the most prevalent theme of Greek culture, there are certain critical theoretical and practical considerations to be addressed from the standpoint of positive psychology.
In line with Aristotle’s (trans. 1953) well-known dictum on the “golden mean” of optimal strengths, which calls for a virtuous, purposeful, leveraged, and timely approach to events, investigating central cultural values or national strengths such as philotimo can not only offer crucial insights into national crises and their component absurdities, conflicts, and life dilemmas, but also highlight viable avenues out of those crises, using the transformative power of reframing national narratives. Philotimo can be thought of as the number one culturally constructed national strength of Greeks; it meets the definition of a character strength in that it is a “pre-existing capacity for a particular way of behaving, thinking, or feeling that is authentic and energizing to the user, and enables optimal functioning, development and performance” (Linley, 2008, p. 9). The investigation into cultural narratives such as philotimo could contribute to the crystallization of character strengths that psychologists have identified as morally prevalent worldwide, such as kindness, justice, honesty, gratitude, and courage (Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004), with the necessary cultural specificity of national identities factored in to an overarching theory. Cultural specificity that mediates with features of “positivity” is paramount; without it, an epistemological approach such as that of PP is likely to be both incomplete and unreliable.
While philotimo is still perceived by most Greeks as a core cultural strength, despite confounding nuances in meaning, it is an ideal starting point for placing strength narratives back in language and thus forming a foundation mark of intrapersonal change that is – more often than not – dependent on the quality of dialogue that takes place between individuals. Furthermore, the investigation into the narrative qualities of philotimo starts a community discourse that can lead to increased overall awareness of the issues concerning inherent negativity bias as well as an individual’s ability to regulate such bias on the subject, a central premise in positive psychological rationale (Linley, Bhaduri, Sharma, & Govindji, 2011). This empowerment is fundamental to helping people take back control of their lives from interwoven interests that fall outside societal well-being. Once negative language recedes, positive language is revived and new possibilities of building a positive organization or even a nation-wide collection of empowered communities are revealed (Page & Carter, 2008; Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press).
The above aspirations are supported by research exhibiting that individuals will improve their personal or societal performance – more acceptably, more respectfully, more pro-socially – after encountering the perspectives of others (Biswas-Diener, 2011). By inviting meaningful stories revolving around strengths and virtues, people are encouraged to understand how similar or different their impressions are of common traits, thus increasing empathic concern among people in a community, which in turn leads to viewing and treating other people as the self. Furthermore, this process is considered conducive towards a new approach to eudaimonic flourishing called purpose, suggesting an intersection of intentions that are mutually meaningful to the self and the world beyond (Damon, 2008). This process can lead to the sharing of cognitive representations, descriptions of personality, and explanations of behavior, creating a “symbolic merging” of selves (Hodges, Clark, & Myers, 2011). Providing further support for the use of narrative in negotiating positive change in identities is the observation that perspective-taking through meaningful storytelling has been shown to reduce in-group favoritism while reducing stereotypes through the non-conscious mechanism of accessing the self-concept, rather than forming stereotypes, as only one can be dominant at any given time (Wang, Kenneth, Ku, & Galinsky, 2014).
The widely accepted advantages of building on the strengths of individuals and its effects on their wider social groups, such as family, other community populations, and larger social networks, is a guiding force for positive social change. This progression from the personal to the social was articulated by Linley (2008) in the mission of the strengths approach as a tripartite construct, characteristically involving 1) personal commitment to use personal strengths, 2) communal commitment to ensure the right conditions for others to explore and build on their strengths, and 3) the social responsibility of harnessing the benefits of those strengths for the wider society. With the understanding that well-being is a social quality that contagiously travels through social networks (Fowler & Christakis, 2008), this algorithmic commitment to building a systemic strengths paradigm has been extensively supported by a wide base of empirical, experiential, and theoretical work, pointing to the fact that commitment to realizing personal strengths can bring about substantial change.
To examine the positioning of the self in relation to grand cultural concepts such as philotimo, the narrative approach is suggested as superior to realist epistemology. This postmodernist view of knowledge, particularly through the critical lens of social constructionism, considers knowledge as corresponding to history, context, culture, language, and experience. Furthermore, it enables different – and sometimes contradictory – layers of meaning to emerge out of how people understand situations, themselves, and the intentions, beliefs, and values of others. Lastly, it appreciates the processes of meaning-making as a historically and culturally specific transformative experience for both researcher and participant within postmodern societies (Boyatzis, 1998; Bruner, 1986; Polkinghorne, 2007; Schwandt, 2000; Turner & Reynolds, 2010).
With “grand narratives” missing from modern day theories of identity, there is particular interest in the constructibility of identity (Georgakopoulou, 2006; Kristjánsson, 2013). This process of individuilization is defined by the fact that the construction of coherence is no longer guaranteed by collective identities, something that is increasingly evident in the case of philotimo. Identity is not a story with closure, but is always subject to transformation, rearranging, and reframing of one’s self and position in society as a dynamic of power relationships, open to the scrutiny of self-analysis (Kraus, 2006). One would hope that an optimistic view of the future of society, afforded to us by Peter Singer’s (1981) model of an expanding circle of empathetic concern and virtuous influence (extending from the self to the next of kin through to humanity as a whole and the planet), could eventually materialize through the positive parallel advances of the modern world, such as those of social mobility, intellectual communication, and public discourse.
In light of all preceding outcomes, philotimo is considered as the central Greek meta-virtue in that it helps a person overcome issues of relevance, conflict, and specificity in exercising virtues on route to attaining the good life, or eudaimonia, issues commonly encountered in the 24 strengths and virtues approach (Kristjánsson, 2013; Schwartz & Sharpe, 2006). In other words, philotimo becomes the adjudicator in choosing the right time, place, feeling, and way in which each virtue should be exercised, depending on the context and agencies of the people involved. In this way, philotimo as a meta-virtue (similar to the Aristotelian master virtue of practical wisdom or phronesis) provides a helpful antidote to the character strengths and virtues approach, which largely lacks moral integration or judgment. Moreover, and in line with prevailing criticisms regarding significant omissions of Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) model (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2006), philotimo includes and is often defined by virtues that do not appear on the VIA list of character strengths and virtues. These encompass particular aspects of social and emotional intelligence such as self-respect, justified anger, pride, shameful self-correction, and emulousness (Kristjánsson, 2013; Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press).
In contrast to the wide acceptance of philotimo as central in the life of Greeks, there is hardly any mainstream academic or public discourse that relates to the challenges of choosing an appropriate aspect of philotimo to match a particular life situation, how to avoid it being in conflict with another aspect that might also be relevant, and ultimately how to translate it each time into action. Philotimo, like most virtues, involves many strengths that, when pronounced in isolation (e.g., meekness or humility), can push a philotimous person out of balance and further away from attaining well-being effectively. Instead of focusing on evaluating further the processes inherent in philotimo, relevant discussions are primarily focused on superficial and retrospective evaluations of events and actions (Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press). This absence of a whole-person focus of life experienced along its myriad and often conflicting complexities contributes to PP’s problem of moral arbitration.
Positing meta-virtues such as philotimo and practical wisdom ameliorates certain shortcomings in the Peterson and Seligman (2004) model, in that they propose a way to study virtue and happiness that is evaluative and descriptive without being morally arbitrational. Just as in the argumentation of PP’s reluctance to be prescriptive (Kristjánsson, 2013), philotimo provides a useful paradigm out of the problem of moral arbitration, in that it encompasses character traits universally regarded as virtues, which are in turn known to be self-reported indicators of well-being. At the same time, despite empirical shortcomings to integrate a complete theory of moral ethics, philotimo – in the case of Greeks, at least – sets forth a living prototype that does not concede to moral relativism, is in line with Aristotelian moral naturalism, and makes empirically grounded evaluative judgments of normative behavior without being normative at passing moral arbitrations. One could further argue, using metaphor, that the agency of a meta-virtue as the arbiter of all other virtues could be likened more to the exercise of political science and its dependence on ethical reasoning, rather than the truth-seeking aspirations of social science.
Despite their conceptual underdevelopment, consideration placed on the morality of virtues such as philotimo is increasingly relevant to the “flourishing” promoted by PP (Fowers, 2008). Currently, the word most commonly employed to denote analytical qualities of internal phenomena in PP is “values,” in preference to “virtues,” which refers more to internal states. However, the present focus on philotimo supports the view that positive psychology needs to address the need for a foundational and systematic value enquiry between what is less or more effective at promoting optimal states of personal and societal being, lest it deprive itself of any usefulness for individuals and societies. In other words, to settle for the anti-realist outlook that morality will always be dependent on situations would undermine PP’s treatise on the moral capacities of humans (Kristjánsson, 2013).
Accompanying the call for a more systematic moral inquiry has been the call for moral prototypes: exemplary cases of virtuous being and doing – or, in other words, heroes and leaders. This call, be it in the resilience of people dealing with the challenges of austerity or the entrepreneurs that strive to find innovate ways out of it, in the solidarity movements helping citizens to deal with the sudden absence of the welfare state, or—in more extreme cases—where people are venerated for confronting terrorism or defying the elements to save the lives of migrants in the Aegean Sea (Smith, 2015), is highly prevalent, suggesting its psychological importance to humankind. While heroes tend to be the prototypes of virtuous individuals in society, a closer look at their particular attributes suggests that heroism is a confounded phenomenon without clear-cut definitions. According to Zimbardo (2007), 12 different types of heroes can be observed, from the military to the civic, political, religious, and scientific whistleblowers, bureaucratic heroes, underdogs, and even celebrities. Aside from their definitive characteristics of social attribution – contrasted with the usually solitary nature of their actions – there is no one single defining feature of heroes and heroic behavior aside from referencing attributes such as bravery, integrity, courage, honesty, selflessness, and determination (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). Moreover, heroism appears to be situationally determined, meaning that someone who is venerated as a hero in one historical or cultural context might be called a villain in another.
An important distinction within the general category of heroes is the typology of social heroism. This typology, although often morally controversial, depicts a typically less dramatic, mostly private exercise of moral courage dedicated to the preservation of community-sanctioned values or standards under threat, or the promotion of new community standards and ideals that are not yet widely accepted. The fact that modern society is infatuated with role models as diverse as religious figures to show business to sports celebrities depicts the complex dynamics of establishing effective “heroes” (Kinsella, Ritchie, & Igou, 2015).
The challenge of bridging virtue archetypes with the current demand for moral prototypes is further elucidated by the case of the virtue of megalopsychia. Standing at the intersection between greatness and self-knowledge, this “crowning virtue” – as it was regarded by Aristotelian virtue ethics – is currently discredited by modern theorists because it doesn’t fit the currently prevalent (i.e., Kantian and Christian) moral values and outlook in society (Han, 2015). Specifically, those possessing this virtue would think of themselves as worthy, but would also be truly worthy, meaning they would not only deserve and demand recognition for their self-respect, but that they would do so without expressing gratitude and humility or acknowledging the same from others, and would remain inactive and lethargic except in the face of opportunities for great honor and achievement (Aristotle, trans. 1953). Furthering discredit by modern moral theorists, megalopsychia, according to Aristotle, is dependent on external goods and “moral luck” instead of the modern ideal of simply requiring success and the self-actualization of “good will” (Kristjánsson, 1998).
Just as Plato asserted that no person errs or does harm willfully, so a virtue – as an aspiration to do good – cannot always guarantee the goodness of all subsequent actions. Corresponding to Bertrand Russell’s (1950) four cardinal desires of man, philotimo’s love of honor could be easily devalued as obligating people to be laborious and hardworking merely to acquire material goods, passionate about proving themselves good only to appear better than others, being infused with pride and the vain need for glory simply for the sake of it, and ultimately being obsessed with “good” power to the insatiable degree of omnipotence. At the same time, a dismissal of people’s expressed desires as detached from moral principles or merely as artifacts of a particular time and place overlooks natural human tendencies for material acquisitiveness, rivalry, vanity, and love of power, and would eventually make way for a totalitarian top-down redesign of society (Pinker, 1999). Lastly, in its quest for measuring and prototyping the virtuous life, PP should not shy away from exploring current cross-disciplinary and insightful propositions that attempt to reframe core archetypes of selfhood, such as Charles Stang’s (2016) “Divine Double,” a neo-Platonist idea concerning the discursive and divine counterpart of the self.
The case of philotimo as a principal character virtue for over 18 million Greeks around the world is a distinct, timeless, and relevant phenomenon that is at once acutely culture-specific yet abounds with universal moral implications, highlighting the pitfalls and opportunities encountered within the developing field of positive psychology today.
The socioeconomic and political crises in Greece exemplify a worldwide trend. Contextual parameters in social sciences are changing rapidly and on a large scale, and traditional concepts and dynamics are becoming increasingly complex or less relevant. The cultural value of philotimo, its timeless centrality within Greek culture, as well as its timely projection within a crisis-afflicted Greek society, provides an insightful and prototypical study paradigm capable of contributing to the cultural maturity of the PP movement. Moreover, it provides a distinctively resourceful look at cultural traits found at the center of a modern global socioeconomic crisis, its effects on individuals and society, and the prevailing controversy surrounding power dynamics from the intrapersonal to the civic. Furthermore, philotimo could form a model for prototyping the pursuit of virtue in Western society. It consists of an ideal realist test tube for positive psychology, as it is observed in a relatively homogenous population, encompasses both positive and negative facets of a central virtue, and exposes the vulnerabilities of any irresponsible promotion of morality in society due to its sensitivity to situational factors from the most basic, such as demographics, to the most complex, such as power dynamics (Rhodes Hatzimalonas, in press).
While retaining its centrality in Greek life as an undisputed virtue, the complexity and fluidity of accounts of philotimo, as evidenced through the largest and most elaborate study of its type conducted on philotimo in 30 years, support the idea that morality is an equally complex and sensitive phenomenon dependent on situational “big data” that requires detailed and extended study before it is used to explain or predict human behavior (Fowers, 2008). The paradigm of an archetypal virtue with such a long heritage and persistent modern impact should encourage an in-depth enquiry into prevalent strengths and virtues toward a widely acceptable “golden mean.” A golden mean reassessed, through a combination of emic and etic approaches, toward understanding the effects of constantly adapting nuances and dynamics on individuals and societies. After all, in the eudaimonic tradition of flourishing, moral virtues are best utilized as the tools through which humans discern what is best for both themselves and society.
Accepting the constant truth that there is no value-free vacuum in nature or society, with dominant socioeconomic circumstances interpreting the past, occupying the present, and projecting the future, the mission of a psychological discipline that aspires to improve the human condition should be to fill that void with the best available set of evaluations that scientific progress can afford at any given point in time. Perhaps, then, social science – and PP in particular – should be perceived and understood less as value-neutral and more as morally inquiring, thus as legitimate contributors to the philosophical and humanistic traditions of the West (Christopher & Campbell, 2008).
While traditional science is only beginning to come to terms with realities such as the realization that “most current published research findings are false” (Ioannidis, 2005) due to incomplete or immature scientific approaches, positive psychologists should not readily compromise with biased and simplistic scientific evangelisms that dim critical insights and radicalize worldviews. Instead, they should persevere to refine their senses and intellect through the framework of constant quest and discovery. At a time when advances in human science are closer than ever to bridging the gap between biology and culture, matter and mind (Pinker, 1999), we should be able to separate the process of epistemological enquiry and our current moral values without fearing that we may lose them. On the contrary, they can teach us self-correction and recovery from errors and protect us from pseudoscience (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2013), while affording us more opportunities for evolving our values as tools for the betterment of “the science of mental life, both of its phenomena and their conditions” (James, 1890/1983) toward personal and societal flourishing.
1With special thanks to Channing Rion at Harvard University for her philotimous proofreading contributions.
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