Here we give a succinct overview of the fundamentals of intercultural philosophy, which includes every intercultural philosophical activity that involves (cross-cultural) translation, interpretation, exposition, or comparison of the conceptual schemes of a certain (philosophical) tradition in terms of the conceptual schemes of another tradition. We have argued that it is not necessary to share the same notion of philosophy for intercultural philosophical dialogue or other philosophical practices to be possible. This is trivially so, if one realizes that philosophy (like all other concepts) is a family resemblance concept (i.e., a concept without core or essence of meaning and having indistinct borders). We have stipulated that language is to be understood in the broad sense to include nonlinguistic signs. Further, all language uses concepts. The so-called nonconceptual thought is communicated with the aid of concepts associated with a particular language. Although our focus is philosophy, most arguments concerning “necessary preconditions” apply to any form of cross-cultural interpretation, mutatis mutandis.
All cases of interpretation can be understood in terms of geyi 格义, which means interpreting conceptual schemes of one philosophical tradition (yi) using the conceptual schemes of another tradition as the “standard” (ge). The standard (ge) is not something fixed. Different interpreters may favor different standards. Further, a particular standard may change as a result of clarifying yi in terms of ge or as a result of dialogue (mutual attunement) among interpreters.
We have integrated and extended Wittgenstein’s notions of family resemblance and forms of life, Gadamer’s dialogical model of interpretation, Davidson’s thought experiment of radical interpretation, Quine’s though experiment of radical translation, and other insights. The result of our integration and extension is a consistent outline of the fundamental features of the process of interpretation: the XYZ-model of attunement of “data,” “background,” and “interpretation.” In the case of texts of which the author is deceased, apart from attunement of interpreter Y and text X, there has to be attunement among translators, commentators, and interpreters of X.
The model and its application to interpretation of texts across time and tradition, to intercultural philosophical dialogue, to comparative philosophy, and other kinds of intercultural philosophy, takes the colloquial notion of dialogue as something primitive. It is used in the pragmatic sense of communicative interaction and mutual attunement (which includes dissensus and contestation), not in the sense of argumentative discourse (Habermas, Apel), dialogical consensus (Gadamer) or genuine dialogue (Heidegger).
The main feature of theories of interpretation and our XYZ-model in particular is that reflection shows that one is never interpreting solely one thing at a time (such as a meaning, a belief, a poem, an epistemic virtue, a particular practice). One is always interpreting abundant things at the same time. In consequence, every interpretation is highly underdetermined by “the data.” Ascription of meanings, beliefs, concepts, desires, joint awareness, logic, and so on, all go together in the process of interpretation. Every particular interpretation depends on innumerable other interpretations; every particular one of which could be wrong, but many have to be right, lest the sense of interpretation be lost.
The feature of underdetermination of interpretation is hinted at by the expression holism (in analytic philosophy) or hermeneutic circle (in continental philosophy). The notion of hermeneutic circle is often introduced in the literature with reference to the whole and the parts, but this is too simplistic. There are numerous hermeneutic circles. There is holism all over the place; between different parts, between parts and wholes taken at different levels, between meanings and beliefs, between motivations and background, and so on. In addition, there is hermeneutic relativity: preconceptions (prejudices) are subject to change, but Y cannot completely transcend her or his background. Every interpretation is relative to a background that cannot be completely described.
The indeterminacy of the reference of terms, the indeterminacy of translation, and the principled underdetermination of a theory or interpretation by the data (Quine-Duhem thesis) are rather theoretical cases of underdetermination. Then there is the more common underdetermination by the data, such as incomplete, damaged, or otherwise less reliable sources, as well as the choice of sources. Choices involved in FR-extension of quasi-universals across traditions also lead to more underdetermination. There is underdetermination due to commitment to particular epistemic virtues as well. The latter may be considered to be part of the standard (ge) of the interpreter. Disagreement between interpreters is often caused by (implicit) disagreement about epistemic virtues.
Due to unavoidable hermeneutic relativity and an indefinite number of hermeneutic circles, interpretation requires constraints so as to keep underdetermination within limits. This brings us to our aim of addressing the issue of the necessary and not-so-necessary conditions of possibility of intercultural philosophy. The major not-so-necessary condition is that there is no need for universals, except for biological universals such as the fact that all (“normal”) human beings have similar discriminatory capacities. However, these biological facts allow for numerous (often incommensurable) conceptual schemes and very different languages. The interest in universals is part of the explicit or tacit commitment to the ideal language paradigm shared by many writers in (intercultural) philosophy in one form or another. We have argued that the assumption that a shared or in-between language has to be aimed for, is a congener of the ideal language assumption. We differ from all representatives of intercultural philosophy (comparative philosophy, world philosophy, ethnophilosophy, intercultural philosophical dialogue) on the issue of universality. In their different ways, each of these approaches claims too much universality. It is common for advocates of this or that variant of intercultural philosophy to assume that the language they use (for example, Chinese or English) qualifies as a universal language.
Most of our case studies illustrate the catch phrase “no need for universals.” For cross-cultural communication and interpretation to work, there is no need for basic color terms (such as green, qing 青, or lhenxa); no need for qing 情 and emotion(s) to be the same universal; no need for logic, epistemic virtues (rationality), the truth-predicate, the verb/noun be/Being, or the notion of object, or wu 物 to be universals. Something like standard logical reasoning is presupposed in most interhuman (cross-cultural) interpretation, but it is not possible to stipulate one universal logical standard that governs every case of language use. Several case studies illustrate the impossibility of designing a crucial test for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and hence for linguistic relativism. There are also a priori reasons why testing the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis may be (next to) impossible, as Derrida’s discussion of Benveniste’s view shows.
We have shown that the methodology of empirical research aiming at discovering human universals is disputable. The review of the ideal language paradigm concerning basic color terms illustrates how well the languages investigated have adjusted themselves to Western languages; either via trade contacts with Europe, or via regimentation by Western missionaries, linguists, and anthropologists. This paradigm, widespread in cognitive science (and therefore in large parts of philosophy), confuses the cultural evolution of humanity with the history of the progressive domination of Western categories. All one needs for interpretation is quasi-universal FR-concepts, which are revisable as the process of interpretation continues, and which lend themselves to interaction or comparison of only a small number of traditions.
This brings us to the first necessary precondition of interpretation: the FR-principle (all concepts are FR-concepts). The FR-principle opposes [i] the ideal language paradigm, [ii] the assumption of a shared or common or in-between language, [iii] the assumption of numerous substantial (linguistic, cognitive, cultural, philosophical) universals. The FR-principle dissolves the issue of universalism versus relativism (as well as worries about incommensurability and the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis), because universalism and relativism are complicit in presupposing the existence of precise meanings (being either universal or belonging to a particular tradition). Both adhere to the ideal language paradigm and uphold the isomorphy thesis. Moreover, in almost all examples discussed in the literature, the relativist is a universalist at one remove. For example, relativists consider that different traditions segment the color spectrum in different ways. Were they not assuming the universality of COLOR, such a thesis would not make sense.
We have argued for family resemblance within traditions (e.g., “game” or “rationality”), across traditions (e.g., game-Spiel-youxi 游戏) and for new concepts to be learned from scratch (e.g., vovetas, beunga’i). In advanced stages of interpretation, “difficult” concepts in the other tradition can be learned from their embedment in clusters of conceptual schemes (for example, Heidegger’s Ereignis or Daoist’s wuwei 无为).
One has to assume that all general concepts are FR-concepts, including concepts introduced by ostension. It is possible to stipulate precise meanings of some concepts only by using FR-concepts in the definition. The FR-principle entails de-essentialization of language, meaning, rationality, knowledge, and other important philosophical categories. The FR-principle also entails the principle of no need to speak the same language (NNSSL). We have shown the possibility, desirability, and necessity of the NNSSL-principle by using case studies of first contacts, of the Waitangi treaty, and by resorting to Davidson’s claim that there is no such thing as a language (as this notion is usually understood by linguists and philosophers). We acknowledge that in cross-cultural interpretation there is always a partly shared Umwelt, but this shared Umwelt is described differently in different traditions or languages. In this sense one could also say that no world need be shared (depending on how one stipulates the use of the word “world”).
The NNSSL-principle undermines the possibility of a transcultural universal language. Therefore, we have suggested that in theory results of investigations in intercultural philosophy should be reported in at least two unrelated languages (although this may not be possible anymore because of the constraint of the global regimentation of languages). We have argued that, notwithstanding asymmetries, first contacts can be used as a primitive situation, illustrating basic features of cross-cultural interpretation.
We have dismissed Davidson’s critique of the very idea of a conceptual scheme. His arguments apply to the impossibility of identifying a web of beliefs that is “completely” different from the beliefs of the interpreter. This argument is correct, but it allows for different, even incommensurable, conceptual schemes in different traditions. Conceptual schemes in other traditions can be accessed by FR-extension of quasi-universals or learned from scratch. We have developed a notion of conceptual scheme drawing on insights of Kuhn, Putnam, and Nelson Goodman, and enriching it with features, usually not acknowledged, in particular the crucial feature that people (or groups of people) use indefinite manifolds of conceptual schemes simultaneously.
Quasi-universals can avoid the accusation of transcendental pretence, because, being FR-concepts in different languages, they do not have an essence or core (in whatever tradition). However, being wary of the phenomenon of transcendental pretence does not mean one can avoid hermeneutic relativity altogether. Moreover, globalization leads to a form of hermeneutic relativity that has become extremely difficult to overcome.
We have elaborated a notion of form(s) of life as a “transcendental model” for human communities. Different sets of similarities between form(s) of life are the empirically well-confirmed transcendental condition of possibility for every interpretation. The family resemblance of forms of life and the possibility of FR-extension of conceptual schemes across traditions are grounded in mutually recognizable human practices. That one recognizes strange practices as similar to practices one is familiar with is both a necessary precondition of interpretation and a well-confirmed fact of communicative interaction among humans. There are always family resemblances between (human) forms of life. However, what the family resemblances are in a particular case is relative to the languages and conceptual schemes involved (and hence judged differently by different parties).
What human beings share, is, broadly speaking, similar responses to a large diversity of forms of life. From the point of view of one language or one form of life, practices of human beings always show similarities (because they are human practices). The similarities are, in a way, transcendentally grounded, but the content of this grounding remains tied to the local situation of (potentially actual) encounters between you’s and me’s. Hence, “the other” will observe different similarities, but similarities there will be. To be a human person, it is both an empirical and a transcendental precondition that one knows the certainties of the forms of life one participates in, and that one is capable of recognizing and dealing with an indefinite variety of human behaviors and practices.
Family resemblances between forms of life (mutually recognizable practices) must be presupposed, supervening on the assumption that the other is a human being, living in communities, and having a learnable language. This necessary precondition does not bring with it specific human universals. Revisable, pragmatic quasi-universals suffice. The first access to unfamiliar conceptual schemes is via FR-extension of conceptual schemes of the interpreter. The projection of quasi-universals cannot be avoided. It is implicit in hermeneutic relativity. The interpreter has no other choice than to start with projecting a descriptive metaphysics as a working hypothesis.
In addition to the soul- and FR-principle (and the NNSSL-principle), there are two more necessary preconditions for interpretation. A principle of mutual attunement has to be presupposed. In the prelinguistic phase (as in first contacts), this is the principle of reasonableness. In the radical stage of linguistic interpretation, this principle is somewhat like Davidson’s principle of charity. Only relative to the assumption that the speaker or writer is usually sincere and right (by the standards of the interpreter) is it possible to ascribe to her or him logical, epistemic, or deontic error. In more sophisticated stages of interpretation, the principle of mutual attunement resembles the principle of humanity. It still works in the way of the principle of charity, but now it works from the stance of the other. Virtually all literature considers the principles of charity and of humanity to be an either/or choice. This is not right. Something like the principle of charity and something like the principle of humanity both play a role.
A final necessary precondition and constraint on underdetermination is a (rather evanescent) set of epistemic virtues, which vary among interpreters and across traditions, although there must be some minimal quasi-universal metavirtues. The choice of epistemic virtues and in particular the balancing of different epistemic virtues is a factor at work in underdetermination, but one that is often overlooked (because each interpreter believes that his or her favored epistemic virtues are “obvious”). Epistemic virtues already enter into the choice of FR-extensions and quasi-universals, as well as balancing subsidiaries of the principle of mutual attunement, before they are used in evaluating alternative interpretations.
The formulation of the necessary preconditions for interpretation is relative to pairs of traditions (and their Umwelt) and will be differently formulated in different traditions. There is family resemblance of forms of life and of sets of conceptual schemes, but what is seen as similar is different in different traditions.
If one believes that one is justified to presuppose some kind of universals, the open-endedness and undeterminedness of the process of interpretation will diminish. We hold that the preconditions for interpretation we have proposed are sufficient as necessary assumptions (“the principles”) needed for interpretation. Other assumptions, such as assuming innate similarity standards, may make the task easier, but they are not necessary and too easily lead to transcendental pretence. Therefore, it is better to avoid them. There is no need for horizon fusion, no need for a shared language or a language in-between, no need for cognitive or linguistic universals (at least not the ones that are often mentioned) in order for cross-cultural interpretation to work.
In summary, there are four somewhat different clusters of necessary preconditions for and constraints on interpretation. All four involve mutual attunement.
First, there is the attitude-toward-a-soul principle (which might be called an experiential and/or biological universal). This is the most basic necessary assumption that underlies all other preconditions of interpretation.
Second, there is the FR-principle. On the one hand, reflection on language shows that all meanings should be understood as FR-concepts. On the other hand, there are and must be mutually recognizable similarities between human practices or forms of life. De-essentialization of language entails the NNSSL-principle. The FR-principle also entails that there is no need for universals. It forms the ground for the possibility of FR-extension of assumed quasi-universals across traditions.
The third necessary precondition or cluster of necessary constraints is a principle of mutual attunement that, in different stages of interpretation, can take the form of revised versions of the principle of reasonableness, the principle of charity, and the principle of humanity.
Finally, there are a number of constraints implicit in hermeneutic relativity. This includes the constraint that an interpreter has to assume a set of epistemic virtues. Hermeneutic relativity is also operative in the options for FR-extension (choice of quasi-universals).
In addition to the necessary and not-so-necessary preconditions of interpretation across philosophical traditions, not only the epoch of colonization, but also the ensuing globalization (planetarization) and regimentation of languages under the influence of center-periphery forces, fundamentally undermine interpretation of texts from ancient traditions. This is a de facto necessary constraint on interpreting whatever premodern text or tradition.
In this book we focus on necessary preconditions of intercultural philosophy. This also bears on the methodology of intercultural philosophy and we end this conclusion with a few brief remarks on the practice of interpretation. We hope to return elsewhere to a more elaborate treatment of the methodology of interpreting conceptual schemes from one tradition in terms of the conceptual schemes of another tradition.
The XYZ-model claims to model the current practice of interpretation. Good scholars may already have extended the model to particular situations. The XYZ-model is most fundamentally based on a commonsense notion of dialogue and mutual attunement (including dissensus and contestation). Hence the quasi-universal of the commonsense notion of dialogue figures in the background of any cross-cultural interpretative practice. The XYZ-model shows the unavoidability of hermeneutic relativity and massive underdetermination.
Some necessary preconditions for cross-cultural interpretation do not have direct consequences for the practice of interpretation, but they are part of the background of justifications why cross-cultural interpretation is not thwarted by (linguistic) relativism or incommensurability. This includes the attitude-to-a-soul principle, the necessary precondition that there will always be mutual recognizable human practices (forms of life), and the revised principle of charity (part of the principle of mutual attunement).
Some necessary preconditions for cross-cultural interpretation are part of the methodology of any inquiry. This includes the necessity of using epistemic virtues. Epistemic virtues are effective in comparing competing interpretations; in assessing the balancing of different forms the principle of mutual attunement may take; in the choice of quasi-universals; and in combating any other form of underdetermination.
Some necessary preconditions for cross-cultural interpretation we have proposed suggest a major reorientation of the methodology of cross-cultural interpretation, in particular the FR-principle. Instead of the ideal language paradigm and its congeners, cross-cultural interpretation should proceed on the basis of the necessary assumption that all concepts in all traditions are FR-concepts. The FR-principle works its way far into the methodology of cross-cultural interpretation through the necessity of constructing quasi-universals by extending the interpreter’s FR-concepts to include part of the reference of alien FR-concepts. Any kind of ideal language assumption has to be dropped and the investigator has to be critical of any proposed human universals.
The FR-principle entails the NNSSL-principle. It is not necessary to speak the same language and this leads to our suggestion that the results of cross-cultural investigation, ideally, should be published in (at least two) unrelated languages.
On several occasions, we have criticized scholars who use translations of classical Chinese characters into a modern language (including modern Chinese) without being alert to the alien presuppositions embodied in the translation. An obvious objection to this criticism is: “What then is the alternative?” It is not possible to provide a single unfailing multifunctional tool, but a number of strategies are available to limit the effect of hermeneutic relativity, transcendental pretence, and the effects of planetarization Heidegger drew attention to. Our suggestions made in various chapters include (focusing on cases of interpreting classical Chinese texts into a modern language) the following.
First of all, keep vigilant of superficial analogies; for example, the misleading analogy of Bohr’s complementarity principle and Chinese yin and yang (see chapter 7).
Proceed with patience, deconstructing Western philosophical terminology as much as possible on the way; aligning oneself with ordinary language and staying away as far as possible from the ideal language paradigm in its various guises. Here the first step is to commit oneself to all general concepts in all traditions being FR-concepts.
Confront Western concepts with what one is interpreting, for example, by acknowledging that new (hybrid) concepts have to be constructed in interpretative practice to obtain “access” to alien concepts, which are “untranslatable.” We made this and the previous suggestion when discussing Derrida’s criticism of Benveniste in chapter 1.
Make judicious decisions concerning which Chinese terms are better not to be translated and provide justifications for translations of Chinese terms in the metalanguage of the interpreter. As Shun Kwong-loi (1997) states in a summary of his methodology of engaging with ancient Chinese texts such as the Mencius, a few key terms can be left untranslated (their meaning emerging from their continued use in the interpreter’s metalanguage), but not too many. Translated key terms need to be elaborated at length by investigating the actual use of the terms in classical times (Shun: 10). It is best to use terms that have no technical philosophical connotations in Western languages and to assume that the mutual recognition of human practices is primarily embedded in ordinary language. As remarked in chapter 3, intercultural philosophy should be built on the quasi-universals of ordinary language. Even then, in particular if the term is a key term in the interpretative discourse, the interpreter has to carefully indicate the associations of the term that are common in contemporary Western speech but nevertheless are absent in Chinese. In that way one can attempt to circumscribe the sense of the Chinese term by contrasting its senses with senses of English concepts. However, as the example of cattle-fur-appearance terms in chapter 8 illustrates, one should be wary of the fact that, contrary to expectations, ordinary language terms often cannot be accessed by quasi-universals either, and new (hybrid) concepts have to be introduced in the metalanguage of the interpreter.
As was noted in chapter 8, there may be no possibility of going back (as Qiao Qingju remarks), but it may still be relevant which ge are used to explain the yi of (strings of) characters in classical texts, and one should not exclude the possibility of developing new ge’s tailored to the interpretation of classical texts. “New” quasi-universals (new hybrid concepts), that is, making new “blended” FR-concepts in the interpreter’s language can serve as quasi-universals to cover alien (perhaps polysemous) concepts.