During his time as Governor-General, Sir John Kerr actively sought to cultivate a relationship with Charles, the Prince of Wales, and future King. Kerr had access to Charles and a direct dialogue with him in a way that was impossible in his dealings with the Queen. From the time of their first meeting in October 1974, Kerr’s style of friendly deference, along with his status as a vice-regal figure and his age—Kerr was a mature sixty and Charles a young man of twenty-five—meant that the Governor-General had a distinct advantage in establishing a meaningful rapport. It became a mutually supportive and trusting relationship.
The key to the Kerr–Charles connection was its personal dimension. Charles was not the monarch; he was not located in Buckingham Palace; he was not an adviser to the Queen and he was not a decision-maker. Yet he had standing as the Prince of Wales, and heir, and he had a long-standing interest in Australia. Kerr used every opportunity to establish his influence with Charles. His success in this endeavour was revealed in March 1976 in a remarkable handwritten letter Charles wrote to Kerr when he supported his dismissal of the Whitlam Government and sympathised with an embattled Governor-General under siege from his critics.
The Kerr–Charles relationship was documented by Kerr in a 11-page typed memo titled ‘Notes on Conversations and Correspondence with H.R.H The Prince of Wales’, written in April 1981. This document, now revealed for the first time, offers a startling insight into the bond between Kerr and Charles which the Governor-General valued so deeply. It canvasses issues of extreme sensitivity—Charles’ fixation on acquiring a property in Australia, his ambition to become Governor-General and Kerr’s encouragement of that ambition, and their discussions in September 1975 about the looming constitutional crisis and the decisions Kerr might face. Kerr emphasised that he wanted this note revealed in future for the sake of history.1
On becoming Governor-General, Kerr inherited a project that had occupied his predecessor, Sir Paul Hasluck—the acquisition of a property for the Prince of Wales. The documents suggest a difference of opinion on this subject between Charles and Buckingham Palace. On 9 October 1974, Sir Martin Charteris told Kerr in a letter that this idea was not viable. ‘In modern times it is never “a good moment” for The Royal Family to spend money, but I think it fair to say that the present could hardly be a worse moment. I think, therefore, that the Prince of Wales will decide not to do anything at the present time about a property but to keep his options as open as possible for the future.’2
A few days later, Charles arrived in Australia on an official visit and inspected the proposed property, ‘Yammatree’, south of Cootamundra, in New South Wales. With Charles was his private secretary, Squadron Leader David Checketts. Kerr described Charles’ reaction after seeing the property: ‘When he returned to Government House on that day, he was very anxious to try and explore alternative possibilities to enable something to be done before Christmas.’ Charles wanted to press ahead. Kerr noted that Charles had a ‘very great desire to have a property in Australia’.3 He asked Kerr whether it would be possible to discuss the proposed property purchase with Gough Whitlam. The Prime Minister was coming to dinner at Government House that evening and Kerr arranged for him to arrive early to have the discussion which involved the three of them.
Whitlam supported the proposal but said there would be no financial support from the Australian government. The proposal, however, had been canvassed with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the British High Commission in Canberra, the British Consulate General in Sydney and NSW Governor Sir Roden Cutler. A number of properties were considered for purchase. In his note, Kerr said that Wilson ‘saw no difficulty at all about the Royal Family or the Prince taking the necessary decisions’ but it would not be financed by the British government.4 Kerr felt the best arrangement would be for the property to be financed by loans negotiated in Australia. He was keen to support Charles and bring the project to fruition. Kerr initiated talks with William Vines, the chairman of pastoral company, Dalgety, about the property.
In his note, Kerr outlined the initial objections of the Palace:
first because the economic situation was not good in England and it might be a bad step from the point of view of the Royal Family for substantial sums to be spent on a good property in Australia at such a time. The second reason was, so I was told, that there were some doubts about the interpretation which might be put upon the making of such a purchase: something along the lines that some people might think that some kind of preparation was being made for a retreat to Australia to be available if some awkward situation should arise in the future.5
He proceeded to explain the final outcome.
A scheme was worked out which would have enabled the property to be bought without using any funds of the Royal Family—it would be financed by mortgage. Ultimately a firm decision was made at the Palace not to go on with the scheme at that time, and it did not come to life again during my Governor-Generalship. During the discussions about the proposed acquisition, my talks with the Prince and with Squadron Leader Checketts were quite detailed and frank, and constituted the beginning of what became a friendly relationship between H.R.H. and myself.6
Charles knew that while the Palace had denied him, the Governor-General had actively supported his ambition. Before he left Australia, Charles was reconciled to defeat on the property front. On 23 October 1974, in a handwritten note to Kerr from Government House in Tasmania, Charles said he had enjoyed their conversations ‘enormously’ and felt ‘indebted to you for taking so much trouble on my behalf’ with Whitlam, the banks and Dalgety. He conceded the problems in relation to the property were ‘too great’ at this stage. ‘I don’t know what I would have done without your help and enthusiasm,’ Charles wrote.
There was, however, an even more important issue for Charles’ future discussed during this visit: the possibility of him becoming Governor-General of Australia. In his note, Kerr wrote: ‘This was something which was very dear to his heart, and he undoubtedly hoped that some day he could occupy the office of Governor-General.’ Kerr said Charles was too young to assume the office at that time and would need to be married. Kerr was being sounded out on his attitude to vacating the office when Charles was ready.7
In my discussions with Squadron Leader Checketts I said that I would, of course, co-operate at any time in moving from the office so that it could be occupied by the Prince of Wales, on the assumption that the Prime Minister of the day would wish to make a recommendation and that the Queen approved.8
Kerr revealed that he had discussed the idea with Checketts and also on several occasions with Charles. Kerr wrote that Charles saw being Governor-General as training for becoming King.
Squadron Leader Checketts had said that the Prince would be very interested indeed in having the experience that would come from acting as Governor-General and that his, Checketts’, view was that it would be good for the Prince to see from close at hand what constituted the work and activities of the Governor-General, this being not irrelevant to what would be his later experience on ascending the Throne. In my talks with H.R.H. he showed undoubted eagerness to have this experience some time later on and thanked me for what I had said about fully cooperating. I treated the conversation as being an entirely personal one and discussed it with nobody.9
The bond between Kerr and Charles was sealed. Kerr had told the Prince he was prepared to step aside as Governor-General in order to accommodate Charles in a critical step in his career. Even months later, in early 1975, when Kerr met Charles on a visit to Nepal, they talked again about the Prince becoming Governor-General. Kerr wrote that Charles’ interest ‘was clearly being maintained’ and that ‘he still hoped that, some years later, he would be able to become Governor-General.’10 By this stage, the issue was being discussed every time they met. It was raised in Papua New Guinea when they both attended the independence celebrations in September 1975.
Kerr did not inform the Palace about these talks. He cherished them and saw them as personal discussions outside his dialogue with the Palace. ‘I did not report upon them in the Palace correspondence, because it did not seem to be appropriate for me to be writing to the Queen reporting on what the Prince of Wales was saying to me,’ he wrote.11 His attitude is deeply revealing. Kerr saw himself in a preliminary negotiation with Charles about his future and wanted to keep this dialogue from the Palace. He was building a special relationship that might prove a useful future investment.
In Papua New Guinea, Charles asked Kerr about a likely supply crisis in Australia. In his note, Kerr said: ‘I did not discuss with him in any detail what might happen, but the elements of the situation, including the question of the reserve powers of the Crown, were mentioned.’12 However, Kerr spoke frankly to Charles about the contingencies. He told Charles that if supply was denied, an election could well have to take place but ‘that it was possible the government would not see things that way, and might try to hold on to office without an election’. Kerr further explained:
In such a situation, it was possible that the reserve powers might, in extreme circumstances, need to be used. I mentioned that when such a rare and unusual occasion arose, it had to be remembered that the person occupying the vice-regal office held it subject to the risk that the Prime Minister of the day might advise the Queen that he should have his commission terminated. The Prince found this difficult to accept, saying that surely the Queen would not, in the great crisis that would exist, remove the Governor-General from office at the very time when he was contemplating removing the Prime Minister and his Government. I said that if anything like this were to happen, there was in my view no doubt that the Prime Minister had the power to recommend removal of the Governor-General, and that the Queen would have to take that advice.13
Kerr had confided to Charles his deepest fear: recall. He also flagged dismissal of the government as a possible option if supply was denied and the government tried to remain in office without an election. His reference to the reserve powers and a possible dismissal were consistent with the extensive comments he made to Charteris in the Palace letters in the several weeks before the blocking of supply and during the crisis itself. Kerr was not telling Charles he was thinking of dismissing the government—he was referring to the range of possibilities in a constitutional crisis. This is clear from his note. Kerr said the discussion ‘was quite hypothetical as there had been no denial of supply, and nobody really knew what was going to happen.’14
This discussion with Charles about the possibilities arising from any constitutional crisis—including debate about dismissal—also reflected Kerr’s discussions with Whitlam at this time.
However, the real significance of this exchange was Kerr revealing to Charles his fear that Whitlam might advise the Palace to remove him as Governor-General and that the Prime Minister had this power. While Charles was initially puzzled about this, Kerr was in no doubt whatsoever. On display in this conversation was Charles’ naivete and lack of constitutional knowledge on the fundamental relationship between the Queen and Prime Ministers in relation to the appointment and removal of Governors-General.
Kerr’s note then referred to the crucial Charteris letter on 2 October, sent after Charles had returned to London, which confirmed what Kerr already knew: that if Whitlam recommended his recall then the Queen would accept such advice.
The 1981 note by Kerr is a further important documentary record. It shows there are three critical points to make about the Kerr–Charles discussion in Papua New Guinea. First, Kerr did not ask Charles to intervene and try to protect him in the case of any recall advice from Whitlam. Second, Kerr understood there could be no arrangement with the Palace to protect him from recall and did not seek such an arrangement. Third, Kerr did not inform Charles that he planned to dismiss Whitlam. This note, along with Kerr’s other writings on his conversation with Charles, is unequivocal on this point. Kerr’s note makes clear that no understanding was reached about the dismissal of the Whitlam government in this discussion.
The Palace letters and Kerr’s note suggest there was no contact between Kerr and Charles during the constitutional crisis. Charles, of course, had no role in the crisis as a decision-maker. The next contact between the Prince and the Governor-General came after the dismissal when Kerr visited London in January 1976. He met Charles at Sandringham where they discussed the impact of the dismissal, the election result and the Australian political situation.
They again discussed the possibility of Charles becoming Governor-General and Kerr was as enthusiastic as ever. ‘I said that, as far as I was concerned, the position remained the same and that when and if an opportunity developed for him to consider the possibility of becoming Governor-General, I would, if I were still there, move aside as we had previously discussed,’ Kerr wrote.15 This was significant because the new Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, was favourably disposed to Charles’ appointment.
Charles becoming Governor-General remained a live project for Kerr through 1976. He pursued the issue with both Fraser and the Palace. But, in the end, the Palace was unpersuaded.
Two letters from Charteris to Kerr on 3 August and 5 August 1976 terminated any proposal for Charles to succeed Kerr. In the first letter, Charteris said: ‘I think the point we must all bear in mind is that I do not believe the Queen would look with favour on Prince Charles becoming Governor-General of Australia until such time as he has a settled married life.’ Charteris said the prospect ‘must remain in the unforeseeable future’.16 In the second letter, Charteris said: ‘It would be very difficult for Prince Charles to become Governor-General until the constitutional questions are solved.’17 That is, the dismissal legacy was too hot.
However, the idea was not dead. Kerr and Charles continued the dialogue. Checketts wrote to Kerr on 25 October 1976 saying the Prince’s interest in becoming Governor-General remained ‘unaltered’.18
After the dismissal, Charles was a strong supporter of the Governor-General. Kerr recalled that in January 1976 they discussed the ‘current difficulties’ he was facing in Australia.19 In a different note, written on 20 April 1976, Kerr listed the people arguing he should remain as Governor-General rather than resign. They were: the Palace, Fraser, government MPs, Sir Robert Menzies, Sir Anthony Mason, Sir Garfield Barwick and, significantly, Prince Charles. This section of the note referring to Charles was redacted until September 2020.20
On 27 March 1976, while captaining the HMS Bronington at sea, Charles handwrote a supportive letter to Kerr. This letter is referred to in Kerr’s notes and the full letter has been released to the authors for this book. Charles began saying he had read in The Times a report of demonstrations against Kerr at the Australian National University. Charles said that ‘I wanted to write and say how much I sympathize with you.’ He encouraged Kerr not to worry ‘too much about these sorts of demonstrations and stupidities’ and recounted some of the demonstrations he had faced in both Australia and the United Kingdom. He told Kerr not to get ‘depressed’ or ‘dejected’.21
I can imagine that you must come in for all sorts of misinformed criticism and prejudice since I saw you in January and I wanted you to know that I, at any rate, appreciate what you do and admire enormously the way you have performed (and continue to perform) your many and varied duties.22
Charles then addressed the dismissal.
Please don’t lose heart. What you did last year was right and the courageous thing to do—and most Australians seemed to endorse your decision when it came to the point.23
Kerr cherished this letter from the future king. He replied by hand and had several talks with Charles after receiving the letter.
The letter makes clear Prince Charles supported Kerr’s dismissal of the Whitlam Government. Charles went where the Queen never went. This is a direct statement of support for Whitlam’s dismissal by a member of the royal family. It is a personal letter and Charles is not writing with the authority of the Queen. But this was an unwise letter from the heir to the throne. Charles allowed his personal sympathy for Kerr to override the need for prudence from the Prince of Wales on the Whitlam dismissal. This revelation has the potential to damage his future as King of Australia given the partisan nature of Kerr’s intervention.