THE REQUIREMENT: Determine the nature of materials used in holograms located inside advanced missile guidance systems developed by former Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union. Confirm whether holograms are made with dichromated gelatin or more advanced silver halide.
PARTICIPANTS: C/O Jacob Michaelson, known to subject and hereafter referred to as alias JOHN.
Joon Yang, hereafter referred to as alias/krypto HECTOR.
I looked at the requirement and could barely believe what I was reading. The intelligence suggested that the Soviet Union had developed the most accurate missile guidance system to date. It could predict where a missile was going to land within fifty meters, giving the Soviets a major advantage over the United States. If we wanted to keep America safe, we needed to figure out how they were doing it, and time was of the essence. The United States had only one other bit of intelligence: It was suspected that the accuracy had something to do with the hologram embedded inside. Holograms are made with either silver halide or, if they’re very sophisticated, dichromated gelatin. My assignment was to figure out which type of hologram the Soviets were using. If I could get that information it would be an important step in helping the United States figure out how the missile guidance system worked.
I didn’t have much information to go on. I started looking at the research being done at engineering labs all over the world to see if I could find anyone who might be connected to the Soviet missile guidance system. I found an engineering lab in Seoul, South Korea, that was working with silver halide and dichromated gelatin. I felt that familiar flicker of excitement that told me I was on to something. If this lab was working with both holograms, it was possible that the Soviets were using its research. Now for the hard part. I’d need to build a cover, go to Korea, find someone directly involved in the research, befriend him and gain his trust, and get him to spill his secrets at great risk to his own personal safety. It’s a delicate process that can take months or even years—but I didn’t have that kind of time. The longer it took to crack how the missile guidance system worked, the longer America was in danger.
I always build my own cover—I never let anyone else do it for me. I’m a spy, but I also have a background in physics. This background helps a lot when I’m trying to recruit a potential target. I can discuss their work intelligently, and ask the right questions. This is why I craft a cover that runs parallel to my own life. It helps me behave in a more natural manner—and that’s crucial when you’re recruiting someone. Pretending to be something that’s totally out of your realm is a recipe for disaster. I’m not going to say I’m a pilot, because if someone asks me the wrong question about how to fly a plane my cover will immediately be blown. I’m going to say I’m a researcher from an engineering firm in the United States—keep it basic. I also like to think about every aspect of my life as this new person, and I always make sure I know how to answer certain questions:
What does he find interesting?
Who will he need to impress?
What topics should he be well versed in?
How does he talk?
What kind of hand gestures does he use?
How does he wear his hair?
What kind of shoes does he wear?
What does he eat?
It might sound dramatic, but for me getting ready to go undercover is kind of like the process of transforming into a mythical vampire. If you’re doing it right, you are slowly but surely transforming into another creature. I don’t want to go out in the field until I really believe I am that person. If I do this, I know I’ll succeed. If I don’t, sooner or later I’ll make a mistake and get caught. If I can, I’ll take a polygraph under my new cover. If I can answer question after question while really being grilled as my new persona, I know I’m ready for anything.
MEETING HECTOR
PERSONALIA:
NAME/KRYPTO: HECTOR
AGE: 44
HT/WT: 5’6”, 130 LB
HAIR: Black, short, neat
GLASSES: Yes
PERSONALITY/DEAMEANOR/ATTRIBUTES: Outgoing, energetic, very popular, especially with students, enjoys socializing with students regularly, spends money. Enjoys their attention. Wears well-tailored suits and has an expensive wristwatch.
NATIONALITY/CITIZENSHIP: Korean
KNOWN LANGUAGES: Korean, Japanese, English
PROCLIVITIES: Socializing, drinking, staying out late regularly
FAMILY: Wife XXXXX (35), daughter XXXXXXXX (17),
daughter XXXX (14)
ADDRESS: XXX, XXX, XXXX, Seoul, South Korea
TELEPHONE NUMBER: XXX-XXX-XXXX
Leads development work pointed me toward HECTOR. HECTOR was a well-liked professor and researcher at an engineering lab who was working with holograms. Many of his students waited patiently after class for an opportunity to talk with him about their work. It wasn’t unusual for these conversations to move to a local café or restaurant. Students were always thrilled to share a meal with the professor, and these dinners often included lots of drinking and went on late into the night. The tradition in the academic community was that the professor always picked up the check. It would be unheard of to let students pay. After hours of drinking and eating, you can imagine that these bills would be fairly big. As a researcher and professor, HECTOR probably made a decent living, but he was far from wealthy. HECTOR was spending lots of time, and possibly a good portion of his paycheck, entertaining his students. I thought maybe HECTOR would enjoy being taken out for once.
DATE, TIME, & PLACE OF CONTACT: June, 24, 19XX, 8:00 p.m., XXXXXX Restaurant, Seoul, South Korea.
There was a small window of time after his afternoon lecture when HECTOR was alone in his office. I’d have about ten or twelve minutes before his students came in, so I’d have to make a really good impression quickly. I explained I worked for an engineering firm in America, and we liked to keep updated on research going on around the world. I slipped in a couple of carefully prepared questions about HECTOR’s work so that he could see I was knowledgeable on the subject. HECTOR clearly loved talking about his research. As he was telling me about a recent project, I was subtly scanning everything in HECTOR’s office, looking for clues about his personality and interests. I saw he had art books mixed in with his academic texts. I made a mental note to look up the artists. When I saw that students were starting to show up outside the office, I asked him to dinner. “Professor, I’d love to continue this conversation. But I see you have something else to do right now. Could we possibly discuss this further over dinner? It just happens I’m available tonight if you are.” I’d found some of the best restaurants in the area while doing my casing, and I suggested an expensive steakhouse and a traditional French restaurant. I was confident in my ability to get that first meeting, so assuming he’d say yes, I made reservations at both. It was a good thing I did, because HECTOR agreed to meet me. My op was off to a good start.
THINK LIKE A SPY: ANTICIPATE
JOHN knew that part of the lure to getting HECTOR to have dinner with him that evening was the suggestion of eating at a well-respected, expensive restaurant. JOHN anticipated that HECTOR would say yes, so he prepared by making reservations at the restaurants in advance. If HECTOR had agreed to have dinner with JOHN and then JOHN discovered it was impossible to get a table, he would have seriously damaged his chances of developing JOHN. Always anticipate potential outcomes and prepare for each one.
THE FIRST MEET, AND IF ALL GOES WELL, A SECOND
DATE, TIME, & PLACE OF CONTACT: June, 24, 19XX, 8:00 p.m., XXXXXX Restaurant, Seoul, South Korea.
The restaurant I chose was extravagant and elegant, and would surely make an impression on HECTOR. I went all-out and ordered an expensive bottle of wine as well as scallops, lobster, duck, desserts, and more wine. A spy has a few objectives with that first meeting. I wanted to develop a good rapport with HECTOR—I wanted him to like me and feel comfortable around me. I wanted to create a sense of obligation, so he’d feel like he had to see me again. And most importantly, I needed to leave with another meeting already set up. I asked lots of questions about his work. It obviously made HECTOR feel important to talk about his research. I also started to piece together some details about the work he was doing. I was very anxious to find out what kind of holograms he worked with, and who he worked with. He mentioned a researcher whose name sounded Hungarian—definitely promising. I memorized the name and would pass it along to the analyst working the case to see what else he could find out about this guy.
We talked about interests and art too. (I had researched the art books I’d seen in HECTOR’s office.) It seemed like we were two potential business associates getting to know each other, but I was carefully observing the professor. What motivated him? What were his vulnerabilities? What made him tick? I saw that I was right about HECTOR enjoying fine food—especially when someone else was paying. He praised the dinner courses and seemed knowledgeable about wine. I also learned that HECTOR had a daughter who wanted to attend an elite women’s college in the United States. HECTOR said it would reflect really well on his family if his daughter could attend such a prestigious school. This was definitely information I could use to my advantage.
At the end of a very long meal—over three hours—I explained that my company in America gave me a substantial allowance to take out “important researchers,” emphasizing that I thought HECTOR was important. I paid the check and casually mentioned that there was a great steakhouse that I was anxious to try if he’d like to join me. Not about to pass up another terrific free meal, or opportunity to talk about his research, the professor readily agreed. We set up a date for a couple of weeks later. This was a good sign. It’s been my experience that if I can get the second meet, I’ll eventually get what I need from the target.
RAPPORT/ACCESSIBILITY/SUSCEPTIBILITY
During a prearranged meeting at XXXXXX Restaurant, Seoul, South Korea, case officer told HECTOR that he worked for an American engineering firm looking to swap information, and he had an allowance to buy dinner for people doing interesting research. HECTOR enjoys fine food and wine, though likely can’t afford it. Also likes talking about his research at length. He seems to enjoy feeling important and responds well to flattery. He mentioned several trips he has taken to Hungary and the Soviet Union for research purposes. He has a college-age daughter who wants to go to an elite school in America. HECTOR feels it would be a great honor for his family to have a child go to such a prestigious school.
THE RECRUITMENT BEGINS
DATE, TIME, & PLACE OF CONTACT: August 15, 19XX, 8:00 p.m., XXXXXX XXX Restaurant, Seoul, South Korea.
The analyst told me that the intelligence I had given him about the Hungarian researcher was “of value.” HECTOR might be the connection we were looking for, and I needed to continue working him. Luckily I had the perfect carrot, and I was planning to dangle it over very expensive steaks at dinner that night.
“Wouldn’t you know it? I remembered that I have a friend who is a professor at XXXXX College. Isn’t that where your daughter is hoping to go? Perhaps I could make a call on your behalf?”
I got just the reaction I hoped for. The professor’s eyes lit right up. The truth was I didn’t know anyone at XXXXX College, and the guys back home were figuring out how the heck to pull this off. But that didn’t matter right now. I’d offered HECTOR something irresistible, and it was going to keep him coming back. Hopefully, knowing I had a connection to the college his daughter wanted to go to would encourage him to provide me with even more valuable information. The development of HECTOR was now well under way.
Over the next few months we continued to share meals together. Our conversations had deepened, and a real bond started to develop. I don’t believe in seduction for seduction’s sake. You can’t just use people. If you don’t actually care about your recruit on some level, you’re not going to succeed. You’re not going to get the information you need. I’d learned more about HECTOR’s research during this time too. As I originally suspected, HECTOR had been doing some work with Hungarian engineers. It also seemed more likely that the Hungarians were sharing this research with the Soviets. All of this information had been ranked as “valuable.” Soon the paperwork arrived. This meant I could start paying HECTOR for his information, making him an actual spy for the U.S. government. The next time I saw HECTOR I told him I had some really good news. The information he was sharing was so valuable that I was able to give him a consulting fee. “The work you’re doing is so important. You really deserve this money.” Right now the professor was very happy. In addition to lavish dinners, the professor was thrilled to be receiving extra money. But I knew that very soon I’d need to tell him the truth, and how would he feel then?
HOW INTELLIGENCE IS RANKED
The intelligence gathered by case officers is subject to a very specific ranking system. Note that it’s the information, not the source, that’s being graded. A case officer’s life is based on the value of the information they get. In turn, that value then gives credibility to your source.
DROPPING THE FIG LEAF
DATE, TIME, & PLACE OF CONTACT: October, 12, 19XX, 8:00 p.m., XXX XXXX Restaurant, Seoul, South Korea.
Things just kept getting better for HECTOR. He was very excited when he showed up at our next meeting with some big news. His daughter just got accepted to XXXXX College. HECTOR was very grateful that I’d used my influence to help—but I was just relieved the people back home were able to pull the right strings. I’d been consistently getting good intelligence from HECTOR, and I wanted to keep it coming. Helping his daughter get into college was definitely going to help. I started to sense that our relationship was reaching a critical point. In almost every op there’s a moment when you can tell the recruit has a pretty clear idea about why he’s really getting paid for his information, and that the mysterious American company is actually the U.S. government. He just needs to hear the truth, and you’ve got to give it to him. I call it the “dropping-the-fig-leaf moment.” My intuition tends to lead me to the right moment for the big reveal. I try not to make a big deal out of it. I’ll usually just hand over the “consulting fee” and say something like, “It feels really good to be a spy, doesn’t it?” I get the same response nearly every time . . . “I like it, it is very, very exciting.” It’s amazing how many regular people love being a spy. Now that everything was out in the open and HECTOR was “witting,” I could give him direct requests for information, or “tasking.” I could also brief HECTOR before his trips to Hungary, and debrief him when he got back.
BIG NEWS, A NEAR MISS, AND A RUINED SUIT
DATE, TIME, & PLACE OF CONTACT: December 3, 19XX, 7:00 p.m., XXXX XX Restaurant, Seoul, South Korea.
I was debriefing HECTOR about his latest trip to Hungary one night when I learned something very interesting. HECTOR said a Hungarian researcher wanted to show him something. HECTOR was stunned when the researcher led him to a glass display case holding a hologram. The hologram—the very one the American government desperately wanted information about. It was sitting right there in a lab in Hungary. This was big news, and I was very anxious to get in touch with the analyst back home.
I always run an SDR while I head back from a meeting. I was a few blocks in when I noticed the sound of footsteps behind me. It was late at night, and the usually packed streets of Seoul were less crowded, for once. The sound grew closer, so I made a turn that enabled me to look back. There were three guys walking behind me. I crossed the street, and the three men stayed on their side. Because I was always casing, I knew an alternate route and I decided to turn on the next street. About a block later, the guys were back and they were right behind me. Now I knew I was about to be mugged—or worse, busted for being a spy. I had to escape. You never want to fight three guys at once if you don’t have to. I started walking quickly in the other direction, but one of the men started running after me. I started running in the direction of the Han River, and he was still coming after me. But he didn’t expect what I did next. I jumped right into the river. It was really dark, and I was treading water as quietly as I could, and this guy couldn’t see me at all. I was hoping he’d just give up.
Eventually I heard the sound of footsteps walking away. He was gone. I patiently treaded water a bit longer, and when I thought it was safe I found a place to climb out. I was wet, cold, and I’d ruined my best suit. But I knew that didn’t matter. I was still alive and I hadn’t compromised my op.
BONUS TIP
You want to avoid a fight if you can, but sometimes it’s not an option. This is why you have to know critical self-defense tactics. Remember, to see what spies use, visit www.SpyCombatives.com.
THE BIG COUP
The analyst was just as excited as I was about the new intelligence HECTOR gave me about the hologram. This might be the big break we were looking for. But the analyst wanted something else, and it was going to be difficult and dangerous to pull off. The analyst wanted HECTOR and me to figure out how to get our hands on the actual hologram so the United States could analyze it. If we did this, the intelligence would be considered “of major significance”—the highest rating an intelligence officer can get. The idea was to somehow ship the hologram to the United States, where scientists would remove a scraping for analysis. I wanted to get the hologram, but I also knew I’d be putting HECTOR in a very dangerous position. What if the Hungarians saw the scraping? What if it got lost or damaged? Or they figured out it was missing? If anything happened to the hologram, HECTOR would most likely be killed. The analyst assured me the scraping would be so minute, only the world’s most powerful microscopes would be able to notice. When I told HECTOR about what the United States wanted us to do, he was game. He felt the world would be safer if the United States could figure out how the Soviet missile detection system worked.
Our next step was to convince the Hungarians that HECTOR should have the hologram temporarily. HECTOR simply told his Hungarian colleagues that he’d like to borrow it for research purposes, and that having the hologram would be a very useful learning experience for his students. We were relieved when the Hungarians agreed. But we were nervous too. Getting the scraping from the hologram was a major operation that involved nearly a hundred people from the U.S. intelligence world. U.S. intelligence officers dressed like visiting professors had a “meeting” with HECTOR at his lab. Inside their briefcases were special materials to safely pack up the hologram for transport to the United States. Meanwhile, a Concorde was fueling up, preparing to fly the hologram to a secret Air Force base in the United States. There was so much that could go wrong. The Hungarians or KGB could get wind of what we were doing. The hologram could get damaged, something could happen to the plane. The list went on and on, and we prepared the best we could for every possibility. We had to keep in mind that if anything went wrong, HECTOR’s life would be in serious danger. I knew I wouldn’t breathe a sigh of relief until that hologram was back in HECTOR’s office—in one piece.
Somehow, miraculously, everything went exactly as planned. The hologram made it to the United States, where scientists were able to take a microscopic scraping for analysis. The hologram was packed up, put back on the Concorde, and was on display in HECTOR’s lab just twenty-four hours later. No one had any idea the hologram had taken a journey to the United States, and no one ever knew that this mild-mannered Korean researcher had actually been collecting big secrets for the American government.
Most foreign spies are recruited because they have access or knowledge that the government finds desirable, or they are able to travel in and out of certain areas without raising suspicion. For example, the jazz singer Josephine Baker was very popular in Europe when World War II started, and she was able to smuggle messages written in invisible ink to Axis sympathizers on her sheet music. Famous playwright Noël Coward used his access to rich and powerful Americans to pass along top-secret information to President Roosevelt. You don’t have to be a celebrity to be a spy either—in the 1980s, a secretary working for the West German President was arrested when she was discovered spying for East Germany. College professors, engineers, and even secretaries potentially have access to valuable information that might appeal to a foreign government.
Your average American isn’t likely to be recruited as a spy. However, there are often times when we need to ally with someone in the real world—whether it’s in business, or with a neighbor, or with someone at your child’s school—and understanding the process can make your efforts much more successful.
JOHN didn’t just barge into HECTOR’s office and introduce himself the day he arrived. Observation is important, and he would have noted as much as he could about HECTOR’s general habits and behavior before making an introduction. What makes this guy tick? What are his vulnerabilities? Any intelligence officer knows that the introduction is a big moment, and you can’t mess it up. The goal of that introduction is to present yourself as an interesting enough person that you’ll leave having the “first meet” already set up. JOHN would have known that he would have just a few minutes to impress HECTOR enough that he’d want to have dinner with him. JOHN went in knowing exactly what to ask about HECTOR’s research, chatted a bit about good restaurants, and maybe even mentioned what it’s like to have kids old enough to apply to college. Everything JOHN did in that introductory meeting was done with the mind-set of setting up another meet.
In the intelligence world, a good rapport goes a long way. If you don’t have a good rapport with someone right off the bat, you will not be able to recruit this person or elicit information from him. It is crucial to come off as likable—immediately. The subject has to connect with you and feel interested in spending time with you. This is another thing Hollywood gets wrong. If you want to get someone on your side, you don’t sit across a table from them yelling, cursing, and pounding your fist. That’s interrogation, and it’s not going to work when you’re hoping to recruit someone. When building a rapport with a potential recruit, it’s important to avoid the following behaviors.
Behaviors That Damage Rapport
Human beings are complicated. Since there is no one foolproof method for recruiting and eliciting information, intelligence officers use RASCLS, the six “weapons of mass influence” designed by psychologist Robert Cialdini. The idea here is that because we are constantly bombarded by different sights, sounds, and smells, our brains developed some “fixed action patterns of behavior.” This means that when we encounter a specific situation we tend to react in a certain way. If we were constantly analyzing stimuli, our brains would just freeze up and we wouldn’t be able to function. These patterns help us respond to what’s going on around us. However, intelligence officers (as well as many criminals, unfortunately) understand how these patterns work, and can manipulate the following behaviors to their advantage.
Reciprocation
Intelligence officers are taught to “give something to get something,” and that’s what we mean when we talk about reciprocation. When you give a person something early on in a relationship, it usually creates a sense of obligation. This could be something minor—like buying someone a cup of coffee, or maybe sharing an important business contact. Or it could be something much bigger, like how JOHN helped get HECTOR’s daughter into college. Either way, a sense of obligation is established and you’re setting up a scenario where the other person is likely to want to return the favor.
Authority
When JOHN was building his cover, he purposefully created a role that put him in a position of authority. He was a “physicist from an engineering firm in America with a big expense account.” This would suggest that JOHN was an important person, that he had influence, and that his power might extend to HECTOR in some way. JOHN was also sure to dress the part as well. His designer suits and penchant for expensive restaurants all supported the idea that he was a person of authority. In the intelligence world, that air of authority also plays a big role in the recruitment cycle. Once JOHN recruited HECTOR and had him on the payroll, JOHN’s authority would help create a feeling of obligation. HECTOR would feel obligated to get intelligence for JOHN. Spying is dangerous, and HECTOR would also need to feel confident in JOHN’s knowledge of tradecraft—since HECTOR would essentially be putting himself in JOHN’s hands. JOHN’s coming off as authoritative helps assuage any fear HECTOR may have about his own safety.
Scarcity
People are drawn to things that are rare or scarce. That restaurant in town where it’s nearly impossible to get a reservation? That’s usually the place where people want to eat. And if you’ve ever passed on an item in a store, only to feel regretful about it when you find out it’s no longer available—that’s scarcity. When recruiting a target, an intelligence officer will dangle a carrot—perhaps doing a favor such as helping a family member—but then make it clear the offer will quickly go away. A recruit has to act quickly if they want to reap the benefit.
Consistency and Commitment
We don’t trust people who aren’t consistent, that’s just common sense. If an intelligence officer doesn’t exhibit consistent behavior with a potential recruit, he won’t get anywhere. Commitment during the development phase can actually mean making small connections. It might mean agreeing on a particular subject. For instance, HECTOR may have agreed with JOHN that both of their countries would be safer thanks to the information HECTOR was providing. They are both committing to the same idea. This also creates an environment that makes the recruit more comfortable. If HECTOR sees that he and JOHN share the same ideas about national security, he may feel compelled to open up and share more secrets about other things.
Liking
“Liking” obviously goes back to rapport—and an intelligence officer needs to start working on rapport during that first introduction. But it doesn’t stop there. An intelligence officer must continue to look for additional ways to develop a bond with a recruit. What traits do they have in common? What interests do they share? Can they swap notes about raising children, hobbies, or other personal interests? For this process to be the most successful, the relationship needs to move from “liking” to “friend” to feeling like “this is the only person in the world who really understands me.”
Social Proof
Whether we like it or not, there are certain things that signal a person’s place in society. Pulling up in a limo suggests wealth and importance. If loads of people are lining up to get coffee from a particular coffee shop, you assume the coffee is really good. In the espionage world, an intelligence officer can use social proof to make a recruit feel more comfortable about what he’s doing. An intelligence officer might show his importance by getting impossible-to-get tickets to a hit show, or the best table at an exclusive restaurant. Another way social proof is used is to make the recruit feel comfortable by letting him know he’s not the only person who has done what he’s doing. A case officer might say, “Oh, when I was working with X, he used to bring me reports about x, y and z.” This shows a recruit that others have successfully managed to pull off what he is about to do.
The art of elicitation involves manipulating a conversation so that the target starts to give away information that’s of great interest, without necessarily realizing he’s done so. JOHN brilliantly used elicitation to develop a relationship with HECTOR. JOHN used HECTOR’s love of expensive meals and his desire to get his daughter into an elite school to curry favor with him. When done well, elicitation is so subtle that the target will likely have no idea what’s happening.
Obviously, intelligence officers are highly trained in elicitation techniques, but often savvy businesspeople and even criminals use elicitation to their advantage. Chances are, you’ve probably used elicitation without even knowing it. If you asked your wife some subtle questions to figure out what she wants for her birthday, that’s a very simple example of elicitation. (To watch a video case study of elicitation and how you can use this skill to get almost anything you want, visit www.SurviveLikeaSpy.com.)
Unfortunately, not everyone who uses elicitation is doing so for such innocent purposes. A shady business associate may use elicitation to extract information about your business to get an advantage over you. Or even worse, criminals use elicitation to trick you into divulging important personal information like your PIN or Social Security number. Being aware of some of the main elicitation techniques can prevent you from being scammed or spilling secrets to your business’s competition. With patience and practice, you can also use these techniques to pull information you want from someone else.
Playing Dumb
“I’m new to this. I have no idea how this works!”
A person trying to elicit information might just play dumb. They may act like they have no idea what they’re doing. Knowing that human beings are helpful by nature, they know someone is likely to jump in and help, ultimately giving them the exact information they need. A person might say something like, “I didn’t know this place designs software for the U.S. government,” to which someone may very well respond, “Yes, we’ve been making x, y, and z for years”—divulging the information that person wants to know.
Flattery
“Wow! I bet you played a key role in this project!”
The old adage “flattery will get you nowhere” is definitely not true in the intelligence world. It can actually get you quite far. A person trying to elicit information might make a flattering statement, and then sit back and wait for you to fill in the blanks about what you really did. A slightly less direct route might be saying something like, “I bet only a handful of people really know how this actually works,” to which an average person will most likely volunteer that they, indeed, are one of the few who do know.
Common Interests
“That’s a nice car you drive. You like cars? You’ve got to see the vintage Mustang I’m restoring. You should come by and check it out.”
Someone trying to elicit information from you may attempt to connect with you over a common interest. They may cite that common interest as a way to convince you there’s something you need to see—or there’s somewhere you’d love to go. If you agree to this, you’ve just assented to continuing the relationship outside of the initial meeting place, putting the person in a good position to develop a relationship with you further.
The False Statement
“Everyone knows that Iran doesn’t have the technology to build a weapon of mass destruction.”
A person trying to elicit information may hope that you’ll respond to a false statement they make. Humans are wired to want to appear knowledgeable and have a tendency to want to correct inaccurate information. Delivering false statements tends to prompt people to answer with correct information. If you’re on the receiving end of a false proclamation, simply listen and don’t respond. Resist the temptation to set the speaker straight.
The Good Listener
“Are you okay? You don’t seem yourself right now.”
Elicitation requires patience. If a person presents himself as a good listener, eventually you may open up about a topic that’s appealing to him. He may also validate your feeling to encourage you to do this—hoping you’ll open up about a problem at work.
Word Repetition
“My team is just under so much pressure to meet this big deadline.”
This involves encouraging a person to expand on something he just said by repeating a portion of that person’s statement. If you’re complaining about work being extra-tough, you might be asked, “Oh, what’s going on at work?” When you respond, “It’s tough because my boss is being a jerk lately,” the questioner may follow up with, “What’s going on, that he’s being a jerk?” To which you respond that he’s being a jerk because you’re under deadline to deliver a big project . . . giving your questioner all the specifics. Watch out for parroted words and phrases. They could signal that the person you’re speaking with is playing you. Don’t fall for it.
Be Aware of Sharing Knowledge When You Shouldn’t
If you’re talking to someone at a business function, and he’s showing off his knowledge about a topic that you know a lot about—maybe software development or security systems—it’s easy to feel that if this guy already knows about this stuff, you can talk about what you know. You might think, “What harm can it do? He already knows about it.” You find yourself saying something like this:
“I can see you know a lot about security systems, so I might as well tell you.”
The truth might be that he doesn’t actually know anything—until now, because you just filled him in, and that’s exactly what he was hoping you would do.
SOMEONE IS TRYING TO ELICIT INFORMATION FROM ME. NOW WHAT?
Imagine you’re traveling for work. You’ve had a long day of meetings and you decide to treat yourself to a drink at the bar and catch some of the game. There’s another businessman sitting next to you. You’re cheering for the same team and you end up chatting. It turns out he’s in a similar business, and you start to swap stories. Before you even realize it, you’ve told him more than you should have about an upcoming product your company is working on. It might be innocent. Or, one of your competitors has just elicited very useful information from you. It’s never easy to tell the difference between a casual conversation and elicitation, and to complicate things people generally want to be polite. If you ever think someone is trying to trick you into revealing information that should remain private, try the following: