In the aftermath of the dismissal, a new battle to explain and interpret the event and reveal its true meaning took place. This was not a contest waged by Sir John Kerr alone. It was waged by the victor, Malcolm Fraser, and the vanquished, Gough Whitlam. It was conducted in public and in private with Buckingham Palace. At stake was the future of the monarchy in Australia.
Whitlam argued the monarchy had been damaged by Kerr’s actions, in the Queen’s name, and he conveyed this to Sir Martin Charteris. Fraser, concerned about Whitlam’s criticisms of the dismissal, wrote to Buckingham Palace to reassure them of the good standing of the monarchy in Australia. Fraser’s letter had not been revealed before the cache of Palace letters were released in July 2020.
In Charteris’ letter to Kerr on 17 November 1975, he revealed that Whitlam had telephoned him at Buckingham Palace at 4.15 a.m. on 11 November. He informed Charteris of the dismissal and said he should be recommissioned as Prime Minister. He said he should be able to call an election. But was Whitlam asking for a direct intervention from the Palace? Whitlam, full of bravado, appeared to retreat. Charteris told Kerr:
He spoke calmly and did not ask me to make any approach to The Queen, or indeed to do anything other than the suggestion that I should speak to you to find out what was going on. I said I knew you would be reporting what happened, to the Queen, not realizing at that time that you had already done so. I understand that a letter from him is on the way and I shall, of course, consult you through David Smith before replying to it.1
When parliament was suspended in the afternoon of 11 November, but not yet dissolved for an election, Whitlam made another phone call. He rang Kerr. In the House of Representatives, Whitlam had successfully moved a motion of ‘no confidence’ in Fraser as Prime Minister and that he be recommissioned. Gordon Scholes, the Speaker, was to convey this message directly to Kerr. The Senate had also passed supply.
Kerr made a note of the call from Whitlam. ‘He [Whitlam] said that as supply had been granted I should terminate the prime minister’s commission and recommission him. He wanted to attend upon me to put this point of view.’ Kerr baulked; he was waiting for Fraser to prepare bills for his assent and to formally recommend a double dissolution election. Whitlam was insistent they meet. ‘You saw Fraser before, so I suppose you will see me,’ he instructed Kerr. But Kerr now had a new Prime Minister and told the Opposition Leader that he would have to run it by Fraser. Whitlam was exasperated. Kerr continued to stall. ‘I said I would speak to him and let Mr Whitlam know the position.’2 Whitlam denied this call took place. The two men never spoke to each other again.
Scholes was left at the gate of Government House and did not see Kerr until after parliament was dissolved. His message was ignored by Kerr. The next day, still enraged, Scholes sent a letter addressed to the Queen. This letter, seeking to involve the Queen in the crisis, was unwise. Scholes wanted the Queen to take remedial action. He noted that Fraser was Prime Minister even though he did not have majority support in the House of Representatives. ‘It is my belief that to maintain in office a Prime Minister imposed on the nation by Royal prerogative rather than through parliamentary endorsement constitutes a danger to our parliamentary system and will damage the standing of your representative in Australia and even yourself,’ he wrote. ‘I would ask that you act in order to restore Mr Whitlam to office as Prime Minister in accordance with the expressed resolution of the House of Representatives.’3
Scholes, in effect, wanted the Queen to ‘override’ the Governor-General. ‘I wrote to The Queen to tell her she should reconsider the action of the Governor-General,’ Scholes recalled in an interview with Troy Bramston in 2015. ‘We were trying very clearly to reverse the decision. We wanted her to act.’4 This was utterly unrealistic. The Queen would never insert herself into the crisis. The letter remains an embarrassment for Labor.
While Labor has always expressed principled opposition to interference by the Palace, its actions have not always been consistent with this principle. On 11 November, Whitlam told Charteris he should be recommissioned—the implication being the Palace should do something—and on 12 November, Scholes was explicit in seeking the Queen’s intervention.
Charteris pointed out to Scholes the obvious flaws in his letter, replying via Government House on 17 November.5 Charteris’ letter to Scholes arrived on 24 November and was given to the Speaker, who released it to the media later that day. It made clear that the Queen had no part in the dismissal and no role in the crisis.6
On 26 December 1975, having lost the election, Whitlam finally wrote to Charteris. This letter has been previously released. The letter, typed on Leader of the Opposition letterhead, was simultaneously an attack on Kerr’s dismissal and argued his action threatened the future of the monarchy in Australia. Whitlam rejected the idea, expressed by Kerr to Charteris, that the election result on 13 December 1975 endorsed his dismissal: ‘The very clear result of the elections convincingly settles Australia’s immediate political future. In no way, however, do the elections resolve the legal and constitutional questions raised by the conduct of the Crown’s representative on and before 11 November. Nor could the election result of itself legitimise that conduct.’7
Whitlam told Charteris that his ‘immediate concern’ was ‘the manner in which the Governor-General chose to invoke and exercise the reserve powers’ which have ‘put in jeopardy the future of the Crown in Australia’. He argued:
I assert that the Crown can have no enduring future in Australia except by the continuing consensus and assured assent of the overwhelming majority of the people. I further assert that that majority must transcend traditional political allegiances and temporary political attitudes. I finally assert that these conditions can apply only if the Crown continues to avoid any intervention, or appearance of intervention, on behalf of any of the contending political parties. I fear that these conditions no longer apply in Australia.8
He contended that Kerr, acting in the Queen’s name, had undermined confidence in the monarchy in Australia because he had supported the Coalition over Labor. Whitlam outlined Kerr’s ‘political decisions’ that had advantaged the Coalition parties. He concluded by arguing that Kerr’s actions ‘have been such as to call into question on the part of many millions of Australians, particularly the younger majority, not merely the limits of the powers of the Crown, but its whole future role in Australia’.9
Charteris replied to Whitlam on 12 January 1976. Charteris had sent a draft of this letter to Kerr on 9 January noting that he would ‘be grateful for any comments’ that he might like to make. ‘I am anxious not to be drawn into controversy but, equally, to give nothing away,’ he noted to Kerr.10 Charteris thanked the former Prime Minister for his letter and iterated that he had ‘a perfect right to make his views known’ to the Queen. She had ‘taken note’ of his views. Charteris then allowed himself, while not addressing the ‘constitutional propriety’ of Kerr’s dismissal, to make a comment to Whitlam:
The constitutional role of the Governor-General and his reserve powers stem not from his position as The Queen’s personal representative, to which he is appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, but rather from what is written in the Constitution Act as applicable constitutionally. This point has, I think, particular relevance to the position of the Queen as Queen of Australia.11
The Palace was distancing itself from the dismissal. Its point was this was Kerr’s decision and Kerr’s action. He had exercised his powers constitutionally, but not with the expressed endorsement of the Palace. Indeed, Charteris made no mention of the Queen endorsing Kerr’s decision in this letter. But this letter typified Charteris’ style. He flattered the deposed Prime Minister and added a personal touch. Charteris told Whitlam how much he ‘appreciated your kindness and consideration to me personally whilst you have been Prime Minister of Australia’.12
But Kerr was agitated. He felt compelled to write, in longhand, to Charteris about Whitlam’s letter in his self-defence. Kerr rejected the notion that his action had caused ‘damage’ to the ‘status of the Crown’ in Australia. He said again that the decisions he made were undertaken ‘in order to protect the Crown’. Kerr repeated his previous justification for keeping Whitlam clueless about his intentions because he would be recalled and this would have drawn the Palace into the crisis. ‘He would seek to have me dismissed,’ Kerr reasoned, ‘if I gave him any foreknowledge.’13
Fraser was also stung by the Whitlam letter. He repudiated Whitlam’s sustained assertions that the monarchy in Australia was now in jeopardy. In January 1976, Fraser felt he had to reassure Buckingham Palace that the monarchy maintained the confidence of most Australians. Fraser’s four-page letter, received by Charteris on 25 January, had not been made public before July 2020:
may I in the strongest terms state my Government’s view that the relationship between the Crown and the Australian people, and the position of the Crown under our Constitution, has in no way been diminished by recent events. Indeed, it is our firm conviction that as a result of recent events the great majority of the Australian people, of all political persuasions, have acquired a much deeper appreciation of the role which the Crown can and ought properly to play in our constitutional affairs.14
The Fraser Government, he emphasised, ‘completely rejects’ the suggestion that Kerr’s actions had called into question ‘not merely the limits of the powers of the crown but its whole future role in Australia’. He went further. Fraser said he rejected the idea that ‘the manner in which the Governor-General chose to invoke and exercise the reserve powers’ had ‘put in jeopardy the future of the Crown in Australia’ or had ‘gravely undermined’ the office of Governor-General and the Crown itself.
Fraser defended the manner of Whitlam’s dismissal without warning. He offered a systematic defence of Kerr’s actions throughout the crisis. He reassured the Palace that Kerr’s actions were ‘democratic’ and necessary to resolve the deadlock caused by Whitlam’s ‘intransigence’. The dismissal, he said, had been endorsed by the recent election result.
Fraser concluded the letter to Charteris with further reassurance:
I regret that I have found it necessary to write at length on these matters, but as I have already stated I feel it my duty in the circumstances to do so, both in order to assure Her Majesty of the continuing affection between her and her Australian subjects, and to assure her in the strongest terms of the proper performance by Sir John Kerr of his office as Governor-General. There can be no doubt that at all times Sir John was actuated by the highest motives and with a deep sense of public duty.15
This is the strongest defence Fraser would ever give of Kerr’s conduct.
Charteris replied to Fraser on 29 January, thanking him for his letter and said it had been given to the Queen. She was indeed reassured by Fraser’s letter:
Her Majesty is of course particularly glad to learn of your Government’s view that the relationship between the Crown and the Australian people, and the position of the Crown under the Constitution, has in no way been diminished by what happened. It would obviously be a matter of deep regret to Her Majesty if the Crown became a divisive element in Australian politics.16
Following the dismissal, each of the three principals—Whitlam, Fraser and Kerr—went to the Palace with different views on the consequences for the monarchy. Each wrote highly self-serving letters. History suggests that Whitlam’s fears were not realised, but republican sentiment has grown. Kerr’s defence of his actions remained a matter of debate and contention within Australia. Fraser’s defence was understandable at the time but in later years he had little time for Kerr and, in the final irony, became a republican.