The National Defence College (NDC) Course is the most prestigious for armed forces officers of one-star rank, as well as officers at the level of joint secretary in the government. Therefore, only the best brigadiers and their equivalents are selected by the armed forces for this year-long course. This is the first formalized teaching imparted to us in our military careers, where the focus during all discussions and deliberations is at the national level. The aim is to enable the future policy-makers to get an overall understanding of the impact of international, regional and national issues relating to national security, and a focused exposure to political, military, economic and scientific dimensions that are vital for evolving national strategies. Besides this, the course is an excellent opportunity to interact with officers from the armed forces of friendly foreign countries. The highlights of the course are talks given by a vast array of experts, intellectuals and specialists in diverse fields; tours within India and to foreign countries; and presentations on India by study groups of students.
I was fortunate to visit the USA and Poland during the foreign tour in mid-1993. Post Cold War, we were the first students from the NDC course who were allowed to visit the USA. Our programme included interactions with the department of defence officials in the Pentagon, a visit to an airbase in Virginia, where we saw the F-7 stealth fighter from very close, and we were also taken on board the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS John F. Kennedy, at the naval base in Norfolk. It was amazing to learn that the nuclear power plant on the carrier could light up a small town. During the interaction at the Pentagon, I raised the issue of double standards shown by the US in being a champion of democracy on one hand and supporting dictatorships on the other. The frank reply was revealing indeed – ‘our national interests will always predominate while deciding foreign policy, double standards notwithstanding.’ This was realpolitik! We were then taken to California, where we were briefed at the headquarters of the US Army National Guard. We returned via Tokyo, so it virtually turned out to be a trip where we went round the globe. A great experience, indeed.
On graduating from the NDC in December 1993, I was posted as the deputy director general of operational logistics (DDGOL) in the Army HQ. This was my first assignment in Delhi since my commissioning in 1964! For no fault of mine, I had been denied the experience of serving in the ‘mad house’, as the Army HQ is jocularly referred to, and widening my horizons. Despite my high profile and sound professional track record, I never got a Delhi posting for the first thirty years of my service in the army. This was because there is a category of officers in every army of the world, and I would prefer to call them ‘parasites’. We have them, too. These selfish specimens of humanity neither care for others, nor for the good of the army. They repeatedly wangle their way and get plum postings at Delhi or other sought-after stations like Pune, Chandigarh or Kolkata, while the straightforward guys have to grind their arses in unattractive places like Binnaguri, Tibri, Talbehat or Danapur, or in remote field areas, and bear more than their share of the hardships. This situation is mainly attributable to such officers.
The exposure at the Army HQ at the level of a brigadier was an eyeopener. Since I had never served in a staff appointment above a Divisional HQ before, there was a lot of bureaucratese that I was clueless about. My boss, Major General Samay Ram, was a highly decorated and experienced soldier, a veteran of the low-intensity conflict that we had engaged in against the LTTE in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. We had never served together before. In fact, we met for the first time when I reported on duty at the Army HQ in January 1994. Both of us were forthright and practical but with different backgrounds and operational experiences, and hence, quite often we did not see eye to eye. I have always found it difficult to impress superiors at first sight. Initially, despite my best efforts, things did not go as well as I would have wanted. I had a tough time making the general agree with my views and recommendations in quite a few cases. Not to be deterred, I endeavoured to learn my job as fast as possible.
Returning from a tour one fine day, he called for me and said, ‘JJ, I didn’t know that you were such a good combat leader, and that you had commanded your brigade so well in Kashmir. Your men are very proud of you even today.’ I wondered as to who had spoken to him about me. Subsequently, I learnt that during a recent tour he had got talking to a junior commissioned officer (JCO) from a Rajputana Rifles battalion who had been detailed as his liaison officer in Jodhpur. That battalion had served under me in Kashmir during 1991–92. The JCO must have recounted some operational experience where I had figured prominently. All I can say is that the rest of my tenure with General Samay Ram passed smoothly. A good spoken reputation does matter for us soldiers, particularly if the praise comes from someone who has served under one’s command during operations.
During this tenure there were some important assignments or events that took place. I was called by the master general of ordnance (MGO), Lieutenant General R.I.S. Kahlon, in early 1995 and told to carry out a study that would review the requirements and scale of transport in units of the Indian Army, prior to the introduction of the new family of vehicles. Over the next five years the new generation 2.5-ton ‘Azad Super’ and 5/7.5-ton ‘Stallion’ vehicles would replace the existing 1-ton and 3-ton vehicles that were based on the obsolete technology of the 1960s. The MGO gave me only three months to complete this study whose implications would have an impact for decades – an almost unachievable task.
The only way I could do so was to cut out the red tape and long-winded bureaucratic procedures, and go down to the grassroots level of units and sub units directly. This innovative approach involved the creation of a study group comprising officers of the rank of colonels of all arms and services of the army. The next step was to form sub-teams to look into specific areas. After initial discussions with my team, I gave the concept, logic and rationale on which they would base their study. Then we sent questionnaires to different types of units serving in various theatres and diverse terrain and climate zones and asked them to provide details of the utilization of their existing fleets as authorized to them.
I was told that the ministry desired to see a corresponding reduction in the authorization based on the increased carrying capacity of the new generation of vehicles. My response was that if it was purely a mathematical formula, then there was no requirement of this study. A team of clerks with computers could do it! We had to study the operational and functional requirements of vehicles for each type of unit before the authorization could be recommended. If we had not adopted this unconventional procedure and merely followed the chain-of-command route, a study of this magnitude could well have taken a year or more. As soon as we got the response from the units, the sub-teams started finalizing the new scales based on the logic mentioned earlier. We finished our study on time.
The recommendations of the study group were accepted by the ministry of defence without any changes, and the revised authorizations notified to all concerned. Accordingly, new war and peace equipment tables were issued to all units of the Indian Army. We did achieve an overall reduction in the numbers of vehicles in the inventory of the army and a commensurate saving to the state. We also quantified the financial saving by the introduction of these new fuel-efficient vehicles. The ministry of defence and the Army HQ were very appreciative of our study.
When these vehicles were entering service, I decided that the highest priority should be given to J&K. As the first consignment was being sent to a transport company in J&K, I asked to see a Stallion vehicle from that lot. It was brought to Sena Bhawan in the Army HQ and though I was the DDGOL, a brigadier, I did not hesitate to drive it around to get a feel. After all, this was going to be the workhorse of the Indian Army for the next four decades. I noticed that instead of a bucket seat for the driver, the vehicle had an ordinary bench type of seat. How had the quality assurance guys okayed it? Based on my report, those responsible for the lapse were taken to task, and the vehicles introduced into service after due rectification.
We were asked by the UN to deploy an infantry brigade in Somalia in August 1993, when the US forces suffered heavy casualties and were deinducted. Initially we were able to stabilize the situation, but the conflict between two rebel factions began to worsen by the day. Our forces were fired upon a number of times and we suffered a few casualties. The UN asked us to do contingency planning for the worst-case scenario of extrication of our forces by a fighting withdrawal. I realized that we could not do so unless the operational and logistics staff from the Army HQ and the air force had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the area and the operational situation. Hence, I proposed to Lieutenant General V. Oberoi, director general of military operations (DGMO), that we fly to Somalia, study the ground situation and then finalize the plan. The air force readily agreed and our team, led by the DGMO, flew via Muscat (a refuelling halt) to Mogadishu, the war-torn capital of Somalia. In fact, Air Marshal Jimmy Bhatia flew the plane himself. We were briefed at the UN Mission located there. From there we flew to Baidoa, the location of our Brigade HQ. We were briefed by the brigade commander and discussed various options, including evacuation by sea from Kismaayo or, in the worst case, moving through Kenya and embarking from Mombasa. An attempt had been made to simulate a war-zone effect while we were being briefed. But the small-arms and machine-gun firing pattern had no semblance to an actual encounter or a skirmish.
The put-on act failed to impress me. I was accommodated for the night in an EME workshop, because I am an EME brat. Everyone lived in tents there. We had a pleasant evening in the brigade officers’ mess. During this period, Indian naval ships also came up till Kismaayo. Thereafter, we flew back via Nairobi, where we had discussions at the highest level with the Kenyan armed forces and civilian officials. They were most supportive, and assured us of all possible help as and when the situation demanded. This kind of planning process involving the three services of a country was quite unprecedented in contemporary UN history, and it helped in enhancing our image in the region and the world. It most certainly had an effect on the belligerents in Somalia and they did not mess around much with our force thereafter.
My promotion board was held during 1995–96, and I was approved to take over a division as a two-star general. As I had not served in Western Command for almost twenty years, I wrote to the military secretary if he could consider posting me to command any formation in the western theatre, so that I could gain the required experience. My request was acceded to and my appointment as the GOC of 9 Infantry Division was announced in June 1996.
9 Infantry Division was a part of Indian 3 Corps during the Second World War. It took part in operations against the Japanese in Malaya. Finally, it was merged with 2 Indian Division and fought in the battle of Singapore Island. This division was re-raised in August 1964 by Major General P.S. Bhagat, VC, at Saugor, as a result of the expansion of the Indian Army after the 1962 war. It was converted into a mountain division and was moved to Ranchi. Major General Prem Bhagat, the only Indian officer to be awarded the Victoria Cross for outstanding bravery during the Second World War, was a dynamic leader. He forged the division into a highly motivated team with well-set operational drills and procedures. The division has a symbol of a pine tree in its formation badge, and hence is also referred to as the pine division. During the Indo-Pak war of 1971, the division fought extremely well under the leadership of Major General Dalbir Singh, and won the battle honour of Jessore. Several of its brave officers and men were decorated with gallantry awards. Later, the division moved to Meerut, near Delhi. So, I did not have far to go, and took over the formation from Major General K.G. Pitre in July 1996.
My foremost aim was also to forge a war-winning team, and enhance esprit de corps. I got my formation commanders and staff together and shared my aim and priorities with them. We adopted ‘Fight to Win’ as our motto. Since training for our operational missions was our most important challenge, I wanted to ensure that my brigades and units were well-led and trained, and in a good state of operational preparedness. Since most combat units in my division had come to peace stations after a three-year stay in operational or high-altitude areas, they also needed to have time for rest and recuperation. I had given orders that as far as possible, units should not be away from their peace locations for more than two months each year.
The moment my posting orders were issued in mid-1996, I started preparing for this assignment. An important war game had been planned by the Western Command HQ for 11 Corps, and Pine Division was a part of it. Therefore, I requested my boss at the Army HQ, Major General M.P.S. Kandal, for permission to go on area familiarization visits to 11 Corps zone. It was critical for me to do so, as my knowledge of the western theatre was inadequate. I could not take any chances with an army commander like Lieutenant General A.K. Gautam, who was reputed to tear into anyone who did not measure up professionally. After the formal welcomes, some of them lukewarm, as most people in Meerut believed that 9 Infantry Division was on its way out, I proceeded on the reconnaissance of my area of operational responsibility (AOR). There was a month to go for the war game. I got hold of my brigade commanders and we discussed various contingency plans. I may not have known each and every place by name, but I became very clear on the rationale, fundamentals and concepts of our war plans. Though we had a defensive role, yet offensive-defence was our byword. Once the war commenced, we could reach out and strike the aggressor even before he crossed the border. The sanctity of the border becomes meaningless when hostilities commence. That’s exactly how we played the game.
We had set up our operations rooms within the precincts of the Corps HQ in Jalandhar. The tubular frame of the canvas structures was quite flimsy, yet we hung our maps and charts praying that the structure did not collapse on our heads! The war was initiated by Redland (exercise enemy) as it usually happens in our war games. During the first 24 hours, not much happened in our sector. The army commander went around all the Division HQs and other important Brigade HQs and was briefed by the commanders. He asked me a few questions and I responded as best as I could, but with confidence. After the briefing finished, quite a few people came over and congratulated me as nothing had gone awry. As I was quite new to my job and not so familiar with the area, it was some achievement.
The next day all hell was let loose in my division sector. It became clear that our defensive plans were going to be tested. The umpires kept on building the picture by giving us the progress of war. They also gave us the rulings on success or failure of our actions. At a critical juncture, the information given to us demanded immediate action on our part. I tried to get in touch with my corps commander, Lieutenant General H.B. Kala. He was moving around with the army commander and was thus unreachable. In the event, I ordered two companies to move from a flank that appeared less threatened, to beef up the defences of the area that was under heavy attack. This step caught the Redland off guard and their attacks got stalled. When the army commander asked me as to why I readjusted my defences on the first day itself, I replied that I acted before the enemy could create a critical situation for me. ‘AKG’, as he was known, then bowled a googly at me and said, ‘What if the enemy does something on the side from where you have thinned out?’ I did not lose my cool and replied, ‘Sir, based on the information provided to us this was the best course of action in my reckoning. We will handle the situation in the other sector too by readjustments as rehearsed. Further, the enemy can’t be everywhere.’ AKG then asked, ‘So you are not going to recall those companies?’ I stood my ground and said ‘No, Sir.’ I believe I passed the test, as most of the other GOCs did not rise up the ladder subsequently. I was highly appreciative of General Kala, who held my hand because he was convinced that I had taken the correct decision. He was a thorough gentleman and a professional all his life. This was the first time I was serving under him.
Another major challenge I faced was to save the division from being pushed out from Meerut to Tibri, a small military station near Gurdaspur. For various reasons, both operational and administrative, it made little sense to cause so much of turbulence and expenditure. I earnestly appealed to everyone who mattered and was eventually successful in getting the decision put on hold and subsequently, reversed. There were some amongst the military brass who did not give a damn if there wasn’t enough accommodation for married officers and men or schooling facilities in Tibri. The affect on the morale of soldiers was given short shrift. The relocation would have been perfectly understandable if there was a war in the offing. In hindsight, with the revised operational role which was also initiated by me, it was a prudent decision to abort the move.
The next year, we were asked to conduct a seminar on ‘heavy breakthrough’, a Russian concept. Since this involved large-scale employment of armour, mechanized forces and artillery, it should have been ideally conducted by the Strike Corps. For inexplicable reasons, the responsibility was given to our formation. Anyway, as is my wont, I took it up as a challenge. To begin with, we analysed the term ‘heavy breakthrough’, and tried to understand the fundamental issues involved in such an operation. We got eminent speakers to air their views and interact with the audience. Various scenarios on how to execute a heavy breathrough in our context were discussed. In my mind it was clear that this concept involved the delivering of a sledgehammer blow with mechanized forces at a given point to achieve a breakthrough. Having done that, we would need to continue the momentum by penetrating into the bowels of the enemy’s defenses and turn the flanks. It became evident that the three stages of the battle, ‘the break-in, dogfight and break-out’, ought to be merged into a seamless operation and taken to its logical conclusion. The chief of army staff, General Shankar Roychowdhury, the army commander, Lieutenant General H.B. Kala, the corps commander and division commanders and high-ranking staff officers attended this training event. The essence of the seminar was that no linear fortification line, however formidable, could withstand a determined assault in overwhelming strength on a chosen point of attack.
Meerut is a very old cantonment and it has good facilities for sports and social activities. I laid great emphasis on shooting. We also improved the golf course and have fond memories of many a round of golf played there. At the same time, I encouraged many youngsters to play the game. Two of them, Jyoti Randhawa and Digvijay Singh, are leading professional golfers playing in the national, Asian and European circuits today. The Pine House, which is the official residence of the GOC, is a lovely colonial bungalow, and proved to be very lucky for us. We solemnized the wedding of our daughter, Urvashi, with Gagan Dugal in this house in November 1997. Gagan is the son of Major General M.S. Dugal, Vir Chakra, with whom I had gone to the Staff College. Interestingly, the marriage of Tajinder Gill and Nina, daughter of Major General Prem Vadehra, also took place in this well-appointed house. One of my predecessors, Major General K.S. Brar, was himself married while he was the GOC and was living in the Pine House!
By mid-1996, Rohini had established her own office at Delhi, where she started creating new designs for Indian handicrafts and gift items. Therefore, she had to divide her time between her responsibilities at Pine Division and her entrepreneurial venture. Overall this tenure was a very satisfying period for both of us.