NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. See Christopher Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3–73.

2. Heinrich von Staden, “Body, Soul, and Nerves: Epicurus, Herophilus, Erasistratus, the Stoics, and Galen,” in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to the Enlightenment, ed. John P. Wright and Paul Potter (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 116.

3. See A. A. Long, “Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy,” in Long, Stoic Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1–34; Long, “The Socratic Legacy,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe A. Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 617–41; also Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For a detailed study, see Francesca Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione socratica, Elenchos, Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico 30 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2000).

4. Gill, The Structured Self, xix.

5. On Augustine’s opposition to tenets of Epicureanism; see Conf., 6.16.26 (the soul); De Civitate Dei 5.20 (pleasure); 8.5 (atomism); 11.5 (cosmology); 14.2 (ethics); 8.7 (epistemology). His chief source of the school’s doctrines is Varro, De Civ.Dei 6.5. The problem of Stoic influences on Augustine’s philosophical education is more difficult to resolve; see Gérard Verbeke, “Augustin et le stoicisme,” Recherches Augustiniennes 1 (1958): 67–89; Charles Baguette, “Une période stoicienne dans la formation de saint Augustin,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 16 (1970): 47–77; and Michel Spanneut, “Le stoicisme et saint Augustin,” in Forma futuri: Studi in onore del cardinale Michele Pellegrino (Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1975), 796–805.

6. On this topic, see G. R. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenic Philosophy: A Study of Its Development from the Stoics to Origen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

7. Conf., 7.9.13; on the scholarly questions raised by this collection, see Goulven Madec, Saint Augustin et la philosophie (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 37–44.

8. De Civitate Dei 11.1.

9. Conf., 9.10.23–26.

10. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); also in the analytical tradition see Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), and Richard Swinburne, “How to determine which is the true theory of personal identity,” in Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, ed. Georg Gasser and Mattias Stefan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 105–22.

11. I say elusive because there is no Greek or Latin term for the self; for an introduction to this subject as well as broader questions concerning the self in ancient thought, see the authoritative statement of Richard Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life, and Death (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 17–22, 30–31, and 48–53; on the notion of the self in Stoic and Epicurean sources, see the thoughtful remarks of Gill, The Structured Self, xiv–xx, 326–407; on Augustine’s relationship to this tradition, a useful early synthesis is Max Zepf, “Augustinus und das philosophische Selbstbewusstsein der Antike,” Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 11, 2 (1959): 105–32. On the widely acknowledged contribution to his thinking about the self by Plotinus, see Paulina Remes, Plotinus on Self: The Philosophy of the “We” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–20.

12. These have been the subject of numerous studies, among which are the classic essay of M.-D. Chenu, “La nature et l’homme: La renaissance du XIIe siècle,” in La théologie au douzième siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), 19–51. Later syntheses include Colin Morris, The Discovery of the Individual (London: SPCK, 1972) and Robert W. Hanning, The Individual in Twelfth-Century Romance (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977). No attempt can be made here to recapitulate the now abundant literature in the field. Among review essays see John F. Benton, “Consciousness of Self and Perceptions of Individuality,” in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 263–95, and Caroline Walker Bynum, “Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual,” in Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 83–109. On relations between self and textual experience, see Sarah Spence, Texts and the Self in the Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); on theological approaches, see the innovative study of Susan R. Kramer, Sin, Interiority, and Selfhood in the Twelfth-Century West (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2015).

13. See Christopher Gill, Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

14. Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask, Bollinger Series 36 (New York: Pantheon, 1953), 64–78.

15. For a review of the issues in a post-ancient context, see William Robins, “The Study of Medieval Italian Textual Culture,” in Robins, ed., The Textual Culture of Italy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 11–49.

16. See the classic essay “Sermo Humilis” in Erich Auerbach, Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, trans. Ralph Manheim, Bollingen Series 74 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 25–81.

17. For an introduction, see Pierre Hadot, “Spiritual Exercises,” in Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. and intro. Arnold I. Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 82–125.

18. Jerome, Ep. 112; Augustine, Epp. 28, 71, and 72.

19. See Pierre Hadot, “Les Libri Platonicorum,” in Marius Victorinus: Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1971), 201–10; Madec, Saint Augustin et la philosophie, 37–44.

20. Conf., 1.14.23. The difficulty may have arisen in part from the fact that Augustine was already bilingual; he was presumably able to speak Punic with his mother, who was Berber in origin, as well as Latin with his father, who was Roman.

21. There are indications that Augustine had some knowledge of Seneca, for example, at De Civitate Dei 6.11, where he reports Seneca’s negative observations on the Jews of Rome; see Romano Penna, “The Jews of Rome in the Time of the Apostle Paul,” in Paul the Apostle: Jew and Greek Alike: A Theological and Exegetical Study, trans. Thomas P. Wahl (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1996), 23 and note 13. However, there are no direct quotations from Seneca in Augustine’s statements on reading, writing, and the self. This suggests that Augustine cannot be linked by means of precise Latin sources to the lengthy discussion of ‘the scripted self’ in Hellenistic thought to which attention was drawn by Michel Foucault in 1983; see “L’écriture de soi,” Corps Écrit 5 (1983): 3–23, Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), and L’herméneutique du sujet: Cours au Collège de France (1982–1983) (Paris: Gallimard, 2001). On the subsequent discussion of this theme in Seneca’s writings, see the essays of Christopher Gill, Brad Inwood, and Anthony Long in Seneca and the Self, ed., Shadi Bartsch and David Wray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); James Bernauer and Michael Mahon, “The Ethics of Michel Foucault,” in The Cambridge Companion to Michel Foucault, ed., Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 141–58; and Arnold Davidson, “Ethics as Ascetics,” ibid., 115–40.

22. For a specific example, see Margaret R. Graver, “Honeybee Reading and Self-Scripting: Epistulae Morales 84,” in Seneca Philosophus, ed. Jula Wildberger and Marcia L. Colish (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2104), 269–93, in which a distinction is made between the ethical notion of selfhood in the letters and Seneca’s fictional presentation of himself.

23. For a development of this theme, see Jula Wildberger, “The Epicurus Trope and the Construction of the ‘Letter Writer’ in Seneca’s Epistulae Morales,” in Seneca Philosphus, 432–65.

24. David Konstan, “The Active Reader in Classical Antiquity,” Argos 30 (2006): 10.

25. On this topic, see Ilsetraut Hadot, “The Spiritual Guide,” in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, and Roman, ed. A. H. Armstrong (London: SCM Press, 1986), 436–59.

26. See H.-I. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, 4th ed. (Paris: Boccard, 1958), 297–337.

27. Plutarch appears convinced that the speech of Lysias in Phaedrus 230e ff. was genuine and not a discourse concocted by Plato; however, that assumption does not greatly weaken his argument, since the point he is making is about Nicander’s recreation of a speech, not whether it is the speaker’s own words.

28. Epistulae Morales 8.6.

29. Convivio, 1.2.12–13.

30. De Brevitate Vitae 10.2–6.

31. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life and Death, 172. On Epicurus, see Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 10.22.

32. De Brevitate Vitae 10.2.

33. Epistulae Morales. 58. 22–23; trans. Oldfather (Loeb).

34. Epp. 4.1–2.

35. Epp. 1.1–3.

36. Epp. 4.9.

37. See Montaigne, “De la solitude,” Les essais, livre 1, c. 39, ed. Pierre Villey (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), 241.

38. Conf., 11.27.35–38; on spiritual exercises in ancient philosophy, see the excellent introduction of Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 79–144.

39. As recognized by Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), vol. 1, chap. 1.

40. For experimental evidence, see Raymond A. Mar, “The Neural Basis of Social Cognition and Story Comprehension,” Annual Review of Psychology 62 (2011): 103–34.

41. Ep., 80, Patrologia Latina, vol. 33, col. 274; my trans.

42. Conf., 11.27.34–36.

43. Cf. Frederic Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 197; Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study in Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

44. The term is used by both Seneca and Quintilian; for a discussion of its hermeneutic expansion in Augustine, see Michael Fiedorowicz, “Enarrationes in Psalmos: B. Theologische Aspekte,” in Augustinus-Lexikon, ed. C. Mayer et al., vol. 2 (Basel: Schwabe, 1996–2002), cols. 838–58.

45. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.4.6; ed. L. A. Selby-Riggs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 252.

CHAPTER 1. READING WITH THE WHOLE SELF

1. E.g., De Civ. Dei 10.5–8.

2. E.g., Contra Academicos 3.13.37.

3. Conf., 8.1.1; 8.3.6; 8.5.11, and especially 8.6.14–15, which describes the monastic communities founded by Ambrose of Milan.

4. On the general topic of sacred reading, or lectio divina, a good introduction and bibliography are found in Duncan Robertson, Lectio Divina: The Medieval Experience of Reading (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2011); on the Augustinian tradition, see Franklin T. Harkins, Reading and the Work of Restoration: History and Scripture in the Theology of Hugh of St. Victor (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2009). An excellent overview is provided by Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The earlier literature on sacred reading is reviewed in Jacques Rousse, “La lectio divina,” in Rousse, “Lectio divina et lecture spirituelle,” Dictionnaire de spiritualité, vol. 9 (1976), col. 470–87. Among foundational studies are Ursmer Berlière, L’ascèse bénédictine des origines à la fin du 12e siècle (Paris: de Brouwer, 1927); Henri de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale: Les quatre sens de l’Écriture, première partie, tome 2 (Paris: Aubier, 1959), 571–86 (Exégèse monastique); Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture, trans. Catharine Misrahi (New York: Mentor Omega Books, 1962); and Leclercq, Aux sources de la spiritualité occidentale: Étapes et constants (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1964). A more recent study of reading in relation to early Christian monastic life in both Eastern and Western communities with an appreciation of contemporary developments in criticism is Elizabeth A. Clark, Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), chaps. 3–6, pp. 45–152. For an outline of Augustine’s views on the ascetic life, an excellent brief introduction is Henry Chadwick, “The Ascetic Ideal in the History of the Church,” in Monks, Hermits and the Ascetic Tradition, ed. W. J. Shields (Oxford: Blackwell for the Ecclesiastical History Society, 1985), 1–23.

5. For an introduction, see Adalbert de Vogüé, The Rule of Saint Benedict: A Doctrinal and Spiritual Commentary, trans. J. B. Hasbrouk (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1983), 239–50.

6. Cuthbert Butler, Benedictine Monachism: Studies in Benedictine Life and Rule (London: Longmans, Green: 1919), 13. For a precise description of these traditions and their origins, see Antoine Guillaumont, “Monachisme et éthique judéo-chrétienne,” in Aux origines du monachisme chrétien, Spiritualité Orientale 30, Bégrolle en Mauges (Maine et Loire: Abbaye de Belle-fontaine, 1979), 201–18.

7. Owen Chadwick, John Cassian, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 14.

8. Cf. Chadwick, John Cassian, 85. For an introduction to the thought of Evagrius, see Antoine Guillaumont, “Un philosophe du desert: Evagre le Pontique,” in Aux origines du monachisme chrétien, 185–212.

9. Jacques Rousse, “Lectio divina et lecture spirituelle,” 470–71.

10. On which, let us note, the blessed Isaac is said to have discoursed at greater length (copiosa) than is reproduced in Cassian’s compte-rendu; Jean Cassien, Conférences, ed. and trans. Dom E. Pichery, SC 42 (1955); here Conlatio 9.1, p. 40. I use this edition, including vol. 54 (1958), and 64 (1959). On the role of meditation in these prayers, see Antoine Guillaumont, “La Prière de Jésus chez les moines d’Égypte,” in Aux origines du monachisme chrétien, 130–34.

11. Coll 9.2, vol. 54, p. 40: “Omnis monachi finis cordisque perfectio ad iugem atque indisruptam orationis perseuerantiam tendit.”

12. 9.2, p. 40: “Et est inter alterutrum reciproca quaedam inseparabilisque coniunctio.”

13. Cf. Lk. 14:28.

14. This is a rare, early monastic example of the rhetorical technique of enargeia (vivid description), which is discussed in Chapter 2.

15. Coll., 9.3, p. 42, referring, respectively, to 1 Thess. 5:17 and 1 Tim. 2:8.

16. Coll., 9.4, p. 43: “Etenim qualitas animae non inepte subtilissimae plumae seu pennae leuuissimae comparatur.” The idea is elaborated in 9.5, pp. 43–45.

17. Coll., 9.6, p. 45.

18. Coll., 9.8, p. 48: “Secundum mensuram namque puritatis, in quam mens unaquaeque proficit et qualitatem status in quo uel ex accedentibus inclinatur uel per suam renouatur industriam, ipsae quoque momentis singulis reformantur.”

19. Summarizing Coll., 9.8, p. 49.

20. Coll., 9.12, p. 50–51.

21. Coll., 9.17, pp. 53–55.

22. Coll., 9.26, p. 62: “Nonnumquam etenim psalmi cuiusque uersiculis occasionem orationis ignitae decantantibus nobis praebuit. Interdum canora fraternae uocis modulatio ad intentam supplicationem stupentium animos excitauit. Nouimus quoque distinctionem grauitatemque psallentis etiam adstantibus plurimum contulisse feruoris.”

23. Coll., 9.36, p. 72. The monks were not required to recite the psalter once a week, as instructed in the Rule of St. Benedict. The lack of this requirement accounts for the spontaneity of the numerous statements on the reading of the Psalms in the Conferences.

24. Coll., 9.35, p. 71: “ut intrantes in cubiculum nostrum clauso ostio nostro oremus patrem nostrum” (Mt. 6:6).

25. Coll., 9.35, p. 71: “Clauso oremus ostio, cum strictis labiis omnique silentio supplicamus non uocum sed cordium scrutatori.”

26. Coll., 9.35, p. 71 quoting Mt. 7:5: “Put no trust in a neighbour. . . .”

27. De Institutis Coenobiorum de Incarnatione contra Nestorium 2.10, 11; ed. Michael Petschenig and Gottfried Kreuz (CSEL 17, Vienna, 2004), 25–26.

28. Coll., 10.8, vol. 54 (1958), 83: “ut primum nouerimus qua meditatione teneatur uel cogitetur deus.”

29. Coll., 10.11, p. 90: “Istam, istam mens indesinenter formulam teneat, donec usu eius incessabili et iugi meditatione firmata cunctarum cogitationum diuitias amplasque substantias abiciat et refutet.”

30. Chadwick, John Cassian, 102.

31. Coll., 10.11, p. 91: “Et ita quis per istiusmodi paupertatem egregius pauper exsistens illud propheticum inplebit eloquium.”

32. Coll., 10.11, p. 92: “Quorum iugi pascuo uegetatus omnes quoque psalmorum adfectus in se recipiens ita incipiet decantare, ut eos non tamquam a propheta conpositos, sed uelut a se editos quasi orationem propriam profunda cordis conpunctione depromat uel certe ad suam personam aestimet eos fuisse directos, eorumque sententias non tunctantammodo per prophetam aut in propheta fuisse conpletas, sed in se cotidie geri inplerique cognoscat.”

33. Coll., 10.14, p. 95.

34. Coll., 10.14, p. 96: “Constat igitur neminem prorsus ob inperitiam litterarum a perfectione cordis exclude nec rusticitatem obese ad capessendam cordis atque animae puritatem.”

35. Cf. Regula 11.10: perlegere.

36. Reg. 38.7: “Si quid tamen opus fuerit, sonitu cuiuscumque signi potius petatur quam voce.”

37. Is this because the hospes, if a layman, is assumed to be ignorant or illiterate?

38. E.g., Prov. 4:10; 4:20.

39. On the ear of the heart, see Augustine, De Continentia 1.1, CSEL 41.141.3–4.

40. Prol., 9–12; 33; e.g., Rev. 2:7; Ps. 34:12; Jn. 12:35.

41. Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, 24–25.

42. E.g., Gorgias 447a–449a.

43. Coll., 1.2 and 1.4, vol. 1, p. 79.

44. Coll., 1.17, vol. 1, pp. 99–110.

45. Leclercq, The Love of Learning, 25.

46. Coll., 1.17, p. 99.

47. Coll., 7.6, p. 253.

48. Coll., 7.4, p. 248.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., p. 249.

51. Coll., 7.5, p. 249; cf. 2 Cor. 10:4.

52. Coll., 7.6, p. 253.

53. Prov. 28:19; cf. Prov. 14:23; 16:26.

54. Coll., 7.21, p. 262.

55. Non perfectio sed perfectionis instrumenta sunt, p. 85.

56. Coll., 9.2, vol. 2, pp. 40–41.

57. Ibid., p.40: “Ob quam omnem tam laborem corporis quam contritionem spiritus indefessa et iugiter exercemus.”

CHAPTER 2. THE CONTEMPLATIVE IMAGINATION

1. Orator, 1.1, quoted in the edition of H. M. Hubbell, in Cicero, Brutus Orator, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 1939): “. . . et susciperetantam rem, quantam non modo facultate consequi difficile esset sed etiam cogitatione complecti.”

2. Orator, 2.7; my trans.

3. Orator, 2.8: “Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit unde illud ut ex ore aliquo quasi imago exprimatur.”

4. Orator, 3.9: “Ut igitur in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens, cuius ad cogitatam speciem imitando referuntur ea quae sub oculos ipsa non cadunt. . . .”

5. Institutio Oratoria 6.1.7: “Necessarios tamen adfectus fatebuntur, si aliter obtineri vera et iusta et in commune profutura non possint.”

6. The following summary is based on 6.2.8–6.2.18.

7. Quintilian adds that, for some, pathos is temporary, while ethos is continuous; however, some situations require pathos as an ongoing state of mind; 6.2.10.

8. Inst. Orat. 6.2.26: “Summa enim, quantum ego quidem sentio, circa movendos adfectus in hoc posita est, ut moveamur ipsi.”

9. Inst. Orat., 6.2.27: “Quare in iis, quae esse verisimilia volemus, simus ipsi similes eorum qui vere patiuntur adfectibus, et a tali animo proficiscatur oratio qualem facere iudicem volet.”

10. Inst. Orat., 6.2.28: “Primum igitur, ut apud nos valeant ea quae valere apud iudicem volumus, adficiamurque antequam adficere conemur.”

11. Inst. Orat., 6.2.29: “At quomodo fiet, ut adficiamur? Neque enim sunt motus in nostra potestate.”

12. Inst. Orat., 6.2.29–30: “Quas φαντασίας Graeci vocant, nos sane visiones appellemus, per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesentantur animo, ut eas cernere oculis ac praesentes habere videamur. Has quisquis bene conceperit, is erit in adfectibus potentissimus.”

13. Inst. Orat., 6.2.30: “. . . qui sibi res, voces, actus secundum verum optime finget.”

14. Inst. Orat., 6.2.32: “Insequitur ένάργεια quae a Cicerone illustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere; et adfectus non aliter, quam si rebus ipsis inersimus, sequentur.”

15. He is perhaps referring here to Inst. Orat., 4.2.63–65, where enargeia forms part of the discussion of narratio and refers to the clarification of facts in a case. As later at 6.2.32, the chief influence is Cicero.

16. Inst. Orat., 8.3.61: “Eius primi sunt gradus in eo quod velis concipiendo et exprimendo, tertius, qui haec nitidiora faciat, quod proprie dixeris cultum.”

17. Two examples are given: Virgil, Aeneid 5.426 and Cicero, Verrine Orations 5.33.86.

18. Phantasia in Classical Thought (Galway: Galway University Press, 1988), 69.

19. Inst. Orat., 12.1.

20. Henry Chadwick, Saint Augustine. Confessions, trans. with Intro. and notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 36n3.

21. Trans. Chadwick with minor modifications.

22. Conf., 3.2.4; trans. Chadwick.

23. Pierre Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin, 2nd ed. (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1950).

24. E.g., Courcelle, Recherches, 2nd ed., 47.

25. Conf., 8.6.13: “Agebam solita crescente anxitudine. . . .”

26. For a comparable but more detailed account of this development, see my study, Ethics Through Literature: Ascetic and Aesthetic Reading in Western Culture (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2007), 47–85.

27. Conf., 5.1.1, 8–11: “Non cessat nec tacet laudes tuas universa creatura tua, nec spiritus omnis per os conuersum ad te nec animalia nec corporalia per os considerantium. . . .” trans. Chadwick.

28. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads 3.2.11.10 ff.

29. Plato, Sophist 260d–e.

30. Watson, Phantasia, xi.

31. Plotinus, Enneads 3.4.8, trans. Armstrong, slightly modified.

32. Plotinus, vol. 3, pp. 368–69, n. 1.

33. Ep. 3.3: “Certe sensibilis mundus nescio cuius intelligibilis imago esse dicitur.”

34. As Augustine acknowledges, Ep. 4.1, written in 387. Augustine’s notion of phantasia in his early letters and elsewhere has been the subject of several previous studies, each developing a particular aspect of the theme. Two good general introductions to the theme of the imagination in his writings are O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (1987) and Watson, Phantasia in Classical Thought (1989); more specialized studies include two books by J. R. O’Connell, Imagination and Metaphysics in St. Augustine (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1986) and Soundings in Augustine’s Imagination (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994). An excellent analysis of Ep. 7 is found in Giovanna Ceresola, Fantasia e illusione in S. Agostino dai “Soliloquia” al “De Mendacio” (Genoa: il Melangolo, 2001), 70–91.

35. Ep. 4.1: “quid in sensibilis atque intellegibilis naturae discernentia profecerimus.”

36. Ep. 6.2: “Cur, quaeso te, non a se potius quam a sensu phantasiam habere omnes imagines dicimus?”

37. Ep. 6.1: “Nam aut uerba intellectui cogitationibusque nostris adiunximus, quae uerba sine tempora non sunt et ad sensum uel phantasiam pertinent, aut tale aliquid noster intellectus cogitatione passa est, quod in animo phantastico memoriam facere potuisset.”

38. Ep. 7.1: “Memoria tibi uidetur nulla esse posse sine imaginibus uel imaginariis uisis, quae phantasiarum nomine appellare uoluisti.”

39. Ep. 7.1: “In utroque tamen horum generum praeteritum tempus memoria tenet. Nam et illum hominem et istam urbem ex eo, quod uidi, non ex eo, quod uideo, memini.”

40. E.g., Conf., 1.6.8; 1.8.13.

41. Cf. Ep., 120 (to Consentius, ca. 410), in which Augustine refers to three classes of things which are “seen”: material objects, images of objects, and noncorporeal things, e.g., wisdom.

42. De Genesi ad Litteram 12.1.1; Patrologia Latina, vol. 34, cols. 453–54: “Scio hominem in Christo ante annos quatuordecim, sive in corpore nescio, sive extra corpus nescio, Deus scit, raptum ejusmodi usque in tertium caelum: et scio ejusmodi hominem sive in corpore sive extra corpus nescio, Deus scit, quia raptum est in paradisum, et audivit ineffabilia verba, quae non licet homini loqui.” 2 Cor. 12:2–4.

43. The point is illustrated by the familiar example of the cities of Carthage, which he knows, and Alexandria, which he knows only from report.

44. De Genesi 12.6.18; PL 34.460: “Dicitur spiritus et ipsa mens rationalis, ubi est quidam tanquam oculus animae, ad quem pertinet imago et agnitio Dei.”

45. Cf. De Doctrina Christiana 2.1.1.

46. De Genesi 12.11.22: “Jam quidem superius exemplum proposuimus, quo in una sententia omnia tria videntur genera.” At Conf. 11.27.35 the reading of a single line of an Ambrosian hymn, Deus creator omnium, is Augustine’s means of measuring time.

47. De Gen., 12.11.22: “Corporaliter littera videntur, spiritualiter proximus cogitatur, intellectualiter dilectio conspicitur.” Augustine proceeds directly from litterae which are seen rather than voiced, suggesting that the movement from text to thought is silent, as contrasted with Conf. 11.27.35, where the reading is oral, because measurement takes place through the meter.

48. De Gen., 12.11.22: “Sed et litterae absentes possunt spiritualiter cogitari, et proximus praesens potest corporaliter videri.”

49. De Gen., 12.11.22: “nec per imaginem corporis similem spiritu cogitari, sed sola mente, id est, intellectu, cognosci et percipi.”

50. De Gen., 12.11.22.

51. De Gen., 12.11.22: “aut intelligatur continuo quid significet, aut quaeritur; quoniam nec intelligi nec requiri nisi officio menti potest.”

52. De Gen., 12.16.33: “His existit quiddam mirabile, ut cum prior sit corpore spiritus, et posterior corporis imago quam corpus, tamen quia illud quod tempore posterius est, fit in eo quod natura prius est, praestantior sit imago corporis in spiritu, quam ipsum corpus in substantia sua.”

53. De Gen., 12.16.33: “Quos unique non tenet; nisi imaginaliter a se factos in se.”

54. De Gen., 12.16.33: “Ipsarum etiam futurarum motionum imagines praeveniunt fines actuum nostrorum.” Cf. 12.23.49.

55. De Trinitate 11.2.2; CSEL 50a, pp. 334–36.

56. Cf. Virgil, Aeneid 8.202; 6.289.

57. De Trin., 8.4.6: “Sed dilectione standum est ad illud et inhaerendum illi ut praesente perfruamur a quo sumus, quo absente nec esse possemus.”

58. De Trin., 8.4.6: “Amatur ergo et quod ignoratur sed tamen creditur.”

59. De Trin., 8.6.9: “Quid enim tam intime scitur seque ipsum esse sentit quam id quo etiam cetera sentiuntur, id est ipse animus?”

60. De Trin., 8.6.9: “Animum igitur cuiuslibet ex nostro nouimus et ex nostro credimus quem non nouimus.”

61. De Trin., 8.6.9: “Non enim alibi hoc inuenio cum quaero ut hoc eloquar nisi apud me ipsum; et si interrogem alium quid sit iustus, apud se ipsum quaerit quid respondeat.”

CHAPTER 3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOLILOQUY

1. See my study, Augustine’s Inner Dialogue: The Philosophical Soliloquy in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

2. Catherine Lefort, “Soliloques d’Augustin: Introduction, texte, critique, traduction, et notes complémentaires,” dissertation, Université de Paris IV, 2010.

3. For a review of pertinent themes on this topic, see the collection of essays in Literarische Formen der Philosophie, ed. Gottfried Gabriel and Christiane Schildknecht (Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1990). On the dialogue as a literary and philosophical form in Plato, see above all Charles H. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); also Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the historical origins of the Socratic dialogue, see Gabriele Giannantoni, Socratis et Socratorum Reliquiae, 4 vols. (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990). For a more general overview on the development of the Western dialogue and its literary landscape, see Vittorio Hösle, The Philosophical Dialogue: A Poetics and a Hermeneutics, trans. Steven Rendell (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012).

4. Soliloquia, 2.7.14; Retractationes, 1.4.1; the term is employed only in the plural. Ancient Greek has no equivalent; however, modern Greek expresses the notion by means of μονόλογος.

5. E.g., Iliad 4.43; Odyssey 20.18. On drama, see Friedrich Leo, Der Monolog im Drama, Abhandlung der Göttingen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Kl. N.F. X, 5 (Berlin, 1908); Wolfgang Schadewaldt, Monolog und Selbstgespräch. Untersuchungen zur Formgeschichte der griechischen Tragödie, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Weidemann, 1966 [1926], 38–262); cf. John Dean Bickford, “Soliloquy in Ancient Comedy” (dissertation, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1922).

6. Attention is drawn to these by Epictetus, Discourses III.x.2, with the suggestion that they be “kept on hand”; cf. Disc., IV.vi.12.

7. The evidence is succinctly summarized by R. B. Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A Study (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 15.

8. Sophist 228c–d; Theaetetus 189c–190a; Philebus 38c–39a; cf. Crito 50b ff., where the laws speak internally to Socrates, and Hippias Major 287a ff., where an internal dialogue takes place within the open dialogue between Socrates and Hippias. For anecdotal evidence of their use by Pyrrho of Elis, see Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 9.4.6.

9. On the roots of this transformation, see Harold Cherniss, “Ancient Forms of Philosophic Discourse,” in Selected Papers, ed. Leonardo A. Tarán (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 14–35.

10. Cicero, Tusc. Disp., 5.117: “Etenim qui secum loqui poterit, sermonem alterius non requiret;” on Horace, see Sat., 1.4.137–39.

11. See A. A. Long, “Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy,” in Stoic Studies, 1–34, and Epictetus, 67–96.

12. See David Sedley, “Plato’s Auctoritas and the Rebirth of the Commentary Tradition,” in Philosophia Togata II, ed. Miriam Griffin and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 111–29.

13. See Seneca, Epistulae Morales, ed. L. D. Reynolds (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), 95.1–3, where the method is briefly described. For a general account of the period’s educational techniques in philosophy and other disciplines, see H.-I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. George Lamb (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 282–308; on the philosophical implications of this type of instruction, see Pierre Hadot, “Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy,” in Philosophy as a Way of Life, trans. Michael Chase, ed. and intro. Arnold I. Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 50–70; on the broader intellectual context, see G. R. Boys-Stones, Post-Hellenic Philosophy: A Study of Its Development from the Stoics to Origen, and on the methods utilized see Pier Luigi Donini, “Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento. La forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età posthellenica,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 36, 7 (1989): cols. 5027–5100. The classic account of Augustine’s use of such means of instruction remains Aimé Solignac, “Doxographies et manuels dans la formation philosophique de S. Augustin,” Recherches Augustiniennes 1 (1958): 113–48.

14. On the role of silent reading in this evolution, see in general Paul Saenger, Space Between Words: The Origins of Silent Reading (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 18–82; Guglielmo Cavallo, “Between Volumen and Codex: Reading in the Roman World,” in A History of Reading in the West, ed. Guglielmo Cavallo and Roger Chartier, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 64–89; and M. B. Parkes, “Reading, Copying and Interpreting a Text in the Early Middle Ages,” ibid., 90–102.

15. See Josef Balogh, “Voces paginarum: Beiträge zur Geschichte des lauten Lesens und Schreibens,” Philologus 82 (1927): 84–109, 202–40.

16. Plutarch, Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat 16e, in Plutarch, Moralia, vol. 1, with an English translation by Frank Cole Babbit, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009 [1927]), 84; for a discussion, see David Konstan, “The Active Reader in Classical Antiquity,” Argos 30 (2006): 10.

17. De Ordine, 1.3.8.

18. For a review of issues in this field, see Sadi Bartsch and David Wray, eds., Seneca and the Self, especially the essays of A. A. Long and Brad Inwood on the heritage of Michel Foucault.

19. On the use of the term “eclectic” to describe this expansion of sources, see Ilsetraut Hadot, Arts libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique: Contribution à l’histoire de l’éducation et de la culture dans l’Antiquité, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 2005), 483–94.

20. De Ira 3.36.1–3, in Seneca, Moral Essays, vol. 1, ed. and trans. John W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 338, 340; my trans.

21. Ep. Mor., 28.10, ed. L. D. Reynolds, vol. 1, p. 81, 3–7, where a maxim of Epicurus is the point of departure: “‘Initium est salutis notitia peccati.’ Egregie mihi hoc dixisse videtur Epicurus; nam qui peccare se nescit corrigi non vult; deprehendas te oportet antequam emendas. . . . Ideo quantum potes te ipse coargue, inquire in te; accusatoris primum partibus fungere, deinde iudicis, novissime deprecatoris.”

22. Hadot, “Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse,” 49–70 and “Spiritual Exercises,” in Philosophy as a Way of Life, 81–125. The literature on the subject is extensive; for a bibliography, see Stock, Augustine’s Inner Dialogue, 23–24n18. Anglo-American philosophy has evolved a different vocabulary for treating the issues; see Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, ch. 1, and Long, Epictetus, chs. 3–4.

23. Ilsetraut Hadot, Seneca und die griechische-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 105; cf. Robert J. Newman, “Cotidie meditare: Theory and Practice of the meditatio in Imperial Stoicism,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 36, 3 (1989): 1480.

24. Quoting Marcus Agrippa, Ep. Mor. 94.48.

25. De Vita Beata 2, ed. John W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 1932), 102.

26. On this topic see Ilsetraut Hadot, “The Spiritual Guide,” in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman, ed. A. H. Armstrong, 445–55.

27. As suggested by the presence of numerous mock internal dialogues: e.g., De Ira 1.1.3, 1.1.6, 1.8.4, 1.11.1, etc. These views are paralleled by statements (often paraphrased in Seneca’s words) from Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Epicureans, and others. The work thereby advances by means of a double internal dialogue, which is based on texts that Seneca has read and on his own views, both of which are expressed in dialogue form.

28. Miriam T. Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992 [1976]), Appendix B 2, pp. 413–14.

29. De Tran. An. 1.14, trans. Basore.

30. In which the other voice is sometimes portrayed as that of his brother, Gallio, to whom the treatise is dedicated; e.g., 6.1–2, p. 114.

31. E.g., De Vita Beata 4.1–2, p. 109.

32. Ibid., 4.4, p. 110.

33. Ibid., 4.2–3, p. 108.

34. Ibid., 16.1–3, p. 140.

35. Ibid., 8.3, p. 118: “Incorruptus vir sit externis et insuperabilis miratorque tantum sui, fidens animo atque in utrumque paratus, artifex vitae.” Cf. 16.3, p. 140: “Quid extrinsecus opus est, qui omnia sua in se colligit?”

36. On this dimension of self-address, see Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, 18–19.

37. De Tran. An., 1.2–3, ed. Basore (1932), 202.

38. Ibid., 1.1.

39. Ibid., 2.1, p. 212.

40. Ibid., 5.2, p. 234.

41. Ibid., 2.4, p. 214.

42. For a review of the literature on the Epistulae, see Giancarlo Mazzoli, “Le ‘Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium’ di Seneca. Valore letterario et filosofico,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II 36, 3 (1989): 1823–77; for an introduction to major themes, see Brad Inwood, Seneca: Selected Philosophical Letters, trans. with an Introduction and Commentary (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007), xi–xxi, and Inwood, “The Importance of Form in Seneca’s Philosophical Letters,” in Ancient Letters: Classical and Late Antique Epistolography, ed. Ruth Morello and A. D. Morrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 133–48. For a brief statement on the use of reading in the early letters, see Stock, “Éthique et humanités: quelques leçons de l’expérience historique,” in Bibliothèques intérieures, trans. Philippe Blanc and Christophe Carraud (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2005), 73–76, and Stock, Augustine’s Inner Dialogue, 69–71.

43. On this type of self-construal and its potential relationship to Renaissance writers, see Catherine Edwards, “Self-Scrutiny and Self-Transformation in Seneca’s Letters,” Greece and Rome 44, 1 (1997): 23–38.

44. E.g., Ep. Mor., 95; on this topic see Inwood, Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy in Rome (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005); and Inwood, Seneca: Selected Philosophical Letters.

45. On the first type, examples include Ep. Mor. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9; on the second, see Epp. 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, and 14.

46. It is tempting to ascribe a larger role to the reader in the Epistulae, but it must remembered that for Seneca reading is a rational activity, parallel to the dialogue, as well as a form of spiritual direction. A fully autonomous function for reading is not envisaged. For a different view, see Dieter Teichert, “Der Philosoph as Briefschreiber: Zur Bedeutung der literarischen Form von Senecas Briefen an Lucilius,” in Literarische Formen der Philosophie, 64–69.

47. See Discourses I.x.1–9, ed. W. A. Oldfather, Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 1925), vol. 1, 76–77; this edition is quoted throughout along with Oldfather’s translation, except where noted. On the possibility that Arrian revised the text, see T. Wirth, “Arrians Errinerungen an Epiktet,” Museum Helveticum 24 (1967): 149–89, 197–216. Yet even in revision Arrian may have captured the authentic flavor of Epictetus’s teaching; for a positive assessment, see A. A. Long, “Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius,” in Ancient Writers, ed. T. J. Luce (New York: Scribner, 1982), 989–90.

48. See P. A. Brunt, “From Epictetus to Arrian,” Athenaeum N.S. 55 (1977): 21–30.

49. The enthusiasm can partly be attributed to Arrian; see Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, “Le Socrate d’Épictète,” Philosophie Antique 1 (2001): 137–38. On the “Socratic Paradigm” in the Discourses, see Long, Epictetus, chap. 3; cf. Epictetus, Discourses I.viii.11, vol. 1, p. 62; however, Socrates’s teaching is frequently represented by Xenophon’s paraphrase and by allusions, comparisons, or loose summaries. For a list of citations, see K. Döring, “Sokrates bei Epiktet,” in Studia Platonica: Festschrift für Hermann Gündert zu seinem 65. Geburtstag . . . , ed. W. Kull-mann (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1974), 195–226; on the image of Socrates more generally, see A. A. Long, “Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy.” Among Epictetus’s borrowings from Plato are Disc., I.xxv.29–30; vol. 1, p. 164; I.xxvi.8; vol. 1, p. 170 (cf. Plato, Apology, 38a); I.xxix.16; vol. 1, p. 187 (cf. Apology, 30c); II.i.15; vol. 1, p. 216; II.i.32; vol. 1, p. 222; II.ii.8–9 et seq. (cf. Apology 2f.); II.iv.8; vol. 1, p. 236 (referring possibly to the Symposium); II.xii.5; vol. 1, p. 290 (cf. Gorgias 474a); II.xviii.22; vol. 1, p. 354 (cf. Symposium 218D); III.i.19; vol. 2, p 10. Among other moral heroes are the Cynics, Heracles, and Diogenes; see B. L. Hijmans, Jr., ‘AΣΚΗΣΙΣ.’ Notes on Epictetus’s Educational System (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959), 72–77.

50. As Arrian claims in his prefatory letter to Lucius Gellius; Discourses, ed. Oldfather, vol. 1, p. 4.

51. E.g., Long, Epictetus, ix, 2.

52. Possibly in illustration of the Stoic principle of teaching ethics by means of specific case histories; however, a notable exception to this suggestion is Epictetus’s lengthy discussion of freedom; Disc., 4.1; vol. 2, pp. 245–305.

53. Long, Epictetus, 3.

54. Cf., on Cynicism, M. Billerbeck, Der Kyniker Demetrius: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaiserzeitlichen Popularphilosophie (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 3–43.

55. E.g., Disc., I.xi; vol. 1, pp. 78ff.

56. E.g., Disc., I.x.2–6; vol. 1, p. 74; I.xxiii (with Epicurus); vol. 1, 148f; II.ii.15–20 (with Socrates and Heraclitus); vol. 1, pp. 228, 230.

57. E.g., Disc., I.xii.6–9; vol. 1, p. 90; I.xiii; vol. 1, pp. 98f.; I.xvii.1–12, vol. 1, pp. 112ff.; I.xxv.11–13; vol. 1, p. 160; I.xxvii.1–6; vol. 1, pp. 170, 172; I.xxx; vol. 1, p. 204, 206; II.vi.6–10; vol. 1, p. 248; II.xiii.15–22; vol. 1, pp. 302, 304; II.xviii.15–18; vol. 1, pp. 352, 354.

58. Disc., III.i.19 ff.; vol. 2, pp. 10 ff; III.xii.15; vol. 2, p. 84, 86; IV.iv.29–30; vol. 2, p. 324.

59. Disc., I.xx.2–5; vol. 1, p. 136.

60. Disc., I.i.4; vol. 1, p. 8; I.xvi.2–3; vol. 1, p. 108; cf. Augustine, De Ord., II.11.30, where a comparable distinction is made between ratio as mentis motio, and what is rationale or rationabile, as quod ratione uteretur vel ut posset. In Augustine this is followed by an inner dialogue in which the speaker is Reason, whereas Epictetus employs a fictive dialogue with Zeus, possibly drawing on Homer, Odyssey X, 21, and by a soliloquy, presumably in Zeus’ presence, on what is and is not truly within his jurisdiction; Disc., I. i. 21–25; vol. 1, p. 12.

61. E.g., Disc., I.xii.12–21; vol. pp. 92, 94. It is also possible—although the suggestion must be made with caution—that in Epictetus inner dialogues give expression to personal freedom at a time when political options were limited; e.g., the soliloquy at II.1.21–24; vol. 1, p. 220.

62. Disc., I.xvii.14; vol. 1, p. 116: “. . . autos dia seatou parakoloutheis?”

63. E.g., Disc., II.xxi.9–10; vol. p. 386; III.xxii.30; vol. 2, p. 144. The fullest outline is at III.xxiv.105–14; vol. 2, pp. 216, 218, 220.

64. Disc., III.xiv.1–3; vol. 2, p. 96; on the limitations of open conversation as contrasted with solitude and talking to oneself, see III.xvi; vol. 2, 104, 106, 108.

65. E.g., Disc., III.xxi.23; vol. 2, p. 130. The reader’s soliloquy, as practiced by Seneca, is rare in Epictetus; but see Disc., III.xxiii.21–23; vol. 2, p. 176.

66. Disc., III.xxiv.103; vol. 2, p. 216.

67. Disc., IV.1.128–40, a passage on self-consciousness, possibly unique in the period’s writings in philosophy, discussing the potential thoughts of a student during a course of lectures.

68. E.g., Disc., IV.1.6–10; vol. 2, p. 246, where dialogue and soliloquy are indistinguishable.

69. Disc., I.xviii.15–20; vol. 1, pp. 116, 118.

70. Disc., II.vi.6–10; vol. 1, p. 248. These include proverbial expressions which one says to oneself; see II.xv.13–19; vol. 1, pp. 318, 320; on occasion such inner speeches contain literary references; e.g., II.xix.5–11; vol. 1, pp. 360, 362.

71. Disc., III.i.34, vol. 2, p. 16. On the topos of attractiveness in young men entering the field, see IV.xi.25–30; vol. 2, p. 418.

72. As well as in other creatures, e.g., dogs and horses, thereby endowing them with a form of self-consciousness. Cf. Hippias Major, 286c–d, where Socrates asks a similar question.

73. Disc., III.i.8–9, vol. 2, pp. 6, 8; cf. III.i. 15, pp. 8, 10. In Epictetus’s view, this means making oneself beautiful in the sight of god; II.xviii.19–20; vol. 1, p. 354.

74. Disc., III.i.25; vol. 2, p. 14.

75. Disc., III.i.10–13; vol. 2, p. 8, trans. Oldfather with modifications.

76. On the Aristotelian roots, see Robert Dobbin, “Προαíρεσις in Epictetus,” Ancient Philosophy 11 (1991): 111–16 and the bibliography therein.

77. Adolf Bonhöffer, Epiktet und die Stoa (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1890), 259–60.

78. Disc., II.xxii.1–19; vol. 1, pp. 404, 406, 408.

79. Disc., II.xxiii.10–19; vol. 1, pp. 408, 410; II.xxiii.28; vol. 1, p. 414.

80. A.A. Long, Epictetus, 227.

81. Disc., I.xxii.9–10; vol. 1, p. 144; my trans.

82. Disc., I.xxv.1; vol. 1, p. 156.

83. Disc., I.xxii.9; vol. 1, p. 144.

84. Disc., I.xxiv; vol. 1, p. 150 ff.

85. Disc., I.xxv.6, vol. 1, p. 158.

86. Disc., I.xxii.17–18; vol. 1, p. 146; my trans.

87. Disc., I.xxv.11; vol. 1, p. 158, 160.

88. See above all Adolf Bonhöffer, Epiktet und das Neue Testament (Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1911). For a review of the issues, see Amand Jagu, “La morale d’Épictète et le christianisme,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II, 36, 3 (1989): 2164–99; in greater detail, see Michel Spanneut, Le stoïcisme des Pères de l’Église, Patristica Sorbonensia 1 (Paris: Le Seuil, 1957). On the question of the teaching methods of Socrates and Christ, see the thoughtful essay of Paul W. Gooch, Reflections on Jesus and Socrates: Word and Silence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), 1–18, 47–107; on the use of Epictetus’s Manual by Christian writers, see Gerard Boter, The “Encheiridion” of Epictetus and Its Three Christian Adaptations (Leiden: Brill, 1999).

89. Disc., III.xxiv.2–4; vol. 2, p. 184; in general, see Keimpe Algra, “Epictetus and Stoic Theology,” in The Philosophy of Epictetus, ed. Theodore Scaltsas and Andrew S. Mason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 32–33.

90. See Bonhöffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, 80.

91. E.g., Disc., I.iii.1–2; vol. 1, p. 24; cf. Epictetus, Encheiridion, c. 26. On the superiority of divine to human will, see Disc., IV.vii.20; vol. 2, p. 366.

92. Disc., I.vi.1–7; vol. 1, p. 40; cf. I.xiii.1–5; vol. 1, p. 98. One of the purposes of inner dialogue is the contemplation of these functions; I.vi.37 ff; vol. 1, pp. 48 ff.

93. Disc., III.xxvi.29; vol. 2, p. 230; my paraphrase; cf. IV.1.103; vol. 2, p. 278.

94. On these and other theological topics, see the summary of Algra, “Epictetus and Stoic Theology,” 42–47.

95. Disc., III.i.36; vol. 2, p. 18; III.xiii.11–12; vol. 2, p. 90.

96. On the justification for hymns of praise to god, see Disc., I.xvi.15–21; vol. 1, p. 112.

97. Disc., II.xiv.11; vol. 1, p. 308.

98. Disc., III.xxiv.3; vol. 2, p. 184.

99. Disc., I.xxv.2–6; vol. 1, pp. 156, 158; trans. Oldfather with modifications.

100. Disc., I.xxv.27–28; vol. 1, pp. 162, 164.

101. Disc., I.xxvi.13–15; vol. 1, p. 166.

102. See Disc., I.xxix.59; vol. 1, p. 198

103. Disc., 1.xxix.41–47; 4.7.13; Handbook, 17.

104. Disc., 3.xxii.4–8; 1.xxix.41–47; 4.vii.13.

105. Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life, and Death, 161; on prohairesis and self, see pp. 11–185.

106. Disc., II.viii.12–14; vol. 1, pp. 260, 262; my paraphrase.

107. Disc., II.x.1; vol. 1, p. 274.

108. Disc., II.xvii.1–3; vol. 1. p. 336; my paraphrase.

109. Disc., II.xvii.5–13; 29–33; vol. 1, pp. 336 ff.

110. Disc., II.xviii.2; vol. 1, pp. 348, 350; my paraphrase.

111. Disc., IV.1.63; vol. 2, p. 264; trans. Oldfather slightly modified.

112. Disc., II.xviii.4; vol. 1, p. 350.

113. Disc., II.xviii.5–8; vol. 1, p. 350.

114. Disc., I.xx.7; vol. 1, p. 138.

115. Disc., II.xviii.20; vol. 1, p. 354 (cf. Plato, Laws IX, 854b and for the following example Symposium 218d ff.).

116. Disc., II.xviii.27; vol. 1, p. 356.

117. Disc., III.viii.1; vol. 2, p. 60; my paraphrase.

118. Disc., I. iv. 5ff. III.i.; vol. 2, pp. 4 ff.

119. Disc., I.iv.18; vol. 1, p. 32.

120. Disc., II.xix.11; vol.1, p. 362.

121. Disc., II.ix.13; vol. 1, p. 270.

122. Disc., IV.iv.29–30; vol. 2, p. 324.

123. Disc., II.xix.20; vol. 1, p. 366.

124. Disc., II.ii.21–26; vol. 1, p. 230; cf. II.xiv.15, p. 310.

125. Disc., II.xxi.8–10; vol. 1. pp. 384, 386; my paraphrase.

126. The term “meditations,” referring to internal reflections of a moral or philosophical nature, is derived from a late ancient and medieval rather than ancient meaning for meditatio; an early example is found in Jerome’s translation of Genesis XXIV, 24: “Et egressus fuerat [Abraham] ad meditandum in agro.”

127. Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, xvii, 45–47.

128. Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, 8–9; 13–14; cf. Pierre Hadot, The Inner Citadel: The “Meditations” of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 34.

129. Med., I.9; see Hadot, Inner Citadel, 59–69. References to the Meditations in this section are taken from The Communings with Himself of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Emperor of Rome, Together with his Speeches and Sayings, ed. C. R. Haines, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 1916); translation unless otherwise stated from The “Meditations” of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, trans. A. S. L. Farquharson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1944), and A Selection from the Letters of Marcus and Fronto, trans. with Intro. and Notes by R. B. Rutherford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). In addition to Epictetus, Marcus was influenced by Democritus, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates; see the Index to Haines, The Communings . . . , sub nominibus.

130. The presentation is the philosophical equivalent of what is called, in literary criticism, “a stream of consciousness.”

131. But see Med., V.16, where Marcus argues that the soul acquires its coloring, i.e., its disposition for virtue, from the succession of our thoughts.

132. Med., I.7. On this theme, see the important observations of Hadot, Inner Citadel, 30–34.

133. Med., III.14; Epictetus, Disc., I.7.

134. He complains about the lack of leisure for reading, Med., III.14; the evidence is thoughtfully summed up by Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, 28–29.

135. See Hadot, Inner Citadel, 48–51.

136. It is not clear that he intended to record them; however, against this view, see Disc., II.1.32, vol. 1, p. 222, where he speaks of the extensive “writings” of Socrates. What is possibly meant is private notes not intended for publication but circulated to a small number of students; cf. II.1.34–35, vol. 1, p. 222, where he refers to writings of his own. Notes are scattered throughout the Discourses on the ways reading and writing prepare students for leading a philosophical life. As noted, writing is viewed as a model skill, permitting individuals to adapt to a variety of spoken sounds, just as trained Stoics adapt to different challenges in life; II.ii.21–26; vol. 1, p. 230; cf. II.xiv, 15–16; and vol. 1, p. 310, on writing in relation to other techniques. Similarly, reading is viewed as a preparation for living; IV.iv.11; vol. 2, 316.

137. Arrian, Letter to Lucius Gellius, in Epictetus, Disc., vol. 1, pp. 4, 6; for a different view, see Wirth, “Arrians Errinerungen.”

138. In this respect his method resembles that of Christian exegetes to whom he was fervently opposed; see P. A. Brunt, “Marcus Aurelius and the Christians,” in Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History, ed. Carl Derous, vol. 1 (Latomus, vol. 164, Brussels, 1979), 483–518.

139. E.g., Med., I.14; for a review, see Hadot, Inner Citadel, 2–20.

140. See Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, 126–37.

141. E.g., Med., III.4.

142. For a convincing analysis, see Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, 126–77 and Hadot, Inner Citadel, 257–60.

143. Although he hints at his method at Med., VI.26, where he compares the enumeration of life’s duties to reading the letters of a name, one by one; cf. VI.30, describing Antoninus’s habit of close scrutinization before reaching decisions; cf. VIII.11; VIII.22.

144. Cf. Hadot, Inner Citadel, 34.

145. Matthew Arnold, “Marcus Aurelius,” in Essays in Criticism: First Series (London: Macmillan, 1865), 279. For a reassessment of this view, see Rutherford, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, chap. 4, and Hadot, Inner Citadel, 257–63. Some of the infelicities in style are those one would expect from a Latin speaker who is writing Greek.

146. E.g., Med., II.1–2; on this theme and its evolution between Epictetus and Marcus, see the important observations of Hadot, Inner Citadel, esp. pp. 105–25.

147. Med., VIII.48; ed. Haines, p. 222.

148. Med., VI.1; ed. Haines, p. 130.

149. Med., VI.3; ed. Haines, p. 130; cf. III.11, where Marcus advises us to make a mental outline of an object as it appears in our minds in order to see its essence distinctly; similarly, at VI.31, on dreams and waking images.

150. Med., IV.1, 2; trans. Farquharson, modified.

151. Med., IV.4; ed. Haines, p. 70.

152. Med., XI.12; ed. Haines, p. 302.

153. Med., XII.19; ed. Haines, p. 339; trans. Farquharson, modified.

154. Med., VI.11; ed. Haines, p. 132.

155. Med., IX.15; ed. Haines, p. 242; trans. Farquharson, modified.

156. Med., VII.68; ed. Haines, pp. 192, 194.

157. Med., I.7, trans. Farquharson, modified.

158. Med., V.1; ed. Haines, p. 98; my trans.

159. Med., V.11; ed. Haines, p. 112; trans. Farquharson, modified.

160. Med., VIII.2; ed. Haines, p. 200; my trans.

161. Med., VIII.29; ed. Haines, p. 210; cf. VII.15; VIII.36; IX.7.

162. Med., X.1; ed. Haines, p. 260; my paraphrase.

163. Med., XI.16; ed. Haines, p. 304; my paraphrase.

164. Med., III.1; ed. Haines, p. 44, 46; my paraphrase; cf. IV.20–21; V.23, 33; VI.4, 15, 25. On Plutarch, see On the E at Delphi, 392C-E; on Seneca, Epistulae Morales 24.19–21 and 58.22–23.

165. De Ord., I.3.6: “Sed nocte quadam, cum evigilassem de more mecum ipse tacitus agitarem; Sol., I.1.1: “volventi mihi multa ac varia mecum diu ac per multos dies sedulo quaerenti memetipsum.”

166. For an outline, see Stock, Augustine’s Inner Dialogue, 18–120. On the philosophical background of Augustine’s approach to the liberal arts, see above all Ilsetraut Hadot, Arts libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique, 101–36 (on De Ord., book 2) and 377–90 (on Augustine’s education); cf. Philip Burton, Language in the “Confessions” of Saint Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). The influence of Manichaean exegetical traditions on the early phase of Augustine’s development as a commentator cannot be ruled out; on the background, see Michel Tardieu, “Principes de l’exégèse manichéenne du Nouveau Testament,” in Les règles de l’interprétation, ed. Michel Tardieu (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1987), 123–46.

167. Respectively at Conf., VIII.10.23–11.25, Sol., II.1.1, and Conf., XI.14.17.

168. E.g., De Mag., XI.36; see Goulven Madec, “Analyse du De magistro,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 21 (1975), 63–71, and, on the use of language, Myles Burnyeat, “Wittgenstein and Augustine De Magistro,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement 61 (1987): 1–24 and Stock, Augustine’s Inner Dialogue, 196–211.

169. Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick with an Introduction and Notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 230–31; slightly modified.

170. See Porphyry, Vita Plotini 3–6, ed. and trans. A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, vol. 1: Porphyry on the Life of Plotinus and the Order of His Books: Enneads I.1–9, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 6–24.

171. Vita Plotini 8; ed. and trans. Armstrong, vol. 1, pp. 29, 31.

172. Although it cannot be proven, we must admit the possibility that Plotinus’s unusual form of composition arose in part because he was dyslexic.

173. Plotinus, Enn., 4.8.1, trans. Armstrong, vol. 4, 397; cf. Enn., 6.9.11.24; 6.9.11.45–51; also, Augustine, De Quant. An., 15.25; cf. Ep., 4.2, 4.9, and 148.38. For a review of the issues, see Goulven Madec, Saint Augustin et la philosophie, 15–29.

174. On the background, see H. R. Schwyzer, “ ‘Bewusst’ und ‘Unbewusst’ bei Plotin,” in Les sources de Plotin, Entretiens sur l’Antiquité tardive 5 (Vandœuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1957), 344–90; cf. E. R. Dodds, “Tradition and Personal Achievement in the Philosophy of Plotinus,” reprinted in Dodds, The Ancient Concept of progress and Other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), 135–36. Dodds’s claim that Plotinus invented the Western notion of the self is now considered an overstatement; see Richard Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life, and Death (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 119.

175. See the discussion of time and personal identity in James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 26–37.

176. On this topic see the survey of Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 387–427; on soliloquy, autobiography, and the incarnation, see Stock, “Self, Soliloquy, and Spiritual Exercises in Augustine and Some Later Authors,” Journal of Religion 91, 1 (2011): 8–13.

177. See Pierre Hadot, “Platon et Plotin dans trois sermons de saint Ambroise,” Revue des Études Latines 34 (1956): 202–20.

178. On this topic, see Goulven Madec, “ ‘Verus philosophus est amator Dei’: S. Ambroise, S. Augustin, et la philosophie,” Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 61 (1977): 549–66.

179. See Pierre Courcelle, Recherches sur les “Confessions” de saint Augustin, 93–138; cf. Courcelle, “Nouveaux aspects du platonisme chez saint Ambroise” Revue des Études Latines 34 (1956): 225–39. It is possible that the sermon also drew the attention of Augustine to this text when he came to write De Genesi, book 12.

180. For a line by line comparison of sources, see André Mandouze, “L’extase d’Ostie: Possibilités et limites de la méthode des parallèles textuels,” in Augustinus Magister (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), vol. 1, 67–84. See also Jean Pépin, “Primitiae spiritus: Remarques sur une citation paulinienne des ‘Confessions’ de saint Augustin,” reprinted in “Ex Platonicorum Persona”: Études sur les lectures philosophiques de saint Augustin (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1977), 133–80; more generally, Paul Henry, La vision d’Ostie: Sa place dans la Vie et l’Œuvre de saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1938), 15–26, and Aimé Solignac in Les Confessions, livres I–VII, Œuvres de saint Augustin, BA, vol. 14 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962), 191–97.

181. For an example of a text citing Plotinus and Paul that was probably known to Augustine see Ambrose, On Isaac or the Soul 4.1; CSEL, vol. 32 (Vienna, 1897), p. 650, 15–651, 7.

182. See De Trin., XV.11.20.

183. See above all Isabelle Bochet, “Le firmament de l’Écriture”: L’herméneutique augustinienne (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2004), 157–325.

184. E.g., Marcus Aurelius, Med., II.14; II.17; III.1, and especially VIII.36, where he advises his readers not to be confused by the mental image created by an entire life; for the philosophical justification, see V.23.

185. On this topic and its contemporary echo, see Isabelle Bochet, Augustin dans la pensée de Paul Ricoeur (Paris: Éditions des Facultés Jésuites, 2004).

186. Disc., I.xxviii.12; vol. 1, p. 180; cf. I.xxviii.31; vol. 1, p. 186, for a similarly negative view of the plays of Euripides and Sophocles.

187. For an alternative approach, see Sabine MacCormack, The Shadow of Poetry: Vergil in the Mind of Augustine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

188. De Civ. Dei XI.18, where he speaks of a rhetoric of facts rather than words.

189. Philostratus, Life of Apollonius, VI.19.

190. On the distinction to which Augustine refers often see De Musica. VI.11.32 and chapter 5; for a recent discussion of the background, see Emmanuel Bermon, “Un échange entre Augustin et Nebridius sur la phantasia (Lettres 6–7),” Archives de Philosophie 72 (2009): 199–222.

191. See Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Creation of Self,” in Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 63–87.

192. See James Olney, Memory and Narrative: The Weave of Life-Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 1–83.

193. On Boethius’s literary orientation, a good introduction is Seth Lerer, Boethius and Dialogue: Literary Method in “The Consolation of Philosophy” (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 46–56, 69–93. On the method of alternating prose and verse, see John Magee, “Boethius’ Anapestic Dimiters (Acatalectic), with Regard to the Structure and Argument of the Consolatio,” in Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs, ed. Alain Galonnier (Louvain-La-Neuve: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 2003), 147–69, with a useful bibliography on the prosimetrum, 147, n.1.

194. Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 223. For an excellent introduction to the thought of Boethius, see John Magee, “Boethius,” in The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, ed. L. P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 798–810. A recent commentary is Joachim Gruber, Kommentar zu Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, 2nd ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010).

195. On this theme see the eloquent statement of John Magee, “Boethius’ Consolatio and the Theme of Roman Liberty,” Phoenix 59 (2005): 348–64.

196. On Boethius’s Greek and Latin sources, see Joachim Gruber, Kommentare zu Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae, 2nd ed.

197. Cf. Friedrich Klingner, De Boethii consolatione philosophiae, 3rd ed. (Hildesheim: Weidmann, 2005 [1921]), 9–12, 17, 20, 22.

198. Examples include Servius Sulpicius in Cicero, Letters to his Friends, IV.5; Horace, Odes I.xxiv; and Seneca, Consolations to Marcia, Helvia, and Polybius. Cicero’s consolatio on the death of his daughter, Tullia, has not survived. The themes of the consolatio enter the tradition of the philosophical soliloquy in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, where they draw attention to the inevitability of death, no matter what one’s station in life; e.g., III.3, IV.32, 33, 48, 50; VI.27, 47; VII.49; VIII.5, 25, etc.

199. Examples include Plato’s Apology and Euthydemus and Cicero’s (lost) Hortensius, which converted Augustine to the study of philosophy at age nineteen; Conf. III.2.4. Important studies on the subject include Ingemar Düring, Aristotle’s Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction (Götheborg: Acta Universitatis Gotoburgensis, 1961); A. J. Festugière, Les trois “protreptiques” de Platon: “Euthydemus,” “Phédon,” “Epinomis” (Paris: Vrin, 1973); Cicero, Hortensius, ed. Alberto Grilli (Milan: Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1962). On the difficulty of defining the genre, see Mark D. Jordan, “Ancient Philosophic Protreptic and the Problem of Persuasive Genres,” Rhetorica 4, 4 (1986): 309–33.

200. Cf. Pierre Courcelle, La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1967), 18.

201. Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae I, prose 2, ed. Ludwig Bieler, rev. ed. (CCSL 94): “Sui paulisper oblitus est; recordabitur facile, si quidem nos ante cognouerit.”

202. On this topic, see Pedro Laín Entralgo, The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity, trans. and ed. L. J. Rather and J. M. Sharp (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970).

203. De Cons. Phil., I, pr. 3.

204. De Cons. Phil., I, pr. 5: “Sed tu quam procul a patria non quidem pulsus es sed aberrasti; ac si te pulsum existimari mauis, te potius ipse pepulisti.”

205. De Cons. Phil., I, pr. 5, trans. P. G. Walsh, Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 15. On Boethius’s conception of a private library, see Michael Lapidge, The Anglo-Saxon Library (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 11–12.

206. Crito 44b–c, trans. G. M. A. Grube in Plato: Complete Works, ed. with Intro. and Notes by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 39. The references to this passage, which has been drawn to my attention by John Magee, may have been based on the Latin translation of Calcidius; see Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, ed. J. H. Waszink, Plato Latinus, vol. 4 (London: Warburg Institute, 1962), 263, 7–8: “Uisa est mihi quaedam, inquit [Plato, Crito 44a], mulier eximia uenustate, etiam candida ueste.”

207. De Cons. Phil., I, pr. 6 ff. One might add that the source behind this source is very probably Cicero’s lost Hortensius; on the background see Goulven Madec and Isabelle Bochet, “Augustin et l’Hortensius de Cicéron: Notes de lectures,” in Augustin philosophe et prédicateur: Hommage à Goulven Madec, ed. Isabelle Bochet (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2012), 197–294.

208. For an enduring analysis of the sources of Boethius’s views including Crito, see Klingner, De Boethii consolatione philosphiae, 112–18.

209. Sol., 2.1.1.

210. De Cons. Phil., I, pr. 6.

211. De Cons. Phil., I, pr. 6, trans. P. G Walsh, pp. 16–17.

212. The texts differ but the argument is comparable (my italics):

Augustine,	Boethius,
Sol., 2.1.1:	De Con. Phil., I, pr. 6, 14–17:
Ratio: Tu qui vis te nosse, scis esse te?	Phil: Sed hoc quoque respondeas
Aug.: Scio.	uelim: hominemne te esse
Ratio: Unde scis?	meministi?
Aug: Nescio.	Boe.: Quidne, inquam, meminerim?
Ratio: Simplicem te sentis anne multiplicem?	Phil.: Quid igitur homo sit poterisne proferre?
Aug.: Nescio.	Boe.: Hocine interrogas, an esse me sciam rationale animal atque mortale? Scio, et id me esse confiteor.
Ratio: Moveri te scis?
Aug.: Nescio
Ratio: Cogitare te scis?
Aug.: Scio.	Phil.: Et illa: Nihilne aliud te esse nouisti?
Ratio: Ergo verum est cogitare te.
Aug.: Verum.	Boe.: Nihil.
Ratio: Immortalem te esse scie
Aug.: Nescio
Ratio: Horum omnium, quae te nescire dixisti,
quid sit scire prius mavis?
Aug.: Utrum immortalis sim.

213. Courcelle argued that Augustine was not one of Boethius’s major philosophical sources; La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire, 24; however, Klingner points out that Boethius echoes Augustine on such questions as the good and free will; De Boethii consolatione philosophiae, pp. 43 and 72 (the good) and pp. 103–4 (free will). To the list of Augustinian works mentioned in Klingner’s Index, namely De Civ. Dei, Conf., De Lib. Arbit., and Enn. in Psalmos, should be added Sol. (at Cons. Phil., I pr. 6) and De Mag. (at III, pr. 12) as well, perhaps, as De Beata Vita in both.

214. E.g., Apology 21b, ff.

215. De Cons. Phil., III, pr. 12: “‘Ludisne,” inquam, “me inextricabilem labyrinthum rationibus texens.” Cf. Augustine, Sol., I2.7.13–14; De Mag., 10.31.

216. Plato, Theaetetus 189–90a; trans. M. J. Levett, rev. Myles Burnyeat, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. Cooper and Hutchinson, 210.

CHAPTER 4. SELF AND SOUL

1. Trans. G. M. A. Grube in Plato: Complete Works, ed. Cooper and Hutchinson, 97–98.

2. For a critical review of publications in the field, see Goulven Madec, Saint Augustin et la philosophie, 15–52.

3. See Christopher Gill, Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 [1969]).

4. Conf., 1.14.23. Another reason, as noted, may have been his bicultural family, in which it is assumed both Punic and Latin were used. Greek was not his second language but his third.

5. On this theme, see the reflections of Sabine McCormack, The Shadows of Poetry: Vergil in the Mind of Augustine.

6. The most thorough study of this question is Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron, 2 vols. (Paris: Institut des Études Augustiniennes, 1968).

7. Conf., 10.16.25.

8. For a review of the subject and a full bibliography, see Gerald G. P. O’Daly, “Anima, animus,” Augustinus-Lexikon, vol. 1, 315–40.

9. O’Daly, 315–16.

10. De Trin. 14.26.

11. De Genesi ad Litteram, 7.21.28; my trans.

12. De Immortalitate Animae 1.1; PL 32.1021: “Si alicubi est disciplina, nec esse nisi in eo quod vivit potest, et semper est.”

13. De Imm. An., 3.4; 1023: “Hinc jam colligimus, posse esse quiddam quod cum movet mutabilia, non mutatur.”

14. De Imm. An., 3.4: 1023: “Non igitur si qua mutatio corporum movente animo fit, quamvis in eam sit intentus, hinc eum necessario mutari, et ob hoc etiam mori arbitrandum est.”

15. De Imm. An., 6.10: 1025–26, “Ergo incumbendum omnibus rationcinandi viribus video, ut ratio quid sit, et quoties definiri possit sciatur, ut secundum omnes modos et de animae immortalitate constet.”

16. De Imm. An., 6.10.1026: “Ratio est aspectus animi, quo per seipsum, non per corpus . . . , aut ipsa vera contemplatio . . . aut ipsum verum quod contemplator.”

17. De Imm. An., 6.10.1026: “Nam omne quod contemplamur, sive cogitatione capimus, aut sensu aut intellectu capimus. Sed ea quae sensu capiuntur, extra etiam nos esse sentiuntur, et locis continentur; unde nec percipi quidem posse afirmantur. Ea vero quae intelliguntur, non quasi alibi posita intelliguntur, quam ipse qui intelligit animus: simul enim etiam intelliguntur non contineri loco.”

18. De Quantitate Animae 33.70 (CSEL, vol. 79): “In primis tamen tibi amputem latissimam quandam et infinitam exspectationem, ne me de omni anima dicturum putes, sed tantum de humana, quam solam curare debemus, si nobismetipsis curae sumus.”

19. De Quant. An. 33.71: “Ubi evidentior manifestiorque vita intelligitur.”

20. De Quant. An., 33.71: “Removet se ab his sensibus certo intervallo temporum et eorum motus quas per quasdam ferias reparans imagines rerum, quas per eos hausit, secum catervatim et multipliciter versat; et hoc totum est somnus et somnia.”

21. De Quan. An., 33.71: “Pro copulatione sexus agit quod potest atque in duplici natura societate atque amore molitur unum.”

22. De Quant. An., 33.71: “Rebus inter quas corpus agit, et quibus corpus sustentat, consuetudine sese innectit, et ab eis quasi membris aegre separatur: quae consuetudinis vis etiam seiunctione rerum ipsarum atque intervallo temporis non discissa memoria vocatur.” In my rendering of the first clause I read corpus as subject of agit but object of sustentat.

23. De Quant. An., 33.73, reading si quam universi partem agit as an “even if” clause in relation to sed ipsi, etc., which follows in a lengthy series of clauses. Augustine is suggesting that the soul, as an aspect of world-soul, always acts on behalf of a part of the whole order (universi partem) and in reaching level four acts on behalf of the whole order (sed ipsi universe corpori audit praeponere).

24. Matt. 28: 9; Jn. 20: 11 ff.

25. De Beata Vita 4.34, citing Jn. 14: 6.

26. Confessions, 3.4.8.

27. Mk. 8: 34–38, trans. The New English Bible: New Testament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 70.

28. Vincent Taylor, The Gospel According to St. Mark (London: Macmillan, 1952), 381.

29. Cf. Mk. 4: 10, where both are mentioned.

30. However, see Mk. 8: 34; 9: 38; 10: 21, etc.

31. Vita Antonii, c. 2; Matt. 19: 21.

32. Conf., 8.12.29, trans. Chadwick.

33. Gal. 3:27; Colos. 3:12; cf. 1 Thess. 5:8.

34. E.g., De Trinitate 8.6.9, where we find Augustine’s favorite examples of these two types of memory images, i.e., Carthage, which he has seen, and Alexandria, which he has not seen.

35. Pierre Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin, 175–202. The ensuing literature on the veracity of the garden scene is summarized by H.-I. Marrou, “La quelle autour du ‘Tolle, lege,’” Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique 53 (1958): 47–57. For a judicious review of the issues, see Henry Chadwick, “History and Symbolism in the Garden at Milan,” in From Augustine to Eriugena: Essays in Neoplatonism and Christianity in Honor of John O’Meara, ed. Francis X. Martin and John A. Richmond (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 42–55.

CHAPTER 5. RHYTHMS OF TIME

1. Ep. 166, c. 5.13; Patrologia Latina 34, col. 726; trans. Sister Wilfrid Parsons, S.N.D., Saint Augustine: Letters, vol. 4 (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1955), 18–19; slightly modified.

2. A. A. Long, “The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue,” in Stoic Studies, 202.

3. This is of course a formal rather than substantive source; on Augustine’s general knowledge of Plato, see the excellent review of Goulven Madec, Saint Augustin et la philosophie, 1–52.

4. Trans. G. M. A. Grube in Plato: Complete Works, ed. Cooper and Hutchinson, 880. For a discussion, see Gregory Vlastos, “Anamnesis in the Meno,” Dialogue 4 (1965–66): 143–67.

5. De Magistro 13.43; cf. Goulven Madec, “Analyse du De magistro,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 21 (1975), 69.

6. For a review, see O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 70–75.

7. William Wordsworth, The Lyrical Ballads 1798–1805, ed. George Sampson (London: Methuen, 1961), 33.

8. De Imm. An., 4.6.

9. For a brief account of other features of Augustine’s theory of memory, see my study, Augustine’s Inner Dialogue: The Philosophical Soliloquy in Late Antiquity, 211–21; on his place in the subject’s lengthier history, see Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study and Janet Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

10. Conf., 10.27.38.

11. My translation is based on the version of Maria Boulding, O.S.B., The Confessions: Saint Augustine, trans. and intro. R. S. Pine-Coffin (New York: Vintage, 1997), 222, however with modifications.

12. Conf., 1.1.1.

13. Trans. Chadwick.

14. Plotinus, Enneads 1.6.8, trans. A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus, vol. 1, revised ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 255, 257; for other examples, see Armstrong, 255, n. 5.

15. On this theme see the enduring study of E. R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, chap. 10.

16. This retrospective text is more complicated than it first appears, since Augustine intermingles the reading of Psalm 4, which he was studying and reading aloud at the time, with his memory of the reading of other texts after 387, for example Ps. 18:7, 30:7–8, 138:21, and 142:10, as well as his reading of Paul, Eph. 1:20, Rom. 8:34, 1 Cor. 15:54, 2 Cor. 4:18, and other New Testament texts, e.g., Jn. 14:16 ff., Matt. 3:6. The overall schema of his reading of Psalm 4 is typological.

17. See De Musica 6.9.23; 6.13.39.

18. See Leo Ferrari, “The Theme of the Prodigal Son in Augustine’s Confessions,” Recherches Augustiniennes 12 (1979): 105–18 and James J. O’Donnell, ed., Confessions, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 95–98.

19. Cf. Conf., 2.5.10, on types of beauty, on which Augustine had apparently spoken in De Pulchro et Apto (380–81).

20. Retractationes., 1.6; cf. Ep., 101.3, to Memorius in 405.

21. De Grammatica was known to Cassiodorus and may have survived as the Ars Breviata. The number of surviving texts rises to three if De Dial. is included. De Mus. was to have six books quae rhythmus vocatur, i.e., on rhythm (Retr., 1.6) and six books de melo, i.e., on harmonics (Ep., 101). H.-I. Marrou, S. Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, 4th ed. (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1958), 580–83, suggested 408–9 as a terminus ad quem for book 6, but internal evidence suggests a much earlier date for at least a provisional revision of books 1–5, which I cite in this chapter from De Musica libri sex, ed. G. Finaert and F.-J. Thonnard, Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 1 ser., vol. 4 (Paris: Institut des Études Augustiniennes, 1947). This text reproduces with minor corrections Patrologia Latina 32.1081–1194 from the Maurist edition of 1836, and has occasionally been checked against two early manuscripts, B.N. lat 13375 and B.N. lat. 7200. I quote book 6 in the edition of Martin Jacobsson, Aurelius Augustinus, De musica liber VI: A Critical Edition with a Translation and an Introduction, Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, Studia Latina Stockholmiensia 47 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2002). This edition contains a useful review of issues concerned with the dating and interpretation of De Mus., pp. ix–xxvii, concluding, with Marrou, that book 6 was in some form emended, as Augustine wrote to Memorius in 408 or 409 (Ep., 101.3–4); also that “there exists . . . only one version of the sixth book” (p. xxvii).

22. Ep. 101.3.

23. Retr., 1.6: “sed haberi ab aliquibus existimo.”

24. Ilsetraut Hadot, Ars libéraux et philosophie dans la pensée antique, 101.

25. In his enthusiasm, Alypius overlooks the fact that there are two principles of organization, language and number.

26. De Ordine., 2.20.53–54; cf. Claudius Mamertus, De Stat. An., 2.8, noting Varro’s remark that in music, arithmetic, geometry, and philosophy, one moves from the corporeal to the incorporeal.

27. Books 2–5 are largely concerned with technical matters pertaining to versification, i.e., types of feet (book 2), aspects of rhythm and harmony (books 3–4), and verse forms (book 5).

28. The transition is paralleled in De Libero Arbitrio, in which books 1 and 2 contain no quotations from Scripture, whereas in book 3, written after Augustine’s ordination, they are numerous.

29. Cf. Ragnar Holte, Béatitude et sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la philosophie ancienne (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 46–47. Augustine’s reverence for Pythagoras echoes Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes. 1.17.38–39; 4.1.2.

30. Cf. Marrou, Saint Augustin, 200; and, on scientia, 561–62. In what follows, I have normally rendered scientia as “knowledge,” except where the context specifically demands another translation. Augustine’s use of musica is more difficult to translate by a single term. The usual translation, “music,” based on Varro and Cicero, is too restricted. Within De Mus., Augustine has in mind something closer to the Greek μουσική, which includes music, dance, metrical poetry, and the playing of instruments.

31. Laws 668d; trans. Trevor J. Saunders in Plato: Complete Works, ed. Cooper and Hutchinson, 1358.

32. I am indebted here to the valuable synthesis of Phillip de Lacey, “Stoic Views of Poetry,” American Journal of Philology 69 (1948): 241–71.

33. De Civ. Dei, 10.14, quoting Matt. 6:28 ff., in the light of Plotinus, Enn., 3.2.13.

34. The student is unidentified in the extant manuscript; cf. Evodius in De Lib. Arbit. Some believe that Augustine’s partner in De Mus. is Licentius, since the person in question is knowledgeable about the technical aspects of classical poetry; e.g., De Mus., 3.1.1: “qui uersus te semper cum uoluptate audisse confessus sis.” The evidence for this view is summarized and discussed by G. Finaert, Bibliothèque Augustinienne, vol. 4, n. 1, pp. 483–84; however, Finaert points out that Licentius appears to have no knowledge of the dialogue at the time of writing Ep., 26, where he notes: “si mihi morem / Gesseris et libros in lenta recumbit / Musica tradideris, nam ferveo in illis.” Yet, at De Mus., 1.12.23, speaking of proportion (analogia), the master refers to illa unitas, quam te amare dixisti, in rebus ordinatis, which recalls Licentius’s speech at De Ord., 1.5.14: “Quis neget, deus magne, . . . te cuncta ordine administrare? Quam se omnia tenent! quam ratis successionibus in nodos suos urgentur!” The last of these exclamations speaks of proportion in the mathematical context in which the problem is raised in De Mus. Another possibility for the student, although remote, is Adeodatus, who was clever enough to follow the technical discussion of meter, just as he appears to have assimilated ancient teachings on language for his role in De Mag. When distinguishing between phantasiae and phantasma at 6.11.32, Augustine states that he knew his father but not his grandfather; he also uses the example parens at 2.8.15. The force of these references would have been enhanced if the student had been his son. Also, at 6.5.9, there may be an echo of the discussion of De Mag., when the master enlists the student’s aid in helping him explain what happens when something is heard: “[Magister]: Cito dicam quid sentio: tu vero aut sequere, aut etiam praecede, si valebis, ubi me cunctari et haesitare animadverteris.” Augustine spoke of the difficulty at Ep., 101.3: “Difficillime quippe intelliguntur in eo quinque libri, si non adsit qui non solum disputantium possit separare personas.”

35. Cf. De Beata Vita 4.33, on achieving wisdom through virtue (moderatio animi): “Modus animi, hoc est quo sese animus librat, ut neque excurrat in nimium neque infra quam plenum est coartetur.”

36. Cf. De Civ. Dei, 8.17, on pathos as an irrational movement of the soul, which can affect even the wise man; cf. 9.4; cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp., 4.6.11; for Quintilian, see Chapter 2. Augustine cites Aulus Gellius, and through him Epictetus, in support of his doctrine of involuntary affectus, passiones, and perturbationes animi, which nowadays might be called “emotional disturbances.” For the Stoics, these are “advantageous” or “disadvantageous” depending on the circumstances; for Christians, they are training for the soul to be used in the pursuit of justice; 9.5.

37. De Civ. Dei, 11.18: “Ita quadam non uerborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulchritudo componitur.” Cf. ibid., 11.23, where the same principle is applied to painting.

38. Cf. De Mus., 6.13.41–42, where Augustine notes that numeri examinatores can be called sensuales, since it is by means of sensibilia signa that souls act on each other.

39. De Mus., 1.1.1: “A grammaticis haec audire soleo, et ibi ea didici; sed utrum hoc ejusdem artis sit proprium, an aliunde usurpatum, nescio.”

40. He will subsequently adopt the view that both grammar and numerical harmony are involved; e.g., 2.1.1; 6.1.1.

41. Cf. De Mus., 1.13.27, where this point is important in establishing the role of the senses in scientia modulandi. Cf. Cicero, Tusc. Disp., 2.16.37, who notes that the marching meter of the Roman troops was the anapest.

42. De Mus., 1.1.1: “An per teipsum istos pulsus didicisti, sed nomen quod imponeres, a grammatico audieras?” The master will modify this view in the prefaces to books 2 and 5, where the correctness of grammatical instruction is affirmed through both authority and reason.

43. De Mus., 1.1.1: “quidquid in hujusmodi sit vocibus numerosum artificiosumque.” The name of the discipline arises from its connection with the Muses, who were traditionally responsible for musical expression; for a less sanguine view of their powers, see De Doct. Christ., 2.17.27

44. Reiterated in Ep., 166, 5.13.

45. This view is modified in De Mus., 1.3–5, through the notion of implicit knowledge.

46. De Mus., 1.2.2: “Numquidnam hoc verbum quod modulari dicitur, aut numquam audisti, aut uspiam nisi in eo quod ad cantandum saltandumve pertineret?” This is the first of a number of negative remarks concerning actors, singers, and comedians, doubtless inspired by the low reputation of stage performers in the late empire; cf. Soliloquia, 2.10.18; Conf., 3.2.2. Augustine nonetheless develops a commentary on popular versus learned conceptions of music in book 1 that grants an important role for the implicit knowledge of the discipline among uneducated performers and their equally unsophisticated audiences. When he remarks at 1.2.2 that the pair have not entered into a dialogue just to talk about what any singer or actor knows, he refers to the baser aspects of popular entertainment but looks forward to the role of the senses, judgment, and memory at 1.5.10–1.6.11. The innate knowledge of harmony in performers is recognized as early as 1.2.3; and at 1.4.5 he proposes that educated persons, when they relax, engage in a nontheoretical appreciation of music. Performers who engage in imitation nonetheless employ art, which implies the presence of reason.

47. Cf. De Mus., 1.13.27, where the argument is reiterated without the example.

48. Augustine’s sense is close to Cicero, De Oratore, 3.48.185–86 and Orator, 43.178 and 58.198, the last utilizing the adjective numerosus; on the source and meaning of Cicero’s statement, which is applied to poetry in De Mus. and to prose in De Doctrina Christiana, book 4, see the judicious note of G.B. Pighi, “‘Impressio’ e ‘percussio’ in Cic. De Orat. 2,185–86,” L’Antiquité Classique 28 (1959): 214–22. Cf. Victorinus, Ars Grammatica, in H. Keil, Grammatici Latini, vol. 6 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1874), 188, under the topic De lectione: “Partes lectionis quot sunt? Quattuor. Quae sunt? Accentus, discretio, pronuntiatio, modulatio. . . . Modulatio quid est? Continuati sermonis in iucundiorem dicendi rationem artificialis flexus in delectabilem auditus formam conversus asperitatis vitandae gratia.”

49. Cf. De Mus., 1.2.3–1.3.4.

50. Cf. De Ord., 2.19.49: Ratio: “Non ergo numerosa faciendo sed numeros cognoscendo melior sum.”

51. A neologism, from numerosus; cf. De Doct. Christ., 4.20.40–41, where the topic is prose clausula. Cf. Cicero, Orat., 166, 188.

52. De Mus., 1.2.3: “Non enim possumus dicere bene moveri aliquid, si modum non servat.”

53. Ibid.: “Numquidnam ergo ipse motus propter se appetitur, et non propter id quod vult esse tornatum?”

54. Ibid., 1.4.5 ff. One is tempted to compare these levels to the three types of existence in De Libero Arbitrio, namely esse, vivere, and intellegere, but there is no type of artistic harmony in De Mus. that corresponds to the inanimate in this work. What the two triads have in common is a contrast between animals and humans based on the latter’s possession of reason.

55. Cf. De Mag., 1.1, where birds’ and humans’ popular songs are similarly discussed as types of music that provide only pleasure.

56. Cf. De Mag., 1.1 [Aug.]: “Aliud est loqui aliud cantare; nam et tibiis et cithara cantatur, et aues cantant, et nos interdum sine uerbis musicum aliquid sonamus, qui sonus cantus dici potest, locutio non potest.”

57. Augustine will offer a solution to this problem at De Civ. Dei 11.29, where he distinguishes between a knowledge of an art and the knowledge of the works in that art. On his earlier distinction, cf. usus and natura in De Dialectica, 10, ed. Jan Pinborg and B. Darrell Jackson (Boston: Reidel, 1975), 114, 38–44.

58. Even teaching (docere), since teachers often propose themselves as models ad imitandum. Augustine does not consider his other examples, namely popular music and dance, in this part of the discussion. The role of imitation here is comparable to that of gesture when an infant learns to speak; Conf., 1.8.13.

59. De Mus., 1.4.6: “Ex quo jam colligi potest, omnem qui imitando assequitur aliquid, arte uti; etiamsi forte non omnis qui arte utitur, imitando eam perceperit. At si omnis imitatio ars est, et ars omnis ratio; omnis imitatio ratio: ratione autem non utitur irrationale animal; non igitur habet artem: habet autem imitationem; non est igitur ars imitatio.”

60. De Mus., 1.4.7: “Istam enim hoc volvimus quaestionem, ut intelligamus, si possumus, quam recte sit scientia in illa definitione musicae posita.”

61. Ibid., 1.4.8: “Animo puto esse tribuendam. Non enim si per sensus percipimus aliquid quod memoriae commendamus, ideo in corpore memoria esse putanda est.” The master postpones a further discussion of this question until book 6.

62. Ibid., 1.4.9: “quia difficile nobis est; scientia potius quam usu et sedula imitatione ac meditatione fieri putemus.”

63. Ibid., 1.5.10: “Illud restat, ut opinor, ut inveniamus, si possumus, has ipsas artes quae nobis per manus placent ut illius usus potentes essent, non continuo scientiam, sed sensum ac memoriam secutas.”

64. Ibid.: “Numquidnam id a vulgo per artem musicam fieri credendum est?”

65. Ibid.: “Natura id fieri puto, quae omnibus dedit sensum audiendi, quo ista judicantur.” Augustine will refine his notion of aesthetic judgment in book 6.

66. There is also a change in the nature of the dialogue. The student, who has actively participated to this point, increasingly limits himself to asking questions that merely demand further explanation on the master’s part. In this respect, book 1 of De Mus. and book 1 of De Lib. Arbit. are comparable in relation to the rest of their respective discussions.

67. Cf. Conf., 11.14.19–11.16.21; 11.16.33. The numerical relations outlined by Augustine in this section of De Mus. have been the subject of commentary by Marrou, Saint Augustin, 251–62. This is in my view a rather too negative a view of Augustine’s achievement, which is elementary in number theory but sophisticated in its application of harmony and proportion to aesthetics.

68. Cf. Sol., 2.6.11, which provides a classification of things that resemble each other by being either equal or inferior, paralleled here by the rational and irrational. In his discussion of numerical relations, Augustine distantly echoes the Pythagorean and Platonic view that emphasizes the importance of the primal numbers, one, two, three, and four, which, as suggested in De Mus., provide the connection between the abstract harmony of mathematics and the harmony of the empirical world.

69. Sesque is not descended from se absque; see Finaert, Bibliothèque Augustinienne, vol. 4, n. 19, 494–95.

70. De Mus., 1.12.22: “Ergo haec duo principia numerorum sibimet copulata, totum numerum faciunt atque perfectum.” The relationship is lucidly described by Marrou, Saint Augustin, 260.

71. Ibid., 1.12.23: “Quae quantum valeat, eo jam assuesce cognoscere, quod illa unitas quam te amare dixisti, in rebus ordinatis hac una effici potest, cujus graecum nomen ὰναλογία est.” At De Utilitate Credendi, 5.4–9, written shortly after his ordination, Augustine refers to analogia in an interpretive context as one of the four senses of scripture; 5.1–4. Cf. De Gen. ad Litt. Imper., 2.5, and, for a discussion of Augustine’s usage, H. de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale, vol. 1 (Paris: Aubier, 1959), 177–87, which, unfortunately, does not take account of the statement on analogia in De Mus.

72. De Mus., 1.13.27.

73. Cf. De Mus., 1.1, where the master, giving this example, remarked, “Post ista videbimus.”

74. Ibid., 2.1.1: “An vero sive ista noris sive ignores, malis ut ita quaeramus, quasi omnino rudes harum rerum simus, ut ad omnia nos ratio potius perducat, quam inveterata consuetudo, aut praejudicata cogat auctoritas.”

75. Ibid.: “Atqui scias velim totam illam scientiam, quae grammatica graece, latine autem litteratura nominatur, historiae custodiam profiteri, vel solam, ut subtilior docet ratio, vel maxime, ut etiam pinguia corda concedunt.”

76. Ibid.: “Grammaticus . . . jubet emendari . . . secundum majorum, ut dictum est, auctoritatem, quorum scripta custodit.” Cf. De Mag., 2.3 and the interesting appendix of John Rist, Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 314–16, arguing for Porphyry as source.

77. Ibid., 2.1.1: “Tempora enim vocum ea pervenere ad aures, quae illi numero debita fuerunt.”

78. Cf. Ep., 101.4; Marrou, Saint Augustin, 580–83.

79. Ibid., 6.1.1: “Illos igitur libros qui leget inueniet nos cum grammaticis et poeticis animis non habitandi electione sed itinerandi necessitate uersatos.”

80. Marrou, Saint Augustin, 270, notes four metrical uses for silence: to justify the indifference of the final syllable, to complete this syllable, to begin a meter or verse, and to facilitate scansion. This emphasis is new in Augustine, as contrasted with his sources on meter, and may have resulted from his conception of reading, in which was natural to speak of periods of sound and silence, even when reading aloud.

81. Ambrose, Hymni 1.2.1; quoted at De Mus., 6.2.2, 6.9.23, and 6.17.57. For other occurrences in Augustine’s writings, see James J. O’Donnell, ed., Augustine. Confessions, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 142–43. Augustine’s approach is partly anticipated by Aristoxenus, Elementa Rhythmica, 1.8–10 and in particular 2.38–39, where it is argued that the comprehension of a melody requires that the hearer register a succession of sounds by means of the ears and the mind. This is achieved through sense perception and memory, since, in order to appreciate a musical composition, it is necessary to perceive the sound that is present and to remember the sound that has passed. Against the possibility of direct (or, as is probable, indirect) influence, it should be noted that Aristoxenus does not discuss the implications for the conception of time. His anti-Platonic attitude contrasts with that of Augustine, who, as noted, derives his notions of time directly or indirectly from Plato.

82. A sentiment expressed in numerous ways in the early writings, e.g., De Genesi ad Manichaeos, 1.21.32: “Totus enim ille sermo non de singulis syllabis aut litteris, sed de omnibus pulcher est.”

83. Cf. De Mag., 12.39.

84. Cf. De Lib. Arbit., 2.8.20–23.

85. Marrou, Saint Augustin, 580–83, suggested that the preface was sent to Memorius in order to make book 6 appear to be a unit in itself; however, the statement in the letter applies to the transition between books 1–5 and book 6. The former were not sent; therefore, it is an introduction to the whole treatise, admittedly written as an afterthought.

86. De Mus., 6.1.1: “Nam turba cetera de scholis linguarum tumultuantium, et adplaudentium strepitu uulgari leuitate laetantium, si forte inruit in has litteras [i.e., librum sextum], aut contemnet omnes aut illos quinque libros sufficere sibi arbitrabitur. Istum vero in quo fructum illorum est, uel abiciet quasi non necessarium, uel differet quasi post necessarium.” The adplaudentium strepitus is a negative reference to the reproduction of poetic meters by clapping, striking an instrument, or other physical means; cf. 1.13.27.

87. Ibid., 6.1.1: “cuncta puerilia transvolauerunt, . . . uolando se posse etiam ignorata transire.”

88. Ibid.: [qui] . . . puluerem huius itineris euadant.”

89. Ibid. The retia may refer to Manichaeans or Academics; cf. 6.4.7, whereas Augustine speaks of his readers as “holy and better persons,” who understand the inner meaning of Christ’s death and resurrection.

90. De Mus., 6.2.2: “Responde, si uidetur, cum istum uersum pronuntiamus, Deus creator omnium, istos quatuor iambos quibus constat, et tempora duodecim, ubinam esse arbitreris, id est, in sono tantum qui auditur, an etiam in sensu audientis qui ad aures pertinet, an in actu etiam pronuntiantis an, quia notus uersus est, in memoria quoque nostra hos numeros esse fatendum est?” It is assumed that one of the twelve intervals of time occurs at the beginning and the other at the end when the line is read.

91. Ibid.: Disc.: “In his omnibus puto.” It is interesting, although perhaps accidental, that this involves a transformation of the primary sequence of books 1 and 2, namely 1, 2, 3, 4; cf. 1.12.23–24. Augustine’s fascination with numerical relations is an aspect of his several commentaries on Wisd. 11:21: “You have ordered all things in measure, number, and weight”; e.g., De Civ. Dei, 11.30.

92. Ibid., 6.2.2: “ut in aliquo loco aliquis sonus existat huiuscemodi morulis et dimensionibus uerberans aerem uel stillicidio uel aliquo alio pulsu corporum, ubi nullus adsit auditor.”

93. Ibid., 6.2.3: “Non enim et cum silentium est, nihil a surdis differunt.”

94. Ibid.: “Siquidem aliud est habere numeros, aliud posse sentire numerosum sonum.”

95. Ibid.: “Idipsum ergo quidquid est, quo aut adnuimus aut abhorremus, non ratione sed natura, cum aliquid sonat, ipsius sensus numerum uoco.” This statement returns to the problem of nature and reason discussed in another context at 1.4.5 ff.

96. E.g., 1.5.10; 1.6.12; 1.13.27.

97. Cf. 1.7.13–1.8.14; 2.2.2.

98. Ibid., 6.2.3: “Adfectio ergo haec aurium cum tanguntur sono, nullo modo talis est ac si non tangantur.” It is assumed that tangere refers both to the sound and to the beating of the metrical rhythm.

99. Ibid.: “Similis est enim uestigio in aqua impresso.”

100. Ibid.: “non in silentio.”

101. Ibid., 6.3.4: “Adtende igitur hoc tertium genus, quod est in ipso nisu et operatione pronuntiantis.”

102. Ibid.: “Nam et taciti apud nosmet ipsos possumus aliquos numeros cogitandi peragere ea mora temporis qua etiam uoce peragerentur.” This would be the musical equivalent of the dicibile, the word that is thought but not said; De Dial., 5.

103. Ibid.: “Hos in quadam operatione animi esse manifestum est, quae quoniam nullum edit sonum nihilque passionis infert auribus.”

104. If we then direct our thoughts elsewhere, these recollections recede again into the regions of our minds in which they were located when we are not thinking about them; ibid., 6.3.4: “Nam si eos recordatione depromimus, et cum in alias cogitationes deferimur, hos rursum relinquimus uelut in suis secretis reconditos.”

105. Ibid., 6.4.5: “quintum genus, quod est in ipso naturali iudicio sentiendi, cum delectamur parilitate numerorum, uel cum in eis peccatur, offendimur.”

106. Ibid., 6.4.6: “Quia uideo ibi diuturniores esse numeros quam cum sonant, uel cum audiuntur, uel cum aguntur.”

107. Ibid., 6.4.6; reiterating the example from 1.13.27.

108. Does this analogy hold? Not precisely: the student has in mind the same genus, i.e., a line of verse read at different speeds (or configured in the mind as if it were read), whereas the master is speaking of two different species within a single genus, i.e., health/illness or reading/writing.

109. De Mus., 6.4.6: “Ita numeri, qui sunt in memoria, etiamsi diutius manent quam illi, a quibus inprimuntur, non eos tamen anteponere oportet eis, quos agimus non in corpore sed in anima. Vtrique enim praetereunt, alii cessatione, alii obliuione.”

110. Ibid., 6.4.6: “Non sentitur ista diminutio.”

111. Ibid.: “Vnde intelligi datur ab illo tempore quo inhaeret memoriae, incipere labi. Hinc est illud, quod plerumque dicimus, ‘tenuiter memini,’. . . . Quapropter utrumque hoc numerorum genus mortale est.”

112. Ibid., 6.4.7: “Hos enim sentimus audientes, et cum hos sentimus, hos patimur. Hi ergo faciunt eos qui sunt in aurium passione cum audimus. Hi autem rursus quos sentiendo habemus, faciunt alios in memoria, quibus a se factis recte praeferuntur.”

113. Ibid.: “Illud me conturbat, quomodo sonantes numeri, qui certe corporei sunt uel quoquo modo in corpore, magis laudandi sint quam illi, qui, cum sentimus, in anima esse reperiuntur.”

114. Ibid.: “Sed rursus conturbat, quomodo non magis laudandi sint, cum hi faciant, illi ab his fiant.”

115. On the conceptions of numerositas and convenientia in this section, see Nello Cipriani, “Lo schema dei tria vizia (uoluptas, superbia, curiositas nel De uera religione. Antropologia sogiacente e fonti,” Augustinianum 38 (1998), 162–68.

116. Ibid., 6.4.7: “Hoc enim esse fortasse non posset, si non peccato primo corpus illud quod nulla molestia et summa facilitate <anima> animabat et gubernabat, in deterius commutatum conruptioni subiceretur et morti; quod tamen habet sui generis pulchritudinem et eo ipso dignitatem animae satis commendat, cujus nec plaga nec moribus sine honore alicujus decoris meruit esse.”

117. Ibid.: “Ergo animam in carne mortali operantem passionem corporum sentire non mirum est. Nec, quia ipsa est corpore melior, melius putandum est omne quod in ea fit, quam omne quod fit in corpore.”

118. Ibid., 6.5.13: “Conuersa ergo a domino suo ad seruum suum necessario deficit: conuersa item a seruo suo ad dominum suum necessario proficit.”

119. See Martine Dulaey, Le rêve dans la vie et la pensée de saint Augustin (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1973), 102–5.

120. De Mus., 6.4.7: “At ejus forma in anima fit, hujus autem, quam nunc uidemus, in corpore facta est.”

121. Ibid.: “Quare cum et uerum falso et anima corpore melior sit, uerum in corpore melius est quam falsum in anima.”

122. Augustine’s example of impropriety is a man dressed in a woman’s clothing; but this is improper by convention, not reality, since the clothes, although inappropriate, are recognized to be what they are. This example parallels other situations in which the senses are fooled by appearances.

123. De Mus., 6.4.7: “Quid numeros numeris, et facientes factis, non corpus animae praeponimus.”

124. Ibid.: “Anima uero istis quae per corpus accipit, carendo fit melior, cum sese auertit a carnalibus sensibus, et diuinis Sapientiae numeris reformatur.” The argument is extended at De Civ. Dei, 14.23 in the discussion of human sexuality, where it is proposed that when the soul is in opposition to itself, it can, so to speak, be conquered by itself.

125. Augustine comments at length on this statement in De Lib. Arbit., and at De Gen. ad Litt., 1.21.32 and 1.22.38, where the notion of the parts and the whole is put in a hermeneutic context.

126. De Mus., 6.5.8: “Diligenter considerandum est utrum reuera nihil sit aliud quod dicitur audire, nisi aliquid a corpore in anima fieri.”

127. The student, possibly mindful of the conclusion reached at 1.13.28, is now unclear on the relation between the body’s and the soul’s rhythms, and for this reason asks what takes place when something is heard.

128. On the translation of facientis, earlier views are summarized in Jacobsson, p. 27n12, including the alternative translation “in the intention of the creator” suggested by F.-J. Thonnard, De Musica, Bibliothèque Augustinienne, vol. 7 p. 517n 78; cf., Sofia Vanni Rovighi, “La fenomenologia della sensazione in Sant’Agostino,” Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 54 (1962), 24n 9. Although the translation of faciens as “doer” or “agent” is correct, there is a relationship between the desire of the soul to ascend toward God and the desire of God for the soul to move upward, which is suggested in the next sentence by the phrase tamquam subiecto diuinitus dominationi suae. Augustine’s thinking about this relationship is better expressed in De Lib. Arbit., books 1 and 3.

129. De Mus., 6.5.9: “Corporalia ergo, quaecumque huic corpori ingeruntur aut obiciuntur extrinsecus, non in anima, sed in ipso corpore aliquid faciunt, quod operi ejus aut aduersetur aut congruat.”

130. Summarizing 6.5.9. In the final sentences, Augustine speaks of the soul’s needs, so to speak, its hunger or thirst, as at De Beata Vita, 2.7–8, as well as illness brought on by excess.

131. De Mus., 6.5.10: “Uidetur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati sed in eius passionibus adtentius agere, et has actiones, siue faciles propter conuenientiam siue difficiles propter inconuenientiam, non eam latere, et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur.”

132. Ibid., 6.5.10.

133. Ibid., 6.5.11: “Animam illam, quae ante istum sonum uitali motu in silentio corpus aurium uegetabat.”

134. Ibid., 6.5.12: “Cum autem ab eisdem suis operationibus aliquid patitur, a se ipsa patitur, non a corpore, sed plane cum se adcommodat corpori, et ideo apud se ipsam minus est, quia corpus semper minus quam ipsa est.”

135. Ibid., 6.6.16: “Vegetabat quomodo eos ab illis discernis, quos in actu esse animaduertimus, etiam cum in silentio non recordans agit aliquid anima per temporalia spatia numerosum.” The student adds that rhythms that exist in silence seem to be freer than those associated with the soul’s movement toward the body or those that arise in the body’s passions, but he does not say why. The answer may lie in the notion of otium liberum intrinsecum (6.5.14).

136. Cf. occursio, which means “encountering” or “meeting” in medieval Latin; R. E. Latham, Revised Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources (London: British Academy, 1965).

137. The terms progressor and occursor seem to have been coined by Augustine respectively from the verbs progredior (to advance) and occursare (to meet).

138. De Mus., 6.4.5. In the second scheme the bottom and top levels thus remain the same, as does the role of memory, while variants are introduced at the intermediary levels, which, in the later scheme, give greater weight to what might be called the sending and receiving of signals (i.e., progressores and occursores numeri). This change is consistent with Augustine’s shift in interest from the text to the reader/recipient.

139. De Mus., 6.7.17: “Et dic mihi, quinam istorum inmortales tibi uideantur. An omnes suis temporibus labi atque occidere aestimas.”

140. I take as an example the second in the list of meters at 2.8.15.

141. De Mus., 6.7.17: “Dic ergo, cum aliquanto conreptius siue productius, dum seruiam temporum legi qua simplo ad duplum pedes conueniunt, uersum pronuntio, num offendo ulla fraude iudicium sensus tui?” The problem is introduced at 2.2.2.

142. De Mus., 6.7.17: “Adparet hos igitur mora temporum, qui iudicando praesident, non teneri.”

143. Ibid., 6.7.17–18, where the example used by the master to illustrate the point is to think of the two different readings of iambic feet along the lines of two people walking, one at double the pace of the other. The two walkers are presumably walking in single and double rhythm respectively, beginning at a single point in time that is arbitrarily chosen, like the starting point of a race. One has to imagine a reader reciting a single syllable while the two are in motion at speeds whose ratio is A = 1, B = 2 X 1. The discussion recalls the suggestion of beating out the time at 1.1.1 and anticipates Conf., 11.27–28, offering, in fact, connections that are omitted from this account.

144. Ibid., 6.7.19: “nisi quia unicuique animanti in genere proprio, proportione uniuersatis, sensus locorum temporumque tributus est.”

145. Ibid.: “Sic habendo omnia magnus est hic mundus, qui saepe in scripturis divinis caeli et terrae nomine nuncupatur.” The phrase magnus est . . . anticipates Conf., 1.1.1, “Magnus es, domine,” both possibly drawing on Ps. 47:2, 95: 4, and here especially 144:3: “Magnus Dominus, et laudabilis nimis; et magnitudinis ejus non est finis,” etc.

146. De Mus., 6.7.19–6.8.20: “Quapropter, si humanae naturae ad carnalis uitae actiones talis sensus tributus est, quo maiora spatia temporum iudicare non possit, quam interualla postulant ad talia uitae usum pertinentia, quoniam talis hominis natura mortalis est, etiam talem sensum mortalem puto. . . . Sed quoquo modo sese habeant hi numeri iudiciales, eo certe praestant, quod dubitamus, uel difficile peruesitigamus utrum mortales sint.”

147. Ibid., 6.7.19. The neologism, affabricata, presumably from affaber or adfaber, incorporates the notion of ingenious, contrived, or artificial fabrication into the concept of habit—a novel term for a novel idea.

148. This negative conception of habit contrasts with the positive view, concerning the playing of an instrument, at De Mus., 1.4.8.

149. De Mus., 6.8.20: “Nam et illi progressores, cum aliquam in corpore numerosam operationem adpetunt, latente istorum nutu modificantur.”

150. Ibid., 6.8.21: “Numerus namque iste interuallis temporum constat et, nisi adiuuemur in eo memoria, iudicari a nobis nullo pacto potest.”

151. An apt description of Trygetius, as observed by Monica, at De Beata Vita, 2.7, as well as, perhaps, an echo of the problem of anamnesis.

152. De Mus., 6.8.21: “sed quia intentione in aliud subinde exstinguitur motionis inpetus, qui si maneret, in memoria utique maneret, ut nos et inueniremus et sentiremus audisse.”

153. The experiment is repeated at Conf., 11.27.35–36 using two lines of verse.

154. De Mus., 6.8.21: “Quapropter iudiciales illi numeri, qui numeros in intervallis temporum sitos—exceptis progressoribus quibus etiam ipsum progressum modificant—iudicare non possunt, nisi quos eis tamquam ministra memoria obtulerit.”

155. Ibid., 6.8.22: “Quid enim aliud agimus, cum reuocamus nos in memoriam, nisi quodam modo quod reposuimus quaerimus? Recurrit autem in cogitationem occasione similium motus animi non exstinctus, et haec est, quae dicitur recordatio.”

156. Another reason that Augustine advances concerns the freshness of the memories in question. When we recall something, he argues, we feel that the motion taking place in our minds arose at some moment in the past. It is this pastness, as present in our thoughts, that is the subject of recognition. In comparing the present and the past, our more recent motions will be more familiar than those that are deep-seated.

157. De Mus., 6.9.23. I have added the numeri sonores, which are understood here but not specifically mentioned until 6.9.24: “quibus cum addideris corporales illos quos sonantes uocauimus.” In the end, the master states, our judgment is influenced, if not reinforced, by other, more hidden harmonies, which he does not specify. This recalls aspects of the quintum genus, 6.4.5–6.

158. Ibid., 6.9.23, referring to 6.8.22 on memory.

159. Ibid., 6.9.24: “Nos ergo in istis generibus numerandis et distinguendis unius naturae, id est animae motus adfectionesque dispicimus.”

160. The master repeats what the student has already said; 1.3.4: “Amo quidem rixas verborum praeterire atque contemnere.” Cf. 1.12.26.

161. Ibid., 6.9.24: “Recte etiam uideri potest ratio, quae huic delectationi superinponitur, nullo modo sine quibusdam numeris uiuacioribus de numeris quos infra se habet posse iudicare.” The principle by which that which judges is superior to that which is judged is mentioned inter alia at De Vera Religione, 29.53, ff., and De Lib. Arbit., 2.3.7–8. Cf. Plotinus, Enn., 1.4.2.23.

162. I.e., numeri sonantes; 6.4.7.

163. Cf. De Mag., 11 ff., where the view that language communicates through sound is rejected in favor of instruction from within.

164. Ibid., 6.10.27: “Cur in silentiorum interuallis nulla fraude sensus offenditur, nisi quia eidem iuri aequalitis, etiamsi non sono, spatio tamen temporis, quod debetur, exsoluitur?”

165. Ibid., 6.11.30: “Quoniam si quis, uerbi gratia, in amplissimarum pulcherrimarumque aedium uno aliquo angulo tamquam statua conlocetur, pulchritudinem illius fabricae sentire non poterit, cuius et ipse pars erit.”

166. Ibid.: “Et in quolibet poemate si quanto spatio syllabae sonant, tanto uiuerent atque sentirent, nullo modo illa numerositas et contexti operis pulchritudo eis placeret, quam totam perspicere atque adprobare non possent, cum de ipsis singulis praetereuntibus fabricata esset atque perfecta.”

167. Ibid., 6.11.31: “quos omnes inpetus suos eadem anima excipiens, quasi multiplicat in se ipsa et recordabiles facit, quae uis eius memoria dicitur, magnum quoddam adiutorium in huius uitae negotiosissimis actibus.”

168. Ibid., 6.11.32: “quas [phantasias] pro cognitis habere atque pro pro certis opinationis est, constituta ipso erroris introitu.”

169. Ibid.: “Horum primum phantasia est, alterum phantasma. Illud in memoria inuenio, hoc in motu animi qui ex iis ortus est quos habet memoria.”

170. As noted, Augustine’s normal example of phantasia and phantasma is the mental picture that he has of two cities, Carthage and Alexandria, since he has seen the former but not the latter; cf. De Trin., 8.6. Here the example is his father, whom he has seen, and his grandfather, whom he has never seen; 6.11.32. The phrase imagines imaginum is paralleled in De Mag., 4.7 by signs that are shown on behalf of signs (signa signis monstrari).

171. De Mus., 6.11.32: “Quod autem ex eo quod uidi facio, memoria facio, et tamen aliud est in memoria inuenire phantasiam, aliud de memoria facere phantasma.”

172. Ibid., 6.11.32: “Quae omnia uis animae potest. Sed uero etiam phantasmata habere pro cognitis summus error est.”

173. Ibid., 6.11.33: “Talis enim delectatio uehementer infigit memoriae quod trahit a lubricis sensibus. . . . Sed in spiritalia mente suspensa atque ibi fixa et manente, etiam huius impetus consuetudinis frangitur et paulatim repressus exstinguitur.”

174. Ibid., 6.12.35: “Consentiendum est ergo ab aliquibus manentibus numeris praetereuntes aliquos fabricari?”

175. Ibid.: “Quid? si eum quisquam interrogando conmemoret remigrare ad eum putas illos numeros ab eo ipso, qui interrogat; an illum intrinsecus apud mentem suam movere se ad aliquid, unde sibi quod amiserat redhibeatur?” The statement recalls classical reminiscence, as well as teaching from within as described at the end of De Mag.

176. Augustine doubtless has in mind the contrast between the grammatical and mathematical understanding of meter at 2.1.1, 3.1.1, and especially 5.1.1.

177. Ibid., 6.12.35: “Quo igitur se etiam istum moturum putas, ut menti eius inprimantur hi numeri, et illam faciant adfectionem, quae ars dicitur?”

178. Ibid.: “Eo modo etiam istum arbitror apud semet ipsum agere, ut ea quae interrogatur, uera esse intellegat atque respondeat.”

179. Cf. De Lib. Arbit., 2.8.21.

180. De Mus., 6.12.36: “Vnde ergo credendum est animae tribui quod aeternum est et incommutabile, nisi ab uno aeterno et incommutabili Deo?”

181. Ibid.: “Illud nonne manifestum est eum qui alio interrogante sese intus ad Deum mouet, ut uerum incommutabile intellegat, nisi eundem motum suum memoria teneat, non posse ad intuendum illud uerum, nullo extrinsecus admonente reuocari?”

182. The master proposes that the mind could only turn in three directions, toward something equal, superior, or inferior. But, as there is nothing equal or superior to eternal laws, the third option must be correct.

183. Ibid., 6.13.39: “Amor igitur agendi aduersus succedentes passiones corporis sui, auertit animam a contemplatione aeternorum, sensibilis uoluptatis cura eius auocans intentionem.”

184. Ibid. It is interesting to note that, from the perspective of the soul, it is numeri occursores that commence reception, whereas, when speaking of the senses earlier in book 6, Augustine begins with the numeri sonantes, which are here transformed into numeri sensuales. He later notes that it is accurate to call them sensuales, since it is by means of sensibilia signa that souls act on each other; 6.13.41–42.

185. Ibid., 6.13.40: “Generalis uero amor actionis, quae auertit a vero, a superbia proficiscitur, quo uitio Deum imitari quam Deo seruire maluit anima.” The master supports his statement with two quotations from Ecclesiasticus, 10:14–15 and 10: 9–10. The order in which these quotations appear is reversed, and in each case only a part of the original is presented. This results in a single strong statement on the consequences of pride for the soul’s equilibrium, which can be translated as follows: “Justly it is written in the holy books,” “The beginning of human pride is to desert the Lord” and “The beginning of every sin is pride.” And the nature of pride could not be better demonstrated than in the accompanying statement, “How else can one take pride in earth and ashes . . . , but by living a life in which [the soul] projects outwards its inmost being.” The implied subject of “quoniam in vita sua proiecit intima sua” is rex insipiens (10:3), which Augustine replaces silently with anima from the previous sentence in 6.13.40, omitting the rest of Eccli. 10:10. The emphasis is thereby placed on self-mastery.

CHAPTER 6. LOSS AND RECOVERY

1. The popularity of nonbiological medicine rose considerably in the 1990s; see David M. Eisenberg et al., “Unconventional Medicine in the United States,” New England Journal of Medicine 328 (1993): 246–52.

2. For a brilliant account of the possibilities of mind-body practices, see Jon Kabat-Zinn, Wherever You Go, There You Are: Mindfulness Meditation in Everyday Life (New York: Hyperion, 1994); for a recent review of the scientific literature in one area, see Richard J. Davidson with Sharon Begley, The Emotional Life of Your Brain (New York: Hudson Street Press, 2012).

3. For a strong criticism of these dualisms, see Antonio Damasio, Descartes’s Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994).

4. On this topic in ancient philosophy, see Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 49–125.

5. Often noted; see Frederic M. Luskin et al., “A Review of Mind-Body Therapies in the Treatment of Cardiovascular Disease,” Alternative Therapies (1998): 4, 46.

6. See Herbert Benson, M.D., with Miriam Z. Klipper, The Relaxation Response (New York: William Morrow, 1975), esp. chap. 5.

7. Especially in cancer research; see A. J. Cunningham et al., “A Randomized Controlled Trial of the Effects of Group Psychological Therapy on Survival in Women with Metastatic Breast Cancer,” Psycho-Oncology 7, 6 (1998): 508–17.

8. For a recent review, see Victoria Menzies and Ann Gill Taylor, “The Idea of Imagination: An Analysis of ‘Imagery,’ ” Advances 20, 4 (2004); an earlier, more specialized account is Elizabeth A. Brett and Robert Ostroff, “Imagery and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: An Overview,” American Journal of Psychiatry 142, 4 (1985): 417–24.

9. See Dean Ornish et al., “Intensive Lifestyle Changes for Reversal of Coronary Heart Disease,” Journal of the American Medical Association 280 (1998): 2001–7; on more general applications for Buddhist mindfulness meditation, see Jon Kabat-Zinn, Full Catastrophe Living: Using the Wisdom of Your Body and Mind to Face Stress, Pain, and Illness (New York: Delta, 1991) and Wherever You Go, There You Are.

10. See Kevin J. Tracey, “The Inflammatory Reflex,” Nature 420 (2002): 853–89.

11. See Jerome Sarris, “Mind-Body Medicine for Schizophrenia and Psychotic Disorders. A Review of the Evidence,” Clinical Schizophrenia and Related Psychoses 7, 3 (2013): 138–48.

12. See Therese Schroeder-Sheker, Transitus: A Blessed Death in the Modern World (Missoula, Mont.: St. Dunstan’s Press, 2001).

13. See Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (New York: Bantam, 1995).

14. Among numerous contributions see Sundar Ramaswami and Anees A. Sheikh, “Meditation East and West,” and Anees A. Sheikh, Robert G. Kunzendorf, and Katharina S. Sheikh, “Healing Images: From Ancient Wisdom to Modern Science,” in Eastern and Western Approaches to Healing: Ancient Wisdom and Modern Knowledge, ed. Anees A. Sheikh and Katharina S. Sheikh (New York: Wiley, 1998), respectively 427–69 and 470–515.

15. An early and authoritative article on the subject is Henry K. Beecher, “The Powerful Placebo,” Journal of the American Medical Association 159 (1955): 1594–1602.

16. See Matthew D. Liberman et al., “The Neural Correlates of Placebo Effects: A Disruption Account,” NeuroImage 22 (2004): 447–55.

17. On this topic, see the enduring contribution of Pedro Laín Entralgo, Doctor and Patient, trans. F. Parridge (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

18. A point emphasized in a number of historical surveys; see, for instance, The Church and Healing, ed. W. J. Shiel (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982); Pedro Laín Entralgo, Mind and Body: A Short History of the Evolution of Medical Thought (New York: Kennedy, 1956).

19. Heinrich von Staden, “‘In a pure and holy way’: Personal and Professional Conduct in the Hippocratic Oath?” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 51 (1996): 412; cf. 416–17; cf. von Staden, “Character and Competence: Personal and Professional Conduct in Greek Medicine,” in Médecine et moral dans l’antiquité, ed. Hellmut Flashar and J. Jouanna, Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classque 43 (Vandœuvres-Génève, 1997), 157–95.

20. von Staden, “In a pure and holy way,” 431–32. On the possible debt of the Oath to Pythagoreanism, see Ludwig Edelstein, “The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation, and Interpretation,” in Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein, ed. Oswei Temkin and C. Lilian Temkin, trans. C. Lilian Temkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 17–49; 58–61; cf. Edelstein, “The Relation of Ancient Philosophy to Medicine,” in Ancient Medicine, 349–66.

21. On these questions, see Edelstein, “The Hippocratic Physician,” in Ancient Medicine, 87–110.

22. See Edelstein, “The History of Anatomy in Antiquity,” in Ancient Medicine, 271–73, 294–96.

23. L. D. Hankoff, “Religious Healing in First-Century Christianity,” Journal of Psychohistory 19, 4 (1992): 388; see also R. Hengel and M. Hengel, “Die Heilungen Jesu und medizinisches Denken,” in Der Wunderbegriff im neuen Testament, ed. A. Suhl (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980), 338–73.

24. See Darrel W. Amundsen and Gary B. Ferngren, “The Perception of Disease and Disease Causality in the New Testament,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II, 37, 3 (1996): 2934–56.

25. On this topic, see, for example, in general, Jürgen Helm, “Sickness in Early Christian Healing Narratives: Medical, Religious, and Social Aspects,” in From Athens to Jerusalem: Medicine in Hellenized Jewish Lore and Early Christian Literature, ed. Samuel Kottek, Manfred Horstmanshoff, and Gerhard Baader (Rotterdam: Erasmus. 2000), 241–58; Stephen d’Irsay, “Christian Medicine and Science in the Third Century,” Journal of Religion 10 (1930): 515–44; Michael Dörnemann, Krankheit und Heilung in der Theologie der frühen Kirchenvater, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 20 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); and for a general review, see Darrel W. Amundsen, Medicine, Society, and Faith in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 127–57. Specific studies include G. Rialdi, La medicina nella dottrina Tertulliano, Scientia Veterum 126 (Pisa: Casa Editrice Giardini, 1968); J. Courtès, “Augustin et la médecine,” in Augustinus Magister (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1954–55), 1, 43–51.

26. See H. J. Magoulis, “The Lives of the Saints as Sources of Data for the History of Byzantine Medicine in the Sixth and Seventh Centuries,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 57 (1964): 127–50; Peregrine Horden, “Saints and Doctors in the Early Byzantine Empire: The Case of Theodore of Sykeon,” in The Church and Healing, ed. W. J. Shiels, Ecclesiastical History Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), 1–13; and Susan Ashbrook Harvey, “Physicians and Ascetics in John of Ephesus: An Expedient Alliance,” in Symposium on Byzantine Medicine, ed. John Scarborough, Dumbarton Oaks Paper 38 (1984), 87–93.

27. See Oleg Voskoboynikov, “Thérapie du corps et thérapie de l’âme à la cour frédéricienne,” in Terapie et guarigioni, ed. Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, Edizione Nazionale “La Scuola Medica Salernitana” (Florence: Sismel: Edizione del Galluzzo, 2010), 272–81.

28. This was a legacy dating from the early Christian period; for a recent review, see Gary B. Ferngren, Medicine and Health Care in Early Christianity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); on religion and healing, chap. 4, 64–85.

29. Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 16–17.

30. With the exception of pharmacology; see Nicholas Everett, The Alphabet of Galen: Pharmacy from Antiquity to the Middle Ages (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).

31. Gregory the Great, Ep. 9; CCSL, vol. 140a, p. 768; cf. Ep. 11; 140a, pp. 873 ff.

32. Bibliography is collected in Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

33. See Jane Geddes, The St Albans Psalter: A Book for Christina of Markyate (London: British Library, 2005), 93–104.

34. On Hugh, see Franklin T. Harkins, Reading and the Work of Restoration: History and Scripture in the Theology of Hugh of St. Victor; on Petrarch, see my Jerusalem Lectures, Ethics Through Literature: Ascetic and Aesthetic Reading in Western Culture, 93–139, and on a related theme Gur Zak, Writing from Exile: Petrarch’s Humanism and the Ethics of Care of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

35. See Dale A. Matthews, “Religion and Spirituality in Primary Care,” Mind/Body Medicine 2 (1997), 9; see also D. B. Larson and S. S. Larson, The Forgotten Factor in Physical and Mental Health: What Does the Research Show? (Rockland, Md.: National Institute for Healthcare Research, 1994).

36. On this thesis, see Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.

37. Jean Leclercq, “Spiritualitas,” Studi medievali 3 (1962): 280.

38. See, for instance, Rom 7:14, Gal. 6:1, I Cor. 2:15; also Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 4.20; CCSL, vol. 1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954), 594–97.

39. Isocrates, Busiris, c. 24; for text and translation see Isocrates, trans. Larue van Hook, vol. 3 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), 115.

40. Xenophon, Cyropaedia, 1.5.11; for text and translation see Walter Miller, trans., Xenophon, vol. 5 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 83.

41. Examples from Plato include Phaedo 269d, Republic 374b, and Meno 70a.

42. See Historia Monachorum, ed. Eva Schulz-Flügel (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), Index, s.u. exercitium.

43. Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, 15.2.30; Patrologia Latina 82.539A; cf. Servius, In Virgilii Aeneidos lib.IV commentarii, verse 171; ed. G. Thilo (Leipzig: Teubner, 1881), 494–95.

44. On this topic, see Gerald Epstein, “Hebraic Medicine,” Advances 4 (1987): 56–66.

45. Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, 24–26.

46. Celsus, De Medecina, 1.2.6; for text and translation, see W. G. Spence, trans. Celsus, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 46; cf. De Medecina, 1.7.1, 1.8.1.

47. Regula Benedictina, c. 52.2; Patrologia Latina, 66.747–48.

48. Johann Huizinga, Erasmus and the Age of the Reformation (New York: Harper, 1957), 3–4.

49. The classic account of this subject is Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

50. Thomas Merton, Contemplative Prayer (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 39.

51. Alastair J. Cunningham, The Healing Journey: Overcoming the Crisis of Cancer (Toronto: Key Porter, 1992). On this topic, see also Cheryl Mattingly, Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots: The Narrative Structure of Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

52. On this topic, an early discussion of value is Pedro Laín Entralgo, Mind and Body: Psychosomatic Pathology (New York: Kennedy, 1956), 64, 70.

53. See Wolf von Siebenthal, Krankheit als Folge der Sünde: eine medezin-historische Untersuchung (Hanover: Schmorl and Von Seefeld, 1950). It is worth noting that the miracles, which form an important part of the narrative in the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, are deemphasized in Luke.

54. For a review of the contemporary use of these methods, see Dale A. Matthews, “Religion and Spirituality in Primary Care,” Mind/Body Medicine 2 (1997): 13.

55. See Aviad M. Kleinberg, Prophets in Their Own Country: Living Saints and the Making of Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

56. Vita Procli, trans. K. S. Guthrie, ed. D. R. Fideler (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Phanes, 1986).

57. For the Greek text, see André-Jean Festugière, Vie de Théodore de Sykéôn (Brussels: Société des Bollandistes, 1970); on the life, see Horden, “Saints and Doctors in the Early Byzantine Empire: The Case of Theodore of Sykeon,” in The Church and Healing, vol. 1, 1–13.

58. Giles Constable, The Reformation of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 266.

59. Quoted in Lawrence J. LeShan, Cancer as a Turning-Point: A Handbook for People with Cancer, Their Families, and Health Professionals (New York: Dutton, 1989), 10.