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Vaïsheshikä and Nyâyä

Science and Logic

THE CONCEPTS OF VAÏSHESHIKÄ AND NYÂYÄ WERE handed down by monastic sects, in particular the Pâshupatä and the Kâlâmukhä, who have sometimes given them a religious flavor. The materialistic theory of Vaïsheshikä was considered as a sort of religion. Superstition of scientific reality and the near deification of science is not just a present-day phenomenon.

According to Gunaratnä, the author of a commentary on the Shaddarshana Samucchayä (the six systems of philosophy) of Haribhadrä, Vaïsheshikä and Nyâyä are part of the philosophy of Shaivism. Bhâsarvajñä, the author of the Nyâyä Sârä, also wrote the Ganä-Kârikâ, a work that explains the doctrine of the sect of pâhupatä. The followers of Nyâyä revere eighteen incarnations of Shivä, the last being Lakulishä.

Philosophers of the medieval period, such as Sankarâchâryä, acknowledge the Shaiva origin of the Darshanä(s). When he discusses the doctrine called Ishvarä-Kartri-Vâda, "the power of action of the divine principle," which sees the divine person (Ishvarä) as the operative cause of the world, Sankarâchâryä attributes the teachings of Vaïsheshikä and Nyâyä to the Mâheshvarä(s), the sectarians of Shivä.

The Experimental Method (Vaïsheshikä)

VAÏSHESHIKÄ is the study of the impermanent (ksharä), the visible or apparent world (vyaktä). The word Vaïsheshikä means "study of particulars," that is, the observation of the perceptible world. With the aid of the methods of logic (Nyâyä), the Vaïsheshikä constitutes what can be called the scientific approach, which uses reasoning, deduction, hypothesis, and experimentation to analyze the information provided by the senses, whose perceptions are limited to the visible or impermanent world, also called the "world of movement" (jagat) since it is formed only of energy through which it manifests itself in the form of gravitation and pulsations.

Using observation as a starting point, by analyzing the data provided by our senses and noting the points common to various forms of observation, we can deduce some general principles. The scientific method calls for the development of the means of observation, the instruments that increase the power of the senses. Telescopes, microscopes, and radars today allow us to push our observations even further. Yet these remain limited by the very nature of the senses. We do not observe reality in itself but reality in relation to the limits nature imposes on us.

However, the development of psychic powers, which are part of physical man but are not usually developed, allow the addition of important elements of observation. These powers, developed by the techniques of Yogä, such as perception beyond the limits of dimension and of relative time, can eventually be used. They belong to the physical world and are in no way occult.

It is impossible to prove the existence of a deity by observation of the visible world. For this reason, all true science can be nothing but atheistic. All belief is, by its very nature, the opposite of science. One believes or one knows. The scholar who mixes his religious or moral ideas with his scientific work betrays both science and religion.

Related to Vaïsheshikä is the very important school of atheistic and materialistic philosophers called Lokâyatä, whose best-known advocate was Chârvâkä, almost a millennium before our era. For Chârvâkä, science can acknowledge no evidence other than Pratyakshä (that which is before the eyes). As regards the materialism of Chârvâkä, only matter is eternal; thought and conscience appear as fermentations of matter. There are no gods, nor is there life after death. Materialist theory (bhûtä-vâdi) was part of the doctrine of the Âjîvikä(s), as taught by Makkhali Gosâlä, the master of Mahâvîrä and Buddhä. A summary of it is found in the Manimekhalaï.

Mixing yeast, sugar, and other substances results in fermentation, in the same way consciousness and the feelings are born of combinations of elements. When they disintegrate, consciousness disappears, as resonance disappears when the drum is dismantled. The Tattvä(s) (constituents of the world) are the same as those of the Lokâyatä(s) (materialists), for whom the only means of proof is Pratyakshä (visual evidence). What exists in the present and we enjoy in life is the only reality. There is no other life in which we can reap rewards for our actions. The Onbadukadir, the ancient Tamil work which summarizes the teachings of Gosâlä, deals with five subjects, which are life and the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air, which are made up of indivisible atoms. When they gather, these are perceptible; when they separate, they are invisible. It is agglomerates of these atoms that form a mountain, a tree, a living body. When they disaggregate, the atoms that make them up disperse. That which perceives these phenomena is called life . . . atoms are permanent, have no beginning, and are indestructible. They take on various appearances, depending on the circumstances. No new type of atom appears or is transformed into something else. Atoms are indivisible and do not evolve. They combine into conglomerations, to separate in the end, each keeping its own identity. They can assemble in such density that they become hard as diamonds, or take the light form of bamboo. When they spread over the earth, like moonlight, they take the form of different elements according to their relative density. They are therefore called by different names. They form the seed of the shoot which develops. They form the solid earth, the fluid water, the fire that burns, or the moving air. An atom can be seen only by those who possess the higher eye of knowledge. Others cannot see it. When combined to form the elements (bhûtä), they can be seen. In the same way, a single hair cannot be distinguished in the shadow of twilight, but a lock of hair is easily seen.

The combinations of atoms can be black, dark blue, green, red, gold, or white. These are the six forms that the combinations of atoms take, in order of superiority. Only combinations of pure white atoms can break up and attain freedom (vîdu = mukti). This represents the path of destiny. Those who wish to achieve the end of suffering must reach this stage ... such is the teaching of Markali (Gosâlä). [Manimekhalaï, book 27]

The theory of Vaïsheshikä was explained in Sanskrit before Lakulishä, by Ulûkä, nicknamed Kanâdä (the atom eater). The texts of the Suträ(s) of Kanâdä which have come down to us were reworked in order to introduce certain conceptions of Brahmanism.

In the theory expounded by Kanâdä, the principle of the universe is the energy called Adrishtä (the invisible). The world is formed of nine substances, which are space, time, consciousness (or the soul), thought (manas), and the principles of the five elements, of which four (earth, water, air, and fire) are made up of atoms.

The two great moralistic and atheistic religions, jaïnism and the original Buddhism, have been very influenced by Vaïsheshikä, the materialism of Gosâlä and Chârvâkä, and the philosophers of this school.

Logic (Nyâyä)

THE intellectual method that corresponds to Vaïsheshikä is logic (Nyâyä), by which, with the aid of analogies and deductions, the observed information can be coordinated in order to arrive at definite conclusions.

Nyâyä analyzes forms of reasoning and means of proof. According to the theory expounded by Gautama, the author of the main treatise on Nyâyä, the elements of logical reasoning include a proposition (pratijñâ), the investigation of a cause (hetu), an example (udâharanä), a relationship (upanayä), and precedents (nigamä).

The means of proof (pramânä) envisaged by Nyâyä are:

Pratyakshä, direct evidence

Anumânä, deductive inference

Upamânä, similarity, analogy

Shabdä, the word, the authority of predecessors

Science only makes progress through the accumulation of knowledge over the course of generations.

The Sâmkhyä accepts as means of proof only Pratyakshä, Anumânä, and Shabdä, but adds Anubhava, experience. The Mîmânsâ also accepts Anupalabdhi, the absence of proof to the contrary, and Arthâpatti, assumption. Gautama explains the forms of reasoning by means of illustrations that are well known, such as the real effects of an unreal cause, for example, the case of the snake and the rope: reacting to the sight of a snake, I break my leg (real effect); but the snake was only a rope (nonexistent cause). According to the Manimekhalaï: "The means of proof (prâmanä) are ten in number, but there also exist eight "semblances of proof' (prâmanä abhâsä), of which one must beware. The six basic means of proof are as follows.

1. Kâtchi1, direct experience (Skt. pratyakshä, in front of the eyes), is of five kinds, depending on the pleasant or painful experiences of the five sensory organs. When these come into contact with the vital energies (uyir; Skt. prânä) that serve as a means of communication (vâyil), they are conveyed to the mental faculties (manas), which, in a constant state of activity, become clearly aware of them, without any omissions, or any error or doubt concerning the place, form, type, quality, or effects.
2. Karudal, inference (Skt. Anumânä). Inference allows knowledge of that which is not directly perceived, but which can be deduced from what is visible. It has three forms:

a. Podu (Skt. sâmânyä), deduction. When two things are by their nature dependent on each other, the reality of one is deduced from the perception of the other, as in the situation where we conclude that there is an elephant in the forest when we hear a sound that resembles trumpeting.

b. Eccham (Skt. sheshavat) is the relationship of effect to cause. We deduce from seeing streams pouring into rivers that it has rained.

c. Mudal (Skt. purvavat) is the relationship of cause to effect. At the sight of clouds, we predict rain.

3. Upamâ is the comparison between things with similar qualities: for example, fast as the wind.

4. Âgamä, teachings of the ancients. It is on such a basis that we assume that hell and heaven exist.

5. Arthâpatti, indirect indication. When we speak of a village situated on the Ganges, we mean it is situated on the banks of the Ganges. Saying that a fat man does not eat in the daytime implies that he eats at night.

6. Iyalbu, common sense (Skt. svabhâvä). When an elephant herder says, "Pass me the staff," he means the stick that is used to direct the animal.

7. Aitiham, tradition. There is a spirit that lives in the tree.

8. Abhavä, nonexistence. The assertion that something does not exist in one spot does not imply that it does not exist elsewhere. Nonexistence has three forms: one thing in another (pragâbhavä) (there exists no metal in a cotton cloth); by destruction (pradhvansâbhavä); and absolute (atyantâbhavä), never having existed.

9. Mitchi, implication (Skt. Parisheshä). If one says that Rama has won the battle, this implies that Râvanä, his opponent, has lost it.

10. Ullaneri, probability (Skt. Sambhavä). If a piece of iron moves, we deduce from this the presence of a magnet (Manimekhalaï, book 27).

The semblances of proof (pramânä âbhasä) are eight in number:

1. Suttunarvu, direct experience. Being aware of the existences of things through the experience of the senses, which, however, may be deceptive.
2. Tiryak kôdal: false appearances. We take mother-of-pearl to be silver.
3. Aiyam, uncertainty. We are not sure if what we see in the semidarkness is a man or a tree trunk.
4. Teradu telidal, the arbitrary assertion. We decide that the tree trunk is a man.
5. Kandu nâramai, evaluative error: not realizing that the approaching animal is a tiger.
6. Il-valakku, hare's horns. The two elements are real but the combination represented by the words is not.
7. Unardadai unardal, pretending to demonstrate something obvious, for example, that fire disperses fog.
8. Ninaippu, faith. You only know that a couple is your father and mother by their assertions or those of others (Manimekhalaï,).

Aphorisms of the Nyâyä

IN his account of Vaïsheshikä, Kanâdä gives a number of aphorisms of the Nyâyä that are famous:

1. The blind man and the sparrow (andhachataka). A blind man cannot catch a sparrow. A fool cannot achieve what an enlightened man has difficulty in establishing.
2. "The blind leading the blind" (andhä paramparâ) refers to the disposition of people to follow someone who will lead them to disaster. This is often the case with political leaders.
3. Finding the polar star (arundhati darshanä). To see the polar star, you first look for a very bright star which is close to it. In the same way, one uses an approximation as a starting point in order to arrive at a more subtle truth.
4. The ashokä grove (ashokä vanikä). The demon Râvanä held Sita prisoner in a garden full of ashokäs. You cannot assume from this that he had a preference for these trees. In the same way, when a man is faced with various possibilities in which he has equal interest, you cannot assume that his choice corresponds to a preference.
5. The stone and the clod of earth (ashma loshtä). A clod of earth is hard compared with cotton but soft compared with a stone. An individual always appears important to his inferiors and insignificant to his superiors.
6. The flowering of buds on a tree (kadambä korakä). When you see buds flowering in one tree, you know that they will also have opened to others of the same species. What happens here also happens elsewhere.
7. The crow and the coconut (kâkätâliyä). Just when the crow is flying under a tree, it is killed by a coconut. There are possible but improbable coincidences.
8. Looking for the crow's tooth (kâkädantägaveshanä): wasting time looking for impossible things.
9. The crow's eye (kâkâkshigolaka). This aphorism is based on the belief that the crow has only one eye, which it transfers from one side to the other. This is used in reference to a word which, in a document, has two possible interpretations.
10. The motion of the water wheel (kupäyanträghatikâ). The containers fill on one side and empty on the other. The same applies to the trials and tribulations of life.
11. The customs post and the dawn (ghattkuti prabhâtä). You take an indirect route at night in order to avoid the customs post, and at dawn find yourself right in front of it. You always come face to face with the thing you are trying to avoid.
12. The worm and the letter (ghunâksharä). A worm can by chance draw the shape of a letter on the page of a book. In court, misleading evidence exists.
13. The staff and the bread (dandäpupä). When a loaf of bread is tied to a staff and someone says that the staff has been eaten by rats, it is obvious that the bread has been too. When someone has close ties with another, what is said of one applies, in all probability, to the other.
14. The lamp on the threshold (dehlidîpâ). The lamp lights up the interior and the exterior. One object can serve two purposes at once.
15. The king and the barber's son (nripanâpiträputrä). The king asks his barber to bring him the most handsome boy in the kingdom. After looking around, the barber brings his own son, who is particularly ugly. Everyone overestimates the value of what is his.
16. Washing the mud off (pankâprakshâlanä). It is better to avoid mud than to dive in and wash yourself afterward. It is better not to compromise yourself, even if you think you will be able to justify yourself afterward.
17. Grinding flour (pishtäpeshanä): Making an effort to achieve something that has already been done.
18. The grain and the seed (bîjânkurä). The grain produces the seed, and the seed the grain. Two things are the mutual cause of each other.
19. Iron and the magnet (lohächumbakä). One thing attracts another.
20. Fire and smoke (vahnidhumä). There is no smoke without fire, nor effect without cause.
21. The worm and the poison (vishäkrimi). The worm bred in poison does not feel its effects. People born in a criminal environment feel at home there.
22. The poison tree (vishävrikshä). You cannot destroy a tree you have planted which bears poisonous fruits. When you put forward a harmful idea, you cannot then stop it from spreading.
23. One wave follows another (vîchitârangä). In the end, you are always replaced by someone else. The same applies to social movements.
24. An old maid's wish (vriddhäkumârîvâkyä). The old woman, whom the god Indra had told to make a wish, asked for a husband, children, wealth, corn, cattle, and gold. He who asks for too much receives nothing.
25. The branch and the moon (shâkhâchandrä). The ambitious person thinks he can catch the moon by climbing up a tree near it.
26. The lion's look (simhâvalokä). The lion chases a prey in front of him, but looks back in case there are any others behind him. This applies to those who, while throwing themselves into an undertaking, worry about what they are leaving behind.
27. The needle and the kettle (sûchîkatah). It is easier to make a needle than a kettle. When you have several things to do, it is better to start with the easiest one.
28. The rice and the saucepan (sthâlïpulâkä). When one grain is cooked, so are the others. You can judge the whole by looking at a specimen. (This is the principle behind opinion polls.)
29. Sinking a pillar (sthûnânikhanä). By dint of repeated blows, the pillar becomes stable. The same applies to the spreading of an ideology, even if it is false.
30. The master and the servant (svâmîbhrityä). The master feeds the servant, the servant feeds the master. This refers to the interdependence of persons and things.