Notes

1. Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals, p. 81.
2. The definitive resource on these events (if there can be a definitive resource on anything driven so largely by anarchists) is We Are an Image from the Future: The Greek Revolt of December 2008, edited by A. G. Schwarz, Tasos Sagris, and Void Network.
3. Almost all of the information about this particular action is from “Vortex” and recounted in Schwarz et al., We Are an Image from the Future, pp. 173–176.
4. It probably helped that the actionists outnumbered the police by fifty to two, which might not stop police from trying to arrest people at “peaceful” protests, but definitely stopped them in Greece.
5. Jo Freeman. “The Women’s Movement,” as printed in Goodwin and Jasper, The Social Movements Reader, p. 22.
6. Ibid., p. 22.
7. Ibid., p. 24.
8. Ibid., p. 25. (Emphasis added.)
9. Ibid., p. 25. (Emphasis added.)
10. Ibid., p. 25.
11. Ibid., p. 30.
12. Upton Sinclair, The Cry for Justice, p. 754.
13. Or consider another example from We Are an Image from the Future. Four members of a counter-information group (Ego Te Provoco) in Athens: “Traditionally, we are against using the media to communicate with the public. . . . Theoretically the argument is that you cannot fight alienation with alienated means. You cannot claim that journalists are the scum of the earth and snitches, and at the same time be using them. And on a higher level it’s the question of the spectacle, of whether you could actually use the media.” They favor face-to-face communication, even to the point of rejecting Indymedia. Schwarz et al., We Are an Image from the Future, p. 232.
14. Lloyd, Suffragettes International, p. 46.
15. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 28.
16. Gamson and Modigliani, “The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action.”
17. Boykoff identifies several key frames: the violence frame, the disruption frame, the freak frame, the ignorance frame, and the amalgam of grievances frame. Pages 222 and onward.
18. Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, p. 27.
19. Rose, How to Win Campaigns, p. 153.
20. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 304.
21. These factors make it incredibly difficult for social movements to present a comprehensive critique of the status quo. As Gitlin explains: “Deadlines increase the pressure to keep the story simple, using what is at hand. In general, then, a single story—provoked by a single event—projects only a single field. The crucial, unintended ideological effect is to undermine whatever efforts movements may make to present a general, coherent political opposition; the effect is to reinforce the image that reform movements focus . . . on single grievances which the system, however reluctantly, can correct without altering fundamental social relations. The media thus support the dominant system’s claim to general legitimacy and its ability to fragment opposition.” Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching, p. 35.
22. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, chapter 13.
23. Ibid., p. 254 and pp. 306–307.
24. I often think of what Margaret Thatcher said after ten IRA prisoners starved themselves to death in 1981 in a (largely successful) struggle for Prisoner-Of-War rights. Thatcher continued to insist there was no political basis for their struggle: “Crime is crime is crime. It is not political.”
25. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 215.
26. Ibid., p. 203.
27. Ibid., p. 204.
28. See Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, p. 28. And also Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 212.
29. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, pp. 214–15.
30. Ibid., pp. 179–180.
31. Ibid., p. 188.
32. Ibid., p. 188–89.
33. Ibid., pp. 297–98.
34. Ibid., p. 299.
35. Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, p. 159.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 174.
38. Ibid., p. 173.
39. Jules Boykoff observes the same phenomenon at work more generally. “For activists, the routinization of protest activity paves the way to being disregarded by the mass media.” (Beyond Bullets, p. 177.) He argues: “Contained, sanctioned actions are not likely to garner mass-media attention, but disruptive, novel events improve the chances of mass-media interest.” (Ibid., p. 28.) But pursuing mass-media attention can lead to actions that are more militant, more weird (like levitating the Pentagon), and possibly otherwise more strange or alienating to potential supporters.
40. Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, p. 30.
41. Ibid., p. 30.
42. Ibid., pp. 161–62.
43. Ibid., p. 162.
44. Gitlin cites Bob Moses of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and Mario Savio of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement.
45. Ibid., p. 178.
46. Ibid., p. 203.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 204, Gitlin quoting Mark Rudd in 1968.
50. Ibid., p. 204.
51. In a campaign called “Get clean for Gene” many hippies cut their hair and dressed more conventionally to support the presidential campaign of anti-war Democrat Eugene McCarthy in 1968, but lost the Democratic primary to Hubert Humphrey, who then lost the election to Nixon.
52. Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching, p. 210.
53. Rose, How to Win Campaigns, p. 77.
54. Rolling Thunder, “The SHAC Model.”
55. Rose, How to Win Campaigns, p. 14.
56. Ibid., p. xx.
57. Ibid., p. 2.
58. McHale, Communicating for Change, p. 17.
59. PBS, “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?”
60. Rose, How to Win Campaigns, p. 3.
61. Ibid., p. 116. Speaking more broadly, Mark Somma writes: “Successful insurgencies require a clear political message in order to communicate effectively with the populace. It’s a requirement that revolutionary environmentalism doesn’t yet meet, as it presents a muddled political message. It’s primarily a message of ‘don’t’ . . . but it doesn’t provide a viable framework for positive action to bring about social transformation.” (Mark Somma, “Revolutionary Environmentalism: An Introduction” in Best and Nocella, Igniting a Revolution, p. 39.)
62. Rose, How to Win Campaigns, p. 116–17.
63. Ibid., p. 117.
64. Ibid., p. 99.
65. Though ACT UP is most famous for using this graphic, it was created by a small group of gay activists in New York shortly before ACT UP was created.
66. Crimethinc. is an example of a group that has gotten very good at this for their audience.
67. Rose, How to Win Campaigns, p. 25.
68. Ibid., p. 124.
69. Ibid., p. 14.
70. Ibid., p. 16. This is about more than just framing in interviews—it’s an attitude that affects whole campaigns. (Site 41, which I’ll return to in the final chapter, is a good example.)
71. To deal with this, he suggests first raising an explicitly ethical challenge. Secondly, make separate scientific, economic, legal, or otherwise rational challenges in addition to the ethical and emotional. Third, introduce emotional triggers properly. Ibid., pp. 106–7.
72. Ibid., p. 10.
73. Ibid., p. 56.
74. This rough structure appears in Rose, How to Win Campaigns, p. 133.
75. Gelderloos, How Nonviolence Protects the State, p. 103.
76. Ibid., p. 104.
77. Schwarz et al., We Are an Image from the Future, p. 154.
78. Golnaz Esfandiari, “The Twitter Devolution.”
79. Noam Cohen, “In Unsettled Times, Media Can Be a Call to Action, or a Distraction.”
80. Navid Hassanpour, “Media Disruption Exacerbates Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence from Mubarak’s Quasi-Experiment.”
81. Lusseyran, And There Was Light, p. 76.
82. Ibid., pp. 76–77.
83. Ibid., pp. 109–110.
84. Ibid., p. 111.
85. Ibid., p. 146.
86. Ibid., p. 162.
87. Ibid., p. 166.
88. Ibid., p. 166.
89. Ibid., p. 165.
90. Ibid., p. 167.
91. Ibid., pp. 166–67.
92. Ibid., p. 167.
93. Ibid., p. 169.
94. Ibid., pp. 169–170.
95. Ibid., p. 175.
96. Ibid., p. 171.
97. Ibid., p. 172.
98. Ibid., p. 184.
99. Ibid., p. 173.
100. Ibid., p. 192.
101. Ibid., p. 186.
102. Ibid., p. 174.
103. Ibid., p. 198–200.
104. Ibid., p. 208.
105. Ibid., pp. 227–230.
106. Trivia-Library.com, “Time and History 9:15 P.M. D-Day Warning Broadcast.”
107. Chris Soghoian, “For Hezbollah, It’s Fiber Warfare.”
108. M. R. D. Foot in Elliott-Bateman, The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, p. 49. For further reading see London Calling North Pole, H. J. Giskes, Kimber, 1953 (German perspective). And Inside North Pole, Pieter Dourlein, Kimber, 1954.
109. Foy, Michael Collins’s Intelligence War, p. 178.
110. Burton-Rose, Creating a Movement with Teeth, p. 161.
111. Foy, Michael Collins’s Intelligence War, p. 25.
112. Ibid., p. 179.
113. M. R. D. Foot in Elliott-Bateman, The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, p. 45. Further reading: The Strategic Bomber Offensive by Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, 1961.
114. From “Intelligence: The Common Denominator” by Donald McLachlan, in Elliott-Bateman, The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, p. 53.
115. Ibid. p. 54. Emphasis added.
116. Burton-Rose, Creating a Movement with Teeth, pp. 161–62. Converted into a bulleted list from a single paragraph.
117. This text from his post-apartheid statement to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. See the Amnesty Committee’s report granting him amnesty for ANC/MK operations. Available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/decisions/2001/ac21168.htm.
118. Foy, Michael Collins’s Intelligence War, p. 52.
119. United States Marine Corps, MCDP-2 Intelligence, p. 12. Emphasis added.
120. Robert Lovelace in Agyeman, Speaking for Ourselves, p. xiii.
121. Foy, Michael Collins’s Intelligence War, p. 53.
122. Elliott-Bateman, The Fourth Dimension of Warfare, p. 109 and 121.
123. Dobson, The Troublemaker’s Teaparty, p. 113.
124. Collins, The Path to Freedom, p. xiii.
125. Remember that a resistance movement’s territory isn’t only geographical, but also social, cultural, ideological, and so on.
126. Most of the following notes based heavily on The Ruckus Society Scouting Training Manual, Version 1.0. 4/13/2003. Page 2.
127. Ibid.
128. This is still done today; mapping companies add small, imaginary roads called “trap streets” and other errors to their maps so they can tell if their maps are being reproduced without permission.
129. bernz, “The complete social engineering FAQ.”
130. Kevin Mitnick, a security consultant and former network cracker, has written two books on social engineering: The Art of Deception and The Art of Intrusion. According to Mitnick, tricking someone into giving away a password is usually quicker and easier than trying to hack into a computer system to get around the password. Oftentimes social engineering is done over the telephone, to conceal the genuine identity of the operator.
131. United States Marine Corps, MCDP-2 Intelligence, p. 8. Emphasis added.
132. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, p. 382.
133. Ibid., p. 387.
134. Quoted in “The Nature of Military Intelligence” by Christopher Andrew, in Neilson and McKercher, Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History, p. 12–13.
135. Ibid, p. 13.
136. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA, p. 164.
137. This likely played a role, too, in the “surprise” election of Donald Trump as US president.
138. On one occasion, the forewarned Irish dissidents decided not to flee, to illustrate to the people how nasty the British occupation was. So police found it strange when their “surprise” raids found dissidents with luggage packed, ready to go to jail. Their obvious preparation, however, risked tipping police off to the extent of the IRA intelligence.
139. Oppenheimer and Lakey, A Manual for Direct Action, p. 15.
140. Ibid., p. 20.
141. Ibid., p. 17.
142. Ibid., p. 20.
143. Ibid., p. 19.
144. Rigden, SOE Syllabus.
145. Sources: Diapositive, “Witold Pilecki.”

     NPR Staff, “Meet The Man Who Sneaked Into Auschwitz.”

     Institute of National Remembrance, “Biography Rotamaster Witold Pilecki.”

146. The full text of Witold’s Report can be read at the Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/WITOLDREPORT
147. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 314.
148. This date, of course, is International Women’s Day.
149. Mark Mazzeti, “Burglars Who Took On F.B.I. Abandon Shadows.”
150. Democracy Now! “It Was Time to Do More Than Protest.”
151. Democracy Now! “From COINTELPRO to Snowden, the FBI Burglars Speak Out After 43 Years of Silence.”
152. Theoharis, The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide, p. 126.

     See also this article from the Los Angeles Times: Allan M. Jalon, “A Break-In to End All Break-Ins.” (March 8, 2006).

     Also a copy of the letter accompanying the documents is available here: http://www.brandywine-peace.com/COINTELPRO%20dreamweaver%20test.htm

153. Theoharis, The FBI, p. 126.
154. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices, p. 53.
155. Different thinkers divide the various COINTELPRO tactics into differing groups and categories. I organize them here in a practical way, clustering tactics together where they require a similar response from resistance movements.
156. Reprinted in Churchill and Vander Wall, The Cointelpro Papers, pp. 110–11. Emphasis underlined in original.
157. U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report—Book III, p. 228.
158. Pierrick Bourrat, “People More Strongly Condemn Bad Behaviour When Cued That They Are Being Watched.”
159. Brian Glick, War At Home, full text can be read at https://archive.org/stream/War_At_Home/War_At_Home_djvu.txt
160. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, INTERNAL SECURITY, DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT. A letter from J. Edgar Hoover. Available at: http://www.namebase.org/foia/fbi01.html.
161. Brian Glick, “COINTELPRO Revisted.”
162. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 89.
163. Brian Glick, War At Home.
164. Gary T. Marx, “Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provo-cateur and the Informant,” p. 434.
165. John William Sayer, Ghost Dancing the Law: The Wounded Knee Trials, p. 203.
166. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 123.
167. Neil Tweedie, “Eco Infiltrator Mark Kennedy: The Great Betrayal.”
168. Collins, The Path to Freedom, p. 69.
169. Foot, SOE, p. 144.
170. Ibid.
171. More background on Anna Mae Aquash in Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 119, among other places.
172. Brian Glick, War At Home.
173. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 140.
174. Ibid., p. 142.
175. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, INTERNAL SECURITY, DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT. A letter from J. Edgar Hoover. http://www.namebase.org/foia/fbi01.html
176. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, p. 78.
177. Ibid, p. 81.
178. Brian Glick, War At Home.
179. I would like to thank Bari biographer Steve Ongerth for a phone discussion about Bari’s work and experiences with repression. For more about his biography of Bari, visit http://www.judibari.info/.
180. There’s considerable information about Bari’s case at her official website (http://www.judibari.org/), and at the Albion Monitor (http://www.monitor.net/monitor/bari/interview.html).
181. Nicholas Wilson, “The Judi Bari Bombing Revisited.”
182. Ibid.
183. Ibid.
184. Bill Weinberg, “Judi Bari Suit Against FBI Reveals COINTELPRO Against Earth First!”
185. Austin, Up Against the Wall, p. 214.
186. Ian F. W. Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare, “Boer War.”
187. U.S. Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual: FM3–24. Page 5–21.
188. Ibid.
189. The Pew Center on the States, “One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections.” March 2009. http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_32609.pdf
190. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, p. 87.
191. Collins, The Path to Freedom, p. 86.
192. Ibid.
193. U.S. Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual: page 1-10, para 1-51.
194. Roldo Bartimole, “Nestlé Pressures Notre Dame Students.”
195. For additional analysis, see also: http://www.mintpressnews.com/stratfor-strategies-how-to-win-the-media-war-against-grassroots-activists/166078/
196. From a speech given by Ronald Duchin to the National Cattleman’s Association of the United States; excerpts were published CALF News, June 1991.
197. Mangold and Penycate, Tunnels of Cu Chi, p. 108.
198. Prados, The Blood Road, pp. 299–317.
199. A US division is about 20,000 soldiers.
200. With its compartmentalized sections and hidden doors, a map of the physical tunnels looks much like a network diagram of an underground organization.
201. Mangold and Penycate, Tunnels of Cu Chi, p. 70.
202. Ibid., p. 75.
203. Ibid., p. 81.
204. Ibid., p. 44 and p. 73.
205. Ibid., p. 73.
206. Ibid., p. 263.
207. None of which is to say that the NLF was saintly; it had its own problems. Some Anti-American forces in Vietnam killed civilians, and their backers in Communist China had self-interested reasons to support the struggle. But we can still learn a great deal from the fight.
208. Foxton, Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics, p. 9.
209. Turner, Mau Mau Women.
210. Ibid.
211. Schwarz et al., We Are an Image from the Future, p. 34.
212. L. Allen’s book Black Awakening in Capitalist America, from the version with updated notes reprinted in Incite!, The Revolution Will Not Be Funded, pp. 53–54.
213. Incite!, The Revolution Will Not Be Funded, p. 55.
214. Ibid, p. 56.
215. Ibid, p. 88.
216. Ibid, p. 71.
217. Ibid, p. 72.
218. For a fascinating exploration of how engineering companies, foundations, and the military have worked together over the decades, see John Perkins’s book Confessions of an Economic Hit Man.
219. For a scholarly discussion of the cooptation of grassroots organizers in Mexico, see “Co-optation, Competition, and Resistance: State and Street Vendors in Mexico City” by John C. Cross (https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~alopez-o/politics/competition.html) or Brachet-Marquez, Viviane, 1992 “Explaining Sociopolitical Change in Latin America” in Latin American Research Review 3:91–122.
220. Incite!, The Revolution Will Not Be Funded, p. 10.
221. Ibid, p. 64.
222. Ibid, p. 107.
223. Ibid, p. 108.
224. Flanagan, Successful Fundraising, p. 19.
225. Ibid, p. 21.
226. Ibid, p. 20.
227. Ibid, p. 114.
228. Hedemann, War Resisters League Organizer’s Manual, p. 53.
229. If you are fundraising for a really small, grassroots group you may not want to hand out slick, glossy pamphlets. Photocopied materials may seem more consistent.
230. There is still room for different levels of donation, especially in long-term fundraising campaigns. Plenty of organizations have titles like supporter, patron, sustainer, and so on, at different levels.
231. Hedemann, War Resisters League Organizer’s Manual, p. 81.
232. Flanagan, Successful Fundraising, p. 74.
233. I would add that paid work as a union organizer is similarly useful experience, and it’s a skill set that applies both for fundraising and recruitment.
234. Flanagan, Successful fundraising, p. 31.
235. Ibid., p. 74.
236. Ibid., p. 77.
237. Ibid., p. 91.
238. Ibid., p. 21.
239. Roy, Broken Republic, p. 94.
240. Burton-Rose, Creating a Movement with Teeth, p. 90.
241. Schwarz et al., We Are an Image from the Future, p. 52.
242. This decree had been in place for more than a decade at the point, having been issued by the UN in 1974.
243. Encyclopedia Britannica, “Logistics.” www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/346423/logistics.
244. Goff, Full Spectrum Disorder, pp. 59–60.
245. Based in part on the US Field Manual on Guerrilla Warfare, which identifies several main logistical requirements:

     “Necessities to enable guerrillas to live; such as food, clothing and shoes, shelter, and medical equipment.”

     “Combat equipment for the conduct of operations.”

     “Sufficient transportation to enable guerrilla units to distribute supplies.”

     “A medical system to care for sick and wounded.“

     “Essential services, for example—the repair of shoes and clothing.”

246. Burton-Rose, Creating a Movement with Teeth, p. 266.
247. Ibid., p. 131.
248. Ibid., p. 131.
249. Macksey, For Want of a Nail.
250. AMPRONAC: The Association of Nicaraguan Women Confronting the Nation’s Problems, sometimes just called The Women’s Association.
251. Randall, Sandino’s Daughters, pp. 17–18.
252. Ibid., p. 73.
253. When the SOE was preparing to insert agents into Occupied Europe, there was not global mass manufacturing of clothing as there is now. So they literally had to have emigrants from occupied countries hand-sew apparel for their agents in the style of the particular region they were going to. And when the SOE decided to make camouflaged explosives that would blend in with the scenery of the time, they made things like explosive horse dung to put on roads frequented by Nazi vehicles.
254. In a decentralized resistance movement, logistical capabilities need to be redundantly replicated at every level of an organization and in every team or affinity group. Every person needs to be familiar with security culture and communications. Every person needs to be able to do basic maintenance and repairs on the equipment they use, while combatants in particular need to be able to safely use and maintain the weapons or other specialized equipment. Every person needs to be familiar with basic first aid and medicine. Every person needs to be able to be able to use coded communications systems, navigate, and move about in a secure fashion. Every person needs to be familiar with basic survival techniques as well as escape and evasion. Each group needs to have people with a higher-than-basic level of training and ability in these basic fields—specialists of some variety.
255. Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p. 110.
256. Ibid., p. 112.
257. Ibid., p. 119.
258. Ibid., p. 122.
259. Ibid., p. 111.
260. Shrader, The Withered Vine: Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece, p. 264.
261. Ibid., p. 253.
262. In some cases, Japanese commanders willingly transferred their weapons to the guerrillas and offered training in their use as a kind of “screw you” to their Western enemies.
263. Tanham and Sheehan, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, p. 36. “Vietminh” without space is in original.
264. Macksey, For Want of a Nail, p. 157.
265. Marian E. Vlasak, “The Paradox of Logistics in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies . . .”
266. Bracamonte and Spencer, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, p. 175. Emphasis added.
267. Ibid., pp. 178–79. Mistakes were sometimes made in the delivery—for example, Cubans failed to grind serial numbers off some weapons, allowing them to be traced through Belgian manufacturers. Also, the FMLN had expected to be able to capture large supplies of ammunition from the government. However, they were never able to do so, and because they had not stockpiled, they constantly ran short.
268. Ibid., p. 184.
269. Ibid., p. 185.
270. Ibid., p. 183.
271. Ibid., p. 183.
272. Ibid., pp. 185–186.
273. Do or Die, “SHAC Attack!”
274. Rolling Thunder, “The SHAC Model.”
275. SHAC, “SHAC Victories.”
276. To give a small number of examples, a variety of US army and marine corps handbooks, historical military writings from China, Denis Vasilevich Davydov’s 1821 “Essay on the Theory of Partisan Warfare,” and the comparative analysis of principles in Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices by John M. Collins.
277. Ruckus Society, “Action Planning Training Manual,” Version 1.0, p. 3.
278. Ibid., p. 2.
279. Ibid., p. 3.
280. Goff, Full Spectrum Disorder, p. 182.
281. Alinsky, Rules for Radicals.
282. Ruckus Society, “Action Planning Training Manual,” p. 2.
283. This sort of thing happened to pacifists often, but very rarely when the Deacons were involved.
284. Ericson, Radicals in the University, p. 88.
285. Hedemann, War Resisters League Organizer’s Manual, p. 153.
286. Dobson, The Troublemaker’s Teaparty, p. 49.
287. US Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations.
288. Schwarz et al., We Are an Image from the Future, p. 66.
289. Sharp, Self-Liberation, p. 31.
290. Goff, Full Spectrum Disorder, p. 42.
291. The Economist, “Pipeline Bombs: Mexico’s Gas Infrastructure Comes Under Attack”; Miguel Hernandez, “Mexican Rebels Claim Pipeline Attacks.”
292. John Robb, “Global Guerrillas.”
293. Rolling Thunder, “The SHAC Model.”
294. John Robb, “Bazaar Dynamics.”
295. Quoted in “Tactical Innovation in the Civil Rights Movement” by Aldon Morris in Goodwin and Jasper, The Social Movements Reader, p. 232.
296. See, for example, the 1939 segregated library sit-in in Alexandia, Virginia. http://oha.alexandriava.gov/bhrc/lessons/bh-lesson2_reading2.html
297. Kasimere Bran, “Fire at Midnight, Destruction at Dawn,” p. 11.
298. Ibid., p. 8.
299. Goff, Full Spectrum Disorder, p. 179.
300. Helmuth von Moltke the Elder.
301. Guerrilla Warfare FM.
302. From “Memories of Freedom” by the Western Wildlife Unit of the Animal Liberation Front, p. 22.
303. Ibid., p. 22.
304. Ibid., p. 23.
305. Ibid., p. 23–24.
306. Ibid., 53.
307. US Army, Guerrilla Warfare Field Manual, p. 116.
308. Usually it’s good to ensure that people have their basic skills down and understand the plan before introducing elevated levels of stress, to ensure that people have the confidence and basic competence required to move forward to more challenging scenarios. At the same time, remember that human memory can be “context dependent”—we tend to remember things best when we are in a similar situation to when we learned them. So if you anticipate a stressful action, then people need to practice their roles under at least some stress in order to enhance their memory during the real thing. You can also introduce unexpected elements to the practice runs. Have a “guard” or a “cop” show up unexpectedly. Render part of the group’s equipment inoperable without telling them. (Not safety equipment, obviously.) Take a member of the team out of communication to see how the others cope. There’s no limit to creative stress-induction.
309. Supply flights to Poland from England could only happen in the winter, because that was the only time of year that the night was long enough to conceal the fourteen-hour flight (in an unheated cabin). Moonlight in particular would limit certain kinds of flights to a few candidate days every month.
310. For such a list of questions, see Joan Bondurant’s section in Hedemann, War Resisters League Organizer’s Manual, p. 155.
311. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, p. xv.
312. Ibid., pp. xv–xvi.
313. Ibid., p. xvi.
314. Ibid., pp. xvi–xvii.
315. Ibid., p. xvii.
316. Ibid., p. 29–30.
317. Ibid., p. 31.
318. Ibid., p. 33. Regarding caste resistance in India, Scott quotes Edward B. Harper, “Social Consequences of an Unsuccessful Low Caste Movement,” Social Mobility in the Caste System in India: An Interdisciplinary Symposium, ed. James Silverberg, Supplement No. 3, Comparative Studies in Society and History (The Hague: Mouton, 1968): 48–49, emphasis added by Scott.
319. Ibid., p. 36.
320. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
321. Ibid., p. 243.
322. Ibid., p. 242.
323. Ibid., p. 259.
324. Ibid., p. 262.
325. Ibid., p. 248.
326. Ibid., p. 248.
327. Ibid, p. 254.
328. Ibid., p. 254.
329. The Canadian Encyclopedia, “Louis Riel.”
330. Ed Hird, “The Passion of Louis Riel.”
331. For a detailed history of this period, see James W. Daschuk, Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Aboriginal Life.
332. Woodcock, Gabriel Dumont, p. 148.
333. Ibid., p. 45.
334. Ibid., pp. 27, 48, 60. Dumont was also a person of status among the Métis. On Dumont’s circumstances and motivations, Woodcock writes: “Neither he nor his family stood to gain anything in the way of personal benefits from an uprising. Gabriel had secured the better part of his chosen land as a homestead under the land regulations, and he enjoyed a security of existence and even a level of income and living above that of most of his neighbours—benefits that the call to arms could only shatter. . . . [his family] did not stand to gain any great material benefits. They chose to fight because their freedom and pride as a people seemed to be threatened, and that has been the motive of all the resistance movements which in history have gained more lustre than common wars.” (p. 157.)
335. Ibid., p. 11.
336. Ibid., p. 12.
337. Ibid., p. 13.
338. Ibid., p. 167.
339. Ibid., p. 139.
340. Ibid., p. 167. Emphasis added.
341. Ibid., p. 13.
342. Ibid., p. 179.
343. Ibid., pp. 179–180.
344. Robert E. Gard, “Massacre at Frog Lake.”
345. Woodcock, Gabriel Dumont, p. 188.
346. Ibid., p. 190.
347. John Chaput, “Battle of Cut Knife Hill.”
348. Woodcock, Gabriel Dumont, p. 216. On May 8, they ambushed the steamboat as it approached Batoche along the river. (See also: http://www.museevirtuel-virtualmuseum.ca/sgc-cms/expositions-exhibitions/batoche/docs/proof_en_the_northcote.pdf)
349. Woodcock, Gabriel Dumont, p. 212.
350. Ibid., p. 170.
351. Ibid., p. 192.
352. Ibid., p. 193.
353. I’d like to thank Usman Mushtaq for first bringing the details of this struggle to my attention and for sharing information from his own master’s thesis research on the struggle.
354. Government of Ontario, “Order in Council, June 14, 1990.” Pages 6–8 of attached report.
355. Chair of second Joint Board essentially states that the Premier’s OIC overrides reality: “In spite of the fact that no new evidence was introduced in connection with this matter, I must accept not only that such a process exists but further that it is logical, traceable and replicable.” Quoted Mushtaq, “Socially Just Engineering,” p. 95.
356. Canadian Press, “Simcoe County Permanently Gives Up on Site 41 Dump.”
357. CUPE Ontario, “Site 41 Arrests Point to ‘Disturbing’ Trend of Criminalizing Legitimate Protest, Warns CUPE Ontario President.”
358. Ian F.W. Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare, entry for “Foco.”
359. It’s a sad but illustrative example of how even successful revolutionaries may not fully understand the phenomena that led to their success.
360. See “The East European Revolutions of 1989” by Jeff Goodwin in Goldstone, Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies, p. 260.
361. Albert, The Trajectory of Change, p. 9.
362. Marshall Ganz, “Why David Sometimes Wins: Strategic Capacity in Social Movements,” p. 5.
363. Szymanski, Pathways to Prohibition, p. 25.
364. Ibid., p. 172.
365. Ibid., p. 10.
366. Ibid., pp. 10–11.
367. Ibid., p. 176.
368. Ibid., p. 139.
369. Ibid., p. 23.
370. J. Christopher Soper, Evangelical Christianity in the United States and Great Britain: Religious Beliefs, Political Choices, p. 86.
371. Szymanski, Pathways to Prohibition, p. 67.
372. McQueen, Offbeat Kentuckians, “Carrie Nation: Militant Prohibitionist.”
373. Szymanski, Pathways to Prohibition, p. 19.
374. Ibid., pp. 63–64.
375. Ibid., p. 162.
376. Ibid., p. 182.
377. Szymanski, Pathways to Prohibition, p. 13.
378. Ibid., p. 180.
379. Ibid., p. 165.
380. Ibid., p. 181.
381. Ibid., p. 198.
382. Asbury, The Great Illusion: An Informal History of Prohibition, pp. 144–145.
383. This opium was cultivated in another colony, India.
384. Ssu-yü Teng, New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, p. 42.
385. Compilation Group, The Taiping Revolution, p. 1.
386. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
387. Ibid., pp. 19, 28, and 36.
388. Chiang, The Nien Rebellion, p. vi.
389. Ibid., p. 10.
390. DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, p. 89.
391. Chiang, The Nien Rebellion, p. 41.
392. Ibid., pp. 41–42.
393. Ibid., p. 44.
394. Ibid., p. 42.
395. Compilation Group, The Taiping Revolution, pp. 44–48.
396. Ibid., p. 41.
397. Ibid., p. 45.
398. Ibid., pp. 40, 60.
399. Ibid., p. 77.
400. Ibid., pp. 71–72.
401. Ibid., p. 72.
402. Ibid., p. 69.
403. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, p. 40.
404. Ibid., p. 41.
405. Regarding officers, see Teng, New Light, p. 72.
406. Elleman, p. 41. Also, Compilation Group, p. 48, and Teng, p. 74.
407. Teng, New Light, p. 71.
408. On schisms, see also Compilation Group, The Taiping Revolution, pp. 74 and 78.
409. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, p. 60.
410. Many people in the Taiping organization were illiterate, and the frequently issued religious proclamations meant little to them. Teng, New Light, p. 73.
411. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, p. 57.
412. DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, p. 90.
413. Ibid., p. 89.
414. Chiang, The Nien Rebellion, p. 102.
415. Ibid., p. 104.
416. Ibid., p. 106.
417. DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, p. 89.
418. Van Dyke and McCammon, Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements, p. 303.
419. Bystydzienski and Schacht, Forging Radical Alliances Across Difference, p. 28.
420. Ibid., p. 157.
421. Ibid., p. 118.
422. Ibid., p. 157.
423. Van Dyke and McCammon, Strategic Alliances, p. xvii.
424. Ibid., p. 103.
425. Ibid., p. 156.
426. Ibid., p. 258.
427. Ibid., pp. 258–59.
428. Ibid., p. 259.
429. Bystydzienski and Schacht, Forging Alliances Across Difference, p. 148.
430. Quoted in Mushtaq, “Socially Just Engineering,” p. 90.
431. That said, political opportunity may not be as necessary for coalitions as the other factors. In the analysis cited, political opportunity was a beneficial factor 73 percent of the time, but considered in less than half of the studies analyzed. Factors like ideological alignment, political threats, and prior social ties were favorable at least 90 percent of the time.
432. Benita Roth in Van Dyke and McCammon, Strategic Alliances, p. 148.
433. Ibid., pp. 107–108.
434. Ibid., p. 111.
435. Ibid., p. 107.
436. Ibid., p. 112.
437. Ibid., p. 112.
438. Ibid., p. 106.
439. Ganz, “Resources and Resourcefulness,” p. 1004.
440. Ganz, “Why David Sometimes Wins,” p. 2.
441. Ibid., p. 3
442. Ganz, “Resources and Resourcefulness,” p. 1022.
443. Ibid., p. 1023.
444. Ibid., p. 1024.
445. Ibid., p. 1025.
446. Ibid., p. 1026.
447. Ibid., p. 1027.
448. Ibid., p. 1028.
449. Ibid., p. 1029.
450. Ibid., p. 1033.
451. Ibid., p. 1033.
452. Ibid., p. 1035.
453. Ibid., p. 1035.
454. Ibid., p. 1035.
455. Ibid., p. 1036.
456. Ibid., p. 1034.
457. Ibid., p. 1038.
458. Ibid., p. 1039.
459. Ibid., p. 1040.
460. Ibid., p. 1040.
461. Ganz, “Why David Sometimes Wins,” p. 7. Emphasis added.
462. Ibid., p. 9.
463. Ibid., p. 10.
464. Ibid., p. 11.
465. Ibid., pp. 11–12.
466. Ibid., p. 15.
467. This is partly because women are enculturated to listen instead of to just talk, which means that group is actually able to build a cohesive solution instead of just blabbing on. “Social sensitivity” is a key idea used in this research, which women tend to rate higher on. See, for example: Derek Thompson, “The Secret to Smart Groups: It’s Women.”
468. Ganz, “Resources and Resourcefulness,” p. 1042.
469. Ganz, “Why David Sometimes Wins,” p. 18.
470. Thompson, “The Secret to Smart Groups.”
471. Ganz, “Why David Sometimes Wins,” p. 18.
472. Ibid., p. 19.
473. Ibid., p. 19.
474. Ibid., p. 19.
475. Ibid.
476. Ibid., p. 21.
477. Ibid., pp. 22–23.
478. Goff, Full Spectrum Disorder, p. 175.
479. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, p. 39.
480. Goff, Full Spectrum Disorder, p. 177.
481. Ibid., p. 178.
482. Ibid., pp. 178-79.
483. Sharp and Raqib, Self Liberation, p. 8.
484. Ibid., p. 18. Also further readings suggested on page 19.
485. Ibid., p. 19.
486. Ibid., pp. 31–32.
487. Ibid., p. 33.
488. Ibid., p. 41.
489. Ibid., p. 28.
490. Greenfield. American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration, p. 27
491. Ibid., pp. 28–29.
492. Ibid., p. 29.
493. Goff, Full Spectrum Disorder, p. 211.
494. Albert, The Trajectory of Change, p. 111.
495. Ibid., p. 17.
496. Ibid., p. 24.
497. For a couple of “top five” lists written by historians, see DeFronzo’s Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (pp. 10–11) and two pieces in Goldstone’s Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies: Goodwin (p. 259) and Goldstone (p. 262).
498. In Goldstone, Revolutions, p. 259.
499. These words are paraphrased by Ann-Marie Szymanski in Szymanski, Pathways to Prohibition, p. 10.
500. From Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “But if not” sermon, which you can listen to at http://www.drmartinlutherkingjr.com/