Eisenhower’s third concern was about the actual utility of shelters. He became convinced that, even with shelters, the United States would suffer tremendous devastation in a nuclear war. A variety of scientific studies commissioned by the executive branch on the issue of shelters and survivability reinforced that view. The stated goal of these studies was to provide hard quantitative data on the survivability of nuclear war. The latent intent was to promote optimism and hope about the nuclear age. As previously noted, “The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development” study, despite its grim theme, proved surprisingly optimistic on the issue of recovery. “We share a firm belief,” the panel argued, “that the prospect is not a hopeless one.” “Our pioneer background and inheritance predispose us to count hardships as a challenge and fortify us against complacency. We are resourceful people,” the panel proclaimed, “inventive no less socially and politically than technologically.” American inventiveness and belief in freedom were the “genius of American life,” and through this genius, the committee insisted, the United States could survive even the worst nuclear disaster.¹⁰⁷

Another more influential finding which addressed the issue of shelters was the Gaither report. Titled officially “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age,” the Gaither report recommended that the Eisenhower administration make preparations to strengthen America’s continental and civil defenses. Among these improvements was a five-year, $25 billion program for fallout shelters. Eisenhower took issue. In the event of nuclear attack, the president learned, fallout shelters might save 35 percent of the population. “We are talking about the complete destruction of the United States,” he concluded. The president thus opposed the Gaither committee’s recommendation to build vast numbers of fallout shelters because in any nuclear exchange millions would die and fallout shelters would provide minimal protection for a limited number of people.¹⁰⁸ Echoing Eisenhower’s own conclusion, Vice President Nixon argued that the difference between forty million dead Americans and sixty million dead Americans was inconsequential in the grand scheme of the United States.¹⁰⁹ Why divert billions of dollars to a fallout shelter program which provided inadequate and uneven protection, Eisenhower asked, when that money might be better spent improving America’s economy and maintaining a high level of nuclear readiness to deter a war? For Eisenhower, the answer was clear. The United States held a solid strategic position, despite the Gaither report’s findings, and large-scale, government-sponsored civil defense was costly and ineffective.¹¹⁰ In the event of nuclear war, the United States would suffer horrific physical losses, but even without major civil defense measures, the nation must remain hopeful in the belief that nuclear war was survivable.

Eisenhower believed that the United States would do better to spend its time and money in an effort to prevent nuclear war. He concluded that only the preparation of active defense measures in the form of massive retaliatory capability held some possibility for deterring war, remained cost-effective, and preserved hope for America’s future in the thermonuclear age. “A shelter program would interfere seriously with vital programs for strengthening the active defenses of the United States,” Eisenhower explained. If the United States intended to protect something absolutely, he reasoned, it must be “our massive retaliatory capability” so that the enemy would have no doubt about the consequences of war and thus be less inclined to risk a confrontation.¹¹¹ Working from this rationale, the president implemented the policy of massive retaliation which built upon the great power of the newest nuclear weapons and allowed him to project military strength to America’s enemies. He chose a logical and pragmatic policy of nuclear deterrence. He had confidence the Soviet Union did not seek a general war with the United States, and he pledged that the United States would never launch a first strike. Instead, with some understanding of nuclear war, he placed his faith in the strength of nuclear weapons with the belief that only strength could bring peace.

c. Taking Appropriate Military Action

Following the end of the Korean War and the implementation of the New Look, Eisenhower faced a crisis in Asia in September 1954 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began shelling two small islands, Quemoy and Matsu. Located in the Taiwan Strait close to the mainland of China, Quemoy and Matsu, like other islands in the vicinity, remained disputed by both parties. Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government on Taiwan, then known as Formosa, claimed the two islands as its own and even garrisoned a small number of troops on each island. Mao Zedong and the People’s Republic of China continued to insist that Quemoy and Matsu belonged to the PRC and Chiang’s occupation of those islands and Taiwan as well was both illegal and temporary. To protect Formosa, the U.S. Navy had occupied for some time the straits to repel a Chinese attack against Taiwan but also to deter a Nationalist attack against the People’s Republic. In February 1953, Eisenhower removed the naval blockade which the United States had held in the Taiwan Straits in the days since the beginning of the Korean War. Beijing perceived the removal of the blockade as a signal of America’s intent to unleash Chiang and to begin the rollback of communism in Asia. Soon after the blockade’s removal, Chiang began moving the first of 75,000 troops to Quemoy and Matsu in preparation for battle. Believing that Chiang Kai-shek was developing closer relations with Washington, Mao ordered the People’s Liberation Army to begin began shelling the two islands on 3 September 1954. PLA airplanes also attacked the Tachen islands, another set of disputed territories near the Chinese mainland.

The evidence seemed to support Mao’s view that Washington and Taipei were growing closer. Shortly after the shelling began in September 1954, but nine months after John Foster Dulles announced the policy of massive retaliation, the United States helped form the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Similar to NATO, SEATO intended to resist the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Mao was convinced that Chiang intended to use those islands as launching points for an invasion of mainland China. Mao believed, moreover, that Chiang would not take this risky action without the permission and backing of the United States. In an effort to deter U.S. interference in what he considered in an internal affair, Mao ordered the shelling. He anticipated that this action would put pressure on both Taipei and Washington and also expose to the world the American plot to interfere directly in the affairs of a sovereign nation, namely the People’s Republic of China.¹¹² In January 1955, Chinese forces seized Yijianshan Island approximately 200 miles north of Taiwan and the Nationalist garrison there was destroyed. Military clashes between China and Taiwan increased in the early part of 1955 including fighting on Quemoy, Matsu, and along the coast of mainland China. To Eisenhower, Chinese communists were becoming increasingly hostile and aggressive.

The Taiwan Straits crisis of 1954-55 was the kind of crisis with which Eisenhower was familiar. The danger of wider war always existed in areas where national interests were at stake and where potential combatants failed to recognize the great risks involved. To Eisenhower, World War II was clearly the product of one man’s drive for power, but both World War I and the Korean War came about as a result of miscalculation. In the case of the Great War, Eisenhower understood that “a prince was murdered; there began to be an exchange of notes back and forth; and I believe that there was a miscalculation of what Russia, France, and Britain would do, and that created that war.” In Korea the situation was not altogether different but certainly simpler: “I feel that the Korean conflict started because of our failing to make clear that we would defend this small nation, which had just started, in a pinch.”¹¹³ Miscalculation by the aggressor nation in these two cases resulted in a larger war than originally intended by the aggressor nation.

In Taiwan, Eisenhower feared another “powder keg” war. “To my mind, the danger of Communists beginning a global shooting war is not too imminent,” Eisenhower told a friend in 1952, “at least as long as we are not taking into account the danger of a ‘powder keg’ war.”¹¹⁴ “Wherever there is any kind of fighting and open violence in the world,” Eisenhower told journalist Chalmers Roberts at a press conference, “it is always sort of a powder keg.”¹¹⁵ He believed that even the smallest spark, such as the murder of a prince or misunderstood intentions could ignite a powder keg which would then explode into a greater war. The Taiwan Straits crisis held the potential to create that spark. “As long as actual fighting persists anywhere,” Eisenhower said of the Taiwan Straits, “there is always the danger that some hot bullet will hit a powder keg.”¹¹⁶ Given this view, he sought to make clear the United States’ intentions regarding Taiwan and the surrounding islands.

Eisenhower was not anxious to get into war and he resisted those who seemed eager to do so. The Joint Chiefs of Staff repeatedly argued to Eisenhower the great importance of Quemoy and Matsu to the stability of the military situation in the Straits. They believed that holding the islands was of great military value in the larger Cold War struggle. Eisenhower did not agree, and he cautioned his military advisors on the consequences of placing great value where it did not belong. The president was not willing to risk a larger war over these strategically unimportant islands. If the United States decided to attack the Chinese forces bombarding the islands as well as other Chinese forces in the region to relieve pressure on Chiang, Eisenhower believed that the attack could not be limited. Those strikes would be first steps only, he thought, and the following steps would likely involve atomic weapons.¹¹⁷ But the president did not intend “to use the A-bomb in any ‘border incident,’” rather it “was to be reserved for a major Communist attack.”¹¹⁸ If the United States were to expand the war with atomic weapons over Taiwan, the president reminded his advisors, “we’re not talking now about a limited, brush-fire war. We’re talking about going to the threshold of World War III. If we attack China, we’re not going to impose limits on our military actions.” Even more, he continued, general war would likely follow, and the logical enemy for such a war was Russia, not China. The United States would attack there as well.¹¹⁹ Eisenhower wanted to avoid that scenario, and through late 1954 he believed avoidance of a larger war in Asia was still possible.

The crisis over Taiwan quickly worsened. The bombardment which began in September in the Straits continued through the fall. On 1 November 1954, Eisenhower learned that the Chinese Communists had expanded the bombing to the Tachen Islands, an island group north of Taiwan. Meanwhile, the shelling of Quemoy and other small associated islands continued, as did the buildup of Chinese troops opposite Taiwan.¹²⁰ Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai continued to speak of the liberation of Taiwan, and on 23 November 1954, the government of China announced guilty verdicts and long prison sentences for American airmen shot down during the Korean War. At the same time, Eisenhower received little help in avoiding war from Taiwan’s President Chiang Kai-shek who predicted a war in the near future and appeared to relish that likelihood. The crisis continued to escalate into the next year. On 10 January 1955, the PRC conducted air raids against the Tachen islands and eight days later they overran the small island of Ichiang, seven miles north of the Tachens.

Though he still saw none of these areas as worth the risk of war, at the urging of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower shifted his policy. In January 1955, the United States agreed to an evacuation of the Tachen Islands, which the president believed would be difficult to defend, but also pledged to hold those areas then in friendly hands, including Quemoy and Matsu.¹²¹ In a message to Congress on 24 January, Eisenhower explained just how and where the United States intended to meet the communist aggression in the Taiwan Straits. The president cited the continuing availability of the Seventh Fleet and reminded the Congress of the Mutual Defense treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan then under consideration by the Senate. He recited the series of aggressive military actions by China and noted that “the Chinese Communists themselves assert that these attacks are a prelude to the conquest of Formosa.” While waiting for the United Nations to act appropriately, Eisenhower requested Congressional authorization for “the use of the armed forces of the United States if necessary to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.”¹²² In addition to providing support to Taiwanese forces, the United States “must be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa, and be prepared to take appropriate military action.”¹²³ Congress agreed, and Eisenhower signed the Formosa resolution on 29 January 1955 which afforded him authority to take the military action he deemed appropriate within the confines of the resolution.

Eisenhower hoped that a strong Congressional resolution would help to reduce the likelihood of a powder keg war. He asked for and received from the Congress a resolution which “would make clear the unified and serious intentions” of the United States. The president believed that a clear statement of American intentions and goals would “reduce the possibility that the Chinese Communists, misjudging our firm purpose and national unity, might be disposed to challenge the position of the United States, and precipitate a major crisis which even they would neither anticipate nor desire.” He further wanted to “remove any doubt regarding our willingness … to engage in whatever operations may be required” to preserve the freedom of Taiwan and the world.¹²⁴ The president wanted to guarantee that war did not occur “through mistaken calculations on the other side.” “The purpose is honestly and hopefully to prevent war,” Eisenhower explained.¹²⁵ Specifically, the resolution allowed the president to “to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.” With the resolution, Congress approved in advance those measures the president judged “to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.”¹²⁶ Meanwhile, Eisenhower continued to explore the possibility that the United Nations might help mediate the conflict but China and the Soviet Union had so far refused to cooperate.

The evacuations of the Tachens began on 4 February 1955 and the reinforcement of the Matsus followed. “What we have done has apparently been interpreted by the Chinese Communists merely as a sign of weakness,” Eisenhower wrote Winston Churchill two weeks later.¹²⁷ John Foster Dulles agreed. After returning from Southeast Asia on 8 March 1955, Dulles told the president that “the Chinese Communists are determined to capture Formosa. Surrendering Quemoy and Matsu won’t end that determination.” Dulles told Eisenhower that he estimated the United States’ chance of going to war was fifty-fifty. “If we defend Quemoy and Matsu, we’ll have to use atomic weapons,” Dulles continued, “they alone will be effective against the mainland airfields.” Eisenhower agreed with Dulles’ analysis and considered atomic war with China.¹²⁸

With tensions increasing, the press caught wind of a possible American atomic attack and sought to discover Eisenhower’s thinking on how the situation might develop. The United States has been “active in producing various types of weapons that feature nuclear fission ever since World War II,” Eisenhower reminded a reporter. Without revealing under what specific circumstances these weapons might be used, the president did explain that tactical fission weapons, not thermonuclear bombs, worked best against military targets. “In any combat where they can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes,” he remarked, “I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Eisenhower did add a caveat: “I believe the great question about these things comes when you begin to get into those areas where you cannot make sure that you are operating merely against military targets. But with that one qualification, I would say, yes, of course [fission weapons] would be used.” If he decided to use force in a war, Eisenhower continued, “then I know of no reason why a large explosion shouldn’t be used as freely as a small explosion.” Still, he ridiculed “the indiscriminate use of [thermonuclear] weapons” as illogical. “What would you have left?” the president rhetorically queried. During his press conference the following week, Eisenhower used the term atomic to apply to all fission and fusion weapons. Clearly, “the indiscriminate use atomic weapons” might leave nothing standing. At the same time Eisenhower also noted that “the concept of atomic war is too horrible for man to endure and to practice.”¹²⁹

For his part, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill argued against the use of atomic weapons to defend Quemoy and Matsu. The United States need not defend them at all, Churchill told Eisenhower, because the effort would simply not be worth it. Going to the brink over non-essential areas which proved vital only to the ego of Chiang Kaishek and not the free world made little sense to Churchill. In principle Eisenhower agreed and hoped Chiang Kai-Shek would come to realize how unimportant some of the disputed areas were. For Churchill, waging nuclear war seemed an unacceptable alternative to referring the matter to the United Nations and giving the People’s Republic of China the benefit of the doubt over whether Mao intended to invade and reclaim Taiwan.

Eisenhower, however, believed that the risk of a larger war was small. Indeed, he appeared unconcerned about possible Soviet entry even if the war expanded.¹³⁰ The U.S.S.R. would likely send supplies into China to assist, but the president concluded that Kremlin leaders would ultimately decide not to risk the PRC falling victim to “the bombing that we could conduct against her mainland.”¹³¹ Eisenhower had already concluded that large-scale atomic attacks against China would likely be paired with attacks against what he called the logical enemy, the Soviet Union.

Still, Eisenhower routinely refused to commit either to the use or non-use of atomic weapons to resolve the Taiwan Straits Crisis. He well understood that wars often failed to follow a predictable pattern and that he could not and would not predict just how the United States would meet an unknown series of future events. “So I think you just have to wait,” he concluded, “and that is the kind of prayerful decision that may some day face a president.”¹³² Eisenhower wanted to take all the time he was afforded before committing. As he told Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn on 20 March 1955, “we have not made that decision and will not make it until we know the circumstances surrounding any given attack.”¹³³

Ultimately, the large-scale Chinese attack upon Taiwan which would have likely prompted an American atomic response never came. On 23 April 1955, at an Asian-American conference in Bandung, Chinese Foreign minister Zhou Enlai publicly expressed China’s desire not to go to war with the United States over Taiwan and suggested that China would pursue liberation of Taiwan through peaceful means. The PRC stopped the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu on 10 May 1955 and an informal cease fire fell into place on 22 May 1955. A few days later, China announced the release of the American airmen imprisoned for their participation in the Korean War. Although the area would flare up again in 1958, the first Taiwan Straits Crisis had ended and the region calmed.

Eisenhower remembered the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55 as “one of the most serious problems of the first eighteen months of my administration.” He saw the crisis as an opportunity to learn from previous mistakes, to repair lost credibility, and to put to work his vision of Cold War conflict in the nuclear age. “The mistaken communist notion that under no circumstances would the United States” assist South Korea, for example, led in part to that conflict. This time, Eisenhower resolved that “no uncertainty about our commitment to defend Formosa should invite a major Chinese Communist attack.”¹³⁴

Eisenhower intended to build the nation’s capacity to retaliate instantly and massively and to project that strength in order to eliminate enemy doubt about American resolve. He hoped the projection of strength was all he needed. “It was the threat that he was primarily talking about,” Andrew Goodpaster remembered, “Now behind the threat there has to be the reality, but he always put the stress on the threat.”¹³⁵ When asked if he would use atomic weapons in a general war in Asia, Eisenhower answered that he would. “I hoped this answer would have some effect in persuading the Chinese Communists of the strength of our determination,” Eisenhower later wrote.¹³⁶ If this show of strength should fail to prevent aggression or to stop a war, “then they would know that if their use of conventional force in fact threatened our vital interest, we would not be limited, that the threat of nuclear attack would exist.”¹³⁷ He told his advisers that, as in Korea a year before, if the Chinese pressed the attack and threatened Taiwan, the United States would respond with sufficient force to drive the Chinese back. U.S. conventional military power hardly had this capability, and atomic weapons would be used, first at the tactical level and then beyond as needed.

Eisenhower believed that only satisfactory and indeed overwhelming military strength could provide a deterrent to aggressive action, and he further concluded that only nuclear weapons provided that level of force. The U.S. Seventh Fleet offered only the flimsiest of military protection to Taiwan from an invasion of the People’s Republic of China and vice versa. With SEATO in existence and with a mutual defense pact in place between the U.S. and Taiwan since March 1955, the United States committed not only its conventional force to the area but the whole of its nuclear options as well. By 1955, Eisenhower sought to make all interested parties aware that the defense of Taiwan was perhaps more vital to the United States than the Soviet Union or China realized. If the enemies of the United States underestimated the lengths to which the United States would go to defend Chiang Kai-shek’s nation, they risked a far larger general war. Eisenhower intended to force the communist powers to decide as to what goals they hoped to accomplish and at what cost. He used a strategy of massive retaliation to raise the stakes of the Cold War and simultaneously make sure that a larger war was far less likely. For Eisenhower, the crisis proved to be a successful test of his nuclear policy.

Eisenhower intended for his nuclear strength to be a legitimate, practical, and ultimately decisive strategic weapon. He rejected the advice of the British who, he believed, “had not as yet fully grasped the importance of atomic warfare.”¹³⁸ He employed the New Look and the doctrine of massive retaliation to deter enemy aggression through the threat of nuclear war and also as an appropriate strategy to achieve military victory should deterrence fail. He did not take the use of nuclear weapons lightly, particularly not after the development of the thermonuclear bomb, but he did not attach much special significance to those weapons either. The historical record showed that Eisenhower did not just avoid nuclear war during his administration, but he avoided large-scale conventional war as well. For Eisenhower, only nuclear weapons, tactical and strategic, atomic and thermonuclear, created the military strength necessary to achieve this goal. He did not have much interest in the science of fission or fusion, nor was he burdened by the weight of moral arguments against the use of nuclear weapons that troubled many scientists in the United States and his British allies. Through military strength, Eisenhower hoped either to preserve the peace or win the war. In either capacity, the nuclear weapon proved both useful and good.