The baton of the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee was handed over to me by Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi in February 2007, and I held this position till I superannuated at the end of September that year. This committee is chartered to discuss and evolve joint military strategy focusing on national security challenges and to advise the national leadership on all service matters. During this period, three important events or issues took centre stage: a tri-service delegation led by me to China, the formulation of the recommendations of the armed forces to the 6th Pay Commission, and the implementation of the A.V. Singh Committee Part II report dealing with cadre review of senior ranks. These issues have been dealt with separately.
This was also the first occasion when one took a very close look at the nuclear component of national security. Though we had carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion (Pokharan I) in 1974, we had not demonstrated our capability of nuclear weaponization till the testing of five nuclear devices on 11 and 13 May 1998 (Pokharan II or Operation Shakti). It was in the wake of these tests that on 14 May 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee stated, ‘India is now a nuclear weapons state. We have the capacity for a big bomb now. Ours will never be weapons of aggression.’1
The nuclear dimension of India’s national security strategy is based on the doctrine of a credible minimum nuclear deterrence, and our stated policy that there will be no first use of nuclear weapons, and that these will not be used against non-nuclear states. Our policy clearly lays down ‘a continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear- and missile-related materials and technologies, participation in the fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations, and continued moratorium on nuclear tests.’2 Our national leadership has maintained for a long time that we would work to achieve the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world through non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. I firmly believe that such a capability is not for fighting war but for deterrence. But should deterrence fail, we should not be found wanting in mounting an adequate and effective retaliation.
On India’s nuclear capability, an article, India and Weapons of Mass Destruction3 states, ‘India possesses nuclear weapons and maintains short and intermediate range ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable aircraft, surface ships, and submarines under development as possible delivery systems and platforms.’ Speaking about the three-dimensional capability of the delivery systems, it mentions, ‘Although it lacks an operational ballistic missile submarine, India has ambitions of possessing a nuclear triad in the near future when INS Arihant, the lead ship of India’s Arihant class of nuclear-powered submarines, formally joins the Indian Navy in 2012 after undergoing extensive sea-trials.’4
As part of risk reduction and confidence building, an agreement on the prohibition of attack on each other’s nuclear installations and facilities was signed between India and Pakistan on 31 December 1988. In accordance with this agreement, the updated lists of such installations and facilities were exchanged on 1 January 2010.
I must admit that the Indian government and the nuclear establishment continue to display the highest level of secrecy, control and maturity required of a responsible nuclear power. This has been acknowledged and appreciated worldwide. Even in the highest positions that I have held in the military, I was in the decision-making loop only where required. In 1998, when Pokharan II tests took place, I was the additional DGMO in the Army HQ. It was only when the prime minister made the announcement to the media that I came to know of them. The fact that till the very end, the prying eyes of the world were kept away from Operation Shakti and total surprise was achieved, speaks volumes of the sense of security maintained by all those concerned with the project.
As mentioned in his well-researched book, Weapons of Peace, Raj Chengappa once asked Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, ‘You, more than anyone else, had the unique choice of building vehicles of peace at the space department or making weapons of war in defence. Why did you choose the latter when you know that it is capable of so much destruction and bloodshed?’ Kalam answered: ‘I had no qualms. By building such arsenal I actually ensure peace for my country. Now no nation dare attack us. These are truly weapons of peace.’5 The world sat up to notice the emergence of India as a nuclear-weapon state.
The reaction of Pakistan was as expected. India’s nuclear tests were described as ‘reckless and highly provocative’. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated in his address to the people, ‘We will take all necessary measures to safeguard our security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests.’6 Gohar Ayub Khan, the then foreign minister, said, ‘Indian actions, which pose an immediate and grave threat to Pakistan’s security, will not go unanswered.’7 Despite vigorous efforts and inducements, as also veiled threats by the US, Pakistan went ahead with its retaliation to India’s tests by exploding five nuclear devices in the Chagai Hills on 28 May 1998, and a sixth two days later. These tests took place barely fifteen days after ours.
Pakistan has made it known that it would not be averse to the ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons in case its territorial integrity is threatened. It has blatantly indulged in nuclear sabre-rattling and blackmail both during the Kargil war and during the showdown in 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. The same veiled threats emanated from Pakistan in October 2011 to deter another unilateral US military action inside Pakistan, after the strike that took out Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad.
1 http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaArsenal.html
2 http://www.indembassy.org.ua/english/news10.htm
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India_and_weapons_of_mass destruction
4 Ibid.
5 Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, HarperCollins, 2000, p. xi.
6 Jaswant Singh, A Call to Honour, Rupa & Co, 2006, p. 129.
7 Ibid.