Preface

The traditional problem of hallucination in the philosophy of mind, and more particularly in the philosophy of perception and epistemology, has always attracted attention. However, over the last few years, neuroimaging techniques and scientific findings on the nature of hallucination, together with the upsurge of interest in new theories of perception in philosophy, such as representationalism and disjunctivism, have brought the topic of hallucination to the forefront of philosophical thinking. The importance of the phenomenon of hallucination is such that it deserves extensive treatment; it directly affects a wide range of issues in the philosophy of perception and epistemology, including the question of whether we directly see the world, the nature of perception and perceptual experience more generally, the nature of our knowledge of our own mental states, the nature of our knowledge of the external world, and questions about what we can learn about the mind and the nature of hallucination from empirical results in psychology and brain science.

Reflection on the nature of hallucination, therefore, has the potential to transform many traditional debates in philosophy concerning the nature of the mind, perception, and our knowledge of the world. It has the potential to radically alter our approach and answers to traditional philosophical concerns about the mind and epistemology. In addition, it will be of value to scientists who are trying to determine the nature of hallucination in patients undergoing hallucination, and clinical medics who are trying to treat those patients, by clearly articulating and delineating exhaustively different possible conceptions of hallucination. The nature of hallucination is therefore of great philosophical, theoretical, and practical importance. These are the issues that the essays in this book engage with.

The volume comprises key essays on hallucination first presented on Crete in September 2008 at the interdisciplinary conference on hallucination organized by Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias of the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience, Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow, and Maria Venieri of the Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, University of Crete. It is broadly divided into three parts. Part I comprises scientific papers written by psychologists and neuroscientists, and Parts II and III contain philosophy papers. The chapters of Part II center on the topic of disjunctivism, and those of Part III on the nature of hallucination and its relation to perceptual experience more generally.

We would like to thank all the contributors for sending us their essays in good time and always responding to our numerous requests. We are grateful to them for producing such an excellent, thought-provoking series of essays. We would also like to thank the Scots Philosophical Club, the Greek Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs, the Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, and the Graduate Programme in the Brain and Mind Sciences at the University of Crete for supporting the conference that preceded this volume. Finally, we would like to thank the following people for their help and advice in organizing the conference and producing this volume: Tim Crane, Michael Brady, David Bain, and Stuart Crutchfield. We would also like to thank the final-year students of the Department of Philosophy in Crete for helping with organizational matters, welcoming guests, and providing information. Finally, we owe tremendous thanks to Philip Laughlin for his encouragement in producing the book and in bringing it to press.

 

Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias

Glasgow, 2011