The military operations room is the sanctum sanctorum of the Army HQ. It has a state-of-the-art projection system and videoconferencing facility. Crammed with maps and charts which go up and down or slide into and out of the walls, it is manned round the clock. As additional DGMO, I had the privilege of being the leader of the team that managed all discussions and presentations held in this room. Later, as the chief, I presided over the deliberations here and gave directions on issues of operational significance. Presentations, intelligence briefings and review of operational plans were keenly looked forward to by me. We had to be clear about the challenges that our armed forces faced and be prepared for them. A series of briefings were conducted to update me as the chief designate, starting from December 2004. Based on these interactions and my own study and experience, the security scenario as I perceive it has been covered in the following paragraphs.
During the last two decades, the global security environment has witnessed a paradigm shift. With more than one power centre beginning to emerge in the new world order, strategic partnerships and dialogue encompassing the security, socioeconomic and political fields have replaced the stratagem of coercion or containment. The impact of 9/11 has shaken the world. No nation, howsoever powerful, is secure from the scourge of terrorism, which today occupies centre stage in all security equations, thus transcending state boundaries. We are witnessing the birth of fourth-generation warfare, which goes beyond the canvas of conventional military operations. This has resulted in the global war on terror. Besides this, there are other drivers that are likely to shape the contemporary global and regional security environment in the future, such as economic or security blocs, spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, demographic shifts based on economic or ethnic considerations, and energy, water or other resource needs. Though the US will remain the unchallenged military and economic power for quite some time, the world is slowly moving towards a multipolar configuration. Asia has now assumed a dominant position with the rise of China and India along with the resurgence of Russia, and the presence of Japan. However, at the same time, the security situation in the region is very fragile and unpredictable. It is host to a historical baggage of problems relating to boundaries, religion, ethnicity and resources. The sudden spillover of an internal conflict beyond a country’s border cannot be ruled out. This region also has the maximum number of countries possessing ‘weapons of mass destruction’, with the ever increasing risk of these being exploited by non-state actors. Most significantly, Asia has the epicentre of global terrorism located in the remote mountainous redoubts along the Af-Pak border and jehadi organizations entrenched in the heartland of Pakistan too.
The challenges facing India comprise the entire spectrum, from low-intensity conflict to a conventional war with a nuclear backdrop. On one hand we have internal security threats characterized by insurgency in some parts of the northeast due to geopolitical, tribal, ethnic or other causes, Naxal and left-wing extremism in the underdeveloped and forested areas in the heartland, and a proxy-war in J&K that is aided and abetted by Pakistan. At the other end of the spectrum, there are the conventional challenges that originate from issues such as unresolved borders and sharing of river waters with our neighbours. We are continuing our deliberations at the highest level to find a pragmatic and mutually acceptable solution of our border dispute with China. The border with it extends from the Karakoram, Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarkhand to Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh – a distance of 4056 kilometres. We also have many issues to settle with Pakistan, of which J&K is the foremost. At the same time, the sanctity of the LoC in J&K and the LAC along our Himalayan borders has to be ensured.
Since the 1980s, India’s neighbourhood has turned into a volatile, unstable and strife-prone region. Therefore, we have to be capable of defending our sovereignty and national integrity from both external and internal challenges and safeguard our national interests by an effective presence in the Indian Ocean region. The modernization and enhancement of the capability of our armed forces is an imperative need and this has to be done on priority. To address these major security concerns, the first step I took was to review the overall state of readiness of the army to carry out its assigned tasks for the defence of the nation. Were my formations and units adequately trained and equipped, and were the men well led and motivated? I visited all the important insurgency, and terrorism-affected and sensitive border areas, and met the formation commanders, other officers and troops to get a first-hand feel of the actual situation on the ground. Although I was fairly satisfied with many aspects, there were some issues that I felt had been inadequately addressed, or not in the way I would have liked. I was cognizant of the fact that the mantle of leading the Indian Army rested on my shoulders now, and that the buck would stop with me. Thus, I gave directions for improvement or making changes wherever necessary.
It was my impression that over the previous two decades, commencing from the early 1990s, our focus had shifted to our western border and J&K. The Kargil war in 1999 had accentuated the situation further as more formations, troops, weapons and equipment were moved to the Northern Command at the expense of the eastern theatre. Now, as the situation kept improving in J&K, there was an imperative need to restore the strategic imbalance and fill up the voids existing in the east. Accordingly, I ordered the reversion of units and formations to their areas in Eastern Command and also built up other assets like armoured and mechanized units, artillery and missiles, UAVs and aviation units. This process commenced in 2006. We were able to successfully achieve force restructuring, once the raising and validation of the operational tasks of the South Western Command and 9 Corps was completed. We also initiated the plans for force accretions to enhance our defensive capability by raising a Corps HQ with two infantry divisions and supporting arms and services for the east, and improvement of infrastructure, roads, railway, airports and capability building in the northeast. The air force has similarly upgraded its capability by improving the airfields and has inducted state-of-the-art aircraft in this theatre. These transformational steps have provided the much desired strategic balance to our posture in both the western and eastern theatres. Our endeavour has been not to allow 1962 to be repeated under any circumstances.
The consolidation of the new South Western Command and 9 Corps, and their capability to effectively carry out their operational responsibilities, was an operational KRA for us. During my tenure as the chief, a number of operational discussions, war games as also exercises with troops were conducted to validate our new doctrine for war fighting. A lot has appeared in media reports about the so-called ‘cold start strategy’ of the Indians. In our doctrine and military lexicon, there is no such term or strategy. However, the slow and cumbersome mobilization demonstrated during Operation Parakram has been replaced with procedures that imply a swift response and fighting ‘light and mean’. As a part of strategizing for various scenarios and contingencies, we have put into place, defined and practised specified courses of action which will be unravelled if and when we are challenged. I am confident that the Indian Army will successfully execute these plans.