The chief instigator of the 1975 crisis was the Opposition Leader Malcolm Fraser. It was Fraser’s ambition, ruthlessness and skill that prevailed at every critical point. In his determination to drive the Whitlam Government from office, Fraser embraced a bold and risky strategy unprecedented in Australian politics.
Fraser broke conventions, precedents and the norms that had guided politics for generations. He was tempted by a Whitlam Government that had mismanaged the economy and engaged in improprieties that were equally unprecedented, represented above all in the loans affair. Whitlam’s electoral standing meant a certain Opposition victory at any late 1975 election. In the heated atmosphere of the time, Fraser was under pressure from his own supporters to block the budget and force an election. In so doing, he was unprincipled and impatient.
He led a Liberal Party that belonged to another age, that lived with the Menzies legacy and saw the mistakes of the Whitlam Government as proof that it lacked legitimacy. Fraser believed Labor was unfit to sit on the Treasury benches. He cloaked his actions in high morality, saying the Opposition had an obligation to the Australian people to terminate the Whitlam Government.
Fraser engineered the crisis over supply, and its convulsive outcome, with a series of dramatic political tactics. He weaponised a Senate whose numbers had been corrupted by Liberal and National premiers; he denied the Whitlam Government supply by blocking the budget; he threatened to undermine a half-Senate election; and he put the Governor-General under pressure by threatening Kerr with public criticism if he did not exercise the reserve powers. Fraser pushed the political system to the brink.
The forced resignation of Minerals and Energy Minister Rex Connor for misleading parliament over the loans affair became an irresistible temptation for Fraser to trigger the crisis. The decision was endorsed by the Coalition leaders and the shadow ministry on 15 October 1975. It is significant that nobody objected. In the joint party room, Senator Don Jessop and Senator Alan Missen expressed their concerns about this strategy but said they would vote with their colleagues. The Senate blocked the budget on 16 October.
Fraser decided to defer, not reject, the budget. This invited a dismissal strategy and kept the budget bills alive in the Senate. Denial of supply was a breach of convention which triggered the greatest deadlock between the Senate and the House of Representatives since Federation. ‘It would have been very wrong to leave that government in power one day or one week longer if I could prevent it,’ Fraser told Troy Bramston in 2013.1 For his entire life after 1975, Fraser expressed no regrets about this decision.
Denying supply, however, was only possible because of a tainted Senate. After the May 1974 election, the Senate comprised: twenty- nine Labor senators, twenty-nine Coalition senators, Tasmanian Independent Michael Townley, who subsequently joined the Liberal Party in February 1975, and Steele Hall, representing the Liberal Movement in South Australia. Townley’s defection to the Liberals gave the Coalition thirty senators.
When Lionel Murphy resigned from the Senate to join the High Court in February 1975, it fell to the New South Wales parliament, under the Constitution, to fill his vacancy. Liberal premier Tom Lewis broke the convention that the replacement should be a nominee of the same party and appointed instead Cleaver Bunton, the Independent mayor of Albury. Bunton voted with Labor on supply but Labor’s numbers had been reduced to twenty-eight and the convention had been breached.
When Queensland Labor senator Bert Milliner died in June 1975, Queensland premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen saw his chance. He refused to support Labor’s nominee, Mal Colston, and asked Labor to present a panel of potential senators from which he would choose. Labor, in an act of false pride, refused to play this game. The upshot was the Queensland parliament appointed Albert (Pat) Field, a furniture polisher, who said he was a ‘true’ Labor man. But en route to Canberra, Field declared that ‘Mr Whitlam will never get a vote from me.’2 Labor’s numbers were now reduced to twenty-seven senators. Field did not vote on the supply issue but his appointment delivered the Coalition the numbers to defer supply.
The Coalition now had thirty votes to delay supply and Labor mustered twenty-nine votes in opposition, relying on Bunton and Hall for support. Fraser needed a majority to pass a motion deferring the budget and he only got that majority because the Senate’s numbers had been manipulated. This led to Hall’s comment that Fraser was denying supply ‘over a dead man’s corpse’. The Senate that voted to deny supply was not the same Senate elected at the 1974 election. Fraser as Prime Minister recognised this was a manipulated Senate when he put and carried a constitutional referendum that compelled Senate vacancies to be filled by a replacement from the same party in 1977.
For the next month, the strategy enforced by Coalition Senate leader Reg Withers, nicknamed ‘the Toe Cutter’, was to hold the Coalition senators to the deferral strategy and prevent any loss of nerve. It required a mastery of parliamentary rules and an iron discipline.
A few days earlier, on 13 October, the Liberal Party’s Federal Council resolved that it would not support, and indeed would frustrate, any attempt by Whitlam to advise a half-Senate election. The plan was that in the event Whitlam was granted a half-Senate election, the four non-Labor premiers would advise state governors not to issue the writs. Later in the crisis, the Coalition leaders, Fraser and Doug Anthony, reinforced the message at a meeting of Coalition leaders on 2 November in Melbourne. Such proposals were unprecedented.
After blocking the budget, Fraser put Kerr under public pressure and encouraged the Governor-General to read the legal memorandum just issued by Liberal frontbencher Bob Ellicott, effectively urging Kerr to dismiss Whitlam. At the onset of the crisis, the Opposition called for Kerr to intervene. Ellicott, forty years later, was frank about his advice. ‘I put it out there for the Governor-General to read,’ he said. ‘We wanted it to influence his thinking. We were politicians. The person who’s going to make a decision was the Governor-General.’3
At the Government House dinner on 16 October, Fraser spoke to Kerr about the crisis for the first time. In a seven-page note left in his papers, Kerr relayed his pre- and post-dinner conversations with Fraser. Kerr said he was concerned about being recalled at the height of the crisis and thought Fraser should know because he might face a new Governor-General ‘who would not even consider ever using the reserve power however bad the situation’.4 Kerr had given Fraser vital information and signalled his lack of trust in Whitlam. This exchange is contested. When Fraser was asked about this conversation in 2013, he denied it happened but recognised that Kerr felt vulnerable to recall.5
In a letter to Buckingham Palace the day after the dinner, Kerr referred to his conversation with Fraser: ‘I did not directly discuss the crisis with him, but we did have some conversation.’ He said of Fraser: ‘He is obviously a very worried man but he has crossed the Rubicon. I judge my relations with him and his people to be quite satisfactory.’6
Fraser had a superior understanding of Kerr’s psychology than Whitlam. Senior Coalition figures had studied Kerr’s background, legal training and his transition from Labor supporter to Coalition sympathiser and establishment figure. They knew he had toyed with several invitations to become a Liberal politician. They had assessed his temperament, pride and fascination with the reserve powers.7
On 15 October, ahead of the Tun Razak dinner, Kerr was briefed by officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Geoff Bentley, head of the Malaysia–Singapore Section, prepared the brief. He told the authors that during the meeting Kerr received a phone call from Fraser that went for four or five minutes while the officials remained in the room. Bentley recalled Kerr saying: ‘That was Malcolm Fraser telling me he is going to block Supply.’8 Fraser was diligent in keeping Kerr informed, aware his role could be critical.
Liberal MP Tony Staley, who was instrumental in Fraser’s elevation as Liberal leader in March 1975, said in an interview with Troy Bramston that the Opposition had a superior understanding of Kerr. ‘I don’t think there’s the slightest doubt that we read the character of Kerr correctly,’ he said. ‘Things about his life suggested he would go with the establishment or conservative side … he’d come a long, long way from his origins.’9
The authors interviewed Sir Laurence Street, Kerr’s successor as Chief justice of New South Wales, in 2015. Street revealed that he was approached by the federal president of the Liberal Party Sir John Atwill for an assessment of Kerr and how he might respond during a supply crisis. ‘I told him that Kerr would not hesitate to exercise his power if he was convinced there was a stalemate, or before, but certainly if it came to a stalemate,’ Street recalled. ‘Kerr knew politics. I think he was looking forward to having a hand in what was a really big issue.’10
A turning point in the crisis came with Kerr’s request to Whitlam that he be allowed to engage Fraser to test the prospects for compromise. Whitlam, confident about Kerr, agreed. But this brought Kerr into a dual dialogue—with the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader. Fraser was astute in exploiting this dialogue. Kerr told Charteris his idea was to see if Fraser realised ‘that he has to withdraw from the brink’, not a wholly accurate statement of his motives.11
Allowing Kerr to see Fraser was a blunder by Whitlam. The Governor-General acts on advice from the Prime Minister and, in the normal course of events, has no relationship with the Opposition Leader. But Fraser now had a chance to influence Kerr to intervene in the crisis.
The first formal Kerr–Fraser meeting took place on 21 October. Fraser explained the Opposition position and argued the crisis had already crossed the threshold from the political to the constitutional, implying there was an independent role for the Governor-General. Fraser said if a dissolution was granted, then he could guarantee supply but Whitlam could not. This is why the Coalition chose to defer, not defeat, the budget in the Senate. The briefing Fraser gave Kerr pointed to a dismissal strategy by the Opposition, though this was never stated explicitly.
As the crisis advanced, Staley said there was another factor in how Fraser approached Kerr: he had to convince the Governor-General the Coalition would win an election. Blocking the budget was unpopular and polls during the crisis were often diabolical for the Coalition. This gave Whitlam false confidence. ‘There is apparently quite a big swing against Mr Fraser and in favour of the government,’ Kerr wrote to Charteris on 27 October.12 Staley said Kerr needed to be reassured that once an election was called, the Opposition’s superiority would be obvious. ‘Kerr liked winners,’ Staley said. ‘Malcolm went into those meetings having come from very intense discussions about the importance of getting it across to Kerr that we would win.’13
Fraser’s insight into Kerr was apparent from an interview with Troy Bramston in 2013. Fraser judged that Kerr ‘was frightened of being dismissed’. He said Kerr was ‘lonely’, ‘not a strong personality’, always ‘seeking reassurance’ and ‘was concerned about his place in history’. Fraser also said Kerr was ‘not helped’ by Lady Kerr.14 Fraser, in subsequent years, denigrated Kerr and had little time for the man who had made him Prime Minister.
As the crisis continued into November, Fraser was resolute under pressure. After Kerr met with Fraser on 21 October, he wrote to Charteris noting the Opposition was ‘firm and irreversible’.15 Fraser made it clear he would not accept a half-Senate election. The second Kerr–Fraser meeting was on 30 October where the Governor-General put a compromise proposal: Fraser would pass supply and Whitlam would pledge not to hold the half-Senate election until mid-1976. This meant Labor would forgo any opportunity to constitute an ‘interim Senate’ with territory senators and senators elected to fill casual vacancies in New South Wales and Queensland taking their seats before 1 July 1976. But Fraser was not interested.
As the pressure mounted, Fraser changed his tactics. Now, Fraser put forward his own compromise: the Coalition would pass the budget in return for a House of Representatives election with the normal half-Senate election by May or June 1976. There was extensive media speculation about an Opposition retreat and Coalition senators buckling to pass the budget. Tony Eggleton, the Liberal Party’s federal director, recalled the feelings among some in the parliamentary party that reflected the deeper mood in the party organisation. ‘The concern and worries about [blocking supply] were still very, very raw, right up until 11 November,’ he told the authors.16
The compromise was agreed at a 2 November meeting of Coalition leaders, federal and state, in Melbourne. There was strong support for Fraser’s strategy from premiers Lewis and Bjelke- Petersen. But Victorian premier Dick Hamer wanted to explore ways to defuse the crisis. Fraser won unanimous agreement to keep deferring the budget to secure an election but the compromise tactic was embraced. Fraser briefed Kerr on the compromise on 3 November at Government House in Melbourne. Whitlam saw Kerr after and rejected the compromise.
The reality, however, was that Fraser remained confident Kerr would intervene, provided the Opposition stayed firm. In public, Fraser insisted the Opposition would ‘respect and accept’ any ‘decision’ Kerr made.17 The media had interpreted the compromise as a sign of weakness. Kerr wrote to Charteris: ‘The Government is very confident first that a big back-lash against Mr Fraser is under way and secondly that there may soon be some kind of retreat by the Opposition.’18 But this was not a retreat.
Step by step, Fraser was ratcheting up the pressure on Kerr. The pivotal encounter came at their meeting on 6 November. The Opposition Leader told the Governor-General that if there was no election, he would be criticised for failing in his duty to the nation. ‘I now told the Governor-General that if Australia did not get an election, the Opposition would have no choice but to be highly critical of him,’ Fraser recalled to Paul Kelly in 1995. ‘We would have to say that he had failed his duty as Governor-General to the nation.’19 Fraser told Kerr the moment was now arriving when he had to exercise the reserve powers of the Crown. Fraser was intimidating Kerr. There was no precedent for an Opposition Leader to talk to a Governor-General in this way.
Later that night, Fraser had an off-the-record discussion with Paul Kelly in his office at Parliament House. Fraser said he was sure Kerr would ‘do the right thing’. He said the crisis would be resolved by Christmas because Kerr would intervene to deliver a general election. When pressed further, Fraser told Kelly that he believed ‘the Governor-General … will sack the Prime Minister’. Kelly was struck by Fraser’s confidence—it matched Whitlam’s own confidence on the opposing side.
Kerr reported to Charteris on the 3 and 6 November meetings with Fraser. He explained that Fraser called upon him on 3 November ‘as a matter of courtesy’ to discuss the compromise proposal, and said that Whitlam rejected it outright. Reporting on the 6 November meeting with Fraser, Kerr told Charteris: ‘he indicated that he regarded the position as being so serious that the Senate would go on deferring supply indefinitely and that his party would hold together for this purpose’. Kerr had no doubt ‘that he meant it’.20
Reflecting on this last discussion with Fraser before the dismissal, Kerr acknowledged that he felt threatened. ‘I should say that in my last talk with Mr Fraser he told me that the last moment was arriving when the reserve power of the Crown could be exercised and that … it would have been a grave blow to the powers of the Crown … if not used in the present crisis.’21
At around 7 a.m. on 11 November 1975, there was a secret meeting of senior Liberals organised by Eggleton. This meeting was revealed by the authors in their previous book. They had a message for Fraser. ‘If the result had not occurred that day—that was the last chance we needed to set an election date in that same year—if Malcolm hadn’t achieved an outcome that day, there were lots of people who would probably not have continued to support him with his strategy,’ Eggleton said. For Fraser, that day or the next meant either victory or defeat.
There was a meeting at 9 a.m. between Whitlam and Fraser and other senior government and Opposition figures. It failed to break the deadlock and Fraser returned to his office. At 9.55 a.m., Kerr phoned Fraser on his private line. The call was witnessed by Liberal Senate leader Reg Withers and Opposition whip Vic Garland. Kerr told Fraser this was to be a ‘confidential’ discussion.22 Kerr inquired about the meeting with Whitlam. Fraser said no breakthrough had been reached and there would be no temporary supply for a half-Senate election. Fraser recalled that Kerr then asked him a series of questions that related to the terms and conditions for being commissioned Prime Minister.
Fraser searched his desk and turned over the agenda paper for the joint party meeting to take place at 10 a.m. He jotted down, in a shorthand version, what Kerr said. He made six clear points (although two were numbered five):
1) double dissolution bills
2) caretaker
3) no policy changes
4) no royal commissions
5) plus supply
5) dissolution today
Fraser later recalled the questions Kerr asked: ‘If Whitlam was dismissed and Fraser was made prime minister, would he agree to call a double dissolution election? Would he agree to run a caretaker administration, making no policy changes? Would he obtain supply straightaway? Would he advise a dissolution on that very day? [And] Kerr asked Fraser to guarantee that no action would be taken against the ministers of the Whitlam government over the loans affair, and that there would be no royal commission.’ To each of these questions, Fraser answered ‘yes’.23
Fraser had been tipped off that Kerr was planning to dismiss Whitlam. Fraser agreed to call on Kerr at Government House during the parliamentary lunchbreak. Why did Kerr signal his intentions to Fraser? The surprise dismissal of Whitlam, by ambush, and the commissioning of Fraser were inexorably linked to each other. Kerr did not want to leave anything to chance. He did not want the dismissal to unravel. He wanted reassurance from Fraser that he would accept the terms of his caretaker prime ministerial commission. He wanted it to go smoothly. This was a high-risk operation.
In later years, this phone call became a matter of dispute between Fraser and Kerr, and their respective loyalists. Kerr insisted he only raised these conditions at lunchtime when he was commissioning Fraser. Fraser was certain the conditions were raised in this phone call at 9.55 a.m. He recalled making a note of the conversation at the time but told Paul Kelly in 1995 that he had lost it. It turned up a few years later when he was going through his papers. This note has been seen by the authors. The agenda paper is genuine. It is in Fraser’s handwriting. A different pen was used to identify the time and date, and it was signed by Fraser later in the day.
The phone call has been confirmed by Withers and Garland. The authors disclosed Withers’ oral history interview with the National Library of Australia undertaken in 1997–98 in their previous book. Withers saw Fraser make the note with the ‘conditions’ for his commissioning as Prime Minister.24 Garland, interviewed in 2015, recollected the phone call and the note, and supported Fraser’s version over Kerr’s.25 Dale Budd, Fraser’s principal private secretary, took his own copy of the note on 11 November 1975 and supports Fraser’s account.26
In 2006, as another debate raged about the phone call, Fraser swore and signed a statutory declaration again confirming the substance of the call. It was revealed by the authors in 2015.27
After the 9.55 a.m. phone call, Fraser was confident Kerr would intervene. He later maintained that he didn’t know for certain. Fraser argued that Kerr left him with the impression that he had not made up his mind and that any decision would be influenced by the response to the phone call. ‘I expected Kerr to give Whitlam an ultimatum,’ he told Troy Bramston in 2014. ‘We were hoping for, and expected, an election. I was confident that Kerr would act.’28 But in reality, Fraser was given a signal that Kerr was planning to dismiss Whitlam. There can be no other interpretation. The dismissal was to be a joint Kerr–Fraser enterprise.
The stage was set for the final act. At the Coalition party room meeting at 10.30 a.m., Fraser urged MPs to hold firm because the crisis would soon be over. Kerr dismissed Whitlam just after 1 p.m. at Government House. At around 1.10 p.m., Fraser was shown into Kerr’s study. He was told Whitlam had been dismissed. The questions Kerr had asked Fraser at 9.55 a.m. were the conditions of his commission as caretaker Prime Minister. Fraser agreed, signed a letter outlining the conditions and was sworn in. They decided against the traditional glass of champagne.
Graham Freudenberg, speechwriter and confidant to Whitlam, recognised that Labor suffered from ‘a denial of reality’ throughout the crisis. He said the government never considered ‘an independent role’ for the Governor-General, they misjudged Kerr’s character and they underestimated Fraser. These were strategic blunders. ‘It all goes down to what I now admit was our culpable blindness during the crisis,’ he said in an interview with Troy Bramston. ‘It was our willingness to suspend judgement about people.’ But, in 2017, Freudenberg said Labor’s true believers never lost their faith in Whitlam: ‘He may have infuriated and outraged, but he never disappointed those who believed in him and his program.’29
The originating responsibility for the crisis rests with Fraser. He could have waited, allowed the parliament to run full term, and won a 1976 or 1977 election. But the unprecedented failures of the Whitlam Government were a temptation the Opposition parties could not resist. Fraser chose the course of breaking conventions and precedents to force an election. His performance as Opposition Leader during the crisis was a study in resolution and judgement.
Fraser won the subsequent general election on 13 December in a landslide. Despite that victory there was a degree of caution in how he governed because of the way he came to power. It is most unlikely a future Liberal leader will block supply again.