Captain Hugh G. Nott would have coauthored both editions of this book had he lived. His contribution at the outset is beyond expression. Together we agreed that tactics was a worthy discipline within the broader study of naval warfare; that the foundations of this discipline needed to be brought up to date; that the study of principles was inadequate, because trends, constants, and contexts also played in the equation; and that the processes of combat ought to be expressed with dynamic models. And we both shared in the failure to find a more elegant turn of phrase for our fundamental maxim of naval tactics, Attack effectively first. Hugh’s presence abides on every page.
The late, great Admiral A. J. Whittle, USN (Ret.), was the first to read every word of the original draft and probably had the greatest effect on the whole of it. Frank Uhlig and Frank Snyder of the Naval War College suggested detailed improvements that were nearly as important. Among many others who sharpened the material were Vice Admiral Thomas Weschler, USN (Ret.), and Rear Admiral C. E. Armstrong on operations; Professors John Hattendorf and Thomas Hone on naval history; Lieutenant General Philip Shutler, USMC (Ret.) on littoral warfare; Doctors Joel Lawson, John Wozencraft, and Michael Sovereign on command and control; and W. Robert Gerber, Gael Tarleton, Donald Daniel, and Robert Bathurst on Soviet military science.
Much credit goes to the Military Conflict Institute, which served as an early sounding board and helped me to sharpen the distinctions between the processes of land and sea battle. Among its leadership, Dr. Donald Marshall, Colonel Trevor Dupuy, USA (Ret.), and Lawrence Low were unstinting of their time and advice.
Special thanks go to Lieutenant Mehmet Ayik, a doctoral student at the Naval Postgraduate School, who sharpened “The Battle of the Aegean” in chapter 12. Having an extraordinary seagoing background in the Turkish navy, Mehmet kept my vivid imagination in bounds with technical advice—after I persuaded him that my aim was to illustrate tactics, not geopolitics.
Many others provided source material, ideas, and inspiration, including Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, Vice Admiral John A. Baldwin, Dr. Wilbur Payne, Dr. J. J. Martin, Dr. Milton Weiner, Professor Neville Kirk, and Captains S. D. Landersman and E. M. Baldwin. At the Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Richard Rosenthal and Dr. Alan Washburn were especially generous with their encouragement.
Ideas not communicated are seeds cast on rocks. Readers should join me in saluting those who contributed not to the substance but to the form and expression of that substance: in Monterey, Lieutenant Commander Paul Fischbeck, Ellen Saunders, Sherie Gibbons, and Ruthanne Lowe, and at the Naval Institute Press, Paul Wilderson, Therese Boyd, and Connie Buchanan. My wife, Joan, gave a double measure through two editions: forebearance without untoward jealousy of The Book was one thing; serving as foil and grammarian was to walk the second mile.
Admiral Thomas Hayward has my thanks for his advice and encouragement; he also deserves the appreciation of the American navy for reemphasizing tactical competency in the fleet. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski keeps the flame burning with his foreword to this edition.