Bhakti Yoga

For good secondary sources on Rāmānuja, see Clooney (2007), Carmen (1974), Lipner (1986), and Cari (1998). For primary sources other than his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras (the Śrī Bhāṣya) and Gītā, see Rāmānuja’s Vedārtha Saṅgraha.
I thank Matthew Dasti for this conceptualization.
It is in fact listed in Mādhava’s fourteenth-century doxography, the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha (see Nicholson 2010, 148ff., for discussion on the Sanskrit doxographies).
While the notion of “six schools” surfaces frequently in the doxographies across the centuries, different schools were identified as comprising these six, or more than six were recognized. Additionally, sometimes the schools were differentiated differently—for instance, Yoga was not deemed separate from Sāṇkhya until later times. See Nicholson (2014) for discussion.
Glimpses of Śākta metaphysics can be read into the Upaniṣads, which these traditions—like all others—can then point to as their roots. All Vedic traditions needed to legitimate themselves by somehow or other locating themselves in the Śruti, as we will find in appendix 1 with Jīva himself. From this vantage point, later traditions could then claim to be the “real” or “hidden” or “higher” teachings of the Śruti. The mokṣadharma section of the Mahabhārata, which predated the Common Era, and various Purāṇas contain more explicit Śakta references, so these currents are ancient. And, of course, the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (circa fourth century B.C.E.), despite being frequently quoted by Vaiṣṇava theologians owing to its dualistic and theistic orientations, is explicitly Śaivite.
For excellent sources on Kaśmir Śaivism, see Muller-Ortega (1989), Lawrence (1999), and Dyczkowski (1987).
As noted earlier, so uncompromising is this form of advaita that even sat, cit, and ānanda are considered not “qualities” of Brahman, but its essence. A quality requires a quality bearer, or substance, in which the quality resides, hence creating a dualism between the quality and that in which it adheres. No such semblance of dualism or differentiation in Brahman is accepted by classical advaita.
Rāmānuja never mentions the Bhāgavata, prioritizing rather the Viṣṇu Purāṇa. We resist the proposal that this omission suggests that the Bhāgavata must have been written after Rāmānuja’s time in the twelfth century. We prefer to see this as a theological neglect stemming from, precisely, discomfort with the Bhāgavata’s prioritization of Kṛṣṇa over Viṣṇu.
The Gauḍīya lineage traces its own pedigree (but not without contestation) to Madhva. This connection is not recognized by the orthodox Madhva tradition, however (see De 1986, 13ff.).
As in English negations like theist/atheist, an a- prefix negates the noun to which it is attached.
Where Rāmānuja tends to agree with Śaṅkara at least regarding the identification of the source Upaniṣadic text being referred to in any particular Vedānta sūtra, Madhva frequently identifies completely different source texts, even as his philosophy is very much closer to the former than the latter. See Adams (1993) for a comparative analysis of these three pivotal thinkers on the first chapter of the Vedānta Sūtras.
We take this usage from Dasgupta (1922, 246).
Madhva’s ontology draws heavily from Nyāya categories.
The Nimbarka tradition has a commentary and calls its philosophy dvaita-advaita; Vallabha, a contemporary of Caitanya, did likewise for his śuddha-advaita philosophy; and most recently, the followers of the eighteenth-century Swami Nārāyaṇa tradition have just completed a commentary for the philosophy of their lineage, called navya-viśiṣṭa-advaita.
This trans-human status is irrespective of whether, as with Nyāya and the theistic traditions, the texts are authored and bestowed by Īśvara at the beginning of creation or, as with the nontheistic Mīmāṁsā school, the texts are authorless but nonetheless eternal.
Part of the Vedānta project, as an important aside, is to prove that the overarching primary subject matter of the Upaniṣads ultimately relates to Brahman rather than some other topic (I.3).
Like the Yoga Sūtras, many sūtras consist of only three or four words. They rarely indicate to which passage, section, or phrase in the Upaniṣads they refer and thus are completely inaccessible without commentary.
Precise labels are slightly problematic here since Śaṅkara could, in point of fact, be considered a type of Vaiṣṇava (even as some narratives place him as an incarnation of Śiva), but along the lines noted above—in other words, he accepted in terms of conventional reality that the creator is Viṣṇu (in, for instance, his Gītā commentary), but that in ultimate reality both creation and creator are products of ignorance (see Nelson 2007 for an excellent discussion here). Moreover, since Rāmānuja’s Vedānta school is called viśiṣṭa-advaita, “qualified nondualism,” it has retained the term advaita, since everything is an expression of the one Brahman, but qualified it by positing differences within it, viśiṣṭa, along the lines noted previously. The terms “personalist” and “nonpersonalist” have similar sorts of problems.
This divisioning is seen in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Saṅkara’s param-guru, Gauḍapāda, was either a Buddhist or heavily influenced by Buddhism (for discussion, see King 1995).
The standard primary Vedānta texts—the prasthāna traya, threefold corpus—consist of the Upaniṣads, the Vedānta Sūtras, and the Gītā.
The Padma Purāṇa states: “When Īśvara is described as nirguṇa, without qualities, what is meant is an absence of the guṇas connected with prakṛti like inferior objects” (uttara-khaṇḍa 255.39–40).
There are much less fundamental but still important variations, too, within post-Śaṅkara expresssions of advaita, as among the Vaiṣṇava schools (see Karl H. Potter, ed., Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, vol. 11: “Advaita Vedanta from 800 to 1200: From Vacaspati Misra to Citsuka.” [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2006]).
The Swami Nārāyaṇa tradition, originating in Gujarat in the eighteenth century, has, at the time of this writing, recently completed its own commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras (Ahmedabad: Swaminarayan Aksharpith, 2009). This school calls its philosophy navya-viśiṣṭa-advaita, a “new” variant of Rāmānuja’s philosophy (indeed, their monks are often trained in philosophy and logic by viśiṣṭādvaita Vaiṣṇava theologians).
Nyāya (the school of logicians) argues vigorously contra advaita Vedānta for both the ātman and Īśvara as eternally independent and individual “reals” (which they term padārthas, things that can be named because of having inherent existence), and as discussed, even the monistic Kaśmir Śaivite tradition rejects Śaṅkara’s illusionism when it comes to the world of forms, which they hold to be real citi-śakti.
There are 150 dense pages in Thibaut’s translation (1904). Madhva also vigorously opposed Śaṅkara, as did the great bhakta scholar and theologian Vallabha, a contemporary of Caitanya.
We can briefly touch upon one commonly encountered argument Jīva raises against the advaita position (so as not to burden here those less interested in Vedānta argumentation), in order to give a flavoring of this issue through Vaiṣṇava theological sensitivities. The first argument he introduces against the advaita position in his Bhakti Sandarbha is the most commonly encountered in anti-advaita argumentation and, as with so much else, can be traced back at least to the twelfth-century Vedānta theologian Rāmānuja. If it is true, as advaita holds, that there is in ultimate reality (paramārthika) only one undivided Brahman, whose nature is cit, pure consciousness, but that owing to māyā/avidyā (ignorance), the ātman is erroneously perceived as different from it, when in fact it is nothing other than that same Brahman, then this is tantamount to suggesting that Brahman can fall under the influence of illusion. As Rāmānuja puts it: “Kasyā avidyā,” Whose is this ignorance? Where is its locus? Is ignorance somehow covering Brahman? This is constitutionally impossible, as Brahman’s very nature is cit, full awareness: it can never be unaware or subject to ignorance, any more than the sun can be unilluminated. So ignorance cannot exist in Brahman. But nor can it be located outside of Brahman, as that creates a situation of dvaita, duality (two distinct entities), which contradicts the nonnegotiable tenet of advaita—absolute nonduality. Nor can it be covering the individual ātman since the ātman’s individuality is itself caused by ignorance, hence this ignorance must have existed prior to its effect of individualization. Besides, for advaita metaphysics, ignorance cannot be within a part of Brahman of any sort, for the same reason—Brahman has no parts, once again, because, ex hypothesi, it must only be nondual. In fact, says Jīva, the latter possibility is actually the only coherent one: there must be some sort of difference between the part of Brahman under the spell of māyā—namely, the jīva—and the part of Brahman that can never be reduced to this condition but is, in fact, the wielder of ignorance (māyā)—namely, Īśvara (Tattva Sandarbha anu 35–40).

The basic advaita response to this dilemma (and the issue has been treated differently through the history of the tradition) is that an explanation of ignorance is beyond human comprehension (anirvācanīya). To be fair, the Gauḍīya Vedāntins do not hesitate to resort to a similar position of inconceivability (acintya) when discussing their own ontology. So all this points to the obvious limitations of the human intellect in capturing Truths that, by the definition of all Vedantins (and all mokṣa traditions), lie completely beyond it. Nonetheless, the debate remains an indispensable polemical mainstay of the various Vedānta communities to this day, since clearly, for Vaiṣṇavas, bhakti yoga requires an eternal Īśvara in devotional relationship with an ātman that is quantitatively distinct on the one hand, even as it is qualitatively the same on another (that is, also comprising sat, cit, and ānanda). Hence the perennial effort invested in relentlessly marshaling exegetical and philosophical methods in defense of these Truths.
Bhajana, in addition to its meaning discussed in the kīrtana section, is sometimes more broadly used as another term for bhakti practice.
For the Bhāgavata, nonduality indicates that everything emanates from Bhagavān—nothing has separate or independent existence. Advaya is a synonym of advaita but understood by the Vaiṣṇavas very differently from Śaṅkara.
Paramātman, Supreme Ātmān, is another term understood variously in the Vedānta schools. For the Bhāgavata and Vaiṣnava traditions, it generally refers to derivative forms of Viṣṇu involved in various levels of overlordship in the matter of creation (see I.6.29), as well as the form that manifests to yogīs. Rūpa quotes a verse from the Skanda Purāṇa stating that “Bhagavān is called Paramātman by the followers of the eight-limbed yoga (aṣṭāṅga), Brahman by those who follow the Upaniṣads, and jñāna by the jñāna-yogis” (Laghu-Bhāgavatāmṛta I.196, reference not given; for a rearticulation of this verse, see Bhāgavata III.32.26).
See, for example, Rūpa in yet another of his publications: Laghu-Bhāgavatāmṛta (V.216).
Nyāya is an exception, here, positing that the ātman has consciousness as a quality, but that this quality is instantiated and manifest only when the ātman is coupled with a mind but remains latent when the ātman is liberated and uncoupled from the mind. Hence liberation for Nyāya (and its sister school, Vaiśeṣiká) is a not a state of pure consciousness.
Indeed, Sheridan (1983) reads an “advaitic theism” in this text. See also Bhattacarya (1960–62), Vyasa (1974), and Rukmani (1970) for other studies on the text’s philosophy.
Paramātman in Vaiṣṇavism is the immanent aspect of the personal Absolute consciously active within His own power of māya-śakti, the material world of prakṛti and the guṇas. It is God as regulator of the universe and the selves within it. Specifically, it refers to the various Viṣṇu forms. For example, there is the Mahā-Viṣṇu (Kāraṇodakaṣayī), from whose pores unlimited parallel universes emanate (X.14.11, X.88.41). Unlimited derivative Viṣṇus are manifest from that Mahā-Viṣṇu and enter into each individual universe (the Kṣīrodakaśayī Viṣṇus), and it is from the navels of these Viṣṇus that the lotus grows upon which Brahmā, the secondary creator, finds himself (as we will encounter in the Tale and Teachings of Lord Brahmā). There is a further tertiary Viṣṇu who then enters into the hearts of all beings, as well as into every atom, the Paramātman or Antaryāmin. This ontology, derived from the Pāñcarātrika tradition, is outlined in various sources such as the Paramātma Sandarbha.
See also Gītā XIV.27 and VII.4–7ff.
Draṣṭuḥ svarūpe ’vasthānam, the seer abides in its own nature (Yoga Sūtras I.3), which is just pure consciousness (II.20).