The Sir John Kerr legacy as Governor-General has been substantially repudiated by his successors a generation later. The letters reveal that Kerr reported to Buckingham Palace at length on Australian affairs, that he felt obliged to win the confidence of the Queen and that his style was to ingratiate himself with the Palace. Interviews with the nation’s two most recently retired Governors-General—Dame Quentin Bryce and Sir Peter Cosgrove—reveal that the Kerr method is obsolete and belongs to history.
But the most substantial repudiation of Kerr’s legacy is his exercise of the reserve powers by dismissing the Prime Minister without warning. His two immediate successors, Sir Zelman Cowen and Sir Ninian Stephen, knew their principal task was to rehabilitate the office and unify the country in support of the office. This was a project conducted in Cowen’s mission to ‘bring a touch of healing’ to the role of Governor-General after the dismissal.1 It was advanced by Stephen who said the task of the Governor-General was ‘to represent the Australian nation to the people of Australia’.2
There has been a near unanimous view among Kerr’s successors that the office was damaged by his intervention and preoccupation with the reserve powers. Interviewed for this book, the first woman to hold the office, Bryce, said:
Forty-five years on, the momentous political events of 1975 remain so in my mind. Like so many Australians, they are imprinted in my memory and life experience. It’s undeniable that their legacy infused every Governor-Generalship in their wake.
I understood the gravity of my constitutional responsibilities and the limits within which I was to exercise those. It is not for the Governor-General to be arbiter of events, the umpire of a political impasse. She or he must allow time and distance for our political and parliamentary processes to do their job.
It has never been clear to me why Sir John Kerr took the steps he did when there was a recognised and conventional solution available.3
Interviewed for this book, Cosgrove made it clear that he had a different outlook to Kerr. The principle that governed Cosgrove’s approach to the Queen was to maintain cordial relations and ensure Australian politics was never discussed. ‘I stayed in touch with the Palace but I was not reporting to or accountable to the Palace in any way,’ he said.4 Cosgrove’s focus was the Prime Minister, not the Queen. He wrote very infrequently to the Palace, while he had regular meetings with the Prime Minister. Cosgrove assumed the Palace had its own sources of information about Australian affairs. There was no effort to replicate the huge correspondence Kerr entertained.
Former Governor-General Bill Hayden, interviewed for this book, made a distinct but veiled criticism of Kerr’s intervention. He said: ‘There is a very interesting quote from Charteris where he said Kerr had raised the possibility he might get sacked by the Prime Minister. Gough said something publicly like that. Charteris wrote back and said the Queen would be very unhappy about that being put to her. Charteris also confirms there is a reserve power but only for it to be used cautiously.’5
Kim Beazley, the governor of Western Australia, made a series of direct and indirect criticisms of Kerr when interviewed for this book. He said if there was a crisis of the nature of 1975, he would not discuss it with the Palace. ‘If I needed consultation beyond my own judgement, I would talk to the Solicitor-General and that I think is what any governor or Governor-General should do,’ he said. In that situation, he would not ‘contemplate approaching the Queen or the Palace about it—ever’.6 But Beazley’s strongest critique of Kerr concerned his fear of recall. ‘Fear of being sacked should never be a motivation for your activities,’ he said. ‘If you think you have to go down a particular course and if the advice produces a call for you to be sacked, so be it. You just live with it, you are not going to go to jail, you are not going to be hung, you just disappear out the door and go back to your old house.’7
Kerr’s predecessor, Sir Paul Hasluck, became a private but strong critic of Kerr’s management of the 1975 crisis. Hasluck’s essential critique was that the problem resided in the lack of trust and confidence between Whitlam and Kerr. Whitlam enjoyed regular and frank discussions with Hasluck on a range of policy, political and administrative matters. Hasluck told Charteris that if this same trust had existed ‘there would have never been a crisis’.8 Hasluck said in an oral history interview for the National Library of Australia that if he had been Governor-General, ‘at a much earlier stage there would have been discussions between Whitlam and myself, and some indications to Whitlam that certain matters needed reconsideration’. Hasluck said he was ‘confident’ that if he had remained in the vice-regal role ‘there would not have been the crisis’. The significance is obvious: ‘If I had stayed, only for two years, probably the history of Australian politics would be quite different,’ Hasluck said.9
More recent Governors-General have had relations with the Palace distinctly different to that of Kerr. The unifying theme of Kerr’s successors is that each sought to evolve the office governed by the principle of greater Australian independence. From Bryce to Cosgrove and David Hurley, with their different styles, there was a unifying purpose to their role. As Bryce said:
I wanted to reflect and acknowledge the depth, breadth and diversity of contemporary Australia: our values and aspirations, our Indigenous heritage and proud multiculturalism, our geography, our talent and accomplishment, our work and work ethic, our community service, our generosity and humility, intellect, creativity and spirit.
I also wanted to ensure that the Office itself—in its thinking, operations, symbols, messages, and public outreach—adapted and evolved in a way that was meaningful to all Australians, that was alert and responsive to their mood and sentiment, that made people feel included, respected and understood, while respecting the origins and traditions of the Office.
I was always mindful of where my term was situated in the history of the role, of the evolution of Australia across my own lifetime. I was the first woman in the role, and during my time, we had our first female prime minister. These were signals of a maturing nation. I had to be thinking about, preparing for a time—whenever that was to be—when Australians showed a readiness to see their nation mature to a republic.10
Cosgrove said the Palace respected Australia’s independence and maturity as a nation and this principle governed his dialogue with the Queen. ‘In my time as Governor-General, Australian sovereignty was always upheld,’ he said. Cosgrove enjoyed his several conversations with the Queen—while they canvassed many issues relating to Australia, there was one subject that was never discussed: Australian politics.11
Recent Governors-General and governors have not felt the need to write extensively to the Palace—Bryce, Cosgrove and Beazley being three examples.
Bryce said: ‘Beyond necessary formalities, I did not see it as my role to write regular despatches to the Palace, which I understood had been a feature of the Office for many decades. In my view, it was not for me as Governor-General to provide my own observations and analysis of events and issues. We have a Prime Minister, as the leader of the elected Government, to do that, should they choose.’12
Beazley said he rarely writes to the Palace and certainly not about day-to-day political issues. He said Kerr’s correspondence was unnecessary and sought to compromise the Queen. ‘He’s there as the Queen’s representative and one thing we are obligated to do, aside from the relationship that we have with the administration of the Australian people, is to prevent her name from being sullied or drawn into controversy,’ he said. ‘I cannot see in that correspondence a second’s regard for her situation.’13
Cosgrove, Bryce, Beazley and Hayden said the Queen and the Palace had a strict policy of non-interference in Australian affairs. In this sense, they confirmed a generation later the messages that Charteris and the Queen were giving Kerr in 1975. The principle of Palace non-interference is decades old.
‘The Palace was completely proper,’ Cosgrove said. ‘During my time as Governor-General it never sought in any way to interfere with or become involved with Australian parliamentary or political affairs.’14
‘Communications between the Palace and the gubernatorial officers are minimal,’ Beazley said. ‘There’s no requirement for consultation. I approach them on occasions but it’s really what you would almost describe as constituent business, it’s not political business. If for some reason or other trouble broke out here I would not under any circumstances consult the Palace.’15
Asked if he thought the Queen had always done the right thing by Australia, Hayden said: ‘Yes, I do. I can’t think of any case where she didn’t.’ He could not identify any example where the Palace improperly intervened in Australian politics, including 1975: ‘If ever she intervened, all hell would break out. What’s the Queen trying to do circumventing domestic government? The Liberals would be as tough as the Labor Party in attacking her.’16
‘All matters between the Office of the Official Secretary and the Palace were conducted with courtesy and professionalism,’ Bryce said. ‘There was never any attempt by the Palace during my term as Governor-General—or indeed during my term as Queensland Governor—to provide me with political or legal advice, or to influence or interfere with any of my decisions or actions … Her Majesty was in my experience an impeccable constitutional sovereign.’17
Kerr established for his successors a pattern of behaviour most would not follow. There was wide recognition the office had been damaged and its impartiality needed to be restored. But his successors agreed that the principle governing the Palace was noninterference in Australian affairs.