It seems a favourite trick to shoot one’s finger off when one is cleansing one’s rifle, two men were admitted to hospital today having blown off their fingers cleansing their rifles today.
Lieutenant Neville Woodroffe – 1/Irish Guards
Although the 6th Infantry Division was mobilized on 4 August 1914, it remained in the Cambridge area until 7 September. Concerns at home that England might possibly be invaded by the Germans prevented the full six divisions from being transported to France in early August. Amongst the officers and men of the division there was a real fear that they would arrive too late to join the fight. They had been following the fortunes of the BEF over the retreat from Mons and the advance from the Marne to the Aisne and it was with some relief that orders were received to proceed to Southampton. The West and East Yorkshire Regiments were packed aboard the SS Caudor Castle which docked at St Nazaire at 9.00pm on 9 September. The 1st Battalion the Leicestershire Regiment (1/Leicesters) arrived aboard the SS Braemar Castle at 8.00am the next morning. On board was Captain Robert Hawes who was still technically a newly-wed, having married Eleanorah Rydon a matter of months before mobilization. Hawes had been a gentleman cadet at Sandhurst in 1902 with the author’s grandfather, Howard Murland. The two young men formed a firm friendship whilst in E Company and even though they went their separate ways on being commissioned, their friendship was rekindled when they met up again in India. In 1911 Robert Hawes returned to England to take up his appointment as adjutant of the 3rd Battalion, he was not to see his old friend again.
The division was initially delayed by the decision on 29 August to move the British seaboard base at Le Havre to St Nazaire, some 250 miles further south. This huge transfer of stores was completed in a week – a testament to the Royal Navy’s dominance of the channel and its surrounding waters – and placed the 6th Division southwest of Paris and even further from the Aisne valley. Strangely there was little urgency noticeable in getting the three brigades of Major General John Kier’s division into line with the BEF, which at the time was crossing the Marne on its way north. If the experience of the 1st Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment (1/East Yorks) is anything to go by, it was a fairly leisurely introduction to war. After disembarking at 9.20pm on 9 September, the East Yorks took some ten days to make the journey to the Aisne crossing at Bourg. The first twenty-eight hours were spent courtesy of the French railways which took them to Coulommiers. From there the battalion marched to Doue where it arrived at 3.00pm on 12 September, remaining stationary – apart from a route march – for the next two days, drawing supplies and waiting for 18 Brigade HQ to catch up. When the battalion did resume its move north on 15 September, the war diary reports that it was held up by brigade supply trains and ammunition columns. The battalion finally crossed the Aisne at 6.00am on Sunday 19 September.
Exactly what news had filtered through to Kier’s brigades as they marched north is imprecise but on 16 September Lieutenant Billy Congreve with the 3rd Rifle Brigade was still under the impression that the Germans were retiring.234 It must have come as some surprise then, to hear that the advance had stalled and instead of joining III Corps as originally planned, the newcomers were now to be put into general reserve. For once Sir John French had made a strategically sensible decision; there was little point in deploying the division on the left flank with the 4th Division which is presumably where they were destined. Nevertheless, there had been some discussion at GHQ as to the deployment of Kier’s division before it was decided to use the fresh troops as reinforcements for what was now a very tired and depleted BEF; only the divisional artillery brigades would take up their allotted place in III Corps. Consequently 16 Brigade was sent to relieve 7 and 9 Brigades above Vailly, 17 Brigade was placed in corps reserve and 18 Brigade went to relieve the hard-pressed 1 and 2 Brigades on the furthest extremity of the BEF’s right flank.
18 Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Walter Congreve VC – the father of Billy Congreve – began the relief of the 1st Division units after dark. The 1/West Yorkshires would have been a welcome sight to the Coldstream Guards in the trenches at Troyon, their casualties over the previous few days had been comparatively light but had included two officers from No.1 Company killed and Captain Alfred Egerton who was wounded after serving only one day with the battalion. After completing the handover with Major Leslie Hamilton, the Coldstream Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Towsey deployed his A and B Companies under Major Alexander Ingles into the firing line and his remaining two companies into the support trenches along with the HQ staff. The troop movements during the relief must have alerted the Germans as they were fired on shortly after 9.00pm which did little more than hone the vigilance of the men in the firing line. But much more was to follow at daybreak.
On the right of the West Yorkshires the Moroccan troops of the French XVIII Corps were in position on the extreme left flank of the French Fifth Army. Arthur Osburn was quite distressed by the wretched sight of these North African troops who were not equipped for the cold and rain of a European autumn on the battle-strewn slopes above the Aisne:
‘Drenched with rain, without food or medical aid, they squatted in the mud on the hillside around Paissy. Huddled up together like wounded animals supporting shattered limbs or badly mutilated faces, they were as pathetic a sight as the German wounded had been outside Braine. Those sodden hillsides, strewn with dead horses and dead men, must have been in gruesome contrast to …the whispering palm groves of Ghardais and Side Okba.’235
Osburn could see no sign of any French medical services or any ambulance transport to move them from the firing line. Taking it upon himself to tend to their wounded he and his small medical team established a dressing station in the caves at Paissy. ‘Like the prophets of old, we hid them by tens and fifties in the caves of Paissy where, in their saturated cotton clothing, they huddled close together for warmth’.
20 September was another cold day with heavy showers of hail and rain and it was on the poorly-equipped French colonial troops that the first onslaught of the morning fell. Commanding the German Seventh Army on the Aisne, Josias von Heeringen must have been only too aware of the fragile nature of the French line at this point and began softening up the French lines early that morning. The West Yorkshires on their left reporting heavy shell fire from about 4.00am onwards and at 4.14am some Moroccan troops began leaving their positions. Although they were encouraged to return, the West Yorkshires’ right flank was immediately put under pressure and became increasingly vulnerable in the face of the wavering Moroccan troops. With this in mind, Colonel Towsey sent an officer’s patrol under Lieutenant Thomas Meautys out to his right in order to get a fuller picture of what exactly was taking place.236 Meautys and his men confirmed Towsey’s worst fears; the Moroccan troops on his right flank were in no position to contain a resolute German attack and appeared still to be in some disorder. Towsey had no choice but to deploy one company to protect the right of his battalion’s position. Private Charles Rainbird was with D Company:
‘As dawn was breaking this morning, there occurred one of those hellish mistakes which occur in every war. We saw through the half light a large body of men evidently retiring on our right. Our Colonel ordered my Company ‘D’ to swing round so as to cover their retirement if they should prove to be allies. After advancing about 200 yards we saw that they were allies (Zouaves) when, to our horror they suddenly turned and opened fire on us. Oh God, it was awful, every one of us exposed to a raking fire and no cover; they had evidently mistaken us for the enemy. My mates were falling all over the place and there was 37 killed in less than two minutes. Naturally our boys opened fire on them, in spite of the CO’s shout of “Don’t fire!” I dropped one fellow as he was in the act of firing, then we received the order to retire.’237
In the confusion of the early morning a party of Moroccan troops had opened fire on the West Yorkshires as they moved into position, an incident which underlined the delicate nature of the French positions and the nervousness of the men holding them. After this the line appeared to settle down and there was a pause before the second German attack was made sometime after 10.00am. This time the West Yorkshires were ready for anything and easily checked the attacking enemy infantry and for a while it appeared as if the Moroccan infantry had regained their composure. But this attack was only a precursor to another more determined assault.
Meanwhile Jock Marden had been turned out of his billet at 4.30am with the 9/Lancers to provide support for the infantry. Detailed with eight men to act as, ‘intercommunication between English right and French left’, he established himself on the ridge to await developments:
‘Dig ourselves a little trench for protection from splinters. Leave 2 men with the OC West Yorkshire Regiment on the ridge and remain below with the rest. Note the OC West Yorkshires is sitting eating in the support trenches … Am shown remains of last intercommunication patrol – officer killed238 – 3 horses – 4 men! This, I suppose, is to cheer me up!’239
Marden’s light-hearted rendering cloaked the seriousness of the situation the BEF faced that morning. Colonel Towsey may well have been snatching a bite to eat but it was probably the last chance he had before the next German attack began at about 12.30pm under the cover of a violent rainstorm. The Moroccans were thrown back yet again and Towsey and Lieutenant Meautys both went forward to the firing line to see what was happening – returning a few minutes later with Meautys mortally wounded. According to Captain P H Lowe who was with D Company, the advanced line of the West Yorkshires was on the forward slope of the hill and composed of a succession of rifle pits without any form of communication trenches:
‘The trench here was very badly sited, there being dead ground to the front, though the field of fire to the flanks was good. There was no room in the trench for a number of my men, but there were in many places craters made from shell fire …we beat off comparatively easily two attacks. Then the Germans massed in the dead ground in front. From here they tried to advance by rushes in small bodies. This was more difficult to stop. In the meantime our casualties had been heavy and particularly from machine guns and shrapnel, which was continually traversing our trenches. Near midday two catastrophes took place. The French went, leaving our flank exposed and a short heavy storm of rain turned the ground into a quagmire. Ammunition was being collected from the wounded with the result that all the rifles began to jam.’240
Lowe describes how there were only four serviceable rifles in his particular pit and the bayonets on each had been smashed by enemy fire whilst the bolts on two of the weapons were only able to be operated with the aid of an entrenching tool:
‘It appeared to me that the final German effort could only be met with a counter-attack. To be prepared, I endeavoured to find out the officers and NCOs who were still effective. On the right it was reported there were none. The men began to get somewhat disheartened. It was impossible to send any message to the rear. At the very moment the Germans were about to advance, a man about 40 yards on my right began to waver. As soon as I got up to deal with the situation I was hit.’241
Realizing the need for support Towsey sent a runner to Brigade HQ at Paissy to ask for assistance. But the gap left by the retreating French infantry had given the Germans the opportunity they needed and as the forward companies were overwhelmed, the German infantry took possession of the British firing line, the Official History tells us that they charged and, ‘swept the front companies into captivity’, but in truth, as there were few survivors, only those who were taken captive knew the exact circumstances of what actually happened.
The first Colonel Towsey knew of the disaster that had befallen his battalion was at 1.30pm when a runner from the front line brought the news that the companies had been captured and that the Germans were advancing. Gathering together the remnants of West Yorkshires in the support trenches, Towsey advanced at the head of his men into a hail of fire from his front and right flank. The war diary recorded the inevitable outcome:
‘C Company and HQ Company at once advanced towards the front trenches in order, if possible, to save the companies in the firing line; they fixed bayonets and advanced at the double but were met with a heavy fire from the front and right flank. Fire was opened to the front and two platoons turned to the right. The order was then given to retire back to the trench and the original line was again occupied. Owing to this position offering a poor field of fire the CO decided to retire on to Paissy Hill and connect up with the cavalry on our right.’242
Jock Marden was alerted to the demise of the West Yorkshires by one of his men:
‘He tears down in a great hurry to say that the Yorkshires have bolted and that the Germans are on the ridge – [I] see Zouaves to our right bolting too! This is cheerful – I may be captured. Run up hill and see no Germans – but the Yorkshires have left their wounded behind and bolted – even the reserves. Get my horse and head them off down the valley, and try and stop them. Up comes old De Lisle: “Take ‘em back to the firing line; shoot anyone who won’t go.” Blow! I thought an intercommunication patrol stayed in the reserve trenches – he said, “firing line.” Over the ridge we go – back to the forward trenches.’243
The retirement of the Yorkshires had peeled open the British line and now the Durham Light Infantry – holding the line to the left of the West Yorkshires – came under a heavy enfilade fire. Their situation was not eased until the arrival of the 2nd Battalion Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment (2/Sherwood Foresters). The Foresters were in reserve to the north of Troyon, sheltered in the steep-sided valley which ran down to Vendresse. As they moved across the head of the valley a German column was seen escorting the West Yorkshire prisoners – including Private Charles Rainbird – who had survived the morning’s fighting. Perhaps those British prisoners were witness to what must have been a demonstration of the, British infantry battalion circa 1914 at its very best, as the Foresters advanced into a storm of machine-gun and rifle fire from their front and left flanks. Crossing ground devoid of cover and with men dropping left, right and centre, the battalion stormed the trenches so recently held by the West Yorkshires and drove out the German infantry at the point of the bayonet
In the meantime 2 Cavalry Brigade was arriving in force with a company of the Royal Sussex. 4/Dragoon Guards, led by Major Tom Bridges, dismounted below the ridge and Bridges – never one to avoid getting into action – was soon running ahead of his men:
‘I got on ahead and jumping off my horse, told my trumpeter to wait for the squadron and tell Hornby to dismount and look for my signals. I ran on up to the crown of the hill which was bare stubble, and seemed quite deserted until I saw a German officer’s helmeted head coming up the other side. I saw him wave to his men, and I did the same to mine, giving the signal to double. We met the Picklehaubers almost face to face and standing up poured rapid fire into them which put them to flight. A second squadron came up on our right and we occupied some shallow rifle pits previously dug by the infantry.’244
When the Dragoon Guards went into dismounted action, Trooper Ben Clouting’s job was to stay with the horses, but on this occasion, ‘the older troopers were quite happy to let the likes of me go instead’. Clouting was soon running up the slope after Tom Bridges:
‘We dropped into small scoops made by some recently departed infantry… the Germans came on, packed together, hundreds of them, marching four deep and at a distance of some eleven hundred yards. They were coming down the far slope of a valley, marching through agricultural fields, as we opened up with our fifteen-rounds-a-minute fire. The vision was perfect. I could see Germans toppling over as the rest came relentlessly on, but with our artillery pounding away, the Germans could only take so much. All of a sudden they turned and bolted back up the valley.’245
With the remnants of the West Yorkshires and the Moroccan infantry, ‘in their blue and silver jackets and red trousers’, now rallied and advancing uphill, the cavalrymen’s charge and rapid fire had successfully turned the approaching German infantry. By 4.30pm all the West Yorkshires’ trenches had been retaken and Jock Marden and the 9/Lancers – sent to entrench a position to the rear of the Moroccans – were firmly in place to, ‘dissuade them from bolting’, again.
Jock Marden, who like most cavalrymen, refers to the infantry as ‘feet’, felt the, ‘run forward was a most dangerous show as everyone fired as they ran, in any direction’. Back in the trenches he recounts how, ‘a silly fool’, hit him in the head, presumably a stray shot which could literally have come from anywhere – German, British or indeed French! However, flushed with the excitement of the action around him, the young cavalryman was not ready to leave his post. Tying up his wound with a handkerchief he remained where he was until his relief arrived.
With the ‘feet’ now back in the trenches and a degree of normality restored, the cavalry retired to Paissy. The West Yorkshire war diarist is, ‘certain that the Germans advanced under the cover of a white flag’, on the right flank, a view which is not supported by Captain Lowe’s account of the action – which was completed two years later in 1917 after he was repatriated to Switzerland. In his evidence he makes no mention of a white flag incident taking place – which is not to say it did not occur. Lowe’s account tells us the line was already beginning to waver before he was hit, and in the absence of officers and NCOs to hold the line steady, perhaps the West Yorkshires did indeed do as Jock Marden has suggested and, ‘bolted’. In the Yorkshiremen’s defence, however, although they were regulars they were unseasoned troops who had been put into the front line without the benefit of more experienced men alongside them, and if indeed a white flag ruse was used against them, one can understand how they may have been taken in by it. Later in the war newly-arrived battalions would spend a period of ‘probation’ in the trenches along with more experienced troops to enable them to acclimatize to the local conditions and practices.
What is not in doubt is the scale of the calamity which had overtaken the West Yorkshires on their introduction to front line duty. As to who saved the day on 20 September that is still a subject of some debate. The men of 2 Cavalry Brigade claim their counter attack was responsible for rallying the French and British infantry – which indeed it did – but full credit must go to the magnificent attack by the Sherwood Foresters which took the front line trenches, albeit at a terrible cost. The battalion lost four officers killed and eight wounded together with forty other ranks killed and 140 wounded.
Yet it was the West Yorkshires who suffered most heavily. At roll call on 21 September it became apparent that apart from eight officers killed and two others wounded – including the commanding officer – seven other officers were missing. Amongst the ranks seventy-one were known to have been killed and 110 wounded but 436 were posted as missing, many of which had been taken prisoner. It had been a very severe baptism of fire for the battalion in what was their first day of action. At Troyon – after less than three weeks since landing at St Nazaire – Major Godfrey Lang took command of what was left of the battalion – five officers and 250 men.246 When the Loyal North Lancs took over the West Yorkshires’ trenches, Lieutenant James Hyndson was very conscious that they were, ‘still full of their dead, and it was almost impossible to dig in places without coming on dead bodies’. It was a scenario which would become all too common in the grinding years of trench warfare which lay ahead.
Douglas Haig was particularly critical of the West Yorkshires and of Colonel Towsey himself. According to his diary account, Haig tells us he was informed by Brigadier General de Lisle that, ‘the West Yorkshires left their trenches and ran back to Paizy [sic] village headed apparently by the colonel of the battalion’. Not only that, but he went on to say:
‘This is the worst incident of which I have heard during this campaign. I do not know Lt. Col Towsey but in view of the high character which he holds it may be well to give him another chance, but I recommend that he and his battalion be strongly rebuked and that they are told that it rests with them to regain the good name and reputation which our infantry holds, and which they may have by their conduct on the 20th forfeited.’247
There is, however, a final footnote to the West Yorkshire disaster, Frederick Coleman recounts being on the Tour de Paissy just before the final attack on the West Yorkshires’ trenches:
‘By General Allenby’s haystack on the Tour de Paissy was a big telescope mounted on a tripod. It was in disgrace. It served the divisional staff soberly and well until the very moment of the German attack on the West Yorks trenches. Seeing men coming over the ridge, Colonel Home, General Allenby’s GSO1, declared his field glasses made him think them Germans. To make sure, the big telescope was turned on the ridge. For the first time in its history a moist film formed over the inner lens. A line of grey smudges was all that could be made out through its formally far-seeing eye. When later events proved that Home was right, and the men in sight were Germans, moments ever precious to the guns were forever lost’.248
The pandemonium on the right flank of the BEF may have influenced von Heeringen’s decision to press home another attack the next morning, a decision which led to a personal protest from the commanding general of the VII Reserve Corps, Hans von Zwehl. ‘The daily repetition of attack orders’, he felt, could not achieve any success without reinforcements. According to von Zwehl at least another division was required, if not a whole corps, with artillery support.249 His protest seems to have had the desired effect as 21 and 22 September were relatively quiet. The French Fifth Army made some progress on the Chemin des Dames capturing the Ferme d’Hurtebise and the opportunity was taken for the British to carry out some much needed reliefs. 17 Infantry Brigade took over the positions occupied by 5 Brigade who were withdrawn into corps reserve and 2 Brigade once again found itself on the Chemin des Dames on the extreme right of the BEF.
On 21 September the 1/Leicesters crossed the Aisne late in the evening and relieved the Worcesters and the Royal Irish Rifles at 11.00pm. The trenches were to the right of La Rouge Maison Farm and – at this point in the campaign – were subjected only to regular shell and sniper fire; nevertheless this daily hail of metal soon began to make an impact. Over the course of the next twenty days that the battalion spent in the front line, five men were killed and sixteen wounded. Three officers, including the battalion adjutant, Captain Edmund Tidswell and Captain Robert Hawes were wounded and tragically Hawes died of his wounds on 23 September after being taken down to Vailly.250 The author’s grandfather received news of his death ten days later whilst in India, ‘poor old Hawes has been killed’, he wrote in his diary, ‘one of my best friends, we spent such a long time together at Sandhurst and then at Belgaum’. It was to be the beginning of a long list of deceased friends which Howard Murland would record in his diary over the next four years.
There were several half-hearted attacks on 2 Brigade and against the left of the French XVIII Corps during the morning of 26 September which were quite easily beaten off but it was against the frontage occupied by 1/SWB on the Mont Faucon spur that the most serious attack occurred. The battalion held a line running across the spur with a large quarry situated almost at its mid-point. The steep sides of the spur which fell down towards Vendresse on the right were thickly wooded. At dawn a large force of some 1,200 German infantry from the 21st and 25th Divisions of XVIII Army Corps attacked the battalion. Lieutenant Charles Paterson thought it to be, ‘the most ghastly day’, of his life:
‘At 4.15am the Germans attacked. Main attack apparently against my regiment, which is on the left of our line. D and A Companies in the trenches. B and C hustled up in support, and soon the whole place was alive with bullets. News comes that they [Germans] are trying to work their way round our left.’251
Captain Guy Ward, commanding C Company, remembered getting word that D Company had retired to the shelter of the quarry:
‘This allows the Germans to get into the wood and so bring the lot of us under fire. We form up on a bank and prepare to hold it. Leaving Stewart [Lieutenant Charles Stewart] in charge I go back to the battalion and on the way ask the Welch, who were in reserve for help, they send a platoon to Stewart … News comes which Welby [Major Glynne Welby, OC D Company] is killed and Prichard [Lieutenant William Prichard] is wounded. Curgenven [Captain Victor Curgenven] is sent to take command of D Company.’252
D Company was clearly taking the brunt of the attack. Charles Paterson was with HQ Company when he heard the news that the Germans had broken through the line and apparently got into D Company’s lines in the quarry which formed the nub of the battalion’s defences. For a while there was confusion, compounded by Major Anthony Reddie, the battalion’s second-in-command, who brought in the disturbing news that C and D Companies had surrendered which, if true, would precipitate a general retirement back towards Vendresse. Guy Ward was sent up by Lieutenant Colonel Bertram Collier to find out exactly what was happening and report back:
‘As far as I could make out what happened was D Company had a line of trenches in front of the quarry and by night several sentries in advance of the trenches. Their custom was to withdraw as soon as it was light enough for the sentries in the trenches to see. As soon as the sentries fell back this morning, the Germans, who evidently had been assembling during the night, followed close behind them and got their machine guns and snipers in position before those in the trenches realized that there were more than just the sentries moving in front of them. The men in the trenches must have been quickly wiped out and the Germans advanced to the quarry. I can’t make out if they actually entered the quarry, I think not as C Company appeared on the scene with fixed bayonets at which the Germans fell back. Curgenven told me they advanced at the charge but did not get into them. There were no German dead in the quarry.’253
For the remainder of the morning the Borderers held their own, not needing to call on the 18 Brigade reinforcements which were on standby. At 11.30am the German infantry – realizing their attack had failed – began to withdraw under the cover of their artillery batteries on the Chemin des Dames. It was the moment the British gunners had been waiting for, as the German infantry became visible in the upper Chivy valley the gunners opened fire inflicting heavy casualties on the hapless Germans. The guns of 115/ and 116/Batteries fired over 1,100 shrapnel and high explosive rounds per battery while the XLIII Brigade guns recorded 307 shrapnel and 235 high explosive shells being fired after their batteries came into action. We have no definite indication of the damage inflicted on the Germans during their retirement but the Official History suggests that the number of enemy killed ‘must have exceeded the total casualties of the British’.
The British casualties recorded in the I Corps War Diary amounted to six officers and 423 other ranks killed, 6 officers and 91 other ranks wounded and 110 missing, the vast majority of whom were subsequently found to have been killed. By far the largest number of dead and wounded came from the South Wales Borderers. The battalion had lost 4 officers killed and 3 wounded with 86 other ranks killed and 95 wounded.254 Twelve men from D Company surrendered during the initial engagement at the quarry, an episode which incensed Charles Paterson who considered surrender to be cowardice. In his diary he refers to the regiment by its old numeric, the 24th of Foot:
‘May they be spared to reach England again and be tried by Court Martial and get what they deserve. Never has the 24th surrendered yet, and in spite of the casualties the rest of the Regiment stuck to it and fought like Englishmen and 24th men could fight. We are now left with three officers each in three companies, and only two in the fourth, instead of six in each, a sad sad business.’
Harsh words indeed and a sentiment which would have been far from the mind of Captain Guy Ward who was detailed to recover the bodies of the dead:
‘It fell to our lot to do the melancholy job of burying D Company’s men. Poor old Welby, Sills and Simonds and 27 men, also 14 Germans, but there were many further out. They were Saxons I think, great big men. We put our officers and men in the communication trench leading from the quarry to the front trench: as the front trench is no longer to be used.’255
If 26 September was the ‘most ghastly day’ of Charles Paterson’s life, for the 1/Cameron Highlanders, the previous day had been ‘one of sudden and crippling disaster’. The German shell fire which greeted that dawn began falling on the Cameron Highlanders’ positions on the Beaulne spur at around 6.00am. The battalion’s trenches were a series of unconnected shallow rifle pits, each capable of holding a section of six or seven men. Directly behind D Company’s forward trenches was a large cave which was being used as Battalion HQ – another similar cave nearby was sheltering some of the officers and men of C Company. In command of the battalion was Captain Douglas Miers. The reader will recall that the battalion had suffered serious losses on 14 September which included Colonel McLachan amongst the wounded and had reduced the battalion to 6 officers and 200 other ranks.
Some thirty minutes after the bombardment began Douglas Miers was wounded by a shell splinter and returned to the HQ cave to have his wounds attended to by Lieutenant John Crocket, the battalion medical officer. Sending word to Captain Allan Cameron – the next senior officer in the battalion – to take command, Miers waited in the cave to hand-over to Cameron officially. His departure for the dressing station at Verneuil was delayed by another salvo of German shells and it was whilst he remained in the shelter of the cave that two large shells scored direct hits, one on top and the other at the entrance. The whole structure was brought down entombing the twenty-nine occupants.
This was another serious blow to the battalion. Not only had Miers and Allan Cameron been killed in the falling rubble but three other officers, John Crocket, Lieutenant Napier Cameron and the battalion adjutant, Lieutenant Kenneth Meiklejohn were also killed along with the Regimental Sergeant Major, George Burt.256 There were four survivors including Bandsmen Rosser and Ursell who escaped unscathed and Corporal Mitchell who was pulled out alive but badly crushed. Command of the battalion fell to Captain Ewen Brodie who was one of only two officers left alive.257 Three days later the new draft of officers and men – sent out to replace the losses of 14 September – arrived with the new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas McEwen.
With McEwen’s arrival on the Aisne on 28 September the British positions were almost exactly the same as they had been at nightfall on 14 September. The morning had begun with the usual mist, which, on the 2/Coldstream frontage, allowed a small patrol of three men to approach the forward German trenches unseen. Suddenly the mist lifted placing the three men in range of enemy rifle fire, two were shot down and the third escaped with only a graze to return to the safety of the Coldstream front line. Not waiting for darkness to bring in the two wounded men. Private Frederick Dobson crawled out under heavy fire across the exposed ground to find one of the men dead and the other badly wounded but alive. Having applied first aid he returned to his company trenches to collect a stretcher. Accompanied by Corporal Brown the two men successfully brought the wounded man back to safety. Dobson was awarded the Victoria Cross and Brown the Distinguished Conduct Medal for their selfless acts.
Dobson’s VC was the second which had been awarded to men of the Coldstream Guards since war had been declared and the seventh and last to be won on the Aisne in 1914. By early October both sides were exhausted; frontal attacks – no matter how gallantly led or undertaken – had proved ineffectual and the two sides appeared content for the time being to throw high explosive at each other. But unbeknown to the Germans, plans were afoot for the BEF to move to Flanders.