BEFORE THE OUTBREAK of war in September 1939, Britain had relied on supplies of commodities from overseas: now food had to be produced at home and most raw materials reserved for the production of arms, vehicles and uniforms. Meticulous planning was required and the government’s wartime strategy included managing garment manufacture and the distribution of clothing to an unprecedented degree.
Committed to ensuring the fair distribution of scarce but essential resources, namely food, clothing and furniture, the government introduced a comprehensive rationing scheme based on allocation of coupons – a system deriving, ironically, from the German rationing plan devised in November 1939. Clothes rationing was first considered in June 1940, but was not launched until June 1941, by which time the supply and circulation of civilian clothing were already experiencing a downward turn. Many garment factories had been requisitioned and much of the clothing industry’s labour force withdrawn for essential war work. Raw materials were growing scarce and inflation was forcing up the price of clothes: by March 1941, the cost of dress articles had risen by an alarming 69 per cent, chiefly because of purchase tax, introduced the previous October. Most garments and footwear were taxed at 16 per cent, but items such as furs, head shawls, hairnets, veils, gloves, belts, suspenders, shoe and corset laces, hair and curling pins all carried a hefty 33 per cent purchase tax. By 1941 the government understood that the cost of clothing had to be stabilised, and in an equitable manner: the introduction of rationing aimed to provide affordable dress essentials for the whole civilian population.
Clothes rationing entailed a system whereby both cash and coupons were required for the purchase of new dress items. Certain articles could still be bought without coupons, such as clothing for children below four years of age, work boiler suits, wooden clogs, boot and shoe laces, sanitary towels, tapes, braids, ribbons and sewing and mending thread; so too could second-hand clothes, if ‘genuine’, in recognition that the poorer sectors of society often bought their clothes at rummage sales and second-hand outlets. Conversely, heavily taxed luxury items considered inessential, such as hats, lace and fur coats, were also exempt from rationing. Otherwise, most new clothing had to be purchased using coupons within the rationing system.
Initially the allowance for every British adult was set at sixty-six coupons per year, with an additional fifty coupons for expectant mothers. To help the general public to understand the system, the Board of Trade issued a two-penny booklet entitled Clothing Coupon Quiz. It began by explaining the purpose of rationing and how it would work, then presented a comprehensive table itemising the number of coupons needed for each category of adults’ and children’s clothing. Finally, the ‘question and answer’ section addressed specific issues, such as how men in the services would acquire clothing. National newspapers also published the main details of the rationing system. The Board of Trade was determined that everyone would understand the scheme and be assured: ‘There is enough for all if we share and share alike.’ The fashion press also stood firm, supporting rationing and campaigning for an end to extravagance in dress. In October 1941 Vogue pronounced: ‘Rationing is fair. Nothing counts in comparison with victory. We may not grin, but we can bear it. It is fair to coax two dresses out of one length.’
The sixty-six-coupon annual allowance was not generous: for example, a woman’s jacket or short coat required eleven coupons, a girl’s gym tunic six, a boy’s raincoat or overcoat eleven, and a man’s suit twenty-six coupons. On the whole, however, public reaction to the introduction of clothes rationing was relatively positive, perhaps because few in Britain believed that it would last very long. In mid-1941 it was difficult to envisage the extent to which worsening shortages would transform the everyday life of the nation, not only for the duration of the war but also in the years of austerity that followed. However, as basic materials became progressively more scarce, in spring 1942 the clothing-coupon allowance was slashed to sixty coupons for fifteen months: approximately forty-eight coupons a year. Household linens were also included in the scheme in 1942, thereby further reducing the number of coupons available for clothing. Some help in the form of extra coupons was given to families with children who were rapidly outgrowing their clothes and shoes, and the Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS) opened clothing exchanges at which decent children’s clothes and shoes could be exchanged for larger sizes, without spending money or precious ration coupons.
The public did not have to register with particular clothing shops to use their rations and consequently clothing-coupon fraud was rife, ranging from stolen ration books and forgeries to coupon-swapping and a black-market trade in unused coupons. The definition of ‘second-hand’ clothes – items exempt from coupons – was also vague and provided a convenient loophole: many local street markets became a magnet for ‘spivs’ selling black-market goods looted from bombed shops, warehouses and even houses. Some civilians seized any opportunity to acquire scarce goods, yet many took great pride in their ability to manage within their coupon allowance by carefully planning a few dress purchases each year. Older women often made personal sacrifices, giving away clothing coupons to young relatives, especially school children. Clothes rationing persisted for almost eight years in Britain: only in March 1949 was the scheme finally discontinued.
The system of clothes rationing effectively limited the quantity of new material and clothing available to civilians, ensuring basic dress supplies for all, but it did not resolve issues of cost or quality and in that respect existing social imbalance persisted.
Although coupon allocation was equal throughout society, essentially rationing benefited the wealthier classes who, with both coupons and ample funds, could afford to buy well-made garments, even couture designs, while the less well-off had to spend the same number of coupons on inferior garments that did not wear well. Eventually the Board of Trade took ambitious steps to supervise and consolidate clothing production. By reducing the number of factories producing civilian garments and setting manufacturing specifications, choices were limited and production concentrated on high-performance textiles that would stand the test of time. The system of manufacturing garments from government-approved materials and retailing them at regulated prices affordable for ordinary wage earners – known as the Utility Clothing Scheme – came into force in February 1942.
At around the same time, ‘austerity’ restrictions were also introduced: trimmings on women’s clothing, such as embroidery and other ornamental stitching, were prohibited and the use of scarce materials banned, except for elastic, which was permitted for women’s underwear, children’s clothes and industrial garments. To economise on cloth and haberdashery, patterns were skilfully cut and kept as small as possible, and the number of buttons, use of pleats, width of belts, seams, collars, sleeves and skirts and length of hemlines were limited. Men’s clothing was also subject to strict guidelines: single-breasted jackets replaced double-breasted styles, while lapel size and the number of pockets were restricted; similarly, less material was to be used in the tailoring of trousers, and turn-ups were eliminated. These austerity restrictions were applied to all clothes produced for the domestic market, not only to the Utility ranges.
All clothes produced within the Utility scheme had to be necessary items (not extreme styles or short-lived novelties), economical in terms of labour and pass stringent tests for coupon value, shrinkage, colour-fastness and waterproof qualities, where relevant. Rigid specifications governed the weave and weight of materials, and the colours permitted for garments were purposely vibrant: bright greens, reds, pinks, blues and rich browns deriving from limited dyes. Their retail price was set by the Board of Trade and maximum prices were applied to each garment type, although there were two quality levels, the price limit of standard articles set at two-thirds of the maximum price for higher-quality items. Initially 50 per cent of all British-made textiles were produced under the Utility scheme, but at its height this figure reached 85 per cent.
Utility garments were affordable for many, tax-exempt, and could be purchased using coupons, yet public response to the scheme was mixed. Affluent consumers, used to a choice of luxury goods, widely considered the government-regulated dress articles inferior, while the term ‘Utility Clothing’ unfortunately evoked an image of drab, functional clothes. For its part, the government was well aware of the importance of dress on public morale, but hoped to encourage a shift in popular attitudes at a time of growing shortages, away from a love of extravagant fashions and towards appreciation of a simpler, uncluttered appearance that was both elegant and liberating. Yet dampening the natural feminine urge for ornament was not an easy call: the Utility scheme and austerity measures governing the styling of clothes would only work if women believed that they would not end up looking plain and dowdy. The initiative might never have succeeded had the government not taken the inspired decision to involve leading London couturiers in the design of Utility clothing.
In spring 1942 the Board of Trade commissioned the newly formed Incorporated Society of London Fashion Designers (Inc. Soc.) to produce prototype Utility designs for mass-production – attractive, easy-fitting and durable coat, suit and dress designs that used Utility-approved cloth and conformed to all styling specifications. Inc. Soc. designers, who included the Queen’s couturier Norman Hartnell, Hardy Amies, Victor Steibel, Digby Morton and Edward Molyneux, were invited to submit four designs each, and thirty-two were subsequently made up into stylish, sophisticated garments. These were warmly received by the press. The Daily Mail reported: ‘Suburban wives and factory girls will soon be able to wear clothes designed by the Queen’s dressmaker’; and Vogue proclaimed: ‘They’re Beauties! They’re Utilities!’ Soon Utility clothing was being manufactured at every level, from couture to mail order.
The top ready-to-wear houses, knitwear and lingerie companies – brands including Gossard, Berkertex, Wetherall, Dereta and Windsmoor – advertised jointly in Vogue to demonstrate both their patriotic link with Utility and that they were still in production.
The Utility garments that survive in museum collections reveal significant variations in quality between expensive and economical clothes. The views of wearers also differed widely. Some simply saw the garments as ‘cheap’, while many respondents to the 1942 Mass Observation survey claimed to favour the scheme, but mainly because it furthered the war effort – not necessarily because they liked the fashions. The quality of underwear reportedly improved under Utility specifications, especially cotton vests and knickers, but the Mass Observation survey of 1944 revealed many women to be critical of the corsets and stockings. Early in 1945 the range of Utility textiles was expanded to included better-quality, more costly materials: the end of the war was approaching, but Utility clothing continued to be made until March 1952. Inevitably, the British public would always associate Utility clothing with austerity, yet the positive effects of the scheme were far-reaching: it improved the quality of fabric and the styling of garments and encouraged consumers to be more discriminating in their purchases.