Would the appointment of the chief of defence staff (CDS) be the pill to solve the ills that exist in our higher defence set-up, as some analysts seem to suggest? The CDS has been in the news off and on ever since the Kargil war, and on occasions even before that, in discussions on defence leadership and national security. In the deliberations of the Kargil review committee, which was appointed soon after the termination of this conflict, the subject of higher defence organization once again came up.
The military operations branch, particularly the group that was led by me as the additional DGMO, is responsible for the planning and conduct of operations during war and peace, the defence of our borders, particularly the LoC in J&K and the LAC along the Himalayas in the north, and the ongoing counterterrorism operations in Kashmir and the northeast. Therefore, my team and I interacted extensively with this committee.
Their report indeed recommended the creation of the post of a chief of defence staff. Subsequently, to the credit of the government of the day, a group of ministers (GoM) was promptly appointed to study the Kargil review committee report. Four task forces were then constituted to study and offer concrete recommendations in the domains of enhanced capabilities for gathering of intelligence, management of the borders, internal security and defence management. This having been done, the recommendations of these task forces were discussed by the Cabinet Committee for Security and, after approval, passed down for appropriate action.
However, though many of the recommendations of the GoM have been implemented, the government has not taken a decision on the appointment of a CDS as yet; the ostensible reason being offered is lack of political consensus and unanimity amongst the services. Some of the important findings that have seen the light of day are the creation of the Integrated Defence Staff, the Strategic Forces Command, the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command, the defence intelligence agency and the defence procurement board, and enhancement of the delegated financial powers of the defence and finance ministries and the services for procurement of arms and equipment.
As an interim measure, an inter-service organization with a chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CISC), a three-star ranking officer (from one of the three services) heading it, has been created to assist the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee (COSC) in dealing with tri-service operational and administrative matters and other specific issues assigned by the COSC, besides streamlining the long-term integrated planning process, prioritization of acquisitions, and bringing about greater jointness in the armed forces. From my experience as the chairman, COSC, and as chief of army staff, the CISC set-up has been working satisfactorily. The effectiveness of the CISC and the exploitation of the full potential of the Integrated Defence Staff depends entirely upon the chairman and members of the COSC and the ministry of defence.
Notwithstanding this, the question that still needs to be addressed is whether there is a necessity for a chief of defence staff and if so, in what time frame? Further, will the higher direction of war in India be handicapped without one? These issues have engaged the attention of the political elite, the defence ministry, the national security set-up, strategic thinkers and scholars. Unfortunately, a lot of lip service is paid in this regard by some of them; these issues tend to get raised from time to time, more so at the time of retirement of some service chief or the other – a feeble attempt to get a four-star general’s post created, in the hope that it might benefit the individual concerned! At the same time, I do believe that the parliamentary committees for defence, on more than one occasion, have urged the respective governments to go ahead with the creation of a CDS without further delay. I also accept that there are some genuinely convinced adherents of the view that the CDS must be appointed as early as possible.
There are some fundamental considerations that need to be kept in mind and examined by the government before a decision is taken. First, integration in the true sense must imply not only integration within the services, as is the case at present, but also within the ministry of defence and the service HQs, with a complement of experts at the appropriate level from ministries of external affairs, home, finance and so on. It should be normal to see officers of these ministries and the defence services working together as a ‘team’ in various offices, as is the practice in all democratic nations. This has to happen sooner than later, but is not in place yet.
Secondly, each country must evolve its own defence structure at the apex level. Conceptually, there cannot be one formula that would apply to all. Whatever structure is created, it must ensure the highest level of security of our nation. No turf-guarding exercises should be permitted to compromise or dilute the steps required to safeguard the country. The CDS has been pronounced as the single-point adviser on defence matters for the government, and so it should be. He should have unfettered access to the prime minister and defence minister at all times. His presence at the highest decision-making fora in the country during discussions on national security should be institutionalized.
The next issue that needs to be examined is about the command and control of the armed forces. In most of the countries that have adopted the CDS formula, the operational control of the armed forces has been vested in his hands. In our case, the GoM report has recommended ‘status quo’ as far as the command and control of the forces is concerned. That would render the CDS a toothless tiger, a ‘super adviser’ without a definable responsibility or accountability. One could call him a modern-day Birbal! A dangerous guy to have around, I would think. Further, it is debatable if in our hierarchical and seniority-driven system, a ‘first among equals’ concept would work, more so if he happens to be a junior. We shall take some time to be ready for that.
We must begin first with an inclusive and substantive integration of the ministry of defence with the service HQs at the policy formulation and planning level, and going down to the theatre commands. There must be cross postings that would ensure meaningful integration on a functional basis, so as to include officers of the three services, officials of the ministries of defence, home, external affairs and finance and others as required, on the same lines as is the practice in other major democracies. Without this being in place, we would be handicapped as far as an integrated response to national security challenges is concerned. It is about time that the ‘we’ and ‘they’ syndrome is unshackled.
At the same time, we must create an effective integrated military hierarchy, with officers at the higher levels who have been exposed to conditions in other services and various theatres of our country and abroad. For example, high-calibre officers of the three services must be exposed to things like life in a submarine, the freezing Himalayan border areas, the tropical forests of the northeast, the desert of Rajasthan and so on. Finally, and importantly, such officers must also have a clear vision of the big picture at the national level, with an exposure in the ministry of defence, or the service HQs. I have come across some brigadiers and major generals who haven’t been out of the country even once. As the chief, I desired that selected brigadiers and above should be given an opportunity to travel abroad at least once, so that they could learn by seeing things first-hand. Then alone, in due course of time, can one hope to become a useful ‘single-point adviser’. This process of capacity building can start without delay.
Therefore, in the next ten to fifteen years, we should create integrated theatre commands and specialized commands – such as training and doctrine, aerospace, network-centric warfare and joint logistics in addition to the existing Andaman and Nicobar and Strategic Forces Commands. Cross attachment and posting of middle- and senior-level leadership and tri-service training, war games and courses could commence from 2013. At the theatre or command level and HQ Integrated Defence Staff, the posting of officers representing the MOD, MEA, finance ministry and the Defence Research and Development Organization should also be implemented simultaneously. As an interim measure, the CISC could be upgraded to a vice chief of defence staff of four-star rank to oversee the transformation and restructuring of the armed forces. Alternatively, we could consider having a permanent chairman of COSC at four-star level with specific responsibilities as being advocated by Lieutenant General V.R. Raghavan, who is a member of the Naresh Chandra Committee that is looking at higher defence set-up and national security issues. However, neither of these iterim proposals, if adopted, should get enshrined as a permanent arrangement.
It would be fair to surmise that we could have a CDS by 2020, who should be vested with operational command of the three services and be of a five-star rank. He would then be an effective and meaningful ‘single-point’ adviser on defence matters.