APPENDIX A

Here is the complete text of Feith’s report as ultimately forwarded to me by the National Transportation Safety Board:

Date: November 5, 1985
To: Chairman
Thru: Chief, Denver Field Office GRB 11-6-85
Director, Bureau of Field Operations
Director, Bureau of Accident Investigation
From: Gregory A. Feith, Air Safety Investigator
Subject: After Action Report—Mount Illimani Expedition

This report is a simplified account of the expedition that took place on Mt. Illimani in Bolivia. It also contains my thoughts about the planning and execution of the expedition.

On September 25, 1985, I was selected to retrieve the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder from the Eastern Airlines Boeing 727 that crashed January 1, 1985 at the 19,500 foot level of Mt. Illimani, located near La Paz, Bolivia. I immediately began researching information about high altitude mountain climbing so as to be well informed on the physiological factors associated with the high altitude and lack of oxygen. I contacted AI Errington from Boeing Aircraft Company, and a member of the investigation team, and we discussed the various aspects of the lllimani climb. He informed me that he and Jim Baker, the second Boeing team member, as well as Mark and Allen Gerber, the Airline Pilot’s investigation team members, were on a prescribed drug called Diamox. The drug Diamox is a potent carbonic anhydrase inhibitor that catalyzes the reversible reaction involving the hydration of carbon dioxide. It is used to reduce the likelihood of edema (which is altitude sickness). In addition, Al told me that they were also taking a second drug called Decadron which is an anti inflammatory. I obtained a prescription for Diamox and began taking the drug on October 2. I did not take Decadron. I read a couple of books that discussed the various types of edema and the symptoms associated with each so that I could monitor myself and recognize any abnormalities. I also read several books that described Mt. Illimani and previous climbs (not associated with the accident). I also researched the type of equipment needed for a climb of this caliber and was informed by Mr. Sundeen and Mr. Hendricks, that I had to provide my own equipment and should be self sufficient because equipment and food could not be guaranteed in Bolivia.

I arrived in Washington at NTSB headquarters on Tuesday, October 1, for a planning meeting with the investigation team members, AI Errington and Jim Baker from Boeing, Allen and Mark Gerber and Don McClure from the Airline Pilot’s Association, Barry Trotter from Eastern Airlines, John Young (Ed. Note: I believe this is Jack Young, the NTSB Investigator-in-Charge of the Flight 980 crash) and Rudy Kapustin from the NTSB, and Judith Kelly. While I was in Washington I attempted to obtain a cash travel advance of $2,500.00 because I was told that the Bolivian economy was too unstable to use credit cards. I was only able to receive $600.00 cash because amounts over $300.00 had to be applied for several weeks in advance. Unfortunately I only had three working days notice prior to our October 2 departure date. There should be a way of obtaining sufficient travel funds on short notice because credit cards are not always accepted.

The investigation team departed for La Paz on October 2, via Eastern Airlines. The team spent four days in La Paz (12,500 foot elevation) acclimating to the altitude. During the four days, we had several meetings with Royce Fitche, the Consul General in La Paz, our mountain guide Bernardo Guarachi and Rene Quinsanilla, the Red Cross Coordinator in which we discussed the logistics of the climb. As part of our acclimation, we went to Chocultiya, the highest ski area in the world at 16,500 feet. We climbed the slope to the summit which is at 17,400 feet. Everyone in the team completed the climb with no ill effects. The team was in good physical condition on Monday, October 7, when we departed La Paz. We were transported by a small bus called a Micro to the base camp at Mt. Illimani; we drove approximately 65 miles in 4.5 hours.

We began the climb on Tuesday, October 8, at 0800. The first leg of the climb was done on shale rock and snow that had a vertical slope of 10 to 35 degrees. We ascended 3300 feet to our first base camp located at the 17,800 foot level, arriving at approximately 1600. When we arrived at the camp, we were surprised to find none of our equipment that the Red Cross and porters had carried up the mountain for us. After some discussions between Royce Fitche and Renee Quinsanilla via two-way radio, we learned that the equipment had been moved up to our second base camp at 19,500 because it was thought by Renee that we were capable of a 5000 foot ascent the first day. During this portion of the climb, Jim Baker had developed a severe cough which was to be a result of the very dry air. Renee was requested by Royce to bring tents and cooking supplies down to our camp because we were not able to continue the ascent. After approximately 2 hours of waiting, several Red Cross people arrived with two tents but no stoves or fuel. Because of darkness, it was not possible to retrieve any further equipment and with the equipment we had available we were able to melt enough snow to make one pot of cold noodle soup that allowed each of us one cup. The two tents that had been brought down were two-man tents, there were seven men. AI Errington, Jim Baker, and Bernardo Guarachi agreed to bivouac which allowed myself, Allen and Mark Gerber, and Royce Fitche to share the tents. At about 0130, Jim woke us and told us that AI Errington had developed signs of pulmonary edema and that he was on oxygen. Jim said that he would monitor AI and if his condition became worse they would attempt to return to the low base camp that night. As it turned out, AI held his own through the night and at 0630 Jim and AI left the team and returned to the base camp.

The remaining team members, with the aid of several porters to carry our equipment, completed the second leg of the climb to our base camp at 19,500 feet. This portion was done on a snow slope that ranged from 25 degrees to 45 degrees. During this portion of the climb, we encountered only one problem. Royce had a crampon (spikes used for walking on ice) come off which caused him to lose his balance and fall over the side of the hill that we were climbing. We retrieved Royce, fixed his crampon and continued the climb, arriving at the base camp shortly after noon. The decision was made to remain at this base camp the remainder of Wednesday and Thursday so that the team could be well rested and fed before the final leg of the climb which would be the most difficult. In addition, we also used the extra day to allow some of our equipment that would be needed at the accident site to be brought up from the low base camp.

We began the final leg of the ascent on Friday morning at 0915. This part of the climb was done on a snow and ice slope ranging from 20 degrees to 60 degrees vertical. We encountered extremes in weather conditions, i.e., starting with a bright sunny day and warm surface temperatures, changing then to overcast, cold, blizzard conditions, then back to warm temperatures. The weather was constantly changing. We had two slight problems during this ascent, first, Royce fell into a crevasse while attempting to cross an ice bridge over it; second, I had a crampon come off while walking along an ice ledge which eventually collapsed due to the weight of me and my back pack. I had to leave my pack behind so as to complete that portion of the climb. We reached the accident site base camp at 1730, 8.5 hours after starting. During this portion of the climb, Mark Gerber began showing signs of pulmonary edema. His condition deteriorated during the evening and he was sick throughout the night. Saturday morning Mark’s condition had deteriorated to the point that his balance and equilibrium was significantly effected (sic) and his thought process and speech was slow and inconsistent.

At approximately 0800, we began the process of locating and digging up wreckage in an effort to locate the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder. The aircraft wreckage was covered by snow ranging in depth from 5 to 12 feet. We used light weight aluminum grain shovels to move the snow.

The following portions of the aircraft were located and uncovered for examination:

1.An eight foot by five foot section of the left forward upper fuselage skin and window frame. The fuselage skin had a part of Eastern’s logo painted on it. This part of the aircraft was buried to a depth of approximately five feet.

2. The vertical stabilizer with the upper and lower rudder, the “bullet” and a portion of the left horizontal stabilator was uncovered. A hole of approximately ten feet had been dug to reveal the lower portion of the vertical stabilizer. No. 2 engine compartment components were located as well as passenger cabin, galley and lavatory items. Various paperwork from the cockpit was also found in this hole. No evidence of the CVR or FDR was found.

3. Small incidental pieces of wreckage were found in a crevasse that runs through the wreckage path. I identified a deflated life vest, a part of a seat back, electrical wiring, and plastic pieces that looked like the overhead storage bin in the passenger cabin. I recovered a set of shoulder harness that was attached to a cockpit flight crew seat. The metal buckles had what appeared to be blood stains on them.

4. A section of the fuselage that I identified as the aft stair area where the FDR and CVR would be mounted. This section measured approximately four feet by five feet and was covered by approximately seven feet of snow. Again, no evidence of FDR or CVR.

5. In an area adjacent to the fuselage section described in No. 4, a portion of the fuselage was found that measured approximately ten feet long and five feet wide and covered by seven to eight feet of snow. A portion of this fuselage section was uncovered and several lizard skins that were being carried on the aircraft were found frozen to the metal. This section of fuselage appeared to be a portion of lower fuselage skin possibly near a cargo door.

6. There were numerous minute and undescribable pieces of aircraft wreckage uncovered, none of which could be readily identified or used to find the FDR or CVR.

At 18:30, the digging efforts were terminated because of adverse weather and darkness. In addition, I discussed with Royce Fitche the health of the team members and because of my concern for Mark Gerber’s, as well as Royce’s poor physical condition, I decided to terminate the on-scene investigation and begin the descent as soon as possible. Mark and Royce both used oxygen periodically throughout Saturday evening.

We started the descent on Sunday morning. We were planning to complete the descent in two days but again the Red Cross changed plans without consulting us or even telling us. I was able to complete the descent in one day. Royce also completed the descent in one day with only minor problems. Mark became temporarily incapacitated by the edema and had to be carried down the upper part of the mountain. It took nine hours to transport Mark down to the 17,800 foot base camp. It was decided that Mark, Allan and Bernardo would spend the night at the base camp and complete the descent on Monday. Again, communication with the Red Cross seemed to lose something in the translation because when it was decided that part of the team was staying on the mountain, the Red Cross was required to shuttle equipment (fuel for stoves and food) up from the low base camp to the camp at 17,800 feet. The Red Cross people arrived at the camp with two gallons of KooL-Aid and extra clothing. Mark, Allen, and Bernardo were able to make due (sic) with what they had which got them through the night.

Mark, Allan and Bernardo arrived at the low base camp at 14:00 on Monday. Mark had recovered slightly from the edema and was able to complete the descent under his own power with help from Allan and Bernardo. The entire team, with the exception of Jim Baker, who was admitted earlier in the week to the hospital in La Paz with a lung infection and blood clots, returned to La Paz Monday evening to recover and deacclimate.

The only health-related problem that I experienced occurred after I returned to La Paz and the States. I had problems with hyperventilation and low blood pressure which have since returned to normal.

On Thursday, October 17, myself, Mark, and Allan Gerber departed La Paz for our home bases in the States. AI Errington remained in La Paz with Jim Baker who was still in the hospital recovering. They both returned to Seattle on October 26.

In retrospect of the Illimani expedition, and because an expedition such as this is a possibility in the future, I feel that the Board should be aware of the problems that we encountered, so that future missions will not be hampered by these problems. (Inserted here in this report was the following statement):

[Portions of page 5 and 6 of the attached report have been deleted. This information represents the personal views of the investigator and his conclusions and recommendations to the Safety Board with respect to the conduct of high altitude accident investigations under hazardous conditions]

I would also like to express my thanks to the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bureau of Accident Investigation and the Bureau of Field Operations for selecting me for the mission and providing me with essential logistical support while I was in Bolivia.

Signed

Gregory A. Feith

*Note: I wonder what “essential logistical support” Feith is referencing. When you read the Gerber brothers comments later in this book, you will see that the NTSB did more to doom the mission than anything else.