Australia and New Zealand in 1919 were autonomous communities within the British Commonwealth and separate members of the League of Nations—bent on going their own separate ways in the modern world. Federation and the First World War had destroyed the old sense of being colonials belonging to one or another of the seven colonies of Australasia. On April 25, 1915, when the men of the Australia–New Zealand Army Corps landed at Gallipoli, the consciousness of a separate and distinct Australian and New Zealand nationhood had been born. Participation by W. M. Hughes and W. F. Massey in the Imperial War Cabinet and at the Paris Peace Conference had fostered dominion status as well as imperial partnership.
The new Anzac relationship, which gradually replaced the old intercolonial relations, was essentially a family relationship rather than an international relationship—one that could generally be taken for granted and did not need to be formalized. It was deeply rooted in the past. Four of the six Australian colonies and five of the six provinces of New Zealand were founded from Great Britain; the others were extensions of the colony of New South Wales. Successive waves of British immigrants filtered through the Australian colonies to New Zealand, although the backwash was considerable. The number of Australian-born in New Zealand reached a peak of 50,693 in 1911 and then slowly declined; the same was true in Australia, where the New Zealand-born reached a peak of 31,868 in that same year and also declined. But these expatriates were only the tip of the iceberg of trans-Tasman migration. The flow was regulated principally by local economic conditions. The two countries became a common labor market for all who could afford a steerage ticket.
A common British heritage was reinforced by the common experience of beginning life all over again on the frontier (the “crucible of democracy”) and by sharing in the evolution of “colonial
style” nationalism. The Australians and New Zealanders who emerged were not rugged individualists like Americans. Rather they looked to their mates and to the state for help and sustenance. Yet the myths evolved that they were typical frontiersmen—strong, courageous, independent, enterprising, hospitable, casual and down-to-earth, ingenious improvisers at need. Their utopia was rural, agrarian, democratic, egalitarian, and respectable.
At Gallipoli, the frontier ethos transformed military defeat into glorious victory. Whether they wore slouch hats or “lemon-squeezers,” the “diggers” were intensely loyal to their “cobbers” or mates in khaki. Thereafter Anzac Day, April 25, became a national day of mourning throughout the length and breadth of both countries, which helped very much to keep this spirit alive.
Shared myths and many points of contact in separate but parallel histories are valuable clues as to how Australians and New Zealanders came to regard each other—not as one and the same people—but as brothers, neighbors, and close friends, who had a lot in common but felt in their bones that they were different. The differences became more apparent as the colonials shed their British heritage and came to terms with their own local environment. The Australia to which they adapted was an island continent lying partly in the tropics, a harsh, sun-baked land of dusty gums and golden wattles, kangaroos and koalas. New Zealand was three remote, wind-swept islands more temperate in climate, with mountains, lakes, and forests (the habitat of native birds) running down to plains and sea. Australia’s distinctive qualities were “strangeness and a brooding sense of the vast and half-known”; New Zealand’s were “variety and romance.”
1Australia by 1919 had five million people concentrated in an arc of seaboard cities located around vast sheep runs and wheat lands which were devastated by periodic droughts and edged into a great empty desert—“a nation for a continent and a continent for a nation.” A small sprinkling of tribal Aborigines lived on the outer fringes of the European settlements and on large reserves in the tropical north. Over half New Zealand’s population of about one million was also urban. It was concentrated in four main centers and scattered in country towns. Less than 5 percent were Maori, and most of them dwelt in rural North Island villages.
The Tasman Sea was not only a bridge but a barrier. As Sir John Hall, premier of New Zealand from 1879 to 1882, had tersely remarked: “Twelve hundred obstacles to Federation will always
be found between Australia and New Zealand.”
2 New Zealand with its biracial heritage, better race relations, and long-established rights of local self-government remained aloof. Its leaders had no desire to step down from their exalted positions as representatives of a dominion in London or Geneva and go to Canberra. Its national self-interests were better served by imperial partnership than by Australasian federation. Indeed its fear of being absorbed by Australia naturally pushed it into the arms of England. To the former it displayed “a distrustful independence,”
3 but for the latter it reserved all its loyalty and devotion.
Differences in size, resources, and national character made relations unequal and abrasive though still within the family circle. Australians were regarded by New Zealanders as more aggressive, go-ahead, and extrovert than themselves. New Zealanders seemed quieter, more restrained, and a little old-fashioned to Australians. While New Zealand could not be the tail that wagged the dog, Australia could not afford to ignore or ride roughshod over its smaller, weaker brother and neighbor.
Between the Wars
The forces of Australian and New Zealand nationalism that appeared triumphant in 1919 abated during the 1920s and early 1930s. Both countries still looked to Britain for men, money, markets, and military protection. Thus they remained anxious to preserve the wartime imperial partnership. Despite increasing contacts across the Tasman in business and the professions and in sports and recreations, political relations barely existed. If their leaders informed and consulted each other, it was invariably through the Dominions Office in London and at imperial conferences.
Economically they advanced along similar paths of development. Wool and refrigeration had made them distant farms of Britain, and there was little they could exchange with each other without upsetting some domestic interest. After federation, Australia placed stiff tariffs on New Zealand primary produce and treated New Zealand as “an Asiatic country” with regard to preferences. Erstwhile trading partners were now unevenly matched competitors in overseas markets. Trade relations became more retaliatory than reciprocal. Though each granted the other British preferential rates, in 1922 those preferences made little difference. To protect
plants from disease and local interests from competition, each imposed embargoes on the other’s vegetables and fruits. In a period of falling prices and rising unemployment, said Professor Keith Sinclair, they were “shoving one another into depression.”
4 While New Zealand remained a primary-producing, low-tariff country, Australian secondary industries, developed since federation behind a high tariff wall, gained an increasing share of the New Zealand market. By 1930 the balance of trade was two to one in Australia’s favor.
As the depression deepened, trade relations deteriorated. Australian devaluation in 1931 reduced the limited amount of protection that existed for New Zealand industries and encouraged New Zealand to import small orders from Australia instead of bulk orders from Britain. Threatened with the loss of its citrus market by continued embargoes, the federal government initiated negotiations that led to the 1933 trade agreement. The tariff concessions it offered New Zealand were in practice insignificant, as were negotiations to lift embargoes and regulate the Tasman trade in fruits and vegetables in the interests of plant protection. New Zealand in 1935 introduced more tariff protection for local industries and higher preferences for Britain. These were followed in 1936 by the Labour government’s policies of economic insulation and trade diversification, with first preference for Britain and second preference for commonwealth countries on the basis of reciprocity. Thereafter trade relations became more cordial—some concessions being made on both sides, although the introduction of severe import licensing in New Zealand to conserve overseas funds was a new irritant. By 1939 the balance of trade was three to one in Australia’s favor. Moreover, as wartime supplies from Britain fell away, New Zealand needed more and more from Australia.
In the 1920s and early 1930s, the attitudes and interests of the two governments in defense and foreign policy were basically the same. Both believed that the most likely threat to their future security was Japan. Yet they appreciated that Japan had played the game during the First World War, convoying their troops and offsetting Britain’s naval weakness. Consequently, they wanted the Anglo-Japanese alliance renewed. The only conceivable alternative, said Hughes, was an American assurance of safety. They had perforce to be content with the Washington treaties and the 5:5:3 naval ratio among Britain, the United States, and Japan in place of the old two-power standard.
As strategy and finance dictated that Britain’s main fleet would be concentrated in European waters, the two dominions accepted a proposal to help build a base at Singapore which, in the event of a major emergency in the Far East, would hold out until reinforcements arrived and which would also make possible the operation of capital ships in the area. They were prepared to bear their fair share of the cost as insurance for the future. New Zealand contributed promptly and substantially to the base and reestablished and maintained its own division of the Royal Navy. Australia was slower off the mark and, when the future of the base was in doubt, decided to devote all its contribution to building up its own navy. This virtually ruled out a joint naval agreement.
Neither country had sufficient power to pursue an independent foreign policy. Provided they were informed and consulted by Britain, they were generally content to align themselves with it. But when their vital interests diverged from Britain’s, primarily over Pacific security, they protested vigorously and acted together. Old fears of foreign intruders in the South Pacific and of Chinese immigration were transmuted into new anxieties about Japan’s long-range ambitions and “the Yellow Peril.” New Zealand defended the policy of building the Singapore base when the British Labour government proposed first to abandon it and then to slow down its construction. Australia actively sought to foster good relations and expand trade with Japan. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, the response was slow and smothered in both countries partly because they were preoccupied with the problems of the depression. New Zealand’s anxiety was more muted than Australia’s for it had no bridge of islands linking it to Asia and no vast, empty spaces to fill.
After 1935 the two governments took different stands on foreign policy. New Zealand’s Labour government supported a strong League of Nations and Covenant, and universal collective security, and publicly opposed British appeasement policies. The Australian government, on the other hand, supported the British, though not simply because it was politically more conservative. Australia’s main line of communications to Europe was through Suez and the Mediterranean, and the Far East was its Near North. Yet, when war became imminent, both countries stood together with Britain. The more independent-minded Labour government in New Zealand declared war on its own account. The Australian government adhered to the view that, when Britain was at war, Australia was automatically at war too.
The Second World War brought the imperial phase of Australian-New Zealand relations to an end. Common danger rapidly transcended political differences and forced the two governments to work more closely together. Complete military interchange of information between governments instead of individual services was suggested by New Zealand’s prime minister, M. J. Savage, in 1938. However, Australia’s prime minister, J. A. Lyons, preferred that the information exchanged should be at the discretion of the governments concerned.
5 The first real attempt to insure concerted action in defense was the Pacific Defence Conference, held in Wellington in April 1939 on Savage’s insistent invitation and attended by British, Australian, and New Zealand delegations. Its main purpose was to discuss the lack of defense preparations in the South Pacific, a matter of particular concern to New Zealand, which at that stage was pushing for closer political liaison with Australia and a more independent line in Pacific policy.
6 But coordination in defense policies was still lacking when war broke out. The New Zealand government’s decision to send a special force overseas to the traditional Middle East theater precipitated a similar decision by the Australian government, which regretted that prior consultation had not been possible.
7The Pacific war encouraged better collaboration. After he had been informed of the possible withdrawal of the 9th Australian division, Peter Fraser took great care to consult John Curtin over the return of the New Zealand division from the Middle East in the face of the Japanese threat. Fraser’s final decision to leave the division in the Middle East infuriated Curtin, whose shores were more threatened and who was strongly of the opinion that all New Zealand troops should be available for the Pacific. While Fraser was concerned that their different decisions would jeopardize their good relations, he insisted that the circumstances of the two countries were different, granted their strategical interdependence.
8The most compelling reason for wartime collaboration was Britain’s warning in June 1940 that it would not be able to send reinforcements to the Far East in what was then seen as the unlikely event of Japan’s taking the opportunity to alter the status quo, and that the British would have to rely on the United States to safeguard their interests there.
9 The same month a New Zealand delegation went to Australia to speed up defense supply arrangements,
and it was agreed that New Zealand would be “regarded as one of the Australian States” in these matters.
10The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and advance south into New Guinea made the security of “the British antipodes” essential to the U.S., and they became its forward bases. But the South Pacific was their region, and naturally they felt that they must have “an eye, an ear, and a voice” wherever decisions affecting them were being made. Diplomatic representation in Washington and a Pacific War Council provided information but not participation in top-level decision making. When Australia was included in the Southwest Pacific area under General Douglas MacArthur and New Zealand in the South Pacific under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, both protested that they were inevitably one strategic whole in which the substantial military and economic cooperation that had already been achieved should not be jeopardized,
11 but all in vain.
To add to the stresses and strains of the wartime alliance, there were growing anxieties about American postwar intentions in the Pacific and fears of being excluded from the peace settlement. High commissioners were exchanged in 1943, and the Australian minister of external affairs, H. V. Evatt, invited a New Zealand minister to Canberra for preliminary talks on a proposed conference of countries with Pacific interests. The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, which they first heard about in the newspapers, confirmed their fears that the great powers would, without consultation, decide issues which vitally concerned them. When Fraser arrived in Canberra for further talks in January, he found that Evatt wanted “a solemn Treaty or Pact.” He doubted the constitutional propriety of this but agreed with about 75 percent of what Evatt proposed. The outcome was the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of January 21, 1944, also known as the Canberra Pact.
12In it the two countries demanded to be consulted and represented at the highest level in planning an armistice and a general international organization. They agreed to work together in the South Pacific and to call a regional conference as soon as possible. They insisted that no change in control or sovereignty in the area should be made without their consent. They proposed a regional zone of defense centered on themselves and the arc of islands stretching from New Guinea to the Cook group. Also proposed was a regional organization for the economic, social, and political advancement of Pacific peoples, with permanent secretariats to be created within
their Departments of External Affairs to carry out the agreement. Not only was this a reassertion of their traditional aspirations to a Monroe Doctrine for the South Pacific, it was also an attempt to apply the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the doctrine of trusteeship to all the Pacific island territories under colonial rule. New Zealand, however, rejected a further proposal that they should offer to take over the Western Pacific High Commission territories, for it wanted Britain to remain in the region. Allegations that the agreement was an attempt to keep the U.S. out of the region had caused concern in Washington and London, but such allegations were dismissed by its authors as unwarranted and misleading. Indeed, Fraser went to great lengths to deny them and to stress the importance of good relations with the U.S. The chargé d’affaires of the U.S. legation in Wellington quite rightly commented that Australia apparently was “the aggressive partner but smaller and more distant New Zealand does not want to be forgotten either.”
13In the event, they failed to secure the right to participate directly in wartime policy making concerning the Pacific. Moreover, three years elapsed before they were able to arrange a regional conference in Canberra to establish the South Pacific Commission. Its advisory powers on social and economic matters were less than they had wanted, but regional collaboration to accelerate political development was unacceptable to the other four metropolitan governments represented—Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the U.S.
A major achievement of the Canberra Pact was the working partnership of Evatt and Fraser at San Francisco. The amendments they suggested to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for a future international organization were based on conclusions reached at a ministerial meeting in Wellington in November 1944. Although they failed in their attack on the principle of unanimity of permanent members in the Security Council (the veto), they succeeded in getting the substance of what they wanted on trusteeship and economic and social policy. Canberra Pact objectives were incorporated into the United Nations Charter.
Secretariats provided for in the pact were established in both Departments of External Affairs, but they had difficulty in finding anything to do. An ever increasing volume and variety of work on Australian-New Zealand affairs was handled by the departments and the offices of the high commissioners and trade commissioners. Telephone and air services facilitated it. Flying boats in 1940, replaced by land-based planes in 1954, reduced the Tasman crossing
from four days to seven hours and later to three or four hours. The elaborate machinery for consultation proposed in the Canberra Pact was not needed. The two countries were so close together that they preferred to conduct much of their business on an informal, ad hoc basis. No two other countries exchanged information so freely or had such free access at all levels to each other—a result of the Canberra Pact, which was increasingly valuable as each expanded its diplomatic representation overseas after the war.
14The Postwar Period
The close collaboration of the war years became a permanent feature of the external relations of both countries in the postwar period. Changes of government made little difference in day-to-day relations, though they did introduce new considerations and new interpretations of policy matters into the discussions. Moreover, the frequency and intimacy of consultation at the top political level changed.
After 1945 growing international tensions and endeavors to involve the U.S. in postwar commonwealth defense in the Pacific initiated a new phase in Australian-New Zealand relations. Both countries feared renewed Japanese aggression and wanted a hard peace treaty. Both were becoming increasingly concerned about the threat of communism at home and abroad, and the formation of NATO encouraged the idea of a Pacific pact. The U.S., however, became willing to negotiate only when the Korean War made a soft, early Japanese peace treaty desirable. In Canberra, the new Australian minister of external affairs, Percy Spender, seized the initiative to get the U.S. and New Zealand to agree to tripartite regional security arrangements, partly as a quid pro quo for a soft peace. The outcome was the ANZUS treaty of 1951. Thereafter, regular meetings of the ANZUS council gave Australia and New Zealand machinery for top-level consultation with the U.S. Mutual commitments in ANZUS were broadened by SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), AMDA (Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement), and ANZUK (Five-Power Defense Arrangements in Malaysia and Singapore). Both countries contributed forces for the occupation of Japan, the Korean War, the Malayan emergency, the Vietnam War, and the defense of Malaysia and Singapore—the fulfillment of British Commonwealth, United Nations, and regional obligations.
15Governments of the late 1960s also tended to regard such military commitments as “insurance” for future great-power protection. The exigencies of cold war politics had substituted “forward defense” in Southeast Asia for a South Pacific zone of defense within the framework of an international security system.
From 1950 onward, T. B. Millar said, Australian-New Zealand cooperation in defense “developed from a by-product of crisis to a day-to-day activity.”
16 This was formalized in part by the 1969 memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation in defense supply
17 and in part by the establishment in 1972 of a Consultative Committee on Defence Cooperation for periodic discussions at the senior level.
Despite the meshing of Australian and New Zealand forces a joint defense union was unlikely. In 1972 Australia spent ten times more on defense than New Zealand, though its population was roughly four times larger and its gross national product five times. Furthermore, Australia could become a nuclear power. It was also conscious of the presence of New Guinea, Indonesia, and other Asian countries to its north and west in a way that New Zealand was not.
After the war trans-Tasman trade increased considerably. Because Australia was rapidly developing its mineral resources and industries at a time when New Zealand, with less varied natural resources, continued to rely principally on primary production, the balance became nearly four to one in Australia’s favor. Moreover, New Zealand’s margins of preference were steadily eroded. A fall in export prices, which had particularly adverse effects on New Zealand, prompted ministerial trade talks in 1958. Changing patterns in world trade, Britain’s bid to enter the EEC, and the restructuring of the economies on both sides of the Tasman encouraged more regular consultation on trade matters. In 1960 it was decided to establish an Australian-New Zealand Consultative Committee on Trade consisting of senior officials, and to hold ministerial meetings at least annually. New Zealand, with its rapidly expanding forest industry, wanted a free-trade area in forest products; Australia wanted a broader balance of advantage. The outcome was the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on August 31, 1965, negotiated by John McEwen and J. R. Marshall.
18 Their basic philosophy was that prosperity and expansion in one country were in the best interests of the other. Free-trade provisions were applied to selected goods set out in schedule A of NAFTA. Most of those included initially were already free of duty, and the
intention was to add to them gradually. To facilitate that process a transitional stage was provided in article 3:7 of NAFTA, whereby duties on agreed goods or classes of goods could be remitted or reduced in whole or part. Provision was also made for a phasing-out process on dutiable goods, for safeguards to sensitive industries in both countries, and for import licensing for balance-of-payment reasons. All together 60 percent of the existing Tasman trade was covered in the original free-trade arrangements, 86 percent of New Zealand’s exports and 53 percent of Australia’s.
The will to consult existed but cooperation proved more difficult. Vehement opposition to free trade came from protected sectional interests, such as Australian dairy producers and New Zealand manufacturers. Some Labour critics in New Zealand argued that NAFTA would jeopardize manufacturing in depth, full employment, and social welfare and make New Zealand an economic colony of Australia.
From 1965 to 1972 the Tasman trade increased by 78 percent and more than doubled in value, most of the increase being in manufactures, notably New Zealand forest products and Australian motor vehicles. The expansion of New Zealand’s industrial exports was assisted by devaluation in 1967, and at least some of its industries were proving they could hold their own. Australia by 1973 supplied over 20 percent of New Zealand’s imports; indeed, New Zealand was its largest market for manufactures, whereas less than 3 percent of its imports came from New Zealand. The trade imbalance declined to two to one in Australia’s favor in 1969, then rose again to almost three and one-half to one in 1972. The proportion of duty-free trade included in schedule A did not increase significantly, for there was a marked resistance on the part of industry to move from limited free trade facilitated by article 3:7 arrangements to unrestricted free trade. Despite NAFTA the pattern of trade remained substantially unchanged. Nonetheless, at the industry level cooperation gathered force. Joint Consultative Committees composed of officials and industry representatives of both countries were established for forest products in 1968 and for dairy products in 1972. From 1967 annual meetings were held between officials and the manufacturers’ organizations of both countries. The growth of cooperation, rationalization, and interdependence in industry facilitated by article 3:7 was one of the increasing advantages of NAFTA.
New opportunities for cooperation and consultation in the late 1960s were created by the decolonization of Oceania. Newly independent
or self-governing island states looked to both countries for increased trade and aid and for relief from population pressures. New Zealand initially and Australia somewhat later became increasingly aware of their interests in the region and of their obligations to help their poorer neighbors.
In the South Pacific Commission, they warmly supported changes which transferred responsibility for determining the work program and annual expenditure from the six metropolitan commissioners to the island delegates in the South Pacific Conference.
19 When France and the U.S. insisted that the conference should not discuss politics, New Zealand took the initiative in August 1971 in establishing the South Pacific Forum, an informal meeting of prime ministers of independent and self-governing island states with Australian and New Zealand representatives. The SPF set up the South Pacific Bureau of Economic Co-operation in Suva to change the pattern of trade in the region “whereby the territories previously dependent had supplied raw materials to metropolitan countries but were unable to manufacture many of the goods they required.”
20 A free-trade area in the South Pacific wider than NAFTA became a possibility. Australia and New Zealand were becoming the hub of a new network of family relationships between commonwealth members and their associates in the region. Furthermore, consultation and cooperation were developing among the island states, as well as between the island states and themselves.
The election of Labor governments on both sides of the Tasman toward the end of 1972 produced new initiatives and new perceptions in Australian-New Zealand relations. Although fundamental interests and policies remained unaltered, changes in 1973 seemed “real and deep.” Developments taking place in great-power relations and international relations generally provided a favorable climate. With the emergence of the new multipolar world, both countries could adopt a more independent stance on foreign policy and become more self-reliant.
One of the first things Norman Kirk did after he became prime minister of New Zealand was to telephone the new Australian prime minister, Gough Whitlam, suggesting that they might meet in Wellington on the anniversary of the Canberra Pact. “The first thing we want to talk about,” he said, “is how to revitalize and further strengthen the day-to-day partnership between our two countries.”
21 At lengthy and intimate discussions on January 20–23 they reaffirmed the principles of the Canberra Pact and “indicated their intention to work for the closest possible consultation
and collaboration on all matters—political, economic, defence, social and cultural—which affected their joint interests, particularly in the South Pacific region.” They also agreed to complete the abolition of passport and visa requirements for travel and immigration between them for citizens of both countries and for commonwealth citizens with resident status. The practical effect of this was to extend to New Zealand’s Polynesians and Asians the freedom of movement already enjoyed by others, a demonstration of the sincerity of both leaders in stating “their belief in the equality of every citizen in a multi-racial society and the right of all to the enjoyment of equal opportunities.”
22Compared with the Canberra Pact the joint communiqué of January 1973 was more sober and realistic. Contemporary needs were assessed and new forms of social cooperation were indicated. Australia was quietly and effectively reminded that it could not ignore New Zealand politically.
In 1973 consultation and cooperation advanced at a rate unmatched in the past. Both governments took proceedings in the International Court to examine the legality of French nuclear testing in the South Pacific, and the Australian government and the Royal Australian Navy supported the presence of the two New Zealand frigates in the nuclear-test zone during the testing period. Both governments launched a proposal to finance the South Pacific Commission partly on a voluntary basis by each contributing $NZ 250,000 toward the 1974 work program. New initiatives on tariff restructuring took place under NAFTA after Britain entered the EEC and ended the contractual obligations to extend to Britain tariff preferences which each also extended to the other. Australia’s 25 percent tariff reduction dramatically telescoped the duty-reduction provisions of NAFTA. New Zealand, though not consulted beforehand, was treated generously. Manufacturers agreed to set up joint industry panels to increase overall sales in both countries. A measure of agreement was reached to cooperate in trans-Tasman shipping services. More ministers than ever before met for both formal and informal discussions. A solid working relation between Australia and New Zealand was being established at all levels.
Bridgebuilding across the Tasman has been a long, slow process which, until the Pacific war, proceeded in fits and starts. After diplomatic representation was exchanged in 1943 the trading of information and consultation became routine. More daily cooperation developed in defense after ANZUS and in trade with NAFTA, though still largely in watertight compartments. It must be said,
however, that political initiatives at the top level have been more evident in periods when Labor governments with basically compatible policies have held office on both sides of the Tasman.
Collaboration has been not only between governments but between persons, and it has inevitably reflected their different styles and characters; Evatt, the brilliant lawyer, and Fraser, the astute wartime statesman; Whitlam, the colorful, academic leader, and Kirk, the self-educated, able politician. All of them have been idealists and men of vision. All have believed that their countries had a leading role to play in world affairs, particularly in their own region. Yet there have been marked differences between them which have reflected differences between their two countries—not only in size, resources, power, and capability but also in national character. Fraser and Kirk took their stand on moral principles and were concerned about human rights, the rule of law, and the role of small nations in international affairs. Evatt and Whitlam submerged similar ideals and aspirations beneath realpolitik. Australia has generally been more confident, more forceful, and more ambitious. New Zealand has been a restraining influence. Yet on occasions New Zealand’s quiet diplomacy has been more effective than Australia’s “crashes through.”
23Australian-New Zealand relations generally have been closer in periods when each country has been following a more independent foreign policy rather than a policy determined by the views and interests of its most influential ally: at one time Britain, more recently the United States. Sovereign independence and a strong sense of nationhood, as well as kinship between the two countries, have been the essence of a full and equal trans-Tasman partnership.
24Notes
| 1 |
W. P. Reeves, State Experiments in Australia & New Zealand (London: G. Richards, 1902), I, 22. |
| 2 |
Ibid., 179. |
| 3 |
André Siegfried, Democracy in New Zealand (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1914), 358. |
| 4 |
Keith Sinclair, “Fruit Fly, Fireblight and Powdery Scab: Australia–New Zealand Trade Relations, 1919–39,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, I, 1 (1972), 34. |
| 5 |
For the relevant documents see Robin Kay (ed.), The Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 1944 (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1972), 1–4. |
| 6 |
F. L. W. Wood, The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs (Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1958), 80. |
| 7 |
Kay, op. cit., 5–7. |
| 8 |
Ibid., 7–16, 25–38. |
| 9 |
Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War, 1939–45, III (Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1963), 2o6n. (hereafter cited as Documents, III). |
| 10 |
J. V. T. Baker, The New Zealand People at War: War Economy (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1965), 120. |
| 11 |
Documents, III, 190 passim. See also Kay, op. cit., 17–20. |
| 12 |
Kay, op. cit., 140–148. |
| 13 |
Ibid., 164n. |
| 14 |
New Zealand Foreign Policy Statements and Documents, 1943–1957 (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1972), 17. |
| 15 |
On these mutual and shared commitments, see the essay on “New Zealand Foreign Policy” by F. L. W. Wood and Roderic Alley elsewhere in this volume. |
| 16 |
T. B. Millar, Australian–New Zealand Defence Co-operation (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968), 2. |
| 17 |
Ken Keith (ed.), Defence Perspectives (Wellington: Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1972), 110–111. |
| 18 |
New Zealand Treaty Series 1966, no. 1. |
| 19 |
T. R. Smith, South Pacific Commission: An Analysis after Twenty-Five Years (Wellington: Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1972), 72–75. |
| 20 |
Ken Piddington, The South Pacific Bureau: A New Venture in Economic Cooperation (Wellington: New Zealand Institute for International Affairs, 1973), 10. |
| 21 |
New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 22, 12 (December 1972), 13–14. |
| 22 |
Ibid., 23, 1 (January 1973), 4–5. |
| 23 |
The phrase is Whitlam’s. |
| 24 |
Since this essay was written, Australia–New Zealand relations have been thoroughly and capably researched by Alan and Robin Burnett. See their The Australian and New Zealand Nexus (Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1978). |