From his dismissal of the Whitlam Government until his resignation as Governor-General, Sir John Kerr was under siege. He was a figure of division—mercilessly attacked by Labor politicians, many academics and media commentators. Yet he was defended by the Fraser Government, conservative interest groups and many people who applauded his intervention and his courage.
Kerr’s problem, however, was his inability to function as a Governor-General of unity, the quality needed to discharge the role. The Governor-General could not travel without fear of a hostile demonstration. The toll on Kerr was manifest in the letters he wrote to Buckingham Palace. Kerr felt that he was not getting the support he deserved and needed from Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister. Some of his letters reveal a strand of panic and paranoia.
It fell to Sir Martin Charteris to support and reassure Kerr, keep him calm and avoid any further controversy for the monarchy. Both the Governor-General and the Palace were concerned about the reaction to the Queen ahead of her visit to Australia in 1977. In this period, Kerr agonised between resignation and defiance. But resignation finally prevailed. In the end, the Palace was keen to see Kerr depart and, with Fraser, edged him to an early retirement after just over three years in the vice-regal office.
In early February 1976, having returned from London, Kerr’s governor-generalship was entering a new phase. ‘I look forward to a gradual year of re-building and healing in my own position,’ he wrote optimistically to Charteris. He instinctively knew that he had to win back respect for the office of Governor-General and play a unifying role as the Queen’s representative in Australia. But this was a fantasy project.
Kerr could never be an agent of rebuilding and healing. The healing had to wait upon his successor, Sir Zelman Cowen. Kerr clung to the belief the election result validated his dismissal of Whitlam. Yet this was often a false comfort since half the country would never accept his decision. Kerr conveyed to Charteris his concern about the opening of parliament and the likelihood of ‘demonstrations and boycotts’ against him. With the Queen planning to visit Australia in her jubilee year, it was hardly necessary for Kerr to tell Charteris that he hoped things would calm down in due course.1
The Governor-General’s concerns were soon realised. Ahead of parliament opening on 17 February, the Labor caucus unanimously passed a resolution on 27 January condemning the dismissal. The resolution said Kerr was guilty of ‘squalid Establishment intrigue’ and had not acted as ‘a neutral figure representing the prestige of the Crown but as a man who has grossly abused the Crown prerogatives’.2 Labor sought to drive Kerr from office. On 9 February, in a television interview on the ABC’s This Day Tonight program, Whitlam accused Kerr of being a deceitful and dishonorable man.3
When Kerr arrived at the opening of parliament, hundreds of demonstrators greeted him with loud abuse, boos and jeers. Inside, all sixty-three Labor MPs and senators boycotted his speech. Bob Hawke, the ACTU and Labor Party president, argued against a boycott because it would distract from keeping the focus on Fraser. But Labor was, as Whitlam instructed, maintaining the rage. ‘This is not an easy time,’ Kerr wrote to Charteris on 16 February.4
In a letter after the boycott, Kerr tried to reassure Charteris that the crowds were only about 300 or 400 large, perhaps even less, and downplayed them as just a ‘rent-a-crowd-group’. He rationalised to Charteris that Labor had made itself look ‘ridiculous’ and consoled himself with editorials critical of Whitlam. But Kerr was hurt: ‘It was not, of course, a happy occasion for me to have to tolerate absurd abuse and to listen to the cry reiterated in unison “We want Gough”.’ He said it was ‘awkward’ and was not sure ‘what should be done’.5
Kerr raised the issue with Fraser but the Prime Minister had little interest—an omen of another difficulty Kerr would face. ‘The Prime Minister takes the view that there is no real problem,’ he wrote to Charteris.6 Over the next eighteen months, Fraser only saw or spoke to Kerr on a few occasions. It was as though Kerr had served his main purpose.
Charteris offered a form of pastoral care that was beyond Fraser’s temperament. ‘All of us here who know you and your problems will be thinking of you when you open parliament; we shall hope that all goes well but we shall know that if there is trouble you will deal with it with dignity and reassurance,’ Charteris wrote on 16 February.7 A week later, Charteris agreed with Kerr that Labor will not ‘earn many plaudits for their boycott’. The right approach, he argued, was ‘not to worry’ too much.8 Another week later, as Kerr’s letters piled up, Charteris offered him the consolation that Labor ‘have not done themselves any good’ with the boycott or the ‘rent-a-crowd’ protest at the opening of parliament.9
Unsurprisingly, Kerr took delight in the internal problems surrounding Whitlam’s leadership. When the Iraqi loan scandal broke—an attempt by Whitlam to obtain funds from Iraq’s socialist party to pay election debts—Kerr enjoyed reporting this to the Palace. Charteris said in reply: ‘I find it difficult to believe that Mr. Whitlam can long survive.’10 Charteris’ musings were music to the Governor-General’s ears.
While Kerr took solace from the polite receptions he was receiving in small towns, the story in the capital cities was different—the boycotts continued. At events such as the opening of the Torrens College of Advanced Education in Adelaide, Kerr could not speak without being drowned out by the noise. When Kerr arrived at a function for the departing British High Commissioner, Sir Morrice James, held at the Australian National University, he was jostled by an angry crowd. Even when he attended the theatre, polite applause was coupled with boos and hisses. Kerr, mindful of the Queen’s visit just a year away, tried to reassure Charteris that the demonstrations were about him personally rather than the institution of the monarchy: ‘there has been no organised and co-ordinated attack on the office itself, although occasional republican noises are heard. The boycott, up to date, is a personal protest against me and, in my view, is more motivated by vindictiveness and a desire for revenge than by any hope of changing the constitutional system which, in itself, is very strong.’11
As new books, scholarly journals and newspapers examined the crisis, and Whitlam’s criticism was unrelenting, Kerr was anxious to defend himself. He kept venting his frustrations to Charteris but the response was consistent: keep quiet. ‘I am sure you are wise to remain silent,’ Charteris wrote on 31 March 1976. ‘It would seem to me quite wrong for a Governor-General in office to produce an apologia for his actions.’ There was sympathy for his position. ‘It must, none the less, be galling to have to remain “mum” under tendentious and unjustifiable attack,’ Charteris added.12 Fraser concurred with this. He told Kerr that he had to ‘remain silent’, keep a low profile and not ruminate in public on the dismissal.13 While Kerr accepted such advice, his frustration was manifest.
The Governor-General was also worried about his safety. In April 1976, almost six months on from the dismissal, he told Charteris that the demonstrations against him were growing. Student groups, especially, were mobilising against him. He told Charteris that his program was now being examined to ensure it was ‘non-provocative’ and he could be protected. ‘Security arrangements for myself, and also to some extent for my wife, have been stepped up,’ Kerr wrote.14 The security requirements reinforced Kerr’s problem—there would be no return to any semblance of normal vice-regal duties.
John Menadue, the secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, believed Kerr should leave office before the Queen’s visit. When Kerr learnt this was Menadue’s view, and presumed he had expressed this to Fraser, he summoned the Prime Minister to Government House in April 1976. Fraser assured Kerr that he wanted him to stay.
Kerr later talked directly to Menadue who was explicit with his concerns. Menadue told Kerr he had become a ‘symbol’ for the lingering recriminations over the dismissal. Menadue was ‘pessimistic’ about ‘the way things may well develop’. But Menadue could not enforce his view. He understood Fraser’s position and, reluctantly, had to accept it.15 But Kerr was convinced that Menadue was pushing for him to go at the end of 1976, and he thought this criticism was quite ‘improper’ given Menadue’s senior role in the public service.16
But Fraser’s reassurance to Kerr that he wanted him to stay was not enough. Kerr told Fraser that he wanted the government to develop a strategy for his security and also to deal with the personal attacks that were being spearheaded on him, mostly by Whitlam. Kerr wanted ‘top level attention’ given to the ‘campaign’ against him. He wanted more ‘resources’ at Government House. Fraser was responsive to these requests and said he would ‘take responsibility’ for this. Fraser nominated Geoffrey Yeend, the deputy secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, to be the ‘directly responsible’ public servant for this project. Peter Lawler, the secretary of the Department of Administrative Services, elevated Kerr’s security and allocated a detective inspector to his staff.17
A paper was prepared by Lawler in April 1976 surveying Kerr’s problems. Kerr sent this to Charteris. It is extraordinary in its potential ramifications and remedies. ‘There is some evidence of what may be an organised campaign, the dimensions of which are not yet defined, nor its nature, directed against the Head of State to secure his position from office,’ Lawler surmised. He continued:
if the level of opposition and harassment of a Head of State were to develop to a point where a majority or even a large minority of citizens drawn from various sections of the community were involved, the role of the office could be compromised and the consideration then arises whether in the interests of national unity and the appropriate functioning of the office, the incumbent should go.
Lawler said the development of a strategy should be considered. This could include ‘parliamentary action’ such as ‘statements’, ‘legislation’ and ‘debates’. The Palace might need to be involved. And relevant ‘constitutional issues’ could be ‘put to the test in a referendum’.18
By May 1976, Kerr seemed to be unhappy with progress on a strategy to reinforce his position. He summoned Bob Ellicott, the Attorney-General and an old friend from his law days, to Government House. Kerr was anxious. He wanted action. And he told Ellicott that he needed to be defended by him and the rest of the government.
I put it to him that it was his duty and responsibility to give serious thought to the way in which our system of Government should be defended, protected and explained. I said that I thought the campaign which has been mounted has in effect been allowed to go unanswered. Little is being done in a positive way to explain the position of the Governor-General within the monarchical system or to support the present incumbent. I have been unable to defend myself or to make speeches about the system or the office and nobody else is doing very much.19
Ellicott, apparently, agreed and supported some kind of ‘counterattack’. The Attorney-General also suggested an ‘unofficial’ subcommittee of cabinet be established to plan and implement this ‘counter-attack’.20 Charteris, in reply, was as ever careful with his language. He said he was ‘interested’ to hear this, hoped it went well and looked forward to hearing more about it.21 No such cabinet sub-committee was ever established.
Kerr continued to face aggressive demonstrations. While some dignitaries, politicians and members of the public were polite and welcoming towards Kerr, any such civility at events was almost inevitably coupled with hostile acts. The most significant violence towards Kerr took place in Melbourne on 9 June 1976. Kerr’s Rolls-Royce was attacked during a protest by 400 militant unionists and far-left students. Paint bombs and eggs were thrown at the vehicle, and doors were kicked. Kerr required twenty armed police to run alongside to ensure his safety. A brick was thrown through the front side window and the glass shattered, cutting the face of his aide-de-camp.
Fraser called Kerr that evening. ‘I think he has finally realised that there is an organised campaign by the far left and that a counterstrategy is needed,’ Kerr said to Charteris. ‘He has called for an urgent detailed report on the campaign from ASIO.’22 Charteris was pleased that Kerr and Lady Kerr were not injured in the melee and noted that it ‘may have done good’ as Fraser ‘has come to see the position clearly and intends to do something positive about it’.23 Kerr was extremely concerned that the Queen’s visit would be cancelled. He now tried to reassure Charteris. ‘My opinion as to the position generally is that The Queen’s visit will be unaffected,’ he argued. ‘The grass-roots support for the Monarchy is very great.’24
Fraser arranged to have dinner with Kerr a few days after the Melbourne demonstration. Kerr made a note of the conversation and sent a copy to Charteris. ‘We agreed that what was needed was a strategy of attack, not passivity, weakness or retreat on any matters affecting the Governor-General and his office,’ Kerr said. They discussed a number of options: better police planning, Fraser giving a speech to defend ‘the system’ and Kerr personally, new ‘administrative machinery’ to support Kerr, introducing ‘special legislation’ and even a ‘white paper’.25 This was an extraordinary discussion, exposing the extent of Kerr’s paranoia.
The authors have obtained access to the file that Yeend kept on these discussions within the government about Kerr, the vice-regal office and the monarchy. Yeend, then acting secretary of the department, made a note of a meeting convened by Fraser on Saturday afternoon, 12 June 1976. It included the most senior figures in the government: Deputy Prime Minister Doug Anthony, Treasurer Phillip Lynch, Minister for Industry and Commerce Bob Cotton and the Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations Tony Street. The public servants in attendance were: Treasury secretary Sir Frederick Wheeler, Defence secretary Sir Arthur Tange and Peter Lawler from the Department of Administrative Services.
At this meeting, Fraser expressed his concern about Kerr’s personal safety and his alarm about what he saw as a focused attack on the constitutional authority of the Governor-General:
The Prime Minister indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss informally the preservation of the constitutional power, first in light of the threat to the Governor-Generalship and against the person of the Governor-General, and secondly on the constitutional side, looking particularly at the terms of appointments of Governors-General and the powers available to them. He made it clear that the officials present were there as senior experienced officials of the Service, and not representative of particular departmental interests.26
Fraser appointed Lawler to establish a special group of officials who would oversee the development of a strategy and report directly to him. They involved Clarrie Harders, secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department, in the discussions. It was agreed the group would examine:
• the personal security of the Governor-General—in particular the improvement of intelligence about demonstrations, better planning and co-ordination with State authorities in respect of police action, liaison with the Governor-General in respect of appointments etc.; the Prime Minister told Mr Lawler that if additional funds were required for this increased effort then they would be available
• protection of and support for the Governor-Generalship—involving the combating of demonstration and violence in the longer term, better public relations, Ministerial action and involvement in support of the Governor-General and liaison with State Premiers and Ministers
• an assessment on the security side in respect of The Queen’s visit and although understanding this visit will go ahead, advice as to the action that needs to be taken in respect of visit planning and security arrangements
• examination of the constitutional power itself—terms of appointment of a Governor-General and the powers available to him; whether this constitutional power can stand on so delicate a point as the ‘race for the telephone’.
Yeend noted that during this meeting he ‘was asked to confirm the impression that the Palace took the view that they should not become directly involved in the working out of issues at the constitutional level in Australia’. He replied that their engagement with the Palace ‘confirmed the Palace attitude as being that they would want no action other than action taken on proper advice i.e. by the Prime Minister’.27
On 15 June, Yeend and Lawler were summoned to Government House. Kerr was agitated about security issues and wanted to be updated on what actions the government was taking to ‘dampen down violent demonstrations’ and take action ‘against agitators’. They informed him security arrangements were being upgraded and advised him to consult with ministers about his forward program.28 Lawler wrote his own note outlining the work of the group—he was to prepare a paper for Fraser with ‘specifications for revised procedures and rules and for courses of action’ to ensure ‘the unimpeded and effective discharge of the responsibilities and duties of the Office of Governor-General’. Kerr had finally stirred the government to act. He forwarded Lawler’s paper to Charteris.29
In Kerr’s letters, he said he expected that Fraser would at some stage give a robust speech supporting his dismissal action and his remaining in office. In August 1976, Fraser did give a speech to an academic seminar in Melbourne where he defended Kerr’s dismissal, but much of the media focused on his suggestion of a possible referendum on the Senate’s powers on supply. It was not the full-throated speech Kerr had been hoping for.
A speech drafted for Fraser in April 1976, located in Yeend’s file, offered a stronger defence of Kerr than what the Prime Minister delivered. The draft speech made several key points: the parliament could defer supply bills; Whitlam had advocated deferring supply when in Opposition; the reserve powers existed and Kerr used them to dismiss Whitlam; Kerr allowed ‘the people to determine the issue’ at an election; they did determine the issue; and Whitlam’s attacks on Kerr ‘reflect his failure to accept the umpire’s decision’.30 But Fraser did not want to relitigate the case for dismissal; he wanted to get on with governing.
Violent protests against Kerr continued through 1976. On 22 September, 3000 activists—Labor supporters, unionists and communists—crammed into the Sydney Town Hall to listen to Donald Horne, Manning Clark, Patrick White and others condemn Kerr and call for a new ‘democratic’ constitution. On the first anniversary of the dismissal, rallies were held in every capital city and in front of Parliament House in Canberra, and 10 000 people turned out in Sydney. Yet Kerr continued to tell the Palace that the demonstrations were only small in number and were declining. He was eager to ensure the Queen’s jubilee year visit was not cancelled or postponed. Whitlam felt the need to speak out against violence towards Fraser and Kerr, and opposed demonstrations against the Queen when she visited Australia.
Most of these demonstrations were organised by radical student groups or militant unions, and some Labor supporters. They were an eclectic group which also included an organisation called SACK—Society for the Assertion of the Constitution over Kerr. It was run by the energetic Harriett Swift who single-handedly conducted a campaign to force Kerr out of the vice-regal office.31 She attracted the attention of the Palace after she wrote to the Queen saying she would be met with protests in Australia if Kerr remained in office.32
At the end of 1976, Lawler told Kerr that ‘the Jubilee Year should be used discreetly to strengthen the sentiments for the Monarchy further’. Kerr embraced this notion in a letter to Charteris and downplayed any growth in republican sentiment in Australia. ‘There is, I believe, no active campaign which engages the feelings of the masses,’ he told Charteris on 1 December 1976. Kerr attached a recent newspaper report that showed 48 per cent of those polled thought he had acted ‘properly’ in dismissing Whitlam and 48 per cent thought he ‘did not act properly’. Australians remained divided over Kerr’s dismissal. On the question of resignation, 39 per cent thought he should go and 57 per cent thought he should stay in office.33
On 4 January 1977, Kerr engaged the Palace on an issue which would cause them immense anxiety. He told Charteris he was considering publishing a memoir or autobiography. He had already started writing. He was talking to publishers but had not decided about publication.34 Buckingham Palace was alarmed; they did not approve Kerr writing a memoir. Charteris advised it ‘would be clearly improper for you to publish anything about events which have taken place during your term of office whilst you remain Governor-General’.35
In August 2019, the authors gained access to Kerr’s correspondence with Buckingham Palace after he left office in December 1977. The letters showed that Kerr continued to ingratiate himself with the Palace. The Queen’s private secretaries flattered Kerr’s ego but were concerned about what he might write. Sir Philip Moore, who succeeded Charteris as private secretary in November 1977, asked to read Kerr’s memoir before publication. The manuscript was sent to Buckingham Palace. On 19 September 1978, Moore wrote thanking Kerr for ‘omitting any reference to the informal exchanges which you had with Martin Charteris’.36 This reflected the established Palace position that the Governor-General was not entitled to document his exchanges with the Palace. Kerr’s memoirs are conspicuous for including only one mention of Charteris.37 Kerr replied on 25 September, writing: ‘It is particularly gratifying to me to know that the result is satisfactory.’38
When Matters for Judgment was published later that year, Kerr wanted the Queen to have a personally inscribed copy. It was accepted for the library at Windsor Castle. ‘Her Majesty has asked me to express her warm appreciation,’ Moore wrote on 28 June 1979.39 The book was also dispatched to Charteris, then retired, who replied on 29 March 1979 with appreciation and said ‘it makes a splendid defence of your actions from the broadest constitutional point of view’.40
The Queen’s visit to Australia in March–April 1977 was a grand occasion. Kerr was desperate to remain in the vice-regal office and host the monarch in her realm. But Kerr was a problem for the Palace. Ahead of the visit, security assessments concluded that any event involving Kerr would certainly see ‘demonstrations against the Governor-General’. Kerr sent these reports to Charteris. They said the most common issue in violent demonstrations over the previous year had been Kerr—no other ‘prominent’ person attracted more hostility.41
In the end, the Queen’s visit to Australia was a triumph. She was met with huge crowds and much affection from Australians. Demonstrations were kept to a minimum and were heavily overshadowed by the positive reception. The Palace had managed the Kerr problem. The Queen and Kerr were never seen together in public apart from the customary welcome and farewell.
Before the Queen’s departure, Kerr had discussed the issue of resignation with her at Government House at Yarralumla. In a note, Kerr wrote that ‘advice until now had been against such a move’—resignation. Charteris told Kerr that resignation was ‘one I had to decide for myself’. But after this meeting, Kerr was preparing the ground for resignation—writing that the ‘battle of the streets’ had been won in 1976 and that the royal visit had been an outstanding success. He reassured himself he ‘had achieved all that could be expected or asked’ of him. But he still agonised. ‘Should I do it for the country?’ he asked himself.42
The pivotal meeting where Kerr’s resignation became inevitable was aboard the royal yacht Britannia at Fremantle, Western Australia, on 30 March 1977. This was the day of the Queen’s departure. Kerr was given an audience, invited to lunch and was appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order. That year, Kerr was also made a Privy Councillor on the recommendation of Fraser.
The discussion onboard Britannia left Kerr in no doubt that the national healing that he wanted would only be achieved with his resignation. A few days later, Kerr wrote personally to the Queen in longhand offering his ‘humble thanks’ and ‘gratitude’ and promised to remain her ‘most humble and obedient servant’.43 This was the intention of the honour.
After the Queen’s visit, Kerr travelled to Paris where he wrote and rewrote a tortuous 8-page longhand letter to Charteris from his hotel room. Dated 5 May 1977—and not released as part of the ‘Palace letters’ bundle in July 2020—Kerr told Charteris that resignation ‘has been on my mind’ and a departure from office in late 1977 or early 1978 would likely ‘heal any remaining wounds resulting from the supply crisis of 1975.’ Resignation had been canvassed with Fraser, the Queen and Charteris, and the issue now was the manner and timing.44
Kerr said Fraser thought he should resign and his attitude towards Fraser had soured. Kerr wrote to Charteris that Fraser had been ‘nervous and uncertain’ about the resolution to the crisis in 1975. ‘[H]e did not know what I would do,’ Kerr recalled. ‘Now, in the manner of Prime Ministers, he has a different picture, I believe, in his mind he sees himself as a man who did it all himself.’ In a draft of this letter, Kerr said Fraser was ‘happy for me to go’ and that he ‘never really had the support’ he had deserved since the dismissal. He called Fraser a ‘stern’ and ‘arrogant man’. But while resentful of Fraser, Kerr knew he needed the Prime Minister to help manage his resignation and next career in ‘fresh fields’.45 Charteris replied to Kerr on 12 May confirming an audience with the Queen in London on 3 June.46
Sentiment towards Kerr from both the Palace and the Prime Minister had changed decisively. They were both working to achieve an early resignation now seen as being in the interests of the monarchy and the Fraser Government. The Queen, obviously, never suggested to Kerr that he resign. That would be improper. But the Governor-General, in effect, was being pushed out in the nicest possible way. This is evident from Kerr’s own notes and correspondence, and the testimony and notes of others.
In a ‘personal and confidential’ letter to Sir Robert Menzies on 14 July 1977—made fully available for this book—Kerr revealed the inner story of his resignation. He wrote of talks with Fraser and the Queen about resignation that had reached a new phase:
The reaction was however different from previous attitudes. Both felt that the battle had been substantially won and that if I was minded to do so perhaps it was in the interests of the Monarchy and the country to help things to settle down by making room for a successor. This message came through fairly clearly from the Prime Minister. No one, of course, asked me to resign but after a series of conversations during the visit and in London I felt that I had to take the step which has been taken, as a matter of duty. If I had been asked to stay on I should have done so but I appear to have persuaded the Prime Minister that we should help bitterness to subside and disappear, and the Queen as well … I am not sure whether he [Fraser] or the Queen developed an ‘accepting’ approach first. Things crystallised on the yacht during the visit.47
These comments make it clear that Kerr had lost the confidence of the Palace and the Prime Minister. He felt he ‘had to take’ the resignation decision. He was not asked to stay; that is, they wanted him gone. The psychology was brilliant. The message from the Palace and the Prime Minister was that this was Kerr’s final ‘duty’ in the cause of Queen and country, that is, it was Kerr’s decision.
When Kerr boarded Britannia, he had felt a sense of satisfaction. The Queen’s visit to Australia had been a triumph and he had helped to secure this success. That triumph made his own departure more palatable and gave him a rationalisation for resignation. But it also revealed how deluded he had been since the dismissal in thinking that he could properly discharge the role of Governor-General for the normal five-year term. When Kerr stepped off the boat he knew the Queen’s preference was for his resignation.
Kerr travelled to England and was granted an audience with the Queen at Buckingham Palace on 3 June 1977. He had had two months to reflect on the discussion with the Queen and with Charteris in Australia. His resignation, carefully planned and timed, was confirmed at this meeting. Kerr wrote in longhand to the Queen a week later, on 10 June, asking to be ‘relieved’ of his appointment. He mentioned their ‘recent discussions’ which had canvassed the ‘reasons’ why he had decided to resign.48 Charteris too noted the recent ‘discussions’ between Kerr and the Queen in his letter acknowledging the resignation on 15 June.
In another letter the same day, Charteris referred explicitly to the reason for Kerr’s resignation, acknowledging the Queen ‘fully understands that you are doing this to serve the best interests of Australia and the office that you hold’.49 Charteris was keen to promote a smooth departure. In the end, he was more reassuring than ever, keen to leave Kerr with the message that he had been a successful Governor-General: ‘I hope very much that when the announcement is made you will be given the credit you deserve, not only for your decision to resign, but also for what happened in November 1975.’50
This was Charteris facilitating an amicable farewell for Kerr. It was flattery at its zenith and it had a purpose—to secure the resignation everyone wanted. Kerr needed a friend and Charteris was that friend. He gave Kerr what he craved: reassurance. For the rest of his life, Kerr would be tormented about his 1975 decision and the public reaction.
The real attitude of the Queen and Charteris towards Kerr was further documented just two weeks after his resignation was announced. Charteris had a meeting with Sir Paul Hasluck, Kerr’s predecessor as Governor-General, at Buckingham Palace on 1 August 1977. Hasluck made a note of this discussion at the time which was revealed by the authors in 2015. He wrote: ‘It was also apparent that at some stage some pressure had been applied from the Palace to bring about his resignation. Charteris—and by implication the Queen—had a poor opinion of the Kerrs.’51 Charteris told Hasluck that the Palace had wanted to handle Kerr’s resignation carefully. They decided to let him remain in office during the Queen’s visit to Australia and allow him to visit London for the Jubilee celebrations. Hasluck had also been aboard the Britannia in Fremantle. He ‘gained the impression’ from several discussions ‘that the Palace had brought pressure to bear on Kerr to retire’.52
Hasluck’s account of this meeting with Charteris is highly credible. Hasluck had the full confidence of the Palace and was seen as a completely trusted former Governor-General. The meeting occurred in close proximity to the announcement of Kerr’s resignation, so the event was fresh in Charteris’ mind. As a distinguished historian, it can be assumed that Hasluck made an accurate note.
The Palace’s dubious opinion of Kerr was shared by Fraser and his staff. Dale Budd, who was Fraser’s private secretary, told the authors that Fraser was keen for Kerr to go. ‘I think it was just a formal relationship,’ he said. ‘They never celebrated together. And Fraser tried to ease him out into the UNESCO job which I guess was a way of giving him the blue water treatment.’53 This attitude was confirmed by Fraser’s senior adviser at the time, David Kemp. ‘Fraser did not have regard for Kerr and welcomed his departure,’ he said in an interview.54
Sir William Heseltine, assistant private secretary at the time of the announcement, recalled the reaction in the royal household. ‘Everybody was extremely relieved when he indicated that he was going to go,’ Heseltine said.55
Charteris had conveyed to Hasluck his concern about Kerr’s character. He said the Palace did not ‘trust’ Kerr and thought he was seeking to benefit financially from the vice-regal office. They were dismayed by Kerr’s plan to publish a memoir, against their advice, and had sought and gained assurances that he would not disclose anything that reflected on ‘the position of the Queen in respect of communications to and from the Palace’. Charteris thought Sir John and Lady Kerr were a ‘greedy’ couple, Hasluck recorded:
We discussed the Kerrs, both man and wife, the conclusion being that it was ‘a good thing’ that they were going, that up to date it was a relief to know that his resignation was being handled smoothly, and that the Palace was fervently hoping that at the time he left office or immediately thereafter he did not do anything that was improper, either in publication or in public activities. It was apparent that at the Palace the chief fear arose from a belief that the Kerrs and, especially, Lady Kerr, were ‘very greedy’.56