The Indian Army has a long experience in handling insurgency, terrorism and other forms of low-intensity conflict. This area has been my forte. I have had hands-on experience in counterinsurgency operations in Nagaland in the 1960s as a young officer, in Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh in the 1980s while leading a battalion, and as a brigade commander in Kashmir in 1991–92. This experience helped me make a handsome contribution towards bringing down the level of violence and contain terrorism in J&K and the northeast. However, such challenges are comparatively new for many armies; and therefore, we see that the campaigns of the multinational forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have been extremely costly not only in terms of human lives but also financially. These wars have of late acquired serious political undertones along with a big price tag. Further, the end does not seem to be in sight.
In an asymmetric war, the preponderance of firepower does not give the same advantage as would be the case in conventional warfare. In such conflicts there is no front, and the adversary follows no rules. He can appear from anywhere, and may not even be recognizable. Very often he uses innocent citizens as human shields. When we look at urban insurgency that we are confronted with in parts of J&K or the northeast of India, or for that matter by the multinational forces in Afghanistan, the messy situations that the soldiers have to confront so often are unbelievable, and at times unimaginable! Those of us who have conducted such operations have been through some of these unpleasant experiences. Furthermore, there are no manuals to guide our junior leaders or troops in effectively handling various delicate and tricky situations that develop all of a sudden. As the stakes are very high, they have to take decisions quickly and correctly. Counterinsurgency operations are battles fought by junior leaders and bring out the best in them.
My conviction is that there is no purely military solution for such problems. If that was possible, then by now superior military power and strategy of the West would have prevailed in Afghanistan. The most fundamental step to be taken by us is to carry out a thorough analysis of the disturbed region. We must endeavour to study the people, their history and culture, the characteristics of the terrain, the development status of the area, and consequently, the political, social, economic, ethnic, religious and other causes that have led to the situation becoming critical. Once we have deliberated on these issues we should evolve a multidimensional and multipronged strategy at the national and state level to address the problem. Unfortunately, to the uninitiated, such situations appear as military problems that will require military solutions. Nothing can be further from the truth.
It has always been my belief that the principal reason for the emergence of an insurgent movement in any region is the lack of good governance. This compels segments of society to take recourse to agitations, which are initially peaceful. However, if these go unheeded, they end up resorting to violence. It has been our experience that at times external support is provided by inimical neighbours to people in a disturbed area to stoke the fire. An important means of getting to know the ‘issues espoused by the insurgents’ so as to gain the sympathy of the people and enlist their support, is to get hold of and study the propaganda material, such as booklets, brochures, leaflets, and video and audio cassettes which the insurgents disseminate to the public. Some of these causes may be genuine, some mere exaggerations of issues, while many are likely to be baseless and untrue. But when uncontested or not acted upon, these facilitate the rallying of people around the banner of revolt. Furthermore, these result in a kind of brainwashing of the ignorant masses, and help the insurgents get moral, financial and logistical support, and fresh recruits for their cause. Therefore, in order to counter their vicious propaganda and take the wind out of their sails, the ‘crunch issues’ raised by the insurgents need to be addressed with despatch by the central and state governments, security forces and administrators, beginning at the grass-roots level.
To tackle the challenge of insurgency and terrorism, it is imperative to create an apex core security group at the national and state levels. It is necessary that such evil must be ‘nipped in the bud’. It is easier to do so in the initial stages. This core group should work towards evolving an overall security aim and a counterterrorism strategy.
I am convinced that conventional armies and paramilitary forces need reorientation training to handle terrorism or insurgency. We have accordingly established counterinsurgency institutions in J&K and the northeast. It is being ensured that prior to their induction in a disturbed area, every soldier or unit is put through a specially structured training programme of about eight weeks. Our armed forces have also been carrying out joint training on counterterrorism with foreign armies such as those of the US, Russia, the UK, China, Singapore and other friendly countries. This has been to the mutual benefit of the forces involved. Our police and paramilitary forces have often been outgunned and outmanoeuvred by the Maoists, and have suffered serious reverses in the forested areas of central India, Chattisgarh, West Bengal and Orissa. It is clear that they need to be equipped, trained and led better, and thereby given the capability to successfully wage the campaign against the Maoists and Naxals. It is reassuring to see that many states are modernizing their police force and have created counterterrorism schools for their training, so that they can meet this challenge more effectively.
The people in the conflict zone are the ‘centre of gravity’ and all operational strategies should be focused on winning their hearts and minds, and their support and cooperation. Actions that demean and alienate the population should be scrupulously avoided. After all, they are the helpless victims caught between two warring sides. Very often, the people would give vent to their feelings and say, ‘we are caught in the crossfire between the jehadis and the army. Jenab, ham badkismat, chakki mein pise jaa rahe hain (We, the unfortunate ones, are like grain that is being ground in a mill).’ Therefore, the security forces must reassure the people that, unlike the terrorists, they are responsible and accountable for all their actions. No counterinsurgency strategy can succeed without the active support of the people who, in our case, happen to be citizens of our nation. Special efforts should be made to identify the opinion makers and to convince them that our ‘cause’ and their ‘aspirations’ coincide. It should be unambiguously conveyed to the people that our actions are essentially focused upon achieving peace and prosperity and their well-being.
The Indian Army evolved and promulgated a doctrine of sub-conventional operations/low-intensity conflict during my tenure as the chief of army staff. This is based on lessons learnt from decades of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. A basic tenet of this doctrine advocated by me is the concept of ‘an iron fist and a velvet glove’. This was widely covered during 2005 by our national media based on my interactions with them. The Times of India called it my pet theme. The ‘iron fist’ denotes a ruthless and ‘no-nonsense’ approach while tackling the insurgents or terrorists, and the ‘velvet glove’ demonstrates the compassion and humane face of the security forces while dealing with innocent citizens. This concept hinges on the fundamental principle of employing armed forces to enhance the effectiveness of the government machinery, while painstakingly avoiding the alienation of the masses. While countering insurgency, the army’s role is to provide security to the population and a secure environment for the administration to be able to provide good governance. Only then can the development of remote and inaccessible areas of such disturbed regions take place and the other grievances of the people addressed. This concept lays emphasis on ‘people-friendly’ operations, upholding of the laws of the land, and an abiding respect for human rights. It has to be understood that ‘wanton killing of innocent civilians is terrorism, not a war against terrorism’, as stated by Noam Chomsky. Every soldier operating in a counterinsurgency campaign or fighting terror carries the army chief’s commandments in his breast pocket. Ten commandments of the chief were enunciated by General B.C. Joshi in 1993. Thereafter, during my tenure, ten more were added. These have been reproduced in Appendix 4. Successful and professionally conducted operations based on hard intelligence, causing minimum inconvenience to the local populace, and with little or no loss of innocent lives or other collateral damage, would greatly help in the elimination of the terrorists, and more importantly, in winning over the people as well.
A representation of the concept ‘iron fist and velvet glove’.
It is of vital importance that the security forces avoid the use of excessive force, and conduct themselves in an impeccable manner at all times. In one of my first statements on becoming the chief of army staff, I laid great emphasis on projection of the ‘humane face of our army, and an even greater focus on respect for human rights. And further, I made it clear that there would be zero tolerance for custodial deaths or other unlawful acts that sometime took place at the hands of the forces. I also directed that the term ‘kill’ would not be used while reporting about terrorists killed in actions or operations conducted by our troops. These operations are not like the hunting expeditions during the Raj period, where, at the end of the day, asking the question, ‘How many “kills” did you have?’ was the norm.
WikiLeaks documents released in London and Delhi on 16 December 2010 make a mention of a secret briefing of US diplomats by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2005. While describing some forms of ill-treatment and torture of detainees, the briefing said ‘that the situation in Kashmir was “much better” as security forces no longer roused entire villages in the middle of the night and detained inhabitants indiscriminately, and there was “more openness” from medical doctors and the police.’ In the same cable, American diplomats approvingly quoted media reports that ‘India’s army chief, Lieutenant (sic) General Joginder Jaswant Singh, had “put human rights issues at the centre of a (recent) conference of army commanders.”’1
Use of force happens when the security forces are severely provoked and in an adverse situation, and consequently under great stress. If we drop a bomb on a village to kill two terrorists, and instead, destroy a house with twenty innocent civilians, including women and children, the result will be the creation of twenty families of sworn enemies! One has read of such mistakes having taken place in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Despite these steps, some mistakes are invariably committed by the troops on the ground. We couldn’t afford to have any more cases that happened before I took charge – such as that of Manorama Devi, who was alleged to have been raped and killed by the security forces in 2004 in Manipur. These charges were denied and it was claimed that she was shot while trying to escape, but the army’s version drew flak from some media and human rights activists. There was also the case of Major Rehman, who was accused of rape in Kashmir. Such incidents take the government and the security forces many steps back, besides consuming a lot of time and energy of those in higher echelons of the government, including the Parliament and the state assemblies. Directions were issued that any allegations of such violations were to be speedily investigated in a fair and transparent manner. Each infringement or mistake by our men in uniform would give the Pakistani propaganda machinery the leverage to justify their calling us an ‘occupation army’. The media loves to play up such stories, which furthers the cause of the insurgents and helps to raise their morale. I endeavoured to make this fundamental issue understood by every soldier. As a result, the local population became appreciative of the army’s efforts and change in attitude and began to readily share information about terrorists, leading to successful operations. Growing signs of normalcy in the state are reflective of this change.
At the same time, action needs to be taken to provide solace, financial aid and other help to the aggrieved families by the government and the army. To win over the hearts and minds of the people, Operation Sadbhavana has been going on for a long time. This operation comprises a number of socioeconomic and civic action programmes undertaken by the army in the remote and underdeveloped areas to improve the lot of the people. These projects comprise the building of roads, bridges, model villages, goodwill schools, handicrafts development centres, and water and electricity supply schemes. These projects are executed by the army and have the formal support and funding of the ministries of defence and home affairs. They have been a huge success both in J&K and in the northeast. The armed forces have also been praised by the citizens for responding instantaneously whenever natural calamities like earthquakes, floods or heavy snowfall have struck these areas. Also, efforts were continuously made to encourage surrenders by the local misguided youth – they were given an opportunity to rejoin the national mainstream. This was a step in the right direction. Giving these surrendered terrorists some vocational training along with a viable financial package to help them rehabilitate themselves was definitely cheaper than a long-drawn-out counterterrorist campaign.
A majority of the population of such conflict-prone areas tends to be that of silent spectators or fence-sitters. They keenly observe the actions and the results of the encounters between the security forces and the insurgents, and invariably lean towards the winning side. Hence, the overall strategy and ground-level tactics must ensure that we succeed always. When we don’t, we must analyse our actions and draw lessons from the mistakes that resulted in our failure. We have to outwit the terrorists and keep them on the run. We ought to think better and fight smarter, that is, plan to be two steps ahead of them, so that they are the ones who are reacting to our moves and strategy and we retain the initiative, and not the other way around.
Experience is a great teacher. We learnt the hard way and became wiser after many years of mountain- and jungle-bashing; and many unsuccessful attempts to carry out vague, pointless and impractical orders from higher HQs, mostly without accurate information, such as ‘comb the forest’, ‘flush out the terrorists’, ‘carry out area domination’, ‘seek and destroy’, and ‘wipe out terrorism’! These are clichés quite commonly bandied about, which make one realize that unless the core philosophy and the fundamental principles of counterterrorism are focused upon and addressed, little can be achieved. Besides, one ought to have precise and actionable intelligence on the terrorists and their supporters, in order to get meaningful results. This is an imperative that is unexceptionable. But I have experienced that this is a major area of weakness while conducting operations. Accurate intelligence is generally hard to come by. Our intelligence agencies need to be strengthened and must be on the ball always, to meet this challenge.
The government’s public information set-ups should expose the game plan of the terrorists, their false propaganda, and their utter contempt for human rights, so that the people do not fall prey to their machinations. We must highlight the incidents of rape, torture, killing of innocents, extortion and other atrocities carried out by the terrorists, so that we drive a wedge between the masses and them. We must also seek some accountability from the human rights watchdogs, as quite often they conveniently look the other way on transgressions by the terrorists. It is demoralizing for the security forces to see that only their heads roll when things go out of control or mistakes happen, while the terrorists walk away with impunity even after committing heinous crimes. At times, not a word is spoken by the traumatized people, the media and the human rights organizations against the atrocities of terrorists. For example, when the media or the intelligentsia call such criminals who live by the gun culture and spread ‘dahshat ‘(terror) as militants instead of terrorists, it is indeed sad and ironic! Some do so in order to be able to buy their peace and a safe passage in the disturbed areas. What an enormous price we pay for such compromises! It has rightly been said by counterinsurgency expert Paul Wilkinson that ‘fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you.’2
Important factors discussed heretofore and which should be kept in mind while planning and executing a counterinsurgency/terrorism campaign are summarized in Appendix 5.
In J&K, we were able to achieve satisfying results in counterterrorism operations and against the ongoing proxy war. ‘Our attrition ratios increased from 1:4 to 1:7 in our favour during 2005–07, which was a quantum jump. This is a simple yardstick that conveys who is getting the better of whom in tactical-level encounters or engagements. Simultaneously, there has been a perceptible drop in the levels of violence in the state. Elections have been conducted peacefully despite the usual threats from the jehadis, and there is an overall yearning for peace. The tide has successfully turned in our favour, which is evident from the increased level of intelligence forthcoming from the locals, and the spurt in the number of surrenders.’3
But this was anathema to the terrorists and their mentors across the border. In the summer of 2010, large processions became the norm in Srinagar and some other places in the valley, where the youth resorted to provocative stone-throwing, violence, and slogan shouting. At places the paramilitary forces or the police had to open fire when the mobs got out of control, resulting in the death of ninety-eight civilians over the next few months.
In the rest of J&K, however, the situation is well under control. The ceasefire along the line of control is holding, barring the odd occasion when the Pakistan Army indulges in unprovoked firing, presumably to facilitate infiltration. The number of terrorists operating in J&K has also come down. They hesitate to engage the army and many have surrendered.
Indo-Pak government talks at various levels and confidence-building measures remain the cornerstone for solving the long-standing issue between the two countries. As part of the confidence-building measures, it was decided to enhance people-to-people contact on both sides of the LoC. The most important step in this direction was the start of a bus service from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad. The terrorist organizations and jehadis were vehementally opposed to this idea. Perhaps they did not want the people of J&K to see the underdeveloped state of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). I directed HQ Northern Command, and 15 Corps in particular, to meet the deadline to operationalize the historic Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus link on 7 April 2005. We had to undertake demining operations of the border on our own side and improvement of the road for the final ten kilometers beyond Uri.
The last 300 metres, including a bridge with a span of about 50 metres, had to be made against time. Our military engineers did a marvellous job and we named the bridge as ‘Aman Setu’ (the Bridge of Peace). Many families were reunited after decades because of this road link. We anticipated that the terrorists might try to derail this process and target the buses. In the beginning we took the precaution of aerial as well as ground surveillance to sanitize the route and were prepared to take prompt action in case the terrorists struck the bus. Fortunately, no adverse incident happened, except once when the terrorists carried out some blasts to disrupt the bus service. However, this ill-advised action boomeranged and the people did not hide their anger. It exposed the real agenda and dichotomy of the jehadis. Soon we opened the Poonch-Rawalakot road and further enhanced the people-to-people contacts.
However, we have been unable to optimally utilize the capability of the media to brand Pakistan as the aggressor for all the wars fought over Kashmir. The people of Kashmir on both sides of the LoC have been misled by the Pakistani media and their propaganda machinery. It was quite surprising to note that people from PoK, travelling by bus from Muzaffarabad to Srinagar, asked if they could do the namaz when they crossed over to the Indian side. Such is the scale of disinformation that the people are being subjected to. They are quite astonished to see the development on the Indian side as compared to PoK. Perhaps it is for this reason that when the people of PoK wanted to cross the LoC en masse in the 1990s, it was the Pakistan Army that placed roadblocks on the road from Muzaffarabad to Baramulla.
There is no apparent change in Pakistan’s intent to provide the terrorists moral, diplomatic and financial help. Occasional restrictions placed on terrorist groups remain calibrated, cosmetic and reversible. Pakistani senior officers often brag in typical Punjabi that the ‘tooti’ (tap) is in their hands. The infrastructure of the terrorist organizations remains intact in PoK and in Pakistan as well. General (Retd) Mirza Aslam Beg’s improvident idea that with the nuclear deterrent, ‘he could convert the Kashmir intafada into an armed insurgency,’4 is revelatory. Besides that, Ayesha Siddiqa has recounted being told by General Pervez Musharraf, ‘What makes you think that once Kashmir is over, there will be an end to the conflict with India. That’s what drove his thinking and that’s what drives the thinking of most of our generals.’5 It would serve us well if our policy-planners keep these statements in mind. The threats to our security, I dare say, would continue in the years to come, and even beyond Kashmir! The recent terror attacks in Bombay and Delhi portend the challenges that lie ahead for us.
Having said that, the overall situation in J&K is improving gradually. The visit by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 7 June 2010, the formation of a body of interlocuters and various other initiatives for dialogue aimed at engendering peace are indeed laudable. Greater autonomy under the Constitution is also being talked about. These steps, along with relentless pressure of the security forces and waning local support, are leading to increasing frustration among the terrorists. As a result, they look for soft targets like minority community members, tourists or migrant labour to carry out acts of violence and terrorize innocents. The elected democratic government in the state is functioning with reasonable efficiency and a majority of the Kashmiris are tired of the strife and violence of the past two decades, and are yearning for peace.
As Sheikh Abdullah declared in a famous speech in June 1948, ‘We the people of Jammu and Kashmir have thrown our lot with Indian people not in the heat of passion or a moment of despair, but by a deliberate choice. The union of our people has been fused by the community of ideals of common sufferings in the cause of freedom.’6 Jammu and Kashmir is not only an integral part of our country, but it has reinforced our traditions of moderation, secularism and peaceful coexistence. It gave us the concept of Kashmiriyat, which, in essence, is the basis of our nationhood.
To achieve the goal of conflict resolution in J&K, I would like to re-emphasize the following aspects:
• Over 3000 years of history convincingly proves a shared civilization and culture between Kashmir and Hindustan. The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was ratified by the elected leadership of the state in 1954 during the rule of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, and later in 1975 under the Sheikh Abdullah accord.
• The political dialogue should now be taken forward with the participation of all segments of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The views of people on both sides of the LoC, including the Gilgit, Skardu and Hunza areas, must also be sought. Further, the heterogeneous nature of J&K cannot be lost sight of. The composite dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve various issues should take the views of the people of J&K into consideration.
• The military has performed its role perfectly by bringing down the levels of violence considerably, and shall continue to do so. Now it is for the elected representatives of the people to meaningfully address the problems of the common man. These are primarily related to their socioeconomic development. In this regard, the sincerity of purpose of the current government led by Omar Abdullah is beyond doubt and praiseworthy.
• There must be peace and the gun culture must end. The people must not provide support to organizations which use violence as a tool to achieve their vested interests. This requires the same level of courage and determination as was shown by the people of Punjab to root out extremism.
• The psyche of the ‘awaam’ (people) has been seriously traumatized due to the violence of the past two decades. A healing touch is needed, and a humane approach needs to be adopted while dealing with the common man.
• It would be a step in the right direction to ensure that besides the army, the law enforcement agencies, such as the paramilitary forces and the police, should have a reduced signature and benign presence.
• Greater people-to-people contacts may be allowed along the LoC, along with an enhanced level of border trade, covering more areas.
• Economic activity should be accelerated so that more avenues are created for the employment of the youth. Tourism, industry, handicrafts and horticulture have great potential, which is yet to be exploited. But these would need a peaceful environment, above all else.
Having served in the northeast for over twelve years, I have a fairly good understanding of the region. It has been plagued by a large number of secessionist or militant movements since independence, starting with Z.A. Phizo’s call for independence for Nagaland in the 1950s. Initially, when the army was called to restore law and order, it adopted the ‘scorched earth’ policy and tried to suppress the insurgency with force. It was trained for conventional warfare and was new to counterinsurgency tactics. After making mistakes that antagonized a large part of the population and not achieving much success, it realized its folly. As a result, the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School was created in 1966–67 at Vairangte, to train the Indian Army units and junior leaders before their induction into insurgency-prone areas of the northeast. The Naga insurgency is the mother of all armed secessionist movements there. The high point of my experiences in the late 1960s was when we caught self-styled General Mowu Angami and a large number of rebels of his group who had just returned from China. It was the first major setback to the decade-old insurgency at that point and has been covered earlier in Part II. The pressure put on the underground by effective and professionally conducted counterinsurgency operations by the army resulted in containing the insurgents and winning the hearts and minds of the Nagas to some extent. The next major development was the change of heart of a group of about 1500 underground members of the ‘Revolutionary Government of Nagaland’ led by Scato Swu and the self-styled General Zuheto Sema. They had asked for a peaceful settlement within the Indian Union with some conditions. 16 August 1973 is the historical day when the ceremonial handing over of their arms to Governor B.K. Nehru took place at Zunheboto, the heartland of the Sema tribe. On that occasion, Scato Swu said, ‘I would once again sincerely appeal to those who continue to mislead the people to totally give up the cult of violence and join us in our march forward to make Nagaland a modern and progressive state in our Great Country.’7 Most of the surrendered cadres were rehabilitated in a battalion of Border Security Force under the command of Zuheto Sema and other police or paramilitary forces. Scato Swu was nominated by the Government of India to represent his people in the Rajya Sabha.
I would like to highlight a factor that has not received due recognition: the resounding and unsettling impact of India’s decisive victory in the Indo-Pak war of 1971 on insurgencies in the northeast. During this campaign, we were pleasantly surprised to bag self-styled General Thinouselie and members of his gang undergoing training in erstwhile East Pakistan. Their surrender to our forces was an unexpected bounty, and it definitely had an adverse effect on the Naga rebellion. On 11 November 1975, the Shillong Peace Accord was signed between the Government of India and representatives of the Naga underground organizations, including the Naga Federal Government, which ended the two-decade-old insurgency. In this accord, they agreed of their own volition to unconditionally accept the Constitution of India, lay down arms and formulate other issues for the final settlement of the Naga problem. However, this agreement ran into heavy weather as the Isaac Swu- and T. Muivah-led gang, returning from China in 1975, ‘denounced the Accord’.8 They formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which subsequently split up following a bloody clash in April 1988. This saw the emergence of another faction of the NSCN, led by S.S. Khaplang, a Burmese Naga. Besides the NSCN, there were some other dissidents of the Shillong accord too. Sadly, this accord could not usher in an era of peace. A phase of violence erupted, which was initiated by the NSCN. Eventually, after a decade of bitter fighting, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the NSCN (IM) and the Government of India in July 1997, which has been periodically extended.
At present, there is a ceasefire between the army and both of the Naga armed factions, namely the NSCN Isaac & Muivah (IM) group and the NSCN Khaplang (K) group. They have parcelled out territories in all Naga-inhabited areas of the region, including Myanmar, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, based on ethnic and tribal affinities. There are ongoing inter-factional clashes in which both sides have suffered a number of fatal casualties. To add to the prevailing confusion, recently a further split has taken place in the NSCN(K). One group under Khaplang is entrenched mainly in Myanmar and the breakaway faction under self-styled General Khole Konyak and Kitovi Zhimomi, predominantly comprising of Indian Nagas, is Nagaland-based. The latter group has expelled its founder-chairman, Khaplang, and the leadership has passed into the hands of Khole and Kitovi. This statement has been repudiated by the Khaplang faction. These groups have imposed on the people a ‘parallel government’ and levy taxes, fines, extortion demands and carry out other illegal acts. However, there is a public outcry against this mindless violence and taxation burden. The people have unequivocally rejected the idea of an armed struggle for independence and other demands of the NSCN groups. They want a peaceful resolution of the problem. A historic covenant for peace had been signed on 18 September 2010 by the leaders of various Naga groups, including NSCN-IM General Secretary Muivah, NSCN-K General Secretary Kitovi Zhimomi and their Federal Government of Nagaland/Nagaland Nationalist Council counterparts. A ceasefire monitoring group handles all complaints of violation of the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, there has been an ongoing dialogue between the Government of India and the leaders of the NSCN-IM to find a peaceful solution to the Naga problem. The Government of India has committed that it is prepared to discuss any solution within the Constitution of India and I am hopeful that permanent peace will return to Nagaland. Recently I met with General Thinouselie, who is in his late seventies, in Dimapur, and he categorically told me that the anti-Shillong accord groups have misled the people all these years. The people are looking forward to the end of strife, and ushering in of an era of peace and prosperity.
The Naga insurrection was followed by Mizo and Manipuri rebel movements in the 1960s. The Mizo National Front (MNF), which launched a vicious armed rebellion on 1 March 1966, had its origin from the Mizo Famine Front, an organization that was created to alleviate the sufferings of the Mizo people as an aftermath of a widespread famine in 1959. The apathetic attitude of the administration and lack of governance provided the ballast to the rebel movement. After two decades of violence and strife in the region, we finally succeeded in resolving the problem in Mizo hills. Under the peace accord of 30 June 1986 between the MNF and the Government of India, the new state of Mizoram was carved out of Assam. The Mizos have been reaping the benefits of peace since then. On the other hand, the Manipur imbroglio continues. It has by far the maximum militant outfits in the entire northeast. There are ceasefire or cessation of operations agreements with many of them, but notwithstanding that, there is rampant extortion, illegal taxation, violence, inter-factional clashes and other terrorist activities. Tripura is a typical example of conflict of interest among the tribals and non-tribals. A demographic shift has taken place over the past few decades in favour of plainsmen and the tribal population is below 30 per cent. As of now, the law and order situation is well under control, and the state seems to have turned around. It is, in fact, one of the most peaceful states in the northeast.
In Assam, an agitation was started by the All Assam Students’ Union in 1979 against illegal migration of Bangladeshis and outsiders, and the exploitation of oil, mineral resources and tea without adequate benefit accruing to the people of Assam. This peaceful agitation continued for six years and as a result, the Asom Gana Parishad, a political party, was created after the signing of the historic Assam accord on 15 August 1985. On the other hand, an armed movement sprouted on 7 April 1979 as an offshoot of the parent organization, and is known as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Subsequently, some other militant groups, representing minorities like Karbis, Bodos and Dimasas, surfaced. There is a sense of deprivation among these ethnic minorities and hence, these people are seeking a greater say in their own development and some form of autonomous structure for their areas. However, today, most of these organizations are bereft of any ideology and have almost become criminal groups that are carrying out acts of terrorism, extortion, kidnapping for ransom and killing of innocents. Terrorism has, in fact, become a sort of industry in this region. The crackdown on northeast terrorist outfits by the Bangladesh government in the last two years has given a terrible blow to these groups, and now more and more of them are coming around for talks with the Government of India. Many of their leaders have been arrested by our security forces and the police. The authorities in Bangladesh have also handed over many of their cadres, including some prominent leaders, to our Border Security Force. The chairman of the banned ULFA, Arabinda Rajkhowa, was released on bail on 1 January 2011, and he has publicly stated that ULFA is committed to working for lasting peace in Assam. Many other leaders of this organization have also similarly been released so that meaningful peace talks could be commenced with the Government of India. This development augurs well for peace and prosperity in the region.
The ULFA signed a suspension of operations agreement with the Government of India on 4 September 2011. However, after the heat raised in Bangladesh, the self-styled commander-in-chief of ULFA, Paresh Barua, and others moved to Myanmar. These groups are opposed to any dialogue without the sovereignty issue being on the agenda. On 8 September 2011, the Myanmar army launched operations on the camps of ULFA, NSCN (K) and other terrorist groups holed up in Myanmar. The government is hopeful of arriving at a peaceful solution of the Assam problem as a result of the ongoing parleys with the ULFA leaders. At present there is a democratically elected Congress government led by Tarun Gogoi, which has won the elections for a second term.
Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya are amongst the most peaceful states in the NE. There are two districts of Arunachal Pradesh bordering Nagaland which have a spillover of Naga insurgency, where cases of illegal tax collection, extortion, coercion, kidnapping and forcible recruitment have been taking place. However, the situation has not been allowed to deteriorate or spread to other parts of the state. More than a hundred misguided youth from Tirap District surrendered during 2009–10 because of frustration and a desire to return to the national mainstream. Sikkim has shown a remarkable improvement in governance. It is forging ahead in the domain of tourism. The socioeconomic condition of the people has shown an upward trend. The 2011 earthquake in Sikkim caused massive destruction of the infrastructure, though loss of lives was less than what was feared. The reconstruction process is on, with the army, air force and other agencies lending a helping hand.
Insurgency, terrorism and militancy are getting out of fashion, and the world has got united against terror. The 30 million people of the northeast are fed up of the strife and violence of the past five to six decades. They aspire for peace and prosperity in their part of the world. They need good governance and the connectivity to be able to engage with the global economy, as they are landlocked at present. The fact that Southeast Asia begins from the northeast should be remembered by the national leadership and our policy planners.
The prime minister has stated that Naxal extremism is one of the most serious internal security threats faced by our country. Lack of governance and many deep-rooted socioeconomic problems have led to a major law and order problem in thirty-four districts of eight states in the heartland of our country. In all, a total of eighty-seven districts in nine states are affected by Naxals or Maoists in some form or the other.9 This area is often referred to as the ‘red corridor’ or the ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’. Interestingly, the worst-effected areas are the most remote, thickly forested and underdeveloped. The natural resources, including minerals, in these areas are immense and mostly untapped. Various hues of left-wing extremists (LWE) have gotten together under one umbrella, and are espousing the causes that have the greatest appeal to the poor tribal people inhabiting these areas. Their stated aim is to ‘overthrow the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under neo-colonial form of indirect rule’.10 The nerve centre of this zone is the Dandakaranya forest area, which lies at the junction of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh.
A rising power needs all the resources that are available in the country, and therefore, law and order and peace are essential in this resource-rich heartland of India. The government has adopted an integrated approach to tackle this threat. An empowered group of ministers under the home minister has been created to oversee a coordinated approach to counter the Naxalite violence. And a standing committee of chief ministers of the affected states, also working under the home minister, has been formed to address political, security and socioeconomic development issues. At the executive level, there are various organizations that have been set up to tackle the menace. Integrated action plans covering sixty of these districts are being launched, but the principle of ‘effective governance before development’ would be sacrosanct before these plans are put into action.
The army has been carefully monitoring the developments and playing an advisory role to the government. It is also providing training assistance to the police and the paramilitary forces in various states on their request. We helped to set up the first counterinsurgency school at Kanker in Chattisgarh. I have been clear from the beginning that the army should not get embroiled in this problem as that would play into the hands of inimical forces, and detract us from our primary task of defence of our nation. I maintained this stance as the chief as it was not in our national interest. I am happy to see the policy has remained unchanged since then.
As army chief, my views on the repealing of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) 1958 created a lot of ripples. Some people have termed it as a ‘draconian law’ that gives unbridled powers to the armed forces while they conduct operations against insurgents or terrorists. I believe that the armed forces are the instrument of last resort for a nation. Therefore, they must be given the responsibility of restoring law and order in a specific area only when all other means have failed. When such a situation arises, it becomes mandatory for the state to ensure that the armed forces are provided the necessary moral, material and legal support and wherewithal to overcome the challenge. When asked by the media, my categoric reply was that I would not like my soldiers to fight with one hand tied behind their back, or to be dragged to the courts on flimsy charges. While we shall take all steps to prevent human rights violations and punish those guilty of an offence, we would not want to restrain them from carrying out effective and speedy operations against the unscrupulous and faceless terrorists who strike and disappear instantly. National cohesion and integrity will be seriously jeopardized if the armed forces fail in their mission. However, if there are any ambiguities in the AFSPA, they need to be sorted out; value additions to make it more humane would also be welcome.
1 Jason Burke, WikiLeaks cables, www.guardian.co.uk, 16 December 2010.
2 The Daily Telegraph, London, 1 September 1992.
3 Interview given by me to FORCE, September 2007.
4 M.B. Naqvi, The News (Pakistan) 15 May, 2001.
5 Murtaza Razvi, Musharraf – The Years in Power, HarperCollins, p. 207.
6 Sheikh Abdullah, Aatish-e-Chinar.
7 Murkot Ramunny, The World of Nagas, Northern Book Centre, New Delhi, 1988, p. 310.
8 Ibid, p. 357.
9 Statistics from the Ministry of Home Affairs website.
10 Constitution of the CPI (Maoist), http://www.bannedthought.net/india/CPIMaoist-Docs/index.htm, last accessed on 12 December 2010.