While I was still commanding 9 Infantry Division, I was selected for a prestigious two-star-ranked appointment at the Army HQ, in the military operations directorate. For a hands-on soldier like me, it was like a dream come true when I took over as the additional director general of military operations (ADGMO) in early 1998. I had to report to the director general military operations (DGMO) and the army chief. The job carried great responsibility and entailed planning and execution of operations being undertaken by the million-plus Indian Army in the country or abroad, as also any aid to civilian authorities during serious law and order problems, or in disaster relief. During peace time, my primary task was the handling of the proxy war, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns in J&K or the northeast, as well as guarding the sensitive northern border with China.
But I must admit that even with a service span of thirty-two years, I was a bit lost in the beginning, as I had served for only two-and-a-half-years earlier in the Army HQ. I was not very conversant with the ways of life in Delhi and its work culture or procedures. However, I made up for it with the exposure I had had in difficult border areas and the knowledge gained because of that, and could therefore make a meaningful contribution. I was certainly not a fair-weather soldier, and had a flair for fighting in the mountains and a vast experience in counter terrorism.
My eventful tenure of almost three years, from 1998–2000, has been the longest ever for any ADGMO. In the event, I served with four DGMOs and two army chiefs. The defence minister during this period was George Fernandes. The major events that occurred during this period included India’s nuclear tests in Pokhran followed closely by those of Pakistan, the Kargil war, natural disasters like the supercyclone in Orissa, the earthquake in Bhuj and an outstanding military action, Operation Khukri, undertaken by the Indian Army and Air Force as part of UN operations in Sierra Leone. In this action, we were able to secure the safe rescue and relief of two companies (233 peacekeepers) of our battalion, which had been encircled by rebels at Kailahun. In addition, we were able to free seventeen UN observers who had been made hostage by these rebels. What made this operation stand out was that all peacekeeping contingents except ours laid down their weapons in front of the rebels. I recall that the UK government made a request that Major Andy Harrison, one of the UN observers from the British Army, be rescued on priority. We replied that the lives of all peacekeepers were equally precious and that efforts would be made to ensure their safe evacuation. Therefore we gave the go-ahead for Operation Khukri. I accompanied the defence minister to Sierra Leone to congratulate the Indian forces for their resounding success.
I met Brigadier Rajpal Punia in 2011, and he told me the story of their siege for about three months without any lifeline and with limited rations. He was a major at that time and was a part of the isolated position in Kailahun. A breakout with the support of attack helicopters was executed by the beleaguered sub units and link up established with the rescuing force. Thereafter, we flew out all the observers, including Major Harrison. This operation is spoken of as a ‘great success’ in case studies of UN peacekeeping, according to Brigadier Punia.
As part of our ongoing negotiations on the boundary dispute with China, I visited Beijing in the latter half of 1998 as a member of our joint working group comprising the representatives of the ministries of defence, external, home affairs, and the army. Our deliberations lasted for a day-and-a-half. Expectedly, nothing much came out of our discussions with the Chinese. We reiterated our position that we should exchange maps giving our respective alignment of the line of actual control (LAC), and commence the reconciliation from the area where we have the least variation. That is, from the central sector, which includes the Shipki La and Bara Hoti plateau in the UP-Tibet border area. We should be prepared for a long haul as far as these negotiations are concerned, as I did not think the Chinese appeared to be in a hurry to resolve the problem. This being my first visit to China, it was a great experience to see the Forbidden City, the Great Wall and the shopping malls of Beijing. To top it all, the hosts took us out for traditional Chinese cuisine, including the Peking duck.
During 1998, I also participated in the inconclusive Indo-Pak dialogue on issues like Siachen, Sir Creek, sharing of river waters – all this when the infamous Operation ‘Badr’ in Kargil was perhaps being planned by Pakistan. We maintained our stand that the first step to resolve the Siachen problem should be the authentication of the existing positions of both sides. Besides, we brought out that the issue in question should thereafter be the pull-back from the Saltoro range by the two armies. To call it the ‘Siachen issue’ is a misnomer as the Siachen glacier is well to the east of the Saltoro range, along which lies the actual ground position line (AGPL).