NOTES

PROLOGUE

ix one of the three people most seriously considered: Carl Hulse, “Indiana Senator Offers Obama Risks and Rewards,” New York Times, August 11, 2008.

ix Evan Bayh made it clear: Chris Cillizza, “Evan Bayh Won’t Seek Re-election, Senate Majority in Play?” Washington Post, February 15, 2010.

ix “There is too much partisanship and not enough progress”: Ibid. Increasing concern about the Senate’s diminishing appeal had been expressed the previous year. Carl Hulse, “Despite Prestige, the Senate’s Allure Seems to Be Fading,” New York Times, February 5, 2009.

ix He battled Richard Nixon: John W. Dean, The Rehnquist Choice: The Untold Story of the Nixon Appointment That Redefined the Supreme Court (New York: Touchstone, 2001), pp. 21, 61, 266. Dean’s book is probably the most revealing of many sources that credit Bayh’s leadership in opposing three of Nixon’s Supreme Court nominees.

x “perhaps the most inspired piece of legislation”: “Innovation’s Golden Goose,” Economist Technology Quarterly, December 14, 2002.

xi “a profound sense of crisis”: Lewis L. Gould, The Most Exclusive Club: A History of the Modern United States Senate (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. xiv.

xi “the empty chamber”: George Packer, “The Empty Chamber: Just How Broken Is the Senate?,” New Yorker, August 9, 2010, pp. 38–50.

xii wanted him to look strong: Don Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield: The Extraordinary Life of a Great American Statesman and Diplomat (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2003), p. 246; Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright: A Biography (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 353.

xii tired of fighting with President Nixon: Dean, Rehnquist Choice, p. 278.

xii “To cool it”: Gould, Most Exclusive Club, p. 7, is one of many places this famous anecdote is noted.

xiii “For protracted periods”: Gould, Most Exclusive Club, pp. ix–x.

xiv “their hearts were touched by fire”: Oliver Wendell Holmes, address delivered for Memorial Day, May 30, 1884, in Keene, New Hampshire.

xv “It is the Senate as one of the rocks of the Republic”: Francis R. Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader: A Different Kind of Senate, 1961–1976 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 85. Mansfield’s speech appears in the Congressional Record on November 25, 1963, but was never delivered because of President Kennedy’s assassination.

xvii began to change in the late 1970’s: Gould, Most Exclusive Club, pp. 274–275; Adam Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. 106–163; Alan Crawford, Thunder on the Right: The “New Right” and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 272–289; Allan J. Lichtman, White Protestant Nation: The Rise of the Conservative Movement (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008), pp. 307–311.

xviii “We have been miniaturized”: Carl Hulse, “Policy Agenda Poses Test for Rusty Legislative Machinery,” New York Times, April 5, 2009.

xix completely taken over by the Christian right: John Danforth, Faith and Politics: How the “Moral Values” Debate Divides America and How to Move Forward Together (New York: Viking, 2006), pp. 69, 75, 77.

xix “the battered children from the House”: Interview with former senator Alan Simpson, February 2, 2010.

xix his overriding objective is to defeat Barack Obama: Matt Schneider, “Senator McConnell: Making Obama a One-Term President Is My Single Most Important Political Goal,” MediaIte, July 10, 2011.

xix brilliant portrayal of Johnson’s career: Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).

xix “Johnson was a noisy summer storm”: Gould, Most Exclusive Club, p. 232.

xx the legacy of a democratized Senate: Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, pp. 31–47, 83–88; Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 171–174; Gould, Most Exclusive Club, pp. 233–235. The theme that Mansfield democratized the Senate was voiced in many interviews with former senators, such as Gary Hart and Dick Clark, who remembered being early beneficiaries of important assignments because of Mansfield’s view of the Senate.

xx “the “national mediator”: Walter F. Mondale, with David Hage, The Good Fight: A Life in Liberal Politics (New York: Scribner, 2010), p. 116; interview with Vice President Mondale, September 11, 2009.

CHAPTER 1: THE GRIND

3 seventeen new senators and sixty-seven new House members: Mildred Amer, “Freshmen in the House of Representatives and Senate by Political Party, 1913–2008,” Congressional Research Service, August 20, 2008.

4 a singular moment: 1953 was the only almost comparable moment of change in political leadership, bringing in a new president (Dwight Eisenhower), new Senate leaders (Robert Taft and Lyndon Johnson), and new Speaker of the House (Joseph Martin). Martin, however, had been Speaker previously, unlike Tip O’Neill in 1977.

4 Edmund Muskie of Maine and Ernest “Fritz” Hollings of South Carolina: Robert C. Byrd, The Senate 1789–1989: Addresses on the History of the United States Senate, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 570–572.

4 a delicate political conundrum: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, p. 570; Carl Solberg, Hubert Humphrey: A Biography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), p. 454; interview with former senator John Culver, April 15, 2010.

5 no longer responded to him with their customary warmth: Solberg, Hubert Humphrey, pp. 423–424. The biographer notes: “Humphrey found the new Senate less to his liking. The club-like intimacy in which he had basked . . . seemed to have vanished with the passage of men such as Richard Russell.”

5 Byrd took a call from Humphrey: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, pp. 571–572.

6 None of these senators had come further: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, pp. 541–555, and Robert C. Byrd, Child of the Appalachian Coalfields (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2005) are two of the many sources recounting Byrd’s remarkable rise from poverty.

7 channeled money to his impoverished state: In Child of the Appalachian Coalfields, Byrd recounts numerous examples of his legendary ability to bring federal funds to West Virginia. A humorist once remarked that Byrd would have moved the entire federal government to West Virginia if the Washington Monument could have fit under the bridges on the highway. In 1989, after thirty years in the Senate, Byrd further enhanced his influence by stepping down as Senate majority leader to become chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

8 Byrd saw an opening: Byrd noted that “ideology probably played a bigger role in that race than any subsequent race” he was ever in (Byrd, Senate Addresses , vol. 2, p. 563).

8 a swift and stealthy campaign to defeat Kennedy: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, p. 567; Adam Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy: A Biography (New York: William Morrow, 1999), pp. 171–173.

8 Byrd chafed at the widespread idea: Byrd, Child of the Appalachian Coalfields , p. 385.

9 Nixon gave serious thought to nominating Byrd: Dean, Rehnquist Choice, pp. 133–149. Byrd took the possibility seriously as well. Byrd, Senate Addresses , vol. 2, pp. 565–566; Byrd, Child of the Appalachian Coalfields, pp. 306–308.

9 His views on civil rights became muted: Sanford J. Ungar, “The Man Who Runs the Senate: Bobby Byrd: An Upstart Comes to Power,” Atlantic Monthly, September 1975, pp. 29–35; Clayton Fritchey, “Senator Byrd’s Emergence as a Senate Leader,” Washington Post, June 2, 1973; Vera Glazer, “Senator Byrd’s Political Star Rising,” Charleston Daily Mail, January 15, 1974.

9 “the Southerners’ time had passed”: G. Calvin Mackenzie and Robert Weisbrot, The Liberal Hour: Washington and the Politics of Change in the 1960’s (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), p. 165.

9 selfless, unending efforts to make the Senate work: Political reporters have commented frequently on Byrd’s rise in the Senate, his mastery of Senate procedures and rules, and his dedication to the institution. For example, “New Congress—Younger, but Less Brash—Convenes, Pick Leaders, Organizes,” Congressional Quarterly, January 8, 1977, p. 41; “A Bold and Balky Congress,” Time, January 23, 1978. Nothing captures Senator Byrd’s love of the Senate better than his Addresses on the History of the United States Senate , noted above.

9 the idea of Robert Byrd as majority leader: “Profile: Robert C. Byrd,” Congressional Quarterly, January 8, 1977, p. 33; Ungar, “Man Who Runs the Senate.”

9 preferred to be called “Robert”: Interview with Joseph Stewart, June 14, 2010.

9 his hands frequently trembled: Byrd conveyed his embarrassment about his tremor to me when I worked for him in 1979.

9 unexpected discourse on the inevitability of death: In 1985, while serving as chief of staff to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, I attended a meeting where Senator Byrd surprised a visiting West Virginia delegation by veering suddenly into a vivid and gloomy rumination on the inevitability of death.

10 “Turkey in the Straw”: I had the completely unexpected pleasure of hearing Senator Byrd play the fiddle on one of the first Friday afternoons after I joined his leadership staff at the Democratic Policy Committee in February 1979.

10 his presidential bid was not taken seriously: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, p. 569.

10 “the South’s unending revenge upon the North”: William S. White, Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 68.

11 He transformed the role of Senate leader: Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, pp. 562–580; Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, pp. 17–18; Randall B. Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 263–264.

11 Using Hubert Humphrey as his liaison: Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, pp. 452–462; Robert Mann, The Walls of Jericho: Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell and the Struggle for Civil Rights (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1996), pp. 142–148; Woods, LBJ, p. 233.

11 bullied, badgered, and cajoled the Senate: Johnson’s biographers, including Caro, Woods, and Robert Dallek, provide many examples of his abusive treatment of those Democratic senators he disfavored. Paul Douglas was one of his leading targets. Roger Biles, Crusading Liberal: Paul H. Douglas of Illinois (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2002), pp. 130–131, 170. Unsurprisingly, Douglas was sharply critical of Johnson as majority leader. “As a deliberative body, the Senate degenerated under Johnson’s leadership.” Paul H. Douglas, In the Fullness of Time: The Memoirs of Paul H. Douglas (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 234.

12 The 1958 election was a rout: Mann, Walls of Jericho, pp. 236–237, is one of many sources that emphasize the importance of that off-year election as a turning point for the Senate. The 1958 off-year election began the transformation of the Senate into a liberal institution, but during the first two years of John Kennedy’s presidency, Congress was still closely divided between liberal Democrats and progressive Republicans on the one hand, and conservative Republicans and southern Democrats on the other. Consequently, Kennedy’s legislative accomplishments in 1961–1962 were modest. The 1962 off-year election, however, shifted the balance to the liberals, particularly in the Senate.

12 a new challenge from restive liberals: Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, pp. 1015–1017; Woods, LBJ, p. 344; Mann, Walls of Jericho, p. 241.

12 “He told me to go to hell”: Booth Mooney, LBJ: An Irreverent Chronicle (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976), p. 106.

12 “We were Cuber-ized”: John G. Tower, Consequences: A Personal and Political Memoir (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), p. 163.

13 the Senate’s most towering accomplishment: Many historians and observers of American politics believe that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was the greatest legislative accomplishment in the history of the country and the Senate’s greatest moment. These include Mann, Walls of Jericho; Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Woods, LBJ; Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield.

14 polar opposite of his flamboyant predecessor: Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 170–176, 206–207; Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, pp. 19–23.

15 believed in a democratic, small-d, Senate: Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, pp. 37–42; Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 171–173.

15 a virtual rebellion inside the Senate: Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 205–206; Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, 79–82.

16 “have ranged from a benign Mr. Chips”: Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 206–207; Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, pp. 82–85.

17 the “liberal moment” of 1963 through 1966: my description of the very brief period of explosive liberal legislative activity from 1963 through 1966.

17 the “liberal hour” of the 1960’s: Mackenzie and Weisbrot, Liberal Hour, sets forth the argument that liberal progress through the 1960’s was driven from the top down, by the federal government, with the Senate playing a key role.

17 “awesome patience”: Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, p. 36.

17 His numerous memos were heartbreakingly prescient: Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 185–186,192–193, 198–199 (to President Kennedy), 213–214, 218, 237–241, 254–255, 267–269, 282–283, 290–291, 314 (to President Johnson); 373–374 (to President Nixon, with whom Mansfield met privately twenty-seven times during Nixon’s presidency).

17 gave up on Nixon’s commitment to ending the Vietnam War: “Cambodia tore it”: Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 376, 380–383.

17 angered at the evidence of “dirty tricks”: Ibid., pp. 432–433.

17 Only Mansfield could have picked Sam Ervin: Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, pp. 233–234.

17 stronger oversight of the intelligence community: Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), pp. 10–13, 229–230; LeRoy Ashby and Rod Gramer, Fighting the Odds: The Life of Senator Frank Church (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1994), pp. 471–472.

17 “There is a time to stay and a time to go”: Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, p. 453.

17 “a kind of controlled madhouse”: Gould, Most Exclusive Club, p. 293.

18 a new reluctance to support “big government” programs: Michael Pertschuk, Revolt Against Regulation: The Rise and Fall of the Consumer Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 49–60; Report to Leadership Participants on 1980 Findings of Corporate Priorities (New York: Yankelovich, Skelly and White, 1980): p. 13.

18 “not just a bunch of little Hubert Humphreys”: David S. Broder, “Hart’s Theme,” Washington Post, February 29, 1984.

18 genuinely uncertain about what Jimmy Carter cared about: Steven M. Gillon, The Democrats’Dilemma: Walter F. Mondale and the Liberal Legacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 184–185.

19 Byrd was determined to get out ahead of the issue: “Senators Nearer Ethics Code and Pay Raise,” Associated Press, January 19, 1977.

19 The 1974 New Hampshire Senate election: Gould, Most Exclusive Club, p. 265.

20 Allen . . . a new and ingenious version of the filibuster: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, p. 154.

20 the lethal potential of the post-cloture filibuster: Michael O’Brien, Philip Hart: The Conscience of the Senate (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), p. 207. The clear majority of the Senate supported Hart’s antitrust legislation. But “a major force behind the bill’s progress,” reported the Wall Street Journal, “was the desire of many senators to pass it as a farewell monument to Senator Philip Hart.”

20 “The rich and the powerful were there”: O’Brien, Philip Hart, p. 213.

21 “I am going to get up and walk out:” Ibid.

21 far better to have younger members: Ibid. p. 201.

21 agonized about the future of Detroit: Ibid., p. 210.

22 “he wagered that conscience”: Ibid., p. 212, quoting from Coleman McCarthy’s column in the Detroit Free Press, December 28, 1976.

22 “his integrity, diligence and compassionate humanism”: quoting from the Washington Post editorial, December 28, 1976.

22 foremost advocate of American military strength: Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, pp. 179–180.

22 “a discharge of political passion”: Ibid., p. 367, quoting Schlesinger and Rovere.

22 hearings that calmed the nation: Ibid., pp. 374–381.

22 “a man who had been electrocuted and lived”: Byron C. Hulsey, Everett Dirksen and His Presidents: How a Senate Giant Shaped American Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), p. 2.

23 Byrd quickly signaled his priorities and aspirations: Interviews with Hoyt Purvis, March 22, 2010, and January 17, 2011.

CHAPTER 2: THE NATURAL

25 unable to decide whether to run for Senate minority leader: J. Lee Annis, Jr., Howard Baker: Conciliator in an Age of Crisis, 2nd ed. (Knoxville: Howard Baker Center for Public Policy, University of Tennessee, 2007), pp. 102–103.

25 The heir apparent for the job was Robert Griffin: Judith H. Parris, “The Senate Reorganizes Its Committees: 1977,” Political Science Quarterly 94, no. 2 (Summer 1979), p. 325, refers to Griffin as the “prospective leader”; “New Congress—Younger, but Less Brash” describes the selection of Baker as “a surprise,” p. 35.

26 “You just have to go over there”: Annis, Howard Baker, p. 103.

26 Baker still remained undecided: Ibid.

26 large disappointments had taken a toll on his confidence: Ibid., pp. 101–102.

26 if the senators chose the president: Ibid., p. xix. After Newsweek in 1978 asked a sample of Democratic senators off the record who they would like to see elected president in 1980, a reporter told senior Democrat that a plurality of his colleagues privately backed Baker. “You’re wrong,” the member responded. “He’d win a majority.”

26 a “junior grade Everett Dirksen”: Annis, Howard Baker, p. 32.

26 surprised Dirksen with the firmness of his position: Ibid., pp. 33–34.

27 seeking to become Senate leader: Ibid., pp. 43–44.

27 rejected Baker once again: Ibid., pp. 50–51.

27 offered Baker a seat on the Supreme Court: Ibid., p. 52.

27 frustrating Nixon with his indecision: Dean, Rehnquist Choice, pp. 239–240.

27 “Funeral homes are livelier than the Court”: Annis, Howard Baker, p. 52.

27 “the best television personality in the Senate”: Ibid., p. 62.

28 He had harbored high hopes: Ibid., pp. 92–99.

28 gave serious consideration to running for governor: Ibid., p. 102.

28 “I don’t have the votes”: Ibid., p. 103.

29 “an idea whose time had come”: Hulsey, Everett Dirksen and His Presidents, p. 196; Mann, Walls of Jericho, p. 426.

29 Aiken had breakfasted with Mike Mansfield: Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, p. 174.

29 Cooper’s knowledge of the world: Robert Schulman, John Sherman Cooper: The Global Kentuckian (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1976), pp. 26–32, 44–45, 50–53.

30 The intensity of the Republican right: Annis, Howard Baker, p. 97; Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974–2008 (New York: Harper, 2008), pp. 51–68.

30 Helms had followed a unique path to the Senate: William A. Link, Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), pp. 45–128.

31 Helms broadcast 2,732 viewpoints: Ibid., p. 70.

31 vehement opposition to the civil rights movement: Bill Peterson, “Jesse Helms’ Lesson for Washington,” Washington Post, November 18, 1984.

32 “liberalism, subversion and perversion”: Link, Jesse Helms, p. 84.

32 an opportunity to run for the Senate: Ibid., pp. 114–117.

32 “almost as lib’rul as the other side”: Ibid., p. 134.

33 seeking out Allen as a mentor: Ibid., pp. 135–136.

33 within weeks of arriving: Ibid., pp. 136–137.

33 “Defeats don’t discourage me”: Ibid., p. 136.

33 began regularly to resort to the filibuster: Ibid., pp. 138–139.

34 “only way a minority has”: Ibid., p. 139.

34 Helms had already begun to add the “social issues”: Ibid., pp. 89–92.

34 appalled when Gerald Ford picked Nelson Rockefeller: Ibid., pp. 139–140.

34 refused to meet with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Ibid., pp. 141–144.

35 He would work tirelessly: Ibid., pp. 167–168, 210–215.

35 a disarming and conciliatory style of bargaining: Annis, Howard Baker, p. 32.

35 “bring together a boll weevil and a cotton planter”: Quoted in Annis, Howard Baker, p. xxiv.

35 quickly moved to share the leadership responsibilities: Michael Malbin, “The Senate Republican Leaders—Life without a President,” National Journal, May 2, 1977.

35 emerge as a counterforce: Ibid.; Annis, Howard Baker, p. 104.

36 enmity of many liberals: Godfrey Hodgson, The Gentleman from New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), pp. 114–120.

36 assertive stance at the UN: Ibid., pp. 243–250, 261.

36 crafted Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan: Ibid., pp. 160–174.

CHAPTER 3: GREAT EXPECTATIONS, DIFFERENT AGENDAS

39 grasped several fundamental political realities: Betty Glad, Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), pp. 229–241; Robert Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), pp. 319–320.

39 Four senators ran in the primaries: Lloyd Bentsen also sought the nomination, but abandoned the race early, before the crucial Iowa and New Hampshire primaries.

40 “If Scoop Jackson gave a fireside chat”: Michael Kramer, “Visions of Dream Tickets Danced in Their Heads,” New York, August 11, 1980, is one of many reporters to repeat that famous quip.

40 “the little people couldn’t reach the levers”: George Will, “Staying the Coarse,” Washington Post, January 29, 2008, recalled Harris’s comment in discussing the populist turn in the 2008 campaign.

40 a political cartoon in the Washington Post: Herbert Block, Herblock on All Fronts (New York: New American Library, 1980), p. 151, reprinting his cartoon that appeared in the Washington Post on June 10, 1976.

40 the Democrats drew some comfort from Carter’s choice: Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, p. 169, reflects the widely held view that Mondale was a popular choice.

40 Carter appeared certain to be the next president: Wilentz, Age of Reagan, pp. 69–70, is one of many sources describing the conventional political wisdom in the summer of 1976.

41 Americans just felt better: Ibid., pp. 14–15.

41 whom many senators had personally despised: It is not an overstatement to say that many senators “despised” Richard Nixon long before he became president, and understanding the intensity of that sentiment is crucial for understanding the mood and workings of the Senate from the time Nixon took office January 1969 through the time he resigned the presidency in August 1974. For example, Sam Ervin was “appalled by Nixon’s original red-baiting campaign against Jerry Voorhis that brought him to Congress in 1947.” Karl E. Campbell, Senator Sam Ervin, Last of the Founding Fathers, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 210–211. Mike Mansfield remembered Nixon campaigning against him in an ugly 1952 race in Montana. He also recalled Nixon urging Eisenhower to intervene militarily in Indochina at the time of Dienbienphu, “and thank the Lord we didn’t.” Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 349–350. Albert Gore Sr. detested Nixon, whom he regarded as a dangerously partisan and combative political enemy. Kyle Longley, Senator Albert Gore, Sr.: Tennessee Maverick (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), pp. 99–100. Richard Russell once confided to a friend that “Mr. Nixon, if he ever assumes the presidency, would be the worst president imaginable.” Campbell, Senator Sam Ervin, p. 211. Interviews with Birch Bayh, Joseph Tydings, George McGovern, and Walter Mondale indicate that senators who had no history with Nixon before he became president also grew to despise him.

43 the most influential forces in the Democratic Party: Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 188–191; Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 192–195; Wilentz, Age of Reagan, pp. 79–82; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 77–78.

43 rolling back Taft-Hartley Act: Woods, LBJ, pp. 667–678.

43 Political Washington looked carefully for telltale signs: Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 183–184.

43 “I learned three things about Carter today”: Ibid., p. 184.

43 the new president disliked political small talk: Ibid., p. 192; Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 187–188; Charles O. Jones, The Trusteeship Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), pp. 1–9. “He thought politics was sinful,” Mondale reminisced. Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, p. 201.

44 power had tilted dramatically toward the presidency: Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), is the best known work on the shift of power, which has been discussed by many scholars and participants in government.

45 to allow Congress to reclaim its authority: Jones, Trusteeship Presidency, p. 47; Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 59–60; Wilentz, Age of Reagan, p. 83; and “Bold and Balky Congress” are four of many sources about Congress’s new assertiveness.

45 As professor Nelson Polsby memorably observed: Anthony King, ed., The New American Political System (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute, 1990), quoting Polsby.

45 would not hesitate to let the president know: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 71, refers to Congress as having “an insatiable appetite for consultation”; Kaufman, Henry Jackson, p. 342; Martin Tolchin, “Byrd, Hinting Strained Relation, Says Carter Failed to Seek Advice, New York Times, January 27, 1977.

45 the type of preparation Carter liked best: Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 183–184.

45 confronted a complicated economic picture: Bruce J. Schulman, “Slouching Toward the Supply Side: Jimmy Carter and the New American Political Economy,” in Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, eds., The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post–New Deal Era (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 51–61, Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 191–192.

46 listed job creation as its number-one priority: Schulman, “Slouching Toward the Supply Side,” p. 54.

46 Carter and the congressional leaders came together: “The Economy: Something for (Almost) Everybody,” Time, January 17, 1977.

46 Michael Blumenthal, the new secretary of treasury: Clyde H. Farnsworth, “Carter Aides Describe $31 Million Package,” New York Times, January 28, 1977.

46 the thirty-eight member Republican Conference: Peter Milius, “President’s $50-per-Person Rebate Meets Stiff Opposition in Congress,” Washington Post, February 3, 1977.

47 Jimmy Carter delivered his first televised “fireside chat”: Peter Milius, “Carter Tax Cut Again Assailed at Hill Hearing,” Washington Post, February 5, 1977.

47 Carter and his White House team: “Policy: When More Is Not Enough,” Time, February 7, 1977.

48 Carter’s call for Americans to make sacrifices: Milius, “Carter Tax Cut Again Assailed.”

48 On February 19, without previous consultation: Peter Milius, “Reluctant Hill Panel Passes $50 Rebate,” Washington Post, March 18, 1977.

48 the radical ideas of “share-our-wealth”: Robert Mann, Legacy to Power: Senator Russell Long of Louisiana (Lincoln, NE: Authors Guild Backinprint.com Edition, 1992), pp. 22–29.

49 Long could easily be underestimated: Ibid., p. 331.

49 as Bill Proxmire once said admiringly: William Proxmire quotes collected on Thinkexist.com.

49 Utterly straight with his colleagues: Mann, Legacy to Power, p. 329.

49 “No question about it”: Ibid., p. 331.

49 stopped drinking long ago: Ibid., pp. 286–291.

49 not understanding Russell Long: Ibid., pp. 340–343, 346–347; Carter, White House Diary, pp. 43, 97–98, 102, 110, 141–142, 164–165.

49 By March, emotions were running high in the Senate: Milius, “Reluctant Hill Panel Passes $50 Rebate.”

50 after meeting with the president and congressional leaders: Edward Walsh, “Tax Rebate Seen Linked to Dam Projects,” Washington Post, April 6, 1977.

50 columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak: Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “A Self-Constructed Rebate Trap,” Washington Post, April 11, 1977.

50 On April 12, Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall: “Marshall Sees Rebate Aiding Middle Class,” Associated Press, April 13, 1977.

50 on April 14, in a stunning reversal: Edward Walsh, “He Warns Against New Spending,” Washington Post, April 15, 1977.

51 Muskie raged to Charles Schultze: Interview with Madeleine Albright, August 25, 2010.

51 Calling Carter’s decision “a disappointment”: Editorial, Washington Post, April 15, 1977.

51 “wait until the M’s are called”: Bernard Asbell, The Senate Nobody Knows (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 120–121.

51 “chicken shit”: Theo Lippman Jr. and Donald C. Hansen, Muskie (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), p. 100.

51 the least attractive set of committee assignments: Asbell, Senate Nobody Knows, p. 121; Lippman and Hansen, Muskie, p. 101.

52 Muskie became the principal author and architect: MacKenzie and Weisbrot, Liberal Hour, pp. 211–213; Asbell, Senate Nobody Knows, p. 5; Annis, Howard Baker, pp. 46–48.

52 acquitted himself extremely well: Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1972 (New York: Atheneum, 1973), pp. 75–76; Lippman and Hansen, Muskie, pp. 16–19.

52 campaign proved to be top-heavy and slow moving: White, Making of the President 1972, pp. 77–78.

52 dissolved in the snows of New Hampshire: White, Making of the President 1972, pp. 8 1–83.

53 the importance for Democrats to discover fiscal responsibility: Interview with Al From, January 19, 2011.

53 in a scathing editorial: Editorial, Washington Post, April 15, 1977.

54 On April 18, in a twenty-minute televised talk: Text of Carter’s address, “Carter: Oil and Natural Gas . . . Are Running Out,” Washington Post, April 19, 1977.

54 On April 20, Carter sought the largest audience possible: Edward Walsh and J. P. Smith, “Back Energy Plan, Carter Urges Hill,” Washington Post, April 21, 1977.

55 Humorist Russell Baker noted: “The Nation: The Energy War,” Time, May 2, 1977.

55 Americans were responding positively: Ibid.

55 Congressional leaders recognized the difficulties ahead: Ibid.

55 O’Neill quickly announced the formation: Richard L. Lyons, “House Sets Up a Special Energy Panel,” Washington Post, April 22, 1977.

55 moved quickly to address a festering problem: Parris, “Senate Reorganizes Its Committees,” pp. 319–337. Parris was on the staff of the Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System, and the discussion of the reorganization draws heavily on her paper.

56 Mansfield’s Senate also saw a rapid expansion of staff: Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 10–16; Parris, “Senate Reorganizes Its Committees.”

56 “a male preserve”: Quoted in Harry McPherson, A Political Education: A Washington Memoir (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), p. xxiii. The ranks of women Senate staffers in professional positions greatly increased in the 1970’s, although off an extraordinarily small base.

56 impressed by Stern’s academic and journalistic credentials: Interview with Paula Stern, July 13, 2010.

57 “women aren’t allowed in the cloakroom”: Interview with Mary Jane Checchi, May 13, 2010.

57 “I think you mean ‘gender,’ Senator”: Interview with Madeleine Albright, August 25, 2010.

57 entrusting Dorothy Fosdick with great authority: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, pp. 83–85.

57 if women were not allowed in the meetings: Interview with Susan Alvarado, October 11, 2010.

57 the proliferation of committee and subcommittee assignments: Parris, “Senate Reorganizes Its Committees,” pp. 320–321.

58 who would have jurisdiction over the oceans: Ibid., pp. 326–327.

58 Hollings had spent the summers of 1939 and 1940: Ernest F. “Fritz” Hollings with Kirk Victor, Making Government Work (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), p. 153.

59 reversed Stevenson’s recommendation: Parris, “Senate Reorganizes Its Committees,” pp. 326–328.

59 indicated a willingness to support: Ibid., p. 324. In fact, Nelson, the chairman of the small business committee, only seemed to acquiesce. He encouraged his staff director to keep the small business community apprised of the plan to abolish the committee, which resulted in a predictable flood of political pressure and the committee staying in operation. Interview with Bill Cherkasky, December 3, 2010.

59 “incremental idealism”: Roger H. Davidson, David, M. Kovenock, and Michael K. O’Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1966), pp. 5–6, used the term, which began as a guidepost for the temporary committee’s efforts.

59 Byrd and Baker could take satisfaction: Richard E. Cohen, “Byrd of West Virginia,” National Journal, August 20, 1977, in which Byrd repeated his support and added: “I’d like to see the number of committees and subcommittees further reduced.”

59 chemistry between Carter and Jackson was terrible: Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 100, 225; Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, pp. 239, 3 39–344, 366–367.

59 “We whipped his ass in the Pennsylvania primary”: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson , p. 341, quoting Thomas Foley’s recollection of Jordan’s statement to him.

CHAPTER 4: HAWK AND DOVE

62 convince Johnson that he was pursuing a disastrous course: Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, pp. 211–347, and Woods, Fulbright, pp. 360–452, present the most comprehensive discussions of the dissents of key senators, but the biographies of Frank Church, George McGovern, Albert Gore Sr., Wayne Morse, and others hammer home the same point.

62 haunted by doubts about the course he had chosen: Woods, LBJ, pp. 677–678, 731; Dallek, Flawed Giant, pp. 277–278, 283.

62 He mocked Mansfield as a weak-kneed professor: Oberdorfer, Senator Mansfield, p. 239.

62 and Fulbright as a racist: Woods, Fulbright, p. 427.

62 Johnson coldly told the senators: Ibid., pp. 374–375.

63 Kerry brought the human costs of the war home: Douglas Brinkley, Tour of Duty: John Kerry and the Vietnam War (New York: William Morrow, 2004), pp. 370–373.

63 “You don’t see any hawks around here”: Ibid., p. 361.

64 “[Scoop] had a fixidity of purpose”: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 17.

64 twenty-six-year-old Jackson sought the office: Ibid., pp. 25–30.

64 The threat posed by the Soviet Union: Ibid., pp. 53–70, 95–105, 200–223, 242–260, 341–391.

65 a network of defense experts and scientists: Ibid., p. 213–214, 259.

65 Bob Packwood still spoke in awe: Interview with Senator Bob Packwood, July 19, 2010. The debate between Jackson and Symington took place in an unusual closed session of the Senate on July 17, 1969. Jackson took on Senators Fulbright and Cooper as well, but he directed most of his fire at Symington, the former secretary of the Air Force, whom he disliked intensely. “He upstaged Symington by producing bigger charts than the Missouri senator illustrating the precipitous expansion of the Soviet nuclear buildup.” A Washington Post editorial called Jackson “far and away the most effective advocate of the Safeguard system as a defense of the U.S. land based missile deterrent.” Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 211.

66 Jackson virtually stymied the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, pp. 242–243.

66 Kissinger ruefully recognized: Ibid., pp. 299–300, quoting Kissinger’s memoirs, Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 984–985, 991. Commenting on the fierce fight with Jackson over détente and the emigration of Soviet Jews, Kissinger stated that “Jackson was not a man to welcome debate over firmly-held convictions; he proceeded to implement his by erecting a series of legislative hurdles that gradually paralyzed East-West policy. He was aided by one of the ablest—and most ruthless—staffs that I encountered in Washington.” Kissinger’s battles with Jackson made him “long for the relative tranquility of the Middle East.

66 the moment was at last right: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, pp. 301–322.

66 “not going to elect an anti-Soviet hardliner”: Ibid., p. 316, quoting Senator Moynihan.

67 Jackson’s hopes were dashed: Ibid., pp. 352–353.

67 Jackson had known Sorensen since the mid-1950’s: Ted Sorensen, Counselor: Life at the Edge of History (New York: Harper, 2008), pp. 95, 97–100, 490.

67 the most wrong-headed person imaginable: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, pp. 358–361. Alan Weisman, Prince of Darkness: Richard Perle: The Kingdom, the Power and the End of Empire in America (New York: Union Square Press, 2007), p. 52: “Warnke was the personification of everything Jackson and Perle loathed about the liberal approach to arms control, which was, to their minds, appeasement and accommodation.”

67 “We can be the first off the treadmill”: Paul Warnke, “Apes on a Treadmill,” Foreign Policy, Spring 1975.

68 Jackson imagined the Soviet Union as a burglar: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 249.

68 A central aspect of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of détente: Ibid., pp. 245–253.

69 Kissinger described the summit: Ibid., p. 254.

69 had not been caught up in the general euphoria: Ibid., pp. 254–258.

69 Jackson condemned the results of Vladivostok: Ibid., pp. 288–289.

70 intensely committed to seeking a new approach: Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 43–48.

70 startled the wily and experienced Russian: Ibid., pp. 43–48.

70 “McGovernism without McGovern”: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 365, quoting Eugene Rostow, after a meeting between Carter and the Committee on the Present Danger.

70 testified strongly against Warnke: Pat Towell, “Foreign Relations Approval of Warnke Expected Despite Concerted Opposition Effort,” Congressional Quarterly, February 12, 1977.

71 Byrd’s comments were much more negative: “Both Sides Step up Warnke Word War,” Washington Post, February 12, 1977.

71 predicting that Warnke would be confirmed by a wide margin: Norman Kempster, “Overwhelming Confirmation of Warnke Is Seen by Byrd,” Los Angeles Times, February 18, 1977.

71 no Republican made the case as powerfully as Jackson: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, pp. 360–361.

72 senators had come to doubt his intellectual honesty: Pat Towell, “Carter Assurances Secure Victory on Warnke,” Congressional Quarterly, March 12, 1977.

72 Warnke had been put on notice: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 361.

72 an opportunity to gain Jackson’s support: Ibid., pp. 361–364; Glad, Outsider in the White House, pp. 108–109.

73 “taken a giant step in cutting back on arms levels”: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson , pp. 365–367.

73 “everything is in the sunshine”: Murrey Marder and George C. Wilson, “Jackson Lauds U.S. Arms Proposal as ‘Sensible,’” Washington Post, April 6, 1977.

73 breakthrough on information sharing: Murrey Marder, “President Discloses Key SALT Elements,” Washington Post, May 27, 1977.

73 “And both are tenuous”: Murrey Marder, “SALT Diplomacy Shifts to Capitol Hill,” Washington Post, May 30, 1977.

73 pursuing Jackson was futile: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, pp. 364–370; Glad, Outsider in the White House, pp. 108–109, make it clear that Carter went to great lengths to try to gain Jackson’s support, but the effort was “counterproductive. He would never win Jackson over to a SALT agreement that the Soviets would sign.” Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 108.

74 Jackson’s brilliant and hyperactive staff members: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson , pp. 360, 364, 366; Weisman, Prince of Darkness, pp. 51–56. Leaks of confidential briefings by Jackson’s staff were an intense concern of Senate SALT II advocates. Interview with Senator John Culver, April 15, 2010.

74 issued its report on the prospects: “Senate Delegation Report on American Foreign Policy and Non-Proliferation Interests in the Middle East.” The delegation issued its report on the prospects for peace in the Middle East and U.S. policy toward Iran on February 10, 1977. The complete trip report was printed on May 10, 1977, pursuant to S. Res. 167.

74 The five days spent in Iran: “Senate Delegation Report,” pp. 17–22.

75 Iran . . . “an essential ally”: Ibid., pp. 17–19.

75 “the positive goals of the human rights movement”: Ibid., pp. 20–21.

75 was much too optimistic: Ibid., additional views of Senators Culver and Eagleton, pp. 23–28.

76 “a highly personalized relationship”: Culver-Eagleton views, ibid., p. 23.

76 “emerging from extreme underdevelopment”: Ibid., p. 25.

76 “Iran is an authoritarian nation”: Ibid., p. 28.

76 “as other presidents had before me”: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 435.

76 a serious threat from the liberal wing: Wilentz, Age of Reagan, pp. 78–81; Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 192–195.

77 He did not hold back very long. George McGovern, “Memo to the White House,” Harper’s, October 1977, pp. 33–35, refers to an earlier speech in April.

78 McGovern began driving across South Dakota: George McGovern, Grassroots: The Autobiography of George McGovern (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 53–67. The summary of McGovern’s career draws heavily on his autobiography.

78 “refined in the fires of opposition”: Ibid., p. 54.

78 “we just cost that nice guy a Senate seat”: Ibid., p. 83.

78 McGovern won the South Dakota Senate seat by 200 votes: Ibid., p. 91.

78 focused a spotlight on hunger in America: Ibid., pp. 84–87, 270–271; Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 34, 50, 91, 95; Marjorie Hunter, “Senators on Hunger Tour See Squalor in Florida,” New York Times, March 11, 1969.

78 Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs: Robert Sam Anson, McGovern: A Biography (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 218–242.

79 not immediately drawn to him: Interview with Marshall Matz, May 10, 2010.

79 expressed his opposition to war in September 1963: McGovern, Grassroots, p. 97.

79 “This chamber reeks with blood”: Ibid., p.167, from his Senate speech given on September 1, 1970 (“Nearly the entire Senate was there to hear it”).

79 chaired the Democratic Party’s commission: Ibid., pp. 128–154.

81 suffered the worst loss in the history of presidential elections: Ibid., pp. 188–249, is his detailed recounting of the 1972 general election campaign. McGovern’s campaign, and the choice of Senator Thomas Eagleton to be his running mate, have, of course, been written about widely: for example, White, Making of the President 1972.

81 “letting everyone kick me in the ass”: Ibid., pp. 253–256; interview with John Holum, March 31, 2010.

81 rousing reception at the Democratic mid-term convention: McGovern, Grassroots , pp. 258–259. Spirits buoyed, McGovern gave thought to seeking the presidency again, but was dissuaded by his advisors. However, several of them came up with a novel plan that he should approach Hubert Humphrey about them running together, with Humphrey as the presidential nominee. McGovern did so, but ultimately, Humphrey, surprised and flattered, but torn about seeking the presidency for the fourth time, decided against it. Ibid., pp. 260–261.

81 recognized the brilliance of Jimmy Carter’s campaign: Ibid., pp. 262–263.

81 blistering assault on Carter’s first eight months: McGovern, “Memo to the White House.”

CHAPTER 5: THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY

84 a widespread feeling that corruption was rampant in America: Dominic Sandbrook, Mad as Hell: The Crisis of the 1970’s and the Rise of the Populist Right (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), pp. 10–11.

84 just two out of ten Americans trusted the government: Ibid., p. 11.

84 the two leading environmentalists of their era: Bill Christofferson, The Man from Clear Lake: Earth Day Founder Senator Gaylord Nelson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. 173; interview with Leon Billings, February 19, 2010.

84 Nelson was known for his wry wit: Ibid., pp. 187–196.

85 he forged his identity as the “conservation governor”: Ibid., pp. 138–147.

85 He urged Kennedy to make conservation a priority: Ibid., pp. 176–178.

85 “rather bored with the whole subject”: Ibid., pp. 183–184.

86 Nelson was bitterly disappointed: Ibid., p. 186.

86 He made friends in the Senate almost immediately: Ibid., p. 187, 190, 192.

86 one of Washington’s most popular dinner places: Ibid., pp. 193–195.

86 he saw the peril the planet was in: Ibid., pp. 265–281.

86 “unprecedented environmental disaster”: Ibid., p. 308.

86 grapple with the pollution: Asbell, Senate Nobody Knows, pp. 76–77.

86 radical proposals created space: Interview with Leon Billings February 19, 2010.

87 Nelson’s effort culminated in the first Earth Day: Christofferson, Man from Clear Lake, pp. 301–312.

87 “the day environmentalism began to emerge”: Ibid., p. 7, quoting Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), p. 113.

87 veto power over foreign arms sales: Don Oberdorfer, “Senator Seeks to Slow Arms Sales,” Washington Post, September 8, 1976.

87 battled the pharmaceutical companies: Christofferson, Man from Clear Lake, pp. 251–264.

87 “Byrd has asked me to write the god-damn ethics code”; “Obey’s smart as hell”: Nelson made these statements to me when he first explained the assignment on January 18, 1977.

88 “If restored public confidence demands a strong code”: Statement of Senator Gaylord Nelson, Congressional Record, March 17, 1977, pp. 8034–8062.

88 the task quickly proved even more difficult: Walter Pincus, “Income Curb Splits Senators as Vote Nears on Ethics Code,” Washington Post, March 14, 1977.

89 the anger was bipartisan: Walter Pincus, “Senators Weighing Restriction on Outside Income,” Washington Post, March 17, 1977; Spencer Rich, “Muskie Hits Honorarium Limitation,” Washington Post, March 19, 1977.

89 had even gone to the Common Cause office: Interview with David Cohen, former president of Common Cause, December 1, 2010.

89 he had a fierce temper: Lippman and Hansen, Muskie, pp. 202–203 (“No one doubts that Muskie’s temper tantrums were genuine. . . . He was raging with true anger. Reporters who have covered Muskie are accustomed to his testy nature.”); White, Making of the President 1972, p. 76 (“he had a tendency to emotional outburst”).

89 “throwing us to the wolves”: Spencer Rich, “Challenge to Ethics Code Killed by Senate, 62–35,” Washington Post, March 23, 1977.

90 “Jeez, Gaylord, he’s killing you”: I heard Eagleton’s comment to Nelson on the Senate floor.

90 “an aide to Senator Nelson”: Pincus, “Senators Weighing Restriction.” Muskie’s anger at this point particularly resonated with me since I was the aide who had been quoted.

90 Muskie stalked off the floor: This scene is, obviously, my personal recollection.

91 “the Senate is panicking”: Rich, “Challenge to Ethics Code.”

91 “I hate this code”: I heard Ribicoff’s statement at a meeting of the special committee in March 1977.

92 passed his entire program virtually intact: “Policy: Clean Sweep for Jimmy,” Time, August 15, 1977.

92 a major decision on whether to fund the B-1: “Defense: Carter’s Big Decision: Down Goes the B-1; Here Comes the Cruise,” Time, July 11, 1977.

92 His ultimate decision to kill the B-1: Interview with Senator John Culver, April 15, 2010.

92 effort to create a consumer protection agency: John B. Judis, The Paradox of American Democracy: Elites, Special Interests, and the Betrayal of the Public Trust (New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 139–140.

92 successfully filibustered Carter’s legislation: Spencer Rich, “Filibuster Kills Public Financing of Senate Races,” Washington Post, August 3, 1977.

92 “he will have a stable government”: “The Administration: Working to Reform Welfare,” Time, August 15, 1977.

93 asked Ribicoff to be his attorney general: Arthur Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Crest, 1965), p. 137.

94 When Howard Baker made his first foreign trip: Interview with Senator Howard Baker, October 22, 2008.

94 Ribicoff’s greatest moment of fame: Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson, and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968 (New York: Viking Press, 1969), pp. 584–585; Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968 (New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 302.

94 “Ribicoff and his people exuded class”: Interview with Tom Daffron, April 6, 2009.

94 Younger senators, such as Gary Hart and John Danforth: Interview with Senator Gary Hart February 1, 2010; interview with Senator John Danforth, March 30, 2010.

94 he had written a small book: Abraham Ribicoff, America Can Make It! (New York: Atheneum, 1972).

95 lashed out at Javits: Jacob K. Javits with Rafael Steinberg, Javits: The Autobiography of a Public Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), pp. 268–269.

95 expanded authority to reorganize executive agencies: Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 70–71; Burton I. Kaufman and Scott Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr., 2nd ed., rev. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), p. 37.

96 one cloud in the committee’s otherwise blue skies: Interview with Richard Wegman, June 3, 2010.

96 praise from Republicans and some conservative Democrats: Kaufman and Kaufman, James Earl Carter, p. 73; Helen Dewar, “Ga. Banker to Get Cabinet-Level Post,” Washington Post, November 25, 1976.

96 quickly discovered some disquieting facts: Kaufman and Kaufman, James Earl Carter, pp. 73–77; Michael Putzel, “U.S. Probed Lance Campaign, Found No Grounds to Prosecute,” Washington Post, January 8, 1977; interview with Richard Wegman, June 3, 2010.

96 Ribicoff and Percy raised their concerns: “Senate Panel Approves 8 Top Carter Officials,” Associated Press, January 19, 1977; Wegman interview.

96 Lance faced the possibility of an enormous loss: “Lance Asks Carter for Time to Unload Falling Bank Stock,” Los Angeles Times, July 9, 1977.

96 Carter asked the committee to release Lance: George Lardner Jr., “Carter Backs Lance Delay in Stock Sale,” Washington Post, July 13, 1977.

96 committee agreed to do so: Helen Dewar, “Senate Unit to Give Lance More Time to Sell Bank Stock,” Washington Post, July 16, 1977.

97 opened Pandora’s box: Jack Egan, “This Isn’t a Good Year for Lance or His Bank,” Washington Post, July 17, 1977; Kaufman and Kaufman, James Earl Carter, pp.73–75.

97 holding the new administration to high standards: William Safire, “Carter’s Broken Lance,” New York Times, July 21, 1977.

97 the first post-Watergate scandal: “The Administration: The Sharpening Battle over Bert Lance,” Time, August 1, 1977, summarized the revelations.

97 “neither a witch hunt nor a whitewash”: “The Big Showdown over Banker Bert,” Time, August 22, 1977.

97 “You have been smeared”: Wendell Rawls Jr., “Senators Back Lance and Abandon Inquiry,” New York Times, July 26, 1977.

97 Ribicoff regretted his earlier rush to judgment: Martin Tolchin, “Ribicoff Regrets his ‘Mistake’ in Backing Lance,” New York Times, September 7, 1977; Clayton Fritchey, “The Senators, the Media, and the Lance ‘Smears,’” Washington Post, September 10, 1977; Wegman interview.

97 Carter’s response stunned the senators: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 132; Wegman interview.

98 “it would be wise for Bert Lance to resign”: David Broder and Edward Walsh, “Senators Tell Carter That Lance Should Resign,” Washington Post, September 6, 1977.

98 “This guy is going to go, no question”: Martin Tolchin, “ Ribicoff Regrets His ‘Mistake’ in Backing Lance,” New York Times, September 7, 1977.

98 Lance offered a full-throated defense: Robert G. Kaiser, “Lance Denies Banking Practices Were Unethical or Illegal,” Washington Post, September 16, 1977.

98 Officials from the U.S. Attorney’s office: Robert G. Kaiser, “Lance Probe Figure Allegedly Didn’t Want to Make Waves,” Washington Post, September 15, 1977; Washington Post, September 6, 1977.

99 “like the committee eating its young”: Interview with Richard Wegman, June 3, 2010.

99 Jody Powell leaked a false story: Robert G. Kaiser, “New Hill Testimony Contradicts Lance,” Washington Post, September 14, 1977.

99 He sought Byrd’s advice: James T. Wooten, “Carter Aides Say Lance’s Future Is Still Uncertain After Hearings,” New York Times, September 21, 1977.

99 “no one could replace Bert Lance”: William Claiborne, “Lance Resigns; Carter Accepts Decision with ‘Regret and Sadness,’” Washington Post, September 22, 1977.

99 the presumption of innocence had been eroded: Adam Clymer, “Reaction on Capitol Hill Ranges from ‘Lynching’ Charge to Relief,” New York Times, September 22, 1977.

100 “It is impossible to overestimate the damage”: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 127.

CHAPTER 6: THE LIBERAL FILIBUSTER

104 artificial price ceilings had created a distorted “dual market”: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Leaders Move to Break Impasse on Natural Gas Pricing,” Washington Post, September 24, 1977.

104 Byrd called up the energy legislation: Ibid.

105 liberals did not filibuster: Sarah A. Treul, “Walter F. Mondale and the Filibuster: The Evolution of Agenda Control in the U.S. Senate,” delivered at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute, May 2, 2007.

105 Byrd, Baker, and Jackson responded: George Larder Jr. and J. P. Smith, “Of Cots and Roll Calls,” Washington Post, September 29, 1977.

106 Speaking at a rally in Virginia: Bill McAllister, “President Says He Would Veto a Bill to Deregulate Natural Gas,” Washington Post, September 25, 1977.

106 after the Senate voted to invoke cloture: Richard L. Lyons, “The Case of the Senate’s Backward Filibuster,” Washington Post, September 28, 1977.

107 humorous, painfully exhausting, and borderline surreal: Larder and Smith, “Of Cots and Roll Calls.”

107 Dale Bumpers sharply criticized Byrd’s failure: Ibid.

107 September 28 saw that type of movement: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Sleeps on It,” Washington Post, September 29, 1977.

108 That position enraged Long: George Lardner Jr. and Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Leaders Fail to Unblock Gas Bill Tieup,” Washington Post, September 30, 1977.

108 Jimmy Carter noted in his diary: Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), p. 110.

108 On September 30, in a critical test vote: Richard L. Lyons, “Senators Refuse to Set Aside Gas Deregulation Plan,” Washington Post, October 1, 1977.

109 Byrd decided that the filibuster had to end: Richard L. Lyons, “Mondale Helps Break Gas Pricing Filibuster,” Washington Post, October 4, 1977.

109 an avowed enemy of the filibuster: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 114–134.

109 Mondale had been chosen by Carter: Ibid., pp. 161–164; Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 36–37.

109 Carter accepted Mondale’s vision: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 171–172; Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 39–40.

110 “living in Holiday Inns”: Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, p. 152; Mondale, Good Fight, p. 157.

110 grave and growing doubts about the Vietnam War: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 77–82; Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 122–125.

110 spearheaded the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1968: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 55–68; Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 107–111.

110 worked with Robert Kennedy and Cesar Chavez: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 52, 93.

110 powerful role on the Church Committee: Johnson, Season of Inquiry, pp. 105, 124, 153, 156, 229–230; Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 160–162; Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 135–153.

111 natural liaison with the Senate: Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 190–192; Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 185–189.

111 frequently raised concerns with Carter: Mondale, Good Fight, pp. 178–188, 234–237.

111 “Nah, he wouldn’t do that”: “The Nation: Night of the Long Winds,” Time, October 10, 1977.

111 Byrd moved in for the kill: Lyons, “Mondale Helps Break Gas Pricing Filibuster.”

111 the Senate turned to bedlam: George Lardner Jr., “Bitterness and Resentment,” Washington Post, October 5, 1977.

112 flushed with anger at the criticism: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Votes to Decontrol Natural Gas Prices,” Washington Post, October 5, 1977.

112 They lost heart and ended their effort: “The Nation: Night of the Long Winds,” Time, October 10, 1977.

112 “The Senate is very much like a violin”: “Night of the Long Winds.”

112 Byrd and Mondale “had used the wrong tactics”: Carter, White House Diary, p. 116.

113 Carter put his prestige on the line: Time, October 31, 1977.

114 New Year’s Eve found him in Tehran: Carter, White House Diary, p. 156.

114 offered a withering indictment: David Broder, “The Senate Has No Excuse,” Washington Post, December 18, 1977.

CHAPTER 7: A YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY

117 While battling the disease: Solberg, Hubert Humphrey, pp. 447–456.

117 spoke memorable words: Ibid., p. 456.

118 The Washington Post had asked a thousand people: Ibid. p. 456.

118 As political scientist Nelson Polsby observed: Ibid., p. 458, quoting Polsby.

118 Humphrey might advise new senators: Ibid., p. 461.

118 “Can you believe that Minnesota would send such a fool?”: Ibid., p. 136; Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, p. 448.

118 served as Lyndon Johnson’s bridge to the liberals: Solberg, Hubert Humphrey, pp. 161–164, 176–180; Mann, Walls of Jericho, pp. 117–120, 141–148; Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, pp. 454–462.

118 one of the most attractive personalities: Gilbert C. Fite, Richard Russell, Jr., Senator from Georgia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 420; Mann, Walls of Jericho, pp. 144–145; Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, pp. 460–461.

118 “I knew every senator”: Solberg, Hubert Humphrey, p. 461.

118 a movie star—for Nineteenth Century Fox: Tower, Consequences, p. 128.

119 he would have to be a loyal soldier: Solberg, Hubert Humphrey, pp. 255–256.

119 Johnson promptly froze Humphrey out: Ibid., pp. 272–278.

120 McClellan would meet Joe Biden: Joe Biden, Promises to Keep: On Life and Politics (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 87.

120 a prodigious worker in what he called the “legislative kitchen”: Shelby Scates, Warren G. Magnuson and the Shaping of Twentieth Century America (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 203, 227–238; Eric Redman, The Dance of Legislation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 189–197.

120 the nation’s growing commitment to protect consumers: Scates, Warren G. Magnuson, pp. 212–216.

120 had become a legendary combination: Ibid., pp. 217–218; Michael Pertschuk, Revolt Against Regulation, pp. 24–28.

121 asked Church to take the lead on the treaties: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 541.

121 His staff implored him to let this dubious honor pass: Ibid.

121 Church had spoken for twenty years: Ibid., pp. 536–539.

121 helped smooth passage of the 1957 Voting Rights Act: Ibid., pp. 82–95.

122 Johnson gave Church a coveted seat: Ibid., p. 96.

122 Church made the keynote: Ibid., pp. 129–132.

122 came away deeply opposed to the imperialism: Ibid., pp. 19–26.

122 in a December 1964 magazine interview: Ibid., pp. 190–191.

122 Church’s article: Frank Church, “We Are in Too Deep in Africa and Asia,” New York Times Magazine, February 14, 1965, quoted in Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 192.

122 “plunged into these former colonial regions”: Ibid., p. 193.

122 traveling with Johnson on Air Force One: Ibid., p. 207.

122 deepened his critique of the war: Ibid., pp. 216–217.

122 “the most un-revolutionary nation on earth”: Ibid., p. 216.

122 Church went to the Senate floor: Ibid., pp. 254–256.

123 with Republican John Sherman Cooper: Ibid., pp. 293, 299–305.

123 The investigation was spurred by accusations: Ibid., pp. 416–433.

123 had always distrusted big corporations: Ibid., pp. 422–423.

123 ridiculed the argument that Allende’s election: Ibid., p. 430.

123 tackled an even more explosive issue: Ibid., pp. 436–443.

124 made public thousands of previously classified documents: Ibid., pp. 435–436, 441.

124 plunged into an investigation of bribes: Ibid., pp. 455–462.

124 “Lockheedo,” as the Japanese press referred to the scandal: Ibid., p. 464.

124 articles by New York Times reporter Seymour M. Hersh: Ibid., pp. 470–471.

124 The Senate created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities: Ibid., p. 471.

125 Mansfield had long been concerned: Johnson, Season of Inquiry, p. 10; Valeo, Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, pp. 267–268.

125 When Phil Hart turned down: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 472; Loch Johnson, Season of Inquiry, pp. 13–15.

125 a fundamental divide on the committee: Loch Johnson, Season of Inquiry, pp. 57, 70, 96, 132, 145, 174, 236, 248, 271; Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, pp. 473–474.

125 the committee held 21 public hearings: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 478.

125 The committee issued an extensive report: Ibid., pp. 474, 478.

125 The committee also revealed: Ibid., p. 478.

125 a springboard to a presidential run: Ibid., pp. 485–487.

125 vowed to Mansfield that he would finish: Ibid., p. 486.

126 He compared himself to an evangelist: Ibid., p. 477.

126 told Carter that Ted Kennedy was going to run for president: Carter, White House Diary, p. 167.

127 armed with a self-deprecating sense of humor: Edward M. Kennedy, True Compass (New York: Twelve, 2009), p. 186; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 38–40. Of the several biographies written about Senator Kennedy, I rely principally on Clymer’s, as well as Kennedy’s memoir.

127 he gravitated to experienced senators: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 43–47.

127 the “lion cub of the Senate”: Adam Clymer, “The Lion Cub of the Senate,” New York Times, August 26, 2009.

128 Long was a wily and gifted legislator: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 131.

128 see him as the Democratic frontrunner: Ibid., pp. 135–136, is one of many sources on this point.

128 declined to take the leadership role: Ibid., pp. 161–163; Kennedy, True Compass , pp. 316–320.

128 connecting the strands of fund-raising abuses: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 192–194.

129 Richardson agreed to Kennedy’s insistence: Kennedy, True Compass, pp. 334–335; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 200–201.

129 Kennedy running ahead of the new president: Kennedy, True Compass, pp. 343–344; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 209–210.

129 an excellent and aggressive staff: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 154–166, 192–194, 240–241; Kennedy, True Compass, pp. 318–327.

129 Breyer cited the Civil Aeronautics Board: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 227–228.

129 shocking his faculty colleagues: Interview with Justice Stephen Breyer, January 13, 2009.

130 endlessly fascinating opportunity to shape public policy: Justice Breyer interview.

130 in “the dance of legislation”: Redman, Dance of Legislation.

130 Like many committee staffers before him: This discussion of the power of committee staff reflects my personal experience and observations, but also several principal books including; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy; Redman, Dance of Legislation; Pertschuk, Revolt Against Regulation; Asbell, Senate Nobody Knows; Malbin, Unelected Representatives.

131 Senate consideration of a federal criminal code: Interview with Ken Feinberg, July 11, 2011.

131 “I’m not sure what my views are on criminal justice”: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 240–241; Malbin, Unelected Representatives, p. 39.

131 Kennedy plainly sought to bridge the chasm: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 241.

131 Feinberg went to work on the herculean task: Ibid., p. 241.

131 The American Civil Liberties Union wrote to Kennedy: Ibid., pp. 241, 257.

132 Kennedy had sharply criticized him: Ibid., p. 256.

132 Carter’s determination to proceed piece by piece: Ibid., p. 256; Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 85–87.

CHAPTER 8: THE PANAMA CANAL FIGHT

135 the ten-mile wide, American-controlled Canal Zone: William J. Jorden, Panama Odyssey (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), pp. 21–65; Clymer, Drawing the Line, pp. 1–9.

135 sympathized with the Panamanian position: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 30–31.

136 Mansfield spoke for many: Ibid., pp. 74–75.

136 Johnson committed to negotiating a new treaty: Ibid., pp. 82–87, 110–118.

136 Nixon largely ignored Panama: Ibid., p. 147.

137 Senate conservatives soon shot back: Ibid., pp. 241, 244, 283.

137 reassured the country’s leader: Ibid., pp. 293–294.

137 trailing badly until he began attacking: Clymer, Drawing the Line, pp. 27–32.

137 “Sally Jones sitting at home”: Ibid., p. 30.

137 his foremost Latin American expert: Clymer, Drawing the Line, pp. 43–44.

138 Kissinger briefed Carter: Ibid., p. 43.

138 the cornerstone of a new relationship with Latin America: Ibid., p. 44; Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 341–342; Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 152–155, 184; Glad, Outsider in the White House, pp. 88–89.

138 constitutional responsibility is to advise and consent: Article II, section 2 of the Constitution states that the president “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”

138 reflected on bitter experience: Gould, Most Exclusive Club, p. 13.

138 It was the Senate that ultimately shattered: Ibid., pp. 73–90.

138 Americans trusted Kennedy’s leadership: Hulsey, Everett Dirksen and His Presidents, pp. 177–180.

139 Byrd was ambivalent about the treaties: Byrd, Senate Addresses, Vol. 2, p. 575; Jorden, Panama Odyssey, p. 494.

139 at least half a dozen seminars: Ibid., p. 481.

139 Byrd attended several sessions: Ibid., p. 481.

139 “had an uphill road to travel”: Ibid., p. 481.

139 Hollings approached the problem with an open mind: Hollings and Victor, Making Government Work, pp. 183–184.

140 sent a newsletter to South Carolina: Ibid.

140 an outrageous breach of diplomatic protocol: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 463–464.

140 testimony from seventy-nine witnesses: Ibid., p. 468.

140 Statements by Panama’s chief negotiator: Ibid. pp. 476–477.

140 U.S. Ambassador to Panama William Jorden: Ibid. pp. 473–475.

140 “intervention” in Panama: Ibid., p. 474.

141 General Brown had been working on the treaty: Ibid., pp. 471–473.

141 would not be able to deliver many Republican votes: Ibid., pp. 494–495; Annis, Howard Baker, p. 131.

141 gaining the Republican presidential nomination: Annis, Howard Baker, pp. 129–131.

141 “lends a chilling quality”: Clymer, Drawing the Line, p. 78.

141 Baker would remember his reaction: Interview with Senator Howard Baker, October 22, 2008.

141 “Why now, and why me?”: Clymer, Drawing the Line, p. 75.

141 Baker was especially troubled: Ibid., pp. 78–79.

142 He invited General Torrijos to Washington: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 355–385.

142 Baker and Byrd both applauded the Carter-Torrijos statement: Ibid., pp. 479, 492.

142 two of Baker’s most senior advisers: Ibid., p. 482.

142 Byrd gave the group a thoughtful description: Ibid., p. 483.

142 take the measure of General Torrijos: Ibid., p. 483.

142 among Panamanians, Torrijos was a hero: Ibid., pp. 483–485.

142 Torrijos impressed the senators: Ibid., pp. 484–486.

143 Torrijos walked through the dusty town: Ibid., p. 484.

143 this delegation was the toughest: Ibid., pp. 485–486.

143 “ugly American” occurred to Ambassador Jorden: Ibid., p. 485.

143 one senator told a CBS news reporter: Ibid., p. 486.

143 offered an important verdict: Ibid., p. 486.

143 Baker was getting increasingly irritated: Ibid., pp. 490–491; Annis, Howard Baker, p. 127.

144 “squirming like a worm on a hot rock”: Annis, Howard Baker, p. 127.

144 subtly suggesting Baker was weak: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, p. 490.

144 “the Republican Hamlet on the Potomac”: Clymer, Drawing the Line, p. 86.

144 little doubt that Byrd would fully support: Ibid., p. 491.

144 staffers came away with the same positive reaction: Ibid., p. 491.

144 Baker laid out the political realities: Ibid., pp. 492–493.

144 the treaties must explicitly incorporate: Ibid., p. 492.

144 provided the Senate insisted on no changes: Ibid., p. 492.

144 Torrijos’s commitment settled it for Baker: Ibid., pp. 493–494.

144 Baker softened his point: Ibid., p. 493.

144 an editorial in one of the government-directed newspapers: Ibid., p. 493.

145 decided it was time to declare his support: Ibid., p, 494.

145 announced his decision to support the treaties: Ibid., p. 494.

145 Byrd had captured the central truth: Ibid., p. 494.

145 Church had supported a new Panama Canal treaty: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 539.

145 Perennial right-wing suspicion about Church: Ibid., pp. 536–537.

145 78 percent of Americans wanted to maintain control: Ibid., p. 540.

145 Sol Linowitz approached him: Ibid., p. 542.

146 Sarbanes had won plaudits: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 366, 465–466; Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 542. This point reflects my personal recollection of the positive reaction to Senator Sarbanes’ arrival in the Senate, based principally on his work on the House Judiciary Committee on the impeachment of Richard Nixon.

146 Most Americans still opposed the treaties: Clymer, Drawing the Line, pp. 92–93.

146 William Buckley and George Will supported the treaties: Ibid., pp. 72; Annis, Howard Baker, p. 126.

146 “an issue conservatives can’t lose on”: Clymer, Drawing the Line, p. 56.

146 “best political issue that could be handed to a party”: Ibid., p. 56.

146 The personally genial Laxalt: Ross K. Baker, Friend and Foe in the U.S. Senate (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 210.

147 refused to grant the “unanimous consent”: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, p. 512.

147 the fire they were lighting at the grass roots: Clymer, Drawing the Line, pp. 53–69.

147 The Carter administration had launched: Ibid., pp. 51–52, 93–94.

147 had given serious thought to supporting the treaties: Ibid., p. 36; Jorden, Panama Odyssey, pp. 320, 532.

147 decided the Byrd and Baker amendments were too weak: Clymer, Drawing the Line, p. 100.

147 introduced an amendment on February 9: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, p. 520.

148 failed to check its other flank: Ibid., pp. 522–523, 536–544.

148 Panamanian leaders were enraged: Ibid., pp. 532–551, 560–567.

148 “could cause rejection of the treaty”: Ibid., pp. 543–550.

148 changing the DeConcini reservation was impossible: Ibid., pp. 543–550.

148 agreed to go along for the moment: Ibid., pp. 543–550.

148 Metzenbaum and Kennedy spoke strongly: Ibid., pp. 550–551.

149 Byrd began quoting the words of Shakespeare: Ibid., p. 553.

149 “nothing can be morally right”: Ibid., p. 553.

149 the White House began to understand: Ibid., p. 560.

149 lamented not having recognized the danger: Ibid., p. 560.

149 incensed by the administration’s poor planning: Ibid., p. 567.

149 desperately tried to reassure Torrijos: Ibid., p. 565.

150 Baker warned Panama on CBS News: Ibid., p. 573.

150 an important ally in Mike Kozak: Ibid., p. 580.

150 Purvis told Kozak he had been thinking: Ibid., p. 580.

150 Church read the statement: Ibid., pp. 581–582.

151 Moynihan took the floor: Ibid., p. 582.

151 the Washington Post ripped Deconcini: Ibid., p. 590.

152 The response from Byrd, Church, and others: Ibid., p. 591.

152 Byrd, Church, and Sarbanes shuttled: Ibid., p. 595.

152 Gravel was not a Senate heavyweight: Ibid., p. 582.

153 They gave themselves ninety minutes: Ibid., pp. 602–603.

153 Byrd put a copy of the resolution: Ibid., p. 603.

153 Byrd finally agreed to the phrase: Ibid., p. 604

153 Lewis received word from Torrijos: Ibid., pp. 606–607.

154 Byrd told a group of reporters: Ibid., p. 609.

154 “It has to be like this, Dennis”: Ibid., pp. 613–614.

CHAPTER 9: VENTURING INTO THE MIDDLE EAST

157 Javits regularly stayed on the Senate floor: Interview with Brian Conboy, July 8, 2011.

158 when he rose to speak in the Senate: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, pp. 229–235, 259–260.

158 “I don’t like you—or your kind”: Caro, Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, pp. 102–103.

158 Universally recognized as the Senate’s best lawyer: I interviewed numerous former senators, Democratic and Republican, who cited Javits as one of the great senators of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and/or the most brilliant. The same consensus emerges from the memoirs of senators with diverse political viewpoints, including William Cohen, John Tower, Lowell Weicker, and Paul Douglas.

158 a master of the committee process: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, p. 253.

158 no more than fifteen minutes before the Eastern Shuttle: This description of Javits’s mode of operation, his intellect, and his energy in the Senate reflects my personal observation, his autobiography, and the recollections of the Javits staff, a volume put together in 1981 after his defeat, the latter hereafter cited as “Javits staff remembrances.”

158 He had a soft spot for his staff members: Javits staff remembrances.

159 “The United States Senate was my home”: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, pp. 252–253.

159 Javits planned to finish his term: Ibid., pp. 490, 493.

160 no president had embraced the intractable issues: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 273.

160 “a particularly unpleasant surprise”: Ibid., p. 280.

160 Sadat impressed Carter: Ibid., pp. 282–284.

160 dramatically transformed the political situation: Ibid., pp. 284–285.

160 adamant about returning any of the West Bank areas: Ibid., pp. 288, 292.

161 His optimism about certain leaders: Ibid., p. 286.

161 well-known friends of Israel in the Senate: Ibid., pp. 288–289.

161 senators Abe Ribicoff, Hubert Humphrey, Ed Muskie, and Scoop Jackson: Carter, White House Diary, p. 64.

161 “The Israelis were also facing their ancient enemy”: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 297.

162 Fahd expressed a strong view in support: Carter, White House Diary, p. 161.

162 On February 14, 1978, the Carter administration announced: Graham Hovey, “U.S. Plans First Jet Sale to Cairo, Reduces Israeli Order for Craft; Saudis Get 60; Debate Is Expected,” New York Times, February 15, 1978.

162 announced its vehement opposition to Carter’s proposal: James Reston, “How to Double Trouble,” New York Times, January 27, 1978.

163 appeared overwhelmingly opposed: Bernard Weinraub, “Close Votes Likely in Congress on Mideast Plane Deal,” New York Times, April 27, 1978.

163 deeply involved with Israel since 1946: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, pp. 156–158, 170–182, 271–290.

163 Javits led the fight to convince the Nixon administration: Terence Smith, “Senate, by 81-14, Votes 500 Million for Israeli Arms,” New York Times, Nov. 24, 1971.

164 made his first trip to Saudi Arabia in early 1977: Edward C. Burks, “Senator and the Prince: The Odd Couple,” New York Times, August 6, 1977; Javits and Steinberg, Javits, pp. 479–481.

164 the special relationship between the United States and Israel: Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Carter’s Dilemma on Saudi Arms Sales,” Washington Post, February 2, 1978.

165 Baker made it known to the White House: Ibid.

165 “If you want to work this out, I’m willing to try”: Annis, Howard Baker, p. 135.

166 Brown sent a seven-page letter: Bernard Weinraub, “Brown Says Saudis Will Accept Curbs on the Use of F-15s,” New York Times, May 11, 1978.

166 the Foreign Relations Committee met in its hearing room: Hedrick Smith, “Jet Deal Still in the Balance,” New York Times, May 12, 1978.

166 After a passionate debate, the committee stunned the Senate: James Reston, “Church and State,” New York Times, May 12, 1978.

167 Emotions ran high as the Senate met four days later: Congressional Record, May 15, 1978, pp. 13264–13662.

167 Gravel criticized AIPAC for turning the vote into a “litmus test”: David Maxfield, “Middle East Plane Sales Backed by Senate Vote in Major Carter Victory,” Congressional Quarterly, May 20, 1978.

167 Packwood defended AIPAC’s lobbying with considerable heat: Ibid.

167 “What do we want to do with the Israelis?”: “Nation: F-15 Fight, Who Won What?,” Time, May 29, 1978.

168 “We must have the courage, we must have the guts”: Ibid.

168 a rationalization of “American nervelessness”: Ibid.

168 Tom Eagleton, another strong supporter of Israel: Ibid.

168 criticized the Carter administration’s “skill and competence”: Ibid.

169 won an extraordinary and unexpected victory: Bernard Weinraub, “Mideast Plane Conflict: How Carter Won and Implications for Victors and Losers,” New York Times, May 24, 1978.

CHAPTER 10: AN EPIC BUSINESS-LABOR CLASH

172 played a strong role in securing Carter’s narrow victory: Kaufman and Kaufman, James Earl Carter, pp. 33–34; Gillon, Democrats’ Dilemma, pp. 188–190.

172 Organized labor’s share of the workforce: Judis, Paradox of American Democracy , p. 138.

172 uninterested in putting labor resources into funding recruiting: Ibid., p. 138.

172 a fierce and concerted campaign: Ibid., pp. 138, 140–141.

172 most notorious for anti-labor tactics: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, p. 389.

172 According to National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) statistics: Judis, Paradox of American Democracy, p. 138.

172 sought a labor law reform bill: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, pp. 389–390.

173 the chances of Senate passage seemed good: Judis, Paradox of American Democracy , p. 140; Javits, ibid., p. 390; Orrin Hatch, Square Peg: Confessions of a Citizen Senator (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 26.

173 Moss, a western liberal from the class of 1958: Pertschuck, Revolt Against Regulation, pp. 21, 44, 76–77.

173 Hatch, a self-styled citizen politician: Hatch, Square Peg, pp. 3–5.

173 startled at being asked to lead the opposition: Ibid., p. 24.

173 Hatch agreed to take on the challenge: Ibid., p. 25.

174 prosperity made possible a comfortable consensus: Judis, Paradox of American Democracy, p. 101.

174 their corporate CEOs served on the boards: Ibid., p. 109.

174 drastically expand and rename itself the Business Roundtable: Ibid., pp. 120–122.

174 At the urging of two powerful intellects: Ibid., pp. 116–119, 122–127; Lichtman, White Protestant Nation, pp. 303–307.

175 a concerted message, and a new ideology, emerged: Judis, Paradox of American Democracy, pp. 128–129.

175 By 1978, it had become pervasive: Ibid., p. 129; Lichtman, White Protestant Nation, pp. 337–338.

175 “Broom Hilda did five comic strips”: Judis, Paradox of American Democracy, p. 129.

176 Gallup Polls registered just how effectively: Ibid., p. 130.

176 one of the AFL-CIO’s other priorities: Kaufman and Kaufman, James Earl Carter, p. 34.

176 strike by the United Mine Workers: Ibid., pp. 97–98.

176 He did not intend to be beaten: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, p. 391.

177 not be operating on a “two-track” system: Ibid., p. 391; Hatch, Square Peg, p. 30.

177 plenty of time to make their case: Ibid., p. 30.

177 Hatch received regular counsel from Jim Allen: Ibid., p. 28.

177 Hollings made it clear: Hollings and Victor, Making Government Work, pp. 188–190.

178 Hatch organized the labor law opponents: Hatch, Square Peg, pp. 30–31.

178 a handful of conservative to moderate Democratic senators would decide the outcome: Ibid., p. 29.

178 they were breaking new ground in lobbying: Ibid., p. 31.

178 mobilize the grass roots to flood his office: Ibid., p. 31.

178 97 percent of the mail: Judis, Paradox of American Democracy, p. 140.

178 energize small business by frightening them: Ibid., pp. 140–141.

179 “It’s a different type of lobbying”: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, pp. 390–391, quoting Congressional Quarterly Almanac.

179 Hatch heard that one company: Hatch, Square Peg, p. 32.

180 Javits, Williams, and Byrd put forth a compromise: Javits and Steinberg, Javits , p. 391.

180 Long approached Hatch on the Senate floor: Hatch, Square Peg, pp. 34–35.

180 “Russell Long appears to be running the country”: Quoted in Mann, Legacy to Power: Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, p. 348.

180 In a relatively rare moment of public humor: Ibid., p. 348.

180 Long repeated an offer made to Hatch: Hatch, Square Peg, pp. 34–35.

181 Sparkman pushed him away: Ibid., p. 36.

181 “I thought you promised to be with us”: Ibid., p. 36.

181 already openly predicting a Democratic victory: Ibid., p. 37.

181 “Orrin, you know you’re going to lose today”: Ibid., p. 37.

182 Hollings had been doing some discreet lobbying: Hollings and Victor, Making Government Work, p. 190.

182 He caught Zorinsky coming down the hall: Ibid., p. 190.

182 Hatch knew that he had his forty-first vote: Hatch, Square Peg, p. 39.

182 Long said he was so angered: Ibid., p. 40.

182 “we have always known it”: Ibid., p. 40.

182 “if Senator Long is going to cross over”: Ibid., p. 40.

183 Javits considered the outcome a tragedy: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, p. 392.

CHAPTER 11: SAVING NEW YORK

185 “always had the luster and magic of a new town”: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, p. 435.

185 “the temptation to seek the mayoralty”: Ibid., p. 434.

185 When Walter Mondale was a young senator: Javits staff remembrances, p. 60 (recollection of Ken Gunther).

186 an infamous front page headline: Frank Von Riper, “Ford to City: Drop Dead,” New York Daily News, October 30, 1975; Javits and Steinberg, Javits, pp. 434–446.

187 In February 1978, the Banking Committee had issued: Edward C. Burke, “Senate Committee Votes Not to Renew Aid to New York City,” New York Times, February 10, 1978.

187 “The American people are just plain fed up”: David Broder, “Restless Votes Pave the Way for Youth Movement into Senate,” Washington Post, June 8, 1978.

188 Roth began to “noodle” with his staff: Interview with Neil Messick, June 4, 2010.

188 Roth found a House Republican counterpart: Judis, Paradox of American Democracy, p. 148.

188 “no one in Washington took them seriously”: Interview with Neil Messick, June 4, 2010.

188 California voters, enraged by soaring property taxes: Sandbrook, Mad as Hell, pp. 280–286.

188 Ohio voters turned down 86 out of 139 proposed school bonds: “Sound and Fury over Taxes,” Time, June 19, 1978.

188 shocked the political world: Adam Clymer,“Grumpy Voters Send a Disconcerting Message,” New York Times, June 11, 1978.

189 Proposition 13 became the talk of Capitol Hill: Adam Clymer,“Coast Author of the Tax Cut Scouts Capital,” New York Times, June 20, 1978; “a prairie fire” of opposition: Adam Clymer, “Reagan Urges Party to Support Tax Cuts,” New York Times, June 25, 1978.

189 William Proxmire, a noted pinch-penny: B. Drummond Ayres, “Congress Responds to Frugality Signal,” New York Times, June 18, 1978.

189 “It’s not some magic word”: Ibid.

189 The Senate would have to decide the future: Lee Dembart, “Koch, in Washington, Pleads for Backing on Long Term Bonds,” New York Times, June 7, 1978.

189 Proxmire was the original maverick: Martin Tolchin, “The Perplexing Mr. Proxmire,” New York Times, May 28, 1978.

190 “5,669 consecutive roll call votes”: Ibid.

190 demonstrated his independence from his own party: Interview with Ralph Neas, April 21, 2010.

191 “1978 is not the same as 1975”: Statement of Chairman William Proxmire, Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, on “New York City Financial Aid,” June 6, 7, 12, 13, 1978, p. 1.

191 “these local parties are offering so little”: Ibid., p. 3.

191 Brooke’s opening statement came as a cold splash of reality: Statement of Ranking Member Edward Brooke, ibid., p. 4.

192 Moynihan loved to speak: Statement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ibid., p. 6.

193 “We are where we are because New York is the central city of this country”: Statement of Senator Jacob Javits, ibid., p. 10.

194 the “woof and warp of the legislative process”: Javits used that phrase with me during the special committee’s work on writing the Senate ethics code.

194 noting “what a good strong job you’re doing”: Senate Banking Committee Hearings, p. 25.

195 implored the Committee to provide the federal loan guarantees: Statement of New York City Mayor Ed Koch, ibid., pp. 25–32; Lee Dembart, “Koch, in Washington, Pleads for Backing on Long Term Bonds,” New York Times, June 7, 1978.

195 Proxmire asked again and again: Senate Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 2, 77.

195 showed a new willingness to support seasonal loans: Ibid., pp. 167, 182.

196 “Jack Javits and Pat Moynihan did more to change”: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, p. 447.

196 Lugar drafted and circulated a compromise proposal: Lee Dembart, “Lobbying for City Aid Stepped Up as Proxmire Unit Ends Hearings,” New York Times, June 14, 1978.

196 predicted the committee would approve it: Lee Dembart, “Senate Panel Votes 12-3 to Back Guarantees for New York Bonds,” New York Times, June 16, 1978.

197 less than four weeks after the committee hearings: Congressional Record—Senate, June 29, 1978, pp. 19577–19628.

197 gave an extraordinary, perhaps unprecedented, performance: Statement of Chairman William Proxmire, ibid., pp. 19577–19580.

197 “we are setting a number of undesirable precedents: Ibid., p. 19580.

198 “New York Day in the Senate”; “a national blessing”: Statement of Senator Jacob Javits, ibid., pp. 19583–19585.

198 Moynihan injected an extraordinary personal note: Statement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, ibid., pp. 19585–19586.

198 With a mischievous smile, Baker observed wryly: Statement of Senator Howard Baker, ibid., pp. 19586–19587.

199 “if New York has one quality above all, it is that fantastic brass”: Marjorie Hunter, “Senate Votes New York Aid Bill; Carter Expected to Sign in City,” New York Times, July 27, 1978.

CHAPTER 12: CLOSING DAYS

201 Byrd had expressed optimism: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Leadership Girds for Filibuster on Gas Price Bill,” Washington Post, August 1, 1978.

202 described the negotiations with the Senate as a “descent into hell”: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 346.

202 declared the energy crisis to be “the moral equivalent of war”: Text of Carter’s address, “Carter: Oil and Natural Gas . . . Are Running Out,” Washington Post, April 19, 1977.

202 Finally, after eight more months of haggling: Robert G. Kaiser and J. P. Smith, “Changing Face of ‘Centerpiece’ Gas Bill,” Washington Post, September 9, 1978.

202 A Washington Post analysis commented: Ibid.

203 Abourezk and Metzenbaum held a news conference: Richard L. Lyons, “Two Senators Set to Fight Gas Bill Again,” Washington Post, August 2, 1978.

203 A coalition of unions and citizens’ action groups: Richard L. Lyons, “Accord on Natural Gas Threatens to Come Unstuck,” Washington Post, August 4, 1978.

203 Bennett Johnston, a key architect of the compromise: Peter Barnes, “Byrd, Jackson Say Compromise Gas Bill Can Still Be Saved,” Washington Post, August 13, 1978.

203 he met with key conferees in both houses: Richard L. Lyons, “In Big Victory, Hill Conferees Clear Gas Bill,” Washington Post, August 19, 1978.

204 Long confirmed that he would vote against: Ward Sinclair, “Senate Opponents See Tide Turning Against Gas Bill,” Washington Post, August 25, 1978.

204 On August 31, he invited the critics: Robert G. Kaiser and Edward Walsh, “Carter Pushes Harder for Gas Measure,” Washington Post, September 1, 1978.

204 back from a brief recess for Labor Day: Robert G. Kaiser, “Senate Showdown on Gas Decontrol Is Set Next Week,” Washington Post, September 9, 1978.

204 Long and Clifford Hansen sent a mailgram: Ibid.

204 received endorsements from the National Council of Mayors: Fred Barbash, “Byrd Gaining Hope on Gas Compromise,” Washington Post, September 10, 1978.

205 On September 12, the Senate debated for a second day: Richard L. Lyons, “Lineup on Gas Bill Remains Very Close,” Washington Post, September 13, 1978.

206 On September 14, he engineered a breakthrough: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Will Begin Voting Tuesday on the Gas Bill,” Washington Post, September 15, 1978.

206 On September 19, Jackson, Byrd, and the supporters: Richard L. Lyons, “Senators Reject Attempt to Scuttle Gas Compromise,” Washington Post, September 20, 1978.

206 the Senate approved the natural gas compromise: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Approves Compromise Bill on Natural Gas,” Washington Post, September 28, 1978.

206 finally claim significant, if incomplete, progress: Carter, White House Diary, p. 258.

207 Carter noted in his diary: Ibid.

208 Eagleton hated the amount of waste and fraud at DoD: The brief effort to establish a statutory Inspector General at the Pentagon is based on my personal experience handling the legislation for Senator Eagleton and the Governmental Affairs Committee.

209 “Ira, Chairman Brooks is on the phone for you”: This also reflects personal experience during the frenzied closing days of the Ninety-fifth Congress.

210 I found Eagleton in the Monocle restaurant with Muskie: This is one last personal anecdote.

210 Byrd gave the Ninety-fifth Congress a grade of “A”: Richard L. Lyons, “Congress Quits After All-Night Session,” Washington Post, October 16, 1978.

211 Polls showed overwhelming public admiration: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 153.

211 incumbents were extremely vulnerable: Robert Lindsey, “California Tax Revolt: Lesson for Legislators,” New York Times, June 12, 1978.

211 A New York Daily News poll: “Nation: All Aboard the Bandwagon,” Time, June 26, 1978.

211 the GOP launched a seven-state campaign: Bill Peterson, “GOP Starts Push for Tax Cut Bill,” Washington Post, September 21, 1978.

211 trying to atone for the Panama Canal treaties: Ibid.

212 Roth observed: “We have helped the rich”: Ibid.

212 Short won the Democratic primary: “Nation: To Candidates, Right Looks Right,” Time, September 25, 1978.

212 had brushed aside their concerns: Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Percy: The Lessons of ’78,” Washington Post, November 6, 1978.

212 The number of corporate PACs exploded: Lichtman, White Protestant Nation , p. 303.

213 Republican operative Lee Atwater later wrote: Ibid.

213 the five best-funded independent Political Action Committees: Ibid., p. 307.

213 Republicans also benefited from small contributions: Ibid.

213 Clark’s brother-in-law called him: Interview with Senator Dick Clark, November 9, 2010; interview with Peter Hart, July 6, 2010.

214 Loeb had been gunning for McIntyre: Jorden, Panama Odyssey, p. 526, described McIntyre’s speech as “the one most likely to be included in anthologies of great Senate speeches. . . . Its central theme was the low level to which American politics had sunk in the recent past. . . . It was a courageous exposure of the tactics used by a handful of vicious and narrow-minded political manipulators whose main weapons were exaggeration, distortion, prejudice and fear.”

214 Helms was reelected by a comfortable margin: Link, Righteous Warrior, pp. 199–200.

214 he had created a new model for a senator: Lichtman, White Protestant Nation , pp. 310–311.

214 “the first all purpose Political Action Committee of the right”: Ibid., p. 311.

216 Kennedy delivered one of the most memorable speeches of his career: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 276–277.

216 Bill Clinton, the young governor of Arkansas: Ibid., p. 277.

216 Hamilton Jordan, the White House chief of staff: Ibid.

216 Kennedy had not yet decided to challenge Carter: Ibid.

216 the United States would establish diplomatic relations: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 119.

216 events began to spiral out of control in Iran: Ibid., p. 167.

217 “This is the month that blood will triumph”: Ibid.

217 hit Washington without warning: Ibid., pp. 168–169.

217 The Carter administration offered the shah support: Ibid.

217 one comprehensive Department of State memo: Ibid., p. 170.

217 understood the severity of the situation: Ibid.

218 Brzezinski believed that the shah’s only option: Ibid.

218 Byrd undertook a major trip to the Middle East: Interview with Hoyt Purvis, January 14, 2011; interview with Joe Stewart, June 14, 2010.

218 Byrd had a personal interest in Iran: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, p. 588; Purvis interview.

218 Before leaving Washington, Byrd met with Brzezinski: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, p. 588; Purvis interview.

218 bonfires could be seen: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, p. 587.

218 the grim conversation through the long evening: Ibid., p. 588; Purvis interview.

218 When Byrd met with the shah: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, pp. 588–589.

218 Having concluded that the Shah’s days were numbered: Purvis interview.

219 “A single misstep could produce unforeseeable consequences”: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 170.

CHAPTER 13: BEFORE THE STORM

223 twenty new senators, a record number: Amer, “Freshmen in the House of Representatives and Senate.”

223 decided to continue meeting for lunches: Interview with Senator Alan Simpson, February 2, 2010.

224 Stevens stopped attending the group’s breakfasts: Interview with Wayne Schley, April 12, 2010.

225 Levin had rented a bulldozer: Interview with Linda Gustitis, July 12, 2010.

225 “We’ve come of age as a political force”: Bill Peterson, “Foes of Abortion Aim at Hill ‘Deadly Dozen,’” Washington Post, February 11, 1979.

225 Bayh headed the group’s “Deadly Dozen” list: Ibid.

225 scheduled to receive the Hubert H. Humphrey Inspirational award: Megan Rosenfeld, “Tears and Tributes at Cancer’s Society Volunteer Luncheon,” Washington Post, March 29, 1979.

226 “Congratulations on your chairmanship”: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 561.

227 the subcommittee chairmen had grown accustomed to their power: Ibid., pp. 562–563.

227 He and John Glenn were barely on speaking terms: Ibid., p. 563.

227 Helms seized upon a provision in the Senate rules: Ibid.

227 the atmosphere was so adversarial: Ibid.

227 Carter led the former California governor 57–35: David S. Broder, “1980 GOP Presidential Field Already Crowded,” Washington Post, January 21, 1979.

227 “Army surrenders; Khomeini wins. Destroying all classified”: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 172.

228 Bani-Sadr expressed astonishment: Ibid., p. 178.

228 Khomeini’s goal was “to establish an Islamic Republic”: Ibid., p. 177.

228 many hours talking with the Senate parliamentarians: Interview with Robert Dove, June 9, 2010.

228 “I have stayed on the floor more than any other senator”: Statement of Majority Leader Robert Byrd, Congressional Record—Senate, January 15, 1979, pp. 143–146.

230 complimented Byrd for visiting him: Statement of Minority Leader Howard Baker, Congressional Record—Senate, January 15, 1979, pp. 146–148.

230 the Senate remained on the first legislative day: Richard L. Lyons, “On Capitol Hill,” Washington Post, February 3, 1979; David Broder, “Row over Senate Rules,” Washington Post, February 4, 1979.

230 another long day of talks failed to reach a compromise: Richard L. Lyons, “On Capitol Hill,” Washington Post, February 9, 1979.

231 the Senate reached its resolution of changes: Richard L. Lyons, “Senate Strengthens Rule Restricting Filibusters,” Washington Post, February 23, 1979.

232 Peking’s leaders were consistent in their demands: Robert G. Sutter, “Congress and Foreign Policy: Congress and U.S. Policy in Asia: New Relationships with China and Taiwan,” Congressional Research Service, 1979, pp. 54–71.

232 A political firestorm swiftly ensued: David S. Broder and Bill Peterson, “Credibility of U.S. Hurt, Critics Say: But Most Democrats, Ford Rally Behind President’s Decision,” Washington Post, December 16, 1978.

233 Reagan attacked the administration: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 568.

233 charged Carter with failing to meet: Broder and Peterson, “Credibility of U.S. Hurt.”

233 “We owe the Taiwanese more than this”: Edward Walsh and Robert G. Kaiser, “Carter Indicates He’ll Reject Delay Sought by Baker,” Washington Post, December 20, 1978.

233 Carter quickly and publicly rebuffed Baker’s request: Ibid.

234 Goldwater and fourteen other conservative lawmakers: Kenneth Bredemeier, “Goldwater, Other Lawmakers File Suit over Repeal of Taiwan Defense Pact,” Washington Post, December 23, 1978.

234 Jimmy Carter continued to make clear his view: John M. Goshko, “Carter’s Plan for Taiwan Is Criticized in Congress,” Washington Post, January 17, 1979; John M. Goshko, “President Warns Hill on Taiwan,” Washington Post, January 27, 1979.

234 Taiwan posed the first major issue for Church: John M. Goshko, “President Warns Hill on Taiwan,” Washington Post, January 27, 1979.

234 had already petitioned Congress and the president: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 569.

235 great mutual respect for each other’s abilities: Ibid., p. 570.

235 On February 5, Church banged the gavel: Statement of Senator Frank Church, Taiwan: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, February 5, 6, 7, 8, 21, and 22, 1979, p. 1.

235 Javits dismissed the notion: Statement of Senator Jacob Javits in ibid., p. 11.

236 Christopher noted that the issue of China renouncing force: Statement of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher in ibid., p. 24.

236 On February 8, Church endorsed a Javits resolution: Robert G. Kaiser, “Woodcock Nomination Is Supported,” Washington Post, February 9, 1979.

236 China launched a major cross-border attack into Vietnam: Robert G. Kaiser, “Taiwan Security Bill Clears Senate Committee,” Washington Post, February 23, 1979.

237 differences between the Church-Javits and Percy formulations: Mary Russell and Robert G. Kaiser, “Bill on Taiwan Ties Survives Early Tests in Senate and House,” Washington Post, March 9, 1979.

237 Helms had threatened to filibuster the nomination: Robert G. Kaiser, “Envoy to Peking Is Confirmed Easily in Senate,” Washington Post, February 27, 1979.

237 On March 13, the Senate approved the Taiwan bill: Robert G. Kaiser,“House and Senate Adopt Taiwan Bills,” Washington Post, March 14, 1979.

238 The Carter administration’s recognition of the PRC: John K. Fairbank, “The New Two China Problem,” New York Review of Books, March 8, 1979.

238 Although PRC officials objected to the Taiwan Relations Act: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 571.

238 initial rage about the U.S. decision to recognize China: Ibid.

CHAPTER 14: ENERGY BATTLES AFTER THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

241 Global oil production at the beginning of 1979: Sandbrook, Mad as Hell, p. 295.

241 Gasoline prices rose 55 percent in the first three months: Ibid., p. 298.

242 Theodore White wrote: “There was a contagion of fear”: Quoted in ibid., p. 295.

242 a pump failed at Three Mile Island: Ibid., p. 298.

242 On April 5, saying “the future of the country we love is at stake”: Edward Walsh and J. P. Smith, “Carter Moves to Raise Cost, Cut Use of Oil,” Washington Post, April 6, 1979.

243 strongly supported Carter’s proposal: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 347.

243 would require oil companies to pay back only $1.7 billion: Art Pine, “Windfall Tax with Mild Bite Sent to Hill,” Washington Post, April 27, 1979.

243 On May 3, Abe Ribicoff jolted the Senate: Steven R. Weisman, “Ribicoff Decides He Won’t Seek a Fourth Term,” New York Times, May 4, 1979.

244 Javits was shocked by his friend’s announcement: Interview with Alan Bennett, July 17, 2009.

244 Billings asked Moore what he thought of the idea: Interview with Leon Billings, February 19, 2010.

245 he ripped into the Carter administration officials: Art Pine, “Windfall Profits Tax Criticized on Hill,” Washington Post, May 8, 1979.

245 The Senate, characteristically, worked on a slower track: Art Pine, “Leaders Plan Prompt Action on Windfall Bill,” Washington Post, June 8, 1979.

245 Kennedy’s intensified rhetoric, ripping into Carter’s proposal: Martin Schram, “Kennedy’s Intensified Rhetoric Fuels ’80 Speculation,” Washington Post, June 11, 1979.

245 told Kennedy he would make a lot of his friends look foolish: Ibid.

246 On June 22, the Americans for Democratic Action: Bill Peterson, “ADA Panel Pushes Draft of Kennedy,” Washington Post, June 23, 1979.

246 Returning from an economic summit in Tokyo: “Nation: Carter was Speechless,” Time, July 16, 1979.

246 most unusual presidential speeches ever given: Ibid.

247 Approval of Carter soon plunged to 23 percent: Ibid.

247 As Carter reeled, Howard Baker refused to pile on: Warren Brown, “Bipartisan Support of Energy Proposals Urged by Sen. Baker,” Washington Post, July 18, 1979.

247 he decided to challenge Carter for the Democratic nomination: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 284.

247 the last straw for Jackson as well: John M. Berry, “Kennedy to Win 1980 Nomination, Jackson Predicts,” Washington Post, July 25, 1979.

247 another constant thorn in Carter’s side: Steve Gerstel, “McGovern Backs Race by Kennedy,” Washington Post, July 27, 1979.

248 On July 26, the Senate Energy Committee: Art Pine, “Energy Plan Progress on Hill Is Mixed,” Washington Post, July 27, 1979.

249 Baker’s support for Carter’s energy proposals: Ibid.

249 Rising oil prices raised the economic stakes: Art Pine, “Proposed Oil Tax Becomes a Magic Money Machine,” Washington Post, July 30, 1979.

250 Vice President Mondale chided Congress: Edward Walsh and Richard L. Lyons, “Departing Congress Is Chided About Inaction on Energy Plan,” Washington Post, August 4, 1979.

250 the administration began to give ground: Jerry Knight, “Carter Agrees to Slow His Plans for Synthetic Fuels,” Washington Post, September 12, 1979.

250 On September 18, Senate Finance unanimously approved: “Tax Breaks Favored for Alternative Fuel,” Washington Post, September 19, 1979.

251 Long warned the members: Art Pine, “Finance Panel Votes to Double Solar Credits,” Washington Post, September 20, 1979.

251 Jimmy Carter told a group of out-of-town editors: Martin Schram, “Carter: Nature of Job Breeds Unpopularity,” Washington Post, September 23, 1979.

251 Danforth could no longer abide the amount of abuse: Ibid.

251 On September 25, Senate Finance voted 13–0: Art Pine, “Senate Panel Strips All New Oil Finds from Windfall Bill,” Washington Post, September 26, 1979.

251 The next day, the Finance Committee had made more cuts: Art Pine, “Panel Votes away More Money Than Oil Tax Would Raise,” Washington Post, September 27, 1979.

252 “They just chug-a-lugged it all”: Ibid.

252 The chairman told the committee: “Issue of Fuel Aid for Poor Splits Senate Finance Panel,” Associated Press, September 29, 1979.

252 Hart’s subcommittee issued its report: “Synthetic Fuels Not Likely to Become Alternative to Foreign Oil, Congressional Report Holds,” Associated Press, September 29, 1979.

252 October 3, Long put forth a compromise: Art Pine, “Long Proposes a Compromise on Oil Windfall Profits Tax,” Washington Post, October 4, 1979.

253 The Finance Committee bill would capture: Art Pine, “Oil Windfall Tax Whittle to 29% in Senate Version,” Washington Post, October 9, 1979.

253 On October 2, legislation to create: Mary Russell, “Lines Are Drawn in Senate on Bill for Energy Board,” Washington Post, October 3, 1979.

253 Muskie, with his customary passion: Ibid.

253 the Senate rejected the Muskie-Ribicoff substitute: Mary Russell, “Senate Gives White House Energy Package Victory,” Washington Post, October 4, 1979.

254 the EMB legislation passed the Senate on October 4: Mary Russell, “Senate Votes ‘Fast Track’ Energy Unit,” Washington Post, October 5, 1979.

254 Senate Appropriations Committee approved $20 billion: Mary Russell, “Senate Unit, in Shift, Backs Synfuel Fund,” Washington Post, October 11, 1979.

254 the Committee decided to scale back the tax credit package: Art Pine, “Senate Panel Shifts on Insulation Tax Credits,” Washington Post, October 18, 1979.

254 CBS televised an interview of Kennedy done by Roger Mudd: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 285–287.

254 O’Neill had warned Kennedy in September: Ibid., p. 285.

255 Some of his closest friends wondered: Ibid., p. 287.

255 “What are you guys going to advise me to do”: Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (New York: Grove, 2006), p. 19.

255 students stormed the lightly-guarded U.S. embassy: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 176.

255 The original idea, according to the leader of the students: David Harris, The Crisis: The President, the Prophet and the Shah—1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam (New York: Little, Brown, 2004), p. 200.

255 Speaking to a conference of northeastern state officials: “Business: Crude Assaults,” Time, November 12, 1979.

256 Kennedy was attacking him: Martin Schram, “Kennedy Attacks President’s Policy on Oil Price Controls,” Washington Post, November 4, 1979.

256 Jackson and the Energy Committee pushed: Mary Russell, “Senate Begins Fight on Rival Energy Bills,” Washington Post, November 6, 1979.

256 The Senate rejected the Proxmires version, 57–37: Mary Russell, “Senate Begins Fight on Rival Energy Bills,” Washington Post, November 9, 1979.

256 On November 7, a Washington Post article: Mary Russell, “Senate Wages Energy War with Popgun Legislation,” Washington Post, November 7, 1979.

257 finally began floor debate on the windfall profits tax: Helen Dewar, “Oil-State Senators Lose Surprise Attempt to Cut Tax on Windfall Profits,” Washington Post, November 17, 1979.

257 Bumpers introduced an amendment: Helen Dewar,“Senate Votes to Repeal Controversial Rule Raising Tax on Inherited Property,” Washington Post, November 20, 1979.

257 the Senate voted, 53–41, to exempt most independent producers: Helen Dewar, “Windfall-Tax Break for Independent Oil Approved by Senate,” Washington Post, November 28, 1979.

258 Byrd said he favored raising the windfall profits tax: Spencer Rich, “Byrd Sees a Compromise Hiking Tax on Oil Profits,” Washington Post, December 2, 1979.

258 the Senate voted 58–35 for a Bradley-Chafee amendment: Helen Dewar, “Senate Votes to Increase Oil ‘Windfall Profits’ Tax,” Washington Post, December 5, 1979.

258 On December 5, the Republicans offered a plan: Helen Dewar, “Senate GOP Narrowly Beaten in Effort to Force Tax Cuts,” Washington Post, December 6, 1979.

258 a compromise that would allow the windfall profits tax to pass: Helen Dewar, “Sen. Long: ‘If Missouri Succeeds in Taxing Louisiana, I’ll Get Back at Missouri,’” Washington Post, December 9, 1979.

259 as Danforth would write almost thirty years later: Danforth, Faith and Politics , pp. 24–26.

259 On December 12, the Senate plunged into a filibuster: Helen Dewar, “Filibuster Stalls Senate Attempts to Toughen Tax on Oil Profits,” Washington Post, December 13, 1979.

259 “In about 15 years, I think you’ll be a great senator”: Danforth, Faith and Politics, p. 25; interview with Senator Danforth, March 30, 2010.

259 On December 14, the Senate ended a three day filibuster: Helen Dewar,“Senate Ends Filibuster on Oil Tax with $178 Billion Compromise,” Washington Post, December 15, 1979.

260 Years later, the humiliating defeat stayed with him: Interview with Senator Danforth, March 30, 2010.

260 On December 17, the Senate gave final approval: Helen Dewar, “Senate Votes $178 Billion Oil Tax Bill,” Washington Post, December 18, 1979.

260 Three days later, the House and Senate split the difference: Helen Dewar, “Tax on Oil Profits Set at $227.3 Billion,” Washington Post, December 21, 1979.

260 Jimmy Carter would later write: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 123.

261 The resulting legislation succeeded in reducing oil imports: Carter, White House Diary, p. 490.

261 Assessing Carter’s quest for a national energy policy: John C. Barrow, “An Age of Limits: Jimmy Carter and the Quest for a National Energy Policy,” in Fink and Graham, eds., Carter Presidency, p. 172.

262 “The bipartisanship that I enjoyed”: Carter, White House Diary, p. 530.

CHAPTER 15: FIGHTING THE ECONOMIC TIDE

263 On a trip to Europe, Ribicoff found “geo-politics”: Ribicoff, America Can Make It!, p. 225.

264 He called on the U.S. government to concentrate its efforts: Ibid., p. 226.

264 the creation of a new permanent board: Ibid., p. 216.

265 Jimmy Carter had come to office an avowed free trader: Judith Stein, “The Locomotive Loses Power: The Trade and Industrial Policies of Jimmy Carter,” in Fink and Graham, eds., Carter Presidency, pp. 74–75.

265 the American steel industry was facing an acute crisis: Ibid., pp. 76–82.

265 completion of the multilateral Tokyo Round: Carter, White House Diary, pp. 313–314.

266 The Senate passed the Trade Amendments Act: Ibid., p. 347.

266 they discovered that 28,000 patents: Interview with Senator Birch Bayh, March 18, 2010.

266 Gaylord Nelson meanwhile used his chairmanship: Interview with William Cherkasky, December 3, 2010.

267 Chrysler Corporation announced it was closing: Robert B. Reich and John D. Donahue, New Deals: The Chrysler Revival and the American System (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 94.

268 He was customarily a whirling dervish of activity: many of the observations about Eagleton come from having worked closely with him for nearly seven years.

268 He was known for his sense of humor and comic timing: Interview with Ed Quick, May 21, 2010.

269 advocates of reasserting Congress’s power to declare war: Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender (New York: Liveright, 1974).

269 He had helped Muskie and Howard Baker: Interview with Leon Billings, February 19, 2010.

270 Chrysler, the smallest of the companies: Ibid., pp. 27–29.

270 The company seemed snake bit: Charles K. Hyde, Riding the Roller Coaster: A History of the Chrysler Corporation (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003), p. 224; Reich and Donohue, New Deals, pp. 27–46.

270 Riccardo asked Eizenstat for temporary relief: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 88.

270 By the end of June, Riccardo returned to the White House: “Business: Chrysler Drives for a Tax Break,” Time, July 16, 1979.

271 Miller advised President Carter that Chrysler: Helen Dewar and Art Pine, “White House, Hill React Cautiously to Chrysler SOS,” Washington Post, August 2, 1979.

271 The president agreed: “you’re absolutely right”: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 105.

271 “Miller just blew us out of the water”: Ibid.

272 Russell Long, however, said that it was too early: Dewar and Pine, “White House, Hill React Cautiously.”

272 It was not difficult to envision the UAW: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, pp. 124, 130–131.

272 “I just don’t like you” were Ford’s last words: “Business: Upheaval in the House of Ford,” Time, July 24, 1978.

272 Iaccoca met with Treasury Secretary Miller on September 7: Douglas Williams, “Chrysler Wants $1.2 Billion in Aid,” Washington Post, September 13, 1979.

272 Chrysler reported a staggering $460 million loss: William H. Jones, “Chrysler’s Loss Business History’s Biggest,” Washington Post, October 31, 1979.

273 Carter administration had decided to provide $1.5 billion: Helen Dewar, “Chrysler Rescue Plan of $3 Billion Proposed,” Washington Post, November 2, 1979.

273 the union announced that it would make concessions: Helen Dewar, “UAW Pledges Concessions If Chrysler Gets U.S. Aid,” Washington Post, October 20, 1979.

274 Proxmire gaveled the Banking Committee hearing to order: “Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979,” Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Part I. November 14 and 15, 1979.

274 “We let 7,000 companies fail last year; we didn’t bail them out”: Statement of Chairman Proxmire, Banking Committee Hearings, p. 2.

274 Garn, the ranking member, further proved Proxmire’s point: Statement of Senator Jake Garn, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 3–4.

274 Heinz, bearer of one of the most famous corporate names: Statement of Senator John Heinz, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 66–68.

274 Weicker had earned a reputation: Statement of Senator Lowell Weicker, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 77–79.

275 The task of making the case for helping Chrysler: Statement of Senator Don Riegle, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 69–74.

275 “The United States has not thought to develop”: Ibid., p. 69.

276 Eagleton honed in on the critics’ concern about the precedent: Statement of Senator Tom Eagleton, Banking Committee Hearings, p. 81.

276 Chrysler’s employees should receive a substantial part: Statement of Senator Robert Byrd, Banking Committee Hearings, p. 89.

277 the more liberal House Banking Committee approved: William H. Jones, “Panel Approves Chrysler Aid,” Washington Post, November 16, 1979.

277 broke with the UAW’s long tradition of “pattern bargaining”: William H. Jones, “Chrysler Workers Ratify UAW Pact,” Washington Post, November 17, 1979.

277 testifying himself on November 19, Doug Fraser told the press: W. Dale Nelson, “Fraser’s Optimism Decreases,” Washington Post, November 20, 1979.

277 On November 20, Nader testified in vehement opposition: Statement of Ralph Nader, Banking Committee Hearings, pp. 1198–1277.

278 The exchange became unexpectedly infused with emotion: William J. Mitchell, “Nader, Garn Clash Bitterly,” Knight-Ridder, November 21, 1979.

278 Citicorp Chairman Walter Wriston testified against the bailout: William H. Jones, “Wriston Opposes Chrysler Aid,” Washington Post, November 22, 1979.

279 He predicted that despite his opposition: Ibid.

279 He proposed a “pure” $4 billion bailout: William H. Jones, “Compromise Chrysler Aid Plan Pushed,” Washington Post, November 28, 1979.

280 the Senate Banking Committee, by an emphatic 10–5 vote: William H. Jones, “Panel Votes Chrysler Aid with Wage Roll-Back Plan,” Washington Post, November 30, 1979.

280 “Shared sacrifice” had become the watchword of the day: William H. Jones, “Misery for Many in Senate’s Chrysler Bailout Bill,” Washington Post, December 1, 1979.

280 Howard Paster, who had worked for Birch Bayh: Ibid.

280 Doug Fraser termed the three-year pay freeze “unacceptable”: William H. Jones, “3-Year Chrysler Pay Freeze Unacceptable, UAW Chief Says,” Washington Post, December 5, 1979.

281 On December 14, Mondale, speaking for Carter: Art Pine, “Aid Needed for Chrysler in January,” Washington Post, November 15, 1979.

281 Lugar said that he might bend on the wage freeze: Merrill Brown, “New Bailout for Chrysler Opposed,” Washington Post, December 12, 1979.

281 “the brain drain argument is specious”: Congressional Record—Senate, December 19, 1979, p. 36999.

281 the Eagleton-Roth-Biden amendment passed the Senate: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 155.

281 Weicker punctured the celebratory atmosphere: Congressional Record—Senate , December 19, 1979, pp. 37048–37050; Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 155.

282 Byrd summoned the key senators into his office again: “Nation: Santa Calls on Chrysler,” Time, December 31, 1979.

282 Levin and Riegle went to Gerald Greenwald: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 157.

282 Byrd went the extra mile: Interview with Mary Jane Checchi, May 13, 2010.

282 “probably the biggest mistake Congress has made in its history”: Reich and Donohue, New Deals, p. 156.

283 In conference, the Senate and House split the difference: Art Pine, “Union Has to Forgo $462 Million of Raise,” Washington Post, December 21, 1979.

283 Tsongas declared that “he did not want to do to Detroit”: “Nation: Santa Calls on Chrysler.”

284 the UAW would be supporting Ted Kennedy: Interview with Jim Blanchard, June 9, 2010.

CHAPTER 16: SALT II: DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS

285 the relationship between the superpowers was deteriorating: Glad, Outsider in the White House, pp. 69–79.

286 Brezhnev was very emotional about the deterioration: Ibid., p. 56.

286 authorized Cyrus Vance to explore a summit meeting: Ibid., p. 59.

286 decision to recognize the People’s Republic of China: Ibid., p. 61.

286 they met more than twenty-five times: Ibid., p. 64.

287 Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty: Don Oberdorfer, “U.S., Soviets Reach SALT Agreement,” Washington Post, May 10, 1979.

287 was a far cry from the ambitious arms reduction agreement: Glad, Outsider in the White House, pp. 67–68.

288 Carter had been shocked in January in a meeting with senators: Carter, White House Diary, pp. 281–282.

288 Treaty opponents, led by Scoop Jackson: “Special Report: To Educate Their Senators,” Time, May 21, 1979.

288 His speech received a lukewarm response: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 107.

289 Cranston said the treaty had the support of fifty-eight senators: Ibid.

289 Jackson unleashed an extraordinary blast: Robert G. Kaiser, “Jackson Rips ‘Appeasement’ of Moscow,” Washington Post, June 13, 1979.

290 By mid-June, Baker and Frank Church: Annis, Howard Baker, pp. 152, 156; Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, pp. 592–593; Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 111.

290 Cranston observed that “if Jackson were for the treaty”: “Nation: Twin Salvos for SALT,” Time, April 16, 1979.

290 recalled with amazement visiting Byrd’s office: Interview with Senator John Culver, April 15, 2010.

290 Byrd had visited the Soviet Union: Byrd, Senate Addresses, vol. 2, p. 586.

291 thought Baker might be willing to play a constructive role: “Nation: Signed and Sealed,” Time, July 2, 1979.

291 Baker had received a considerable amount of his SALT briefing materials: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 384.

291 Nunn seemed willing to consider voting for the treaty: Robert G. Kaiser, “White House Moves to Shore Up Support of SALT,” Washington Post, September 14, 1979.

291 “It was nauseating to confront the gross waste of money”: Carter, White House Diary, p. 323.

291 McGovern, a steadfast leader on such issues: “Nation: Signed and Sealed.”

292 He was particularly angry at Jackson’s staff members: Interview with Senator John Culver, April 15, 2010.

292 a natural supporter of the SALT II treaty: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, pp. 591–592.

293 seized the opportunity to take a tough stand: George C. Wilson, “SALT Stumbles over Presence of Soviet Troops,” Washington Post, September 7, 1979.

293 Carter first pronounced the brigade “unacceptable”: “Nation: Carter Defuses a Crisis,” Time, October 15, 1979.

293 Vance implored Dobrynin to give him some help: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 191.

294 Byrd urged that the White House and congressional leaders: Ibid., p. 192.

294 Carter convened a group of fifteen “wise men”: Ibid., p. 193.

294 Carter would never forgive Church: Carter, White House Diary, pp. 422, 424.

294 reported the treaty favorably by an unimpressive 9–6 vote: Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, p. 389.

294 the Armed Services Committee voted 10–0: Ibid.

295 Howard Baker announced his candidacy: David S. Broder, “Baker, Tying His Fate to SALT, Formally Announces 1980 Bid,” Washington Post, November 2, 1979.

295 the “failure to ratify the SALT II treaty: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 265.

296 Carter had intuited the situation at the end of 1977: Carter, White House Diary, p. 152.

296 Carter was handling the crisis with “great competence”: “Iran: The Test of Wills,” Time, November 26, 1979.

296 Carter was helped by Khomeini’s “irrationality”: Robert G. Kaiser, “Congress Is Giving President Freer Hand at Crisis Helm,” Washington Post, December 7, 1979.

297 The year ended on an ironic note: Spencer Rich, “Panama Treaty Supporter Delighted at Offer to Shah, but Foes Unmoved,” Washington Post, December 16, 1979.

CHAPTER 17: A TOUGH POLITICAL CLIMATE

301 Nelson had “a lifelong tendency to loaf or joke his way through the campaign”: Christofferson, Man from Clear Lake, p. 339.

302 Hart and his associates polled 617 Wisconsin voters: “Survey of Voter Attitudes in the State of Wisconsin,” Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., January 1980.

302 “this nation is in deep and serious trouble”: Ibid., p. 2.

302 “moral threats which cut right through the social fabric”: Ibid.

302 “These economic threats are more commonly identified”: Ibid., p. 3.

302 “Leading the list is government’s interference in people’s lives”: Ibid.

303 said he was doing an “excellent” or “good” job: Ibid., p. 11.

303 he also pointed out Nelson’s special problem: Ibid., pp. 9–10.

303 “We cannot overstress,” Hart noted: Ibid., p. 13.

303 The right wing had been gunning for Frank Church for years: Ashby and Gramer, Fighting the Odds, p. 539.

304 had targeted Church early: Ibid., p. 579.

304 “people voting against Church without remembering why”: Ibid., p. 599.

304 moving his family to Australia’s Great Barrier Reef: Ibid., p. 600.

304 Columnist Mary McGrory rebuked Church: Ibid., p. 584.

304 “The Soviet brigade,” McGrory wrote: Ibid., p. 596.

304 Church’s former speechwriter, Bill Hall, said: Ibid.

305 Retired General John K. Singlaub blasted Church: Ibid., p. 601.

305 suppressing evidence regarding Chile: Ibid.

305 A Peter Hart poll of the staff showed significant weaknesses: Scates, Warren G. Magnuson, p. 313.

305 His closest advisers urged him not to seek reelection: Ibid., pp. 313–314.

305 “The boss loved his job, loved his work”: Ibid., p. 314.

305 saw Magnuson, aged, exhausted, and unfocused: Interview with Leon Billings, February 19, 2010.

305 Javits had intended to not seek a fifth term: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, pp. 490–494.

306 Much more serious was his deteriorating health: Ibid.

306 “whether [he] had any business leaving his post of duty”: Ibid.

306 He announced for reelection and disclosed his affliction: Ibid.

306 “There was no argument to stand up against that”: Ibid.

307 Kennedy was absorbing one devastating blow after another: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 292–295.

307 They rallied behind Carter: Ibid., p. 295.

307 Clark’s son expressed disappointment: Interview with Senator Dick Clark, November 9, 2010.

307 a lengthy debate took place between consultants: Ibid.

307 When Kennedy finally did take a strong position: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 295.

308 Peter Hart, polling for the Kennedy campaign: Ibid.

308 Even the Boston Globe, his hometown newspaper: Ibid., p. 297.

308 Carter smashed Kennedy, winning 59 percent: Ibid., p. 300.

308 told Kennedy that he would have to remain neutral: Ibid.; interview with Senator John Culver, April 15, 2010.

308 Joe Biden, who maintained close ties: Carter, White House Diary, p. 362.

308 Kennedy’s advisers were also embittered: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 305, 307.

309 they certainly did not see Carter as an asset: Carter, White House Diary, p. 364, notes on October 22: “We assessed the prospects for U.S. senators up for re-election next year, and they are dismal. Many are quite weak or very liberal. Bob Byrd and I will see what we can do to help them.”

309 On March 30, hopes rose that a deal was at hand: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 185.

310 His appearance probably influenced some undecided voters: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 308.

310 threw all the Iranian diplomats out of the United States: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 186.

310 the rescue mission that an elite Delta Force unit was training for: Ibid.

310 “Gentleman, I want you to know”: Ibid., p. 263.

311 learned to his regret to be very skeptical: Ibid., p. 265.

311 virtually stumbled onto the existence of the planned mission: Witcover, Joe Biden, pp. 144–146.

312 Carter would later write: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 514.

312 this was the one that tore their relationship irreparably: Interview with Dan Tate, June 2, 8, 2010; interview with Hoyt Purvis, January 14, 2011; interview with Joe Stewart, June 14, 2010.

312 “under the impression it was not something that was imminent”: Joanne Omang, “Byrd Knew of Rescue Plan but Didn’t Know It was Underway,” Washington Post, April 27, 1980.

312 he would not have given the operation a 50–50 chance of success: Ibid.

313 Dole said he respected: Robert G. Kaiser, “In Stunned Congress, Wariness and Concern over the War Powers Act,” Washington Post, April 26, 1980.

313 Baker offered unqualified support: Ibid.

313 Jackson was angry he could not get a clear answer: Ibid.

313 Church suggested that launching the operation: Ibid.

313 “a greater failure than that of incomplete success”: Glad, Outsider in the White House, p. 267.

313 “America doesn’t have enough helicopters?”: Ibid., p. 268.

313 Carter was doing the “sensible” thing: Robert G. Kaiser and Michael Getler, “Carter Responds by Returning to the Political Fray,” Washington Post, May 4, 1980.

314 Kennedy still in the race, having finished strongly: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 312–313.

314 The president and the senator met on June 5: T. R. Reid and Edward Walsh, “Kennedy: Planning to Be Nominee,” Washington Post, June 6, 1980; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 312–313; Carter, White House Diary, p. 435; Kennedy, True Compass, pp. 378–379.

314 Carter mulled it over and decided Mondale was right: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 313–314.

CHAPTER 18: AMERICA’S LAST FRONTIER

317 Congress and the Nixon administration also agreed to specify a deadline: Alice Bonner, “Deadline Near for Alaska Lands Bill,” Washington Post, September 17, 1978.

318 Carter was the first president to come to office: Jeffrey K. Stine, “Environmental Policy During the Carter Presidency,” in Fink and Graham, eds., Carter Presidency, pp. 179–180.

318 made protecting the environment a high priority: Ibid., p. 181.

318 On April 25, 1977, Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus: Margot Hornblower, “Carter Stressing Environment in Fight over Alaska Lands,” Washington Post, April 26, 1977.

319 approved a version of the Alaska Lands legislation: Mary Russell, “Alaska Land Bill Is Approved,” Washington Post, May 20, 1978.

320 Tom Eagleton was dropped from the Democratic ticket: Interview with Ed Quick, May 21, 2010.

320 A University of Alaska professor later said: David Westphal, “Mike Gravel, an Anti-War Crusader for Two Generations,” McClatchy Newspapers, December 4, 2007.

320 Carter said on July 31, 1978: Loretta Tofani, “Fallback Methods Studied for Saving Alaska Lands,” Washington Post, August 1, 1978.

320 a bill that nominally set aside 121 million acres: Alice Bonner, “Deadline Near for Alaska Lands Bill,” Washington Post, September 17, 1978.

321 the Energy Committee reached a tentative agreement: “Panel Votes to Set Aside Alaska Lands,” Associated Press, September 30, 1978.

321 a 95-million acre Alaska lands bill: “Technicality Voids Senate Units Vote on Alaska Lands,” Associated Press, October 5, 1978.

321 On October 15, the Alaska Lands Act had died: Richard L. Lyons, “2 Dozen Major Bills Acted on Near End,” Washington Post, October 16, 1978.

321 The post-mortems indicated how much was at stake: Alice Bonner, “Gravel Accused of Sabotaging the Alaska Lands Bill,” Washington Post, October 19, 1978.

321 110 million acres of Alaska land would be closed: Margot Hornblower, “U.S. Moves to Protect Alaska Land,” Washington Post, November 17, 1978.

321 designate 56 million acres of Alaska lands: Margot Hornblower, “Carter Sets Aside 56 Million Acres of Alaska Lands,” Washington Post, December 2, 1978.

322 Carter would express concern about landing in Anchorage: Carter, White House Diary, p. 334.

322 Stevens would always blame Gravel for his wife’s death: Interview with Susan Alvarado, October 11, 2010.

323 Secretary Andrus ordered strict environmental protection: Editorial, “An Unsatisfactory Solution,” Washington Post, February 13, 1980.

323 Stevens, Jackson, and Tsongas meet: “Senators Put Forth Amendments for a Debate over Alaska Lands,” Associated Press, May 4, 1980.

323 On July 21, the Senate began the long-anticipated debate: Joanne Omang, “Energy and Environment Collide on the Senate Floor This Week,” Washington Post, July 20, 1980.

323 Jimmy Carter, deeply committed on the merits: Philip Shabecoff, “Senate Starts Debating Legislation on Future Use of Land in Alaska,” New York Times, July 22, 1980.

324 the environmentalists won a series of test votes: Richard L. Lyons, “Conservation-Minded Senators Survived Test Votes,” Washington Post, July 23, 1980.

324 That explosion was just a prelude to the shouting match: “Senate Sets Aside Alaska Bill to Let Tempers Cool Off,” Associated Press, July 24, 1980.

324 that crucial moment had arrived: Joanne Omang, “Governor, Senators Shun Alaska Bill,” Washington Post, July 30, 1980.

325 On August 4, the negotiators announced: Richard L. Lyons and Helen Dewar, “On Capitol Hill: Alaska Land Substitute Set for Floor,” Washington Post, August 5, 1980.

325 appreciated that Tsongas had been patient: Ibid.

325 Jackson and Gravel were at each other’s throats: Ibid.

325 “every time I try to be reasonable”: Ibid.

326 the Senate gave “all but final approval”: Joanne Omang, “Historic Alaska Lands Bill Nears Senate Passage,” Washington Post, August 19, 1980.

326 On August 19, the Senate gave final approval to the bill: Joanne Omang, “Senate Approves Alaska Bill,” Washington Post, August 20, 1980.

CHAPTER 19: FIGHTING TO SURVIVE

327 Bayh had intensely enjoyed chairing: Interviews with Senator Birch Bayh, February 25, 2009, March 18, 2010.

327 spent an hour telling Bayh what he had to do: Ibid.

328 like surprisingly many other liberal Democrats: Ibid. O’Brien, Philip Hart, pp. 151–153; Christofferson, Man from Clear Lake, pp. 187–190.

328 Bayh joked he was not sure: Bayh interview.

328 committed to remaking the Supreme Court “in his own image”: The phrase is taken from James F. Simon, In His Own Image: The Supreme Court in Richard Nixon’s America (New York: D. McKay, 1973).

328 Bayh quickly took the lead of the coalition: Dean, Rehnquist Choice, p. 21.

328 “I know this president”: Interview with Jay Berman, May 17, 2009.

329 “in no mood for another such donnybrook”: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 161.

329 stepped forward to lead the opposition: Ibid., pp. 161–163.

329 a response that would become one of the most famous: Dean, Rehnquist Choice, p. 21.

330 the Carswell nomination remained in doubt: Ibid., p. 163.

330 Enraged, Nixon went to the White House press room: Ibid., p. 23.

331 he was nominating a guy “who’s there for thirty years”: Ibid., p. 265.

331 expression of his legal views well hidden: Ibid., pp. 266–269.

331 the smoking gun materialized: Ibid., pp. 274–275.

331 Bayh understood what the memo meant: Ibid.

332 He shaped the Intelligence Committee in a bipartisan way: Bayh interview.

333 the news exploded in front-page headlines: Ed Magnuson, “Nation: The Burden of Billy,” Time, August 4, 1980.

333 “There’s a helluva lot more Arabians than there is Jews”:“Nation, The Burden of Billy.”

333 the president had publicly disassociated himself: Ibid.

334 Byrd and Baker met frequently: George Lardner, Jr. “Senate Establishes Investigative Panel,” Washington Post, July 25, 1980.

334 “There’s no necessity for it”: Ibid.

335 Dole could not resist giving a speech: George Lardner Jr., “Probe Leaders Want President as Witness,” Washington Post, July 26, 1980.

335 Bayh, obviously irked at Dole: Ibid.

335 “It’s going to be like walking through a minefield”: George Lardner Jr. and Charles R. Babcock,“Panel to Speed Probe Schedule,” Washington Post, August 1, 1980.

335 his aides had urged him to turn it down: Ibid.

335 On August 4, a line of 300 would-be spectators: Margot Hornblower, “Probe of Billy, Libya Begins,” Washington Post, August 5, 1980.

335 Dole asked sarcastically: Ibid.

335 senators on both sides of the dais seemed uncertain: Margot Hornblower, “Billy Panel: Wondering About the Need,” Washington Post, August 6, 1980.

335 Patrick Leahy, a first-term senator: Ibid.

335 Max Baucus commented: Ibid.

335 Even Dole observed: “A lot was smoke”: Ibid.

335 “in the end, it may not amount to a hill of peanuts”: Ibid.

336 “There’s a lot of disenchantment with confrontation”: Ibid.

336 committed to bringing out the full truth: Walter Isaacson, “Carter: Battling a Revolt,” Time, August 11, 1980.

336 “disclosure of the facts will clearly demonstrate”: Ibid.

336 On August 21, Billy Carter began his testimony: Margot Hornblower, “Billy: No Crime Committed,” Washington Post, August 22, 1980.

336 Dole wanted the investigation to go deeper: Margot Hornblower, “Billy Hearing: ‘Until You Stir the Pot,’” Washington Post, August 24, 1980.

337 “I’ll wager that 90 percent of everything you will hear”: Ibid.

338 heard about Ribicoff’s views: Interview with Dick D’Amato, April 28, 2011.

338 repeatedly called for an open convention: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 315.

338 believed that Byrd was secretly angling for the nomination: Carter, White House Diary, pp. 451–452.

338 Muskie may also have been intrigued: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, p. 314; Bill Peterson and Ward Sinclair, “Open Convention Plotted by a Group of House Democrats,” Washington Post, July 26, 1980. Suspicions about Muskie’s interest increased because of the leadership in the open convention movement by Congressman Michael Barnes, a former Muskie staffer.

338 Jackson apparently had the same thoughts: “Squall Among the Democrats,” Time, May 19, 1980; Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 314–315.

338 He had won three Senate races: Bayh had reached the Senate after upsetting three-term incumbent Homer Capehart in 1962. In 1968, he defeated William Ruckelshaus, who had been the respected first administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. In 1974, Bayh defeated Richard Lugar, the mayor of Indianapolis, who reached the Senate two years later and is still there, running for his seventh term.

339 Republican staffers on the Appropriations Committee: Interview with Mary Jane Checchi, May 13, 2010.

339 “It’s been vitriolic”: Ward Sinclair, “Indiana’s for Reagan, but Some Nasty Dust-Ups Mark Other Contests,” Washington Post, October 19, 1980.

339 Quayle’s consultants came up with a clever line: David Axelrod, “GOP Aiming at Second Indiana Senate Seat,” Chicago Tribune, September 25, 1980.

339 “We gotta help Gaylord”: I was working for Eagleton at the time, but was still close to Nelson, my former boss.

339 Nelson seemed to lack energy: Interview with Jeff Nedelman, May 21, 2010.

339 Howard Paster, a prominent Democrat: Interview with Howard Paster, June 30, 2011.

339 Later that month, Carrie Lee Nelson: Interview with Carrie Lee Nelson, August 30, 2010.

339 Nelson privately agreed: Christofferson, Man from Clear Lake, p. 340.

340 Kasten recognized the challenge: Ward Sinclair, “Wisconsin’s Senator Nelson Stumps from Dawn to Midnight,” Washington Post, October 20, 1980.

340 “I’m hitting hard on the ‘Nelson gap’”: Ibid.

340 “Gaylord is busting his ass”: Christofferson, Man from Clear Lake, p. 340.

340 “This was a different Nelson on the campaign trail”: Ibid.

340 When Vice President Walter Mondale, his close friend: Ibid., pp. 340–341.

340 Nelson opened up a wide lead: Ibid., p. 341.

340 A Washington Post survey on the eve of the election: David S. Broder et al., “A Survey of the Races State by State,” Washington Post, November 2, 1980.

341 Kasten, a bare-knuckled campaigner: Christofferson, Man from Clear Lake, p. 341.

341 A Kasten surrogate pointed out, accurately: Ibid.

341 McGovern had seriously considered not running: Helen Dewar, “McGovern, Trailing Badly, Campaigning Harder Than Ever,” Washington Post, July 8, 1980.

341 McGovern recognized that he was trailing badly: Helen Dewar, “McGovern Trailing Badly,” Washington Post, July 8, 1980.

341 McGovern actually wrote the concession speech: McGovern, “Thoughts on Leaving the Senate,” Congressional Record, December 13, 1980, pp. S16637–16638.

341 threw himself into his reelection campaign: The description of Eagleton’s campaign comes from personal knowledge, since the campaign occurred while I was working for him.

342 Eagleton had surprised Carter by urging him: Carter, White House Diary, p. 211.

342 Eagleton artfully dodged a political bullet: This story comes from personal recollection; I was his subcommittee staff director. It is also told in Ira Shapiro, “Senator Eagleton Made Metro System Possible,” Roll Call, May 21, 2007.

343 Eagleton faced one more unusual challenge: This story also comes from personal knowledge.

344 the distinct possibility of becoming a one-term senator: Patrick Buchanan, “Skies Dark for Liberals in the Senate,” Chicago Tribune, June 12, 1980.

344 Barry Goldwater came to Colorado: Gary Hart, The Thunder and the Sunshine: Four Seasons in a Burnished Life (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 2010), pp. 108–109.

344 Elizabeth Drew, one of Washington’s most distinguished reporters: Elizabeth Drew, Senator (New York: A Touchstone Book, 1979).

344 He had built expertise on defense issues: Drew, Senator, pp. 23–30; Interview with Hoyt Purvis, February 4, 2010.

345 Culver had given serious thought to retiring: Interview with John Culver, April 15, 2010.

345 “He knew he could lose”: Interview with John Podesta, August 19, 2010.

345 Culver decided to run as the liberal he was: Robert G. Kaiser, “Wind from the Right Chills Vulnerable Senate Democrats,” Washington Post, April 10, 1979; Podesta interview.

345 Culver and Grassley squared off in a major debate: Culver interview.

345 “With Watergate,” he wrote: Herman E. Talmadge with Mark Royden Winchell, Talmadge: A Political Legacy, a Politician’s Life (Atlanta: Peachtree Publishers, 1987), p. 265.

345 a grief-stricken Talmadge turned heavily to drink: Ibid., pp. 317–318.

345 The Senate Ethics Committee recommended: Ibid., p. 337.

346 Miller was the only serious threat: Ibid., pp. 344–346.

346 The Republicans sensed Talmadge’s over-confidence: Ibid., p. 352.

346 The film footage led to a devastating television ad: Scates, Warren G. Magnuson , p. 317.

346 “I’m not saying Maggie hasn’t done some good”: Quoted in ibid., p. 316.

346 “the candidate of nostalgia”: Ibid.

346 D’Amato beat him decisively: Javits and Steinberg, Javits, p. 503.

346 Many of his friends and admirers feared: Ibid., p. 505.

346 The Times called on Javits: Ibid.

346 Reagan had come out of the Republican convention: David Broder, “Republicans Dream of Watershed Year,” Washington Post, July 13, 1980; Wilentz, Age of Reagan, p. 120.

347 Carter benefited from some of the same unease: Martin Schram and David S. Broder, “Reagan’s Gears Locked as Carter Pulls Even,” Washington Post, October 17, 1980; Wilentz, Age of Reagan, p. 123.

347 fearing Reagan’s skill on television: Wilentz, Age of Reagan, p. 123.

347 He tried to humanize himself: Ibid., pp. 123–124.

347 Reagan deflected Carter’s sallies with ease: Ibid., p. 124.

348 Nelson turned to Kevin Gottlieb: Christofferson, Man from Clear Lake, p. 341.

349 In his diary, he wrote: Carter, White House Diary, p. 479.

349 I had decided to take the day off: This section is a personal recollection of election day and night 1980.

353 House Speaker Tip O’Neill described it: Wilentz, Age of Reagan, p. 125.

353 One labor leader commented: Helen Dewar, “GOP, with 53 Seats, Claims the Senate,” Washington Post, November 6, 1980.

353 Robert Byrd expressed regret at the defeat: Ibid.

353 “a major advance in the absorption”: Wilentz, Age of Reagan, p. 125.

353 “If the New Right leaders think”: Dewar, “GOP, with 53 Seats, Claims the Senate.”

353 David Broder captured the moment: David S. Broder, “A Sharp Right Turn: Republicans and Democrats Alike See New Era in ’80 Returns,” Washington Post, November 6, 1980.

CHAPTER 20: THE LAME-DUCK SESSION

355 a dozen of them had been dispatched: Bill Prochnau, “Senate Figures, Once Powerful, Ponder Future,” Washington Post, November 15, 1980. This section is supplemented by personal recollection of the lame-duck period.

355 top Senate Democratic aide said: Ibid.

355 Jackson’s aggressive staff: Interview with Ken Ackerman, November 16, 2010.

356 Senator Glenn’s subcommittee staff director: Ibid.

356 McGovern gave the impression of being the calmest: Prochnau, “Senate Figures, Once Powerful.”

356 Bayh, licking his wounds: Ibid.

356 “It’s somebody else’s ballgame now”: Ibid.

356 the lame-duck session proved to be remarkably productive: Carter, White House Diary, pp. 488, 490, 493.

356 asked President Carter to nominate Stephen Breyer: Clymer, Edward M. Kennedy, pp. 324–325.

356 a great relationship with Emory Sneeden: Ibid.

357 Bayh got a call from Long: Gene Quinn, “Exclusive Interview: Senator Birch Bayh on Bayh-Dole at 30,” http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/11/07/exclusive-interview-senator-birch-bayh-on-bayh-dole/id=13198/ November 7, 2010.

357 “perhaps the most inspired piece of legislation”: “Innovation’s Golden Goose,” Economist Technology Quarterly, December 14, 2002.

357 “We’re at the mercy of the Senate”: Joanne Omang, “Shift on Hill May Help Alaska Lands Bill,” Washington Post, November 8, 1980.

358 “This bill is the best that can be done”: Ibid.

358 Mo Udall said that “no president”: “Carter Signs Law for Protection of Alaska Lands,” Associated Press, December 3, 1980.

358 spent countless hours poring over maps of Alaska: Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 582.

358 The Washington Post editorial page called it: “The Alaska Lands Battle Ends,” Washington Post, November 17, 1980.

359 Nelson made the fastest and best transition: Christofferson, Man from Clear Lake, p. 344.

360 remembered Javits lobbying him repeatedly: Interview with Ken Duberstein, November 10, 2010.

360 What could he say to get Domenici’s support: Ibid.

EPILOGUE

361 beautifully captured the essence of the Senate: Congressional Record—Senate, November 30, 2010, pp. 58277–58280.

362 John Sears, the respected Republican consultant: Carl Hulse, “For Republicans, an ’80 Déjà vu?,” New York Times, August 28, 2010.

362 slotting some of the weakest of the new partisans: Interview with John Rother, August 11, 2010.

363 “In the Senate of the ’80’s”: Alan Ehrenhalt, “In the Senate of the ’80’s, Team Spirit Has Given Way to the Rule of Individuals,” Congressional Quarterly, September 4, 1982.

363 “seems to stand for a Senate that has disappeared”: Ibid.

363 “the Senate seemed to be a less congenial place”: Tower, Consequences, p. 84.

364 Dole changed his approach in 1981: Interview with Sheila Burke, October 13, 2010; the discussion of Dole is also based on my personal observations while working in the Senate.

364 she told him she was a Democrat from California: Burke interview.

365 never happier than when he was moving: Ibid.

365 led the most visible investigation: William S. Cohen and George J. Mitchell, Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings (New York: Viking, 1988).

365 “Congress regained its voice in the 1987–1988 session”: Byrd, Senate Addresses , vol. 2, p. 606, quoting New York Times, October 24, 1988.

366 hated the place from the moment he arrived: Trent Lott, Herding Cats: A Life in Politics (New York: Regan Books, 2005), pp. 112–118.

366 “We were conservative, we were hungry”: Ibid., p. 118.

367 Rudman, a respected former prosecutor: Tower, Consequences, pp. 350–352.

367 Dole accused the Democrats of using the nomination: Ibid., 352–357.

367 Cohen still expresses outrage at the treatment: Interview with Senator William Cohen, September 27, 2010.

367 “Dole didn’t really dislike Clinton”: Sidney Blumental, The Clinton Wars (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003),p. 159.

367 Rudman left first: Warren Rudman, Combat: Twelve Years in the US Senate (New York: Random House, 1996), pp. 242–243.

368 “It was as though someone had pushed a mute button”: Danforth, Faith and Politics, p. 143.

368 finally told Dole that he would resign: Interview with Keith Kennedy, November 11, 2010.

368 Connie Mack of Florida, a former House member: Interview with Senator Bob Packwood, July 19, 2010.

369 “The panel was nicknamed ‘The Council of Trent’”: Lott, Herding Cats, p. 125.

369 One thoughtful academic study: Sean M. Theriault and David W. Rohde, “The Gingrich Senators and Party Polarization in the U.S. Senate,” http://journals.cambridge.org/action//displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8360400&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381611000752.

369 Collins was amazed to find: Interview with Senator Susan Collins, July 19, 2010.

369 “The Senate changed when the battered children”: Interview with Senator Alan Simpson, February 2, 2010.

370 “a takeover of the Republican Party by the Christian Right”: Danforth, Faith and Politics, p. 7.

370 Danforth expressed particular contempt for Frist’s role: Ibid., p. 76.

371 From all reports, the seventeen women senators: Dan Weil, “Women Senators Pick Politeness over Politics,” Newsmax.com, February 4, 2011.

372 struck by the paradox: Interview with Senator Carl Levin, August 6, 2010.

372 “the two lasting achievements of this Senate”: George Packer, “The Empty Chamber,” New Yorker, August 9, 2010.

373 blasting the “supine Senate”: Robert C. Byrd, Losing America: Confronting a Reckless and Arrogant Presidency (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 79.

373 “Ronald Reagan would have a very difficult”: quoted in Dana Milbank, “Reagan’s New Party,” Washington Post, July 20, 2011.

374 came out convinced he should support it: Manu Raju, “START Appears Set for Final Approval,” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/46669.html, December 21, 2010.