WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
AUGUST 18, 7:05 A.M. EDT
Several members of the National Security Council were waiting in the Situation Room for President Marshall. They had been summoned by White House Chief of Staff Iris Cho, who, contrary to standard practice, provided no reason for the meeting.
The assembled group consisted of Secretary of Defense Douglas Merritt, CIA Deputy Director John Kessler, Secretary of State Ted Lawrence, Secretary of Homeland Security Susan Cruz, Director of National Intelligence Joseph Antonetti, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Robert Taylor.
Their wait was brief. The door opened and President Marshall entered, followed by Iris Cho and James Brandt, who was led to his customary seat between Merritt and Cruz by Arlo. Marshall remained standing behind his chair, a practice he’d adopted since the EMP affair, partly out of superstition.
“Thank you for getting here on time with such short notice. I’m told the others are traveling and are unavailable for videoconference. I don’t have a specific agenda. That’s not my normal practice, I know, but this is not a normal meeting.
“What we learned from the EMP affair gave us all, I suspect, a PhD in vigilance and threat assessment. We also learned to pay attention to Mike Garin.”
There was a faint rustle in the room. The mention of the name had the effect of an injection of caffeine.
“Jim and I spoke with Garin a short time ago. He believes the Russian agent Taras Bor is here to ‘paralyze’ us, whatever that means. But, apparently, the specific word ‘paralyze’ was used by a Bor associate to describe what Bor was planning to do.”
Marshall paused to let everyone absorb what he said. He continued.
“The paralysis is to be preceded by a decoy attack consisting of suicide bombers. We have no further information about any of this, other than Bor is personally responsible for some sort of backup attack should the main attack fail.
“Now, before we go any further, keep in mind that for the time being nothing discussed here is to go beyond this room. Not even your deputies can know about this. Whoever was providing assistance to the Russians during the EMP affair is still operating. Since all of you were involved in stopping the EMP attack, I can entrust this information to you. But for now, only you. Unless, during the course of this meeting, we determine otherwise.
“There’s another component to all of this. The Russians are engaged in military maneuvers along their western border—all the way from the Baltics southward. I received some inconclusive information about this in the PDB, but nothing to suggest the troop movements were anything out of the ordinary.”
Kessler spoke up. “Mr. President, we’ve seen Russian troop presence along the borders of the Baltic states, but nothing beyond what’s noted in the PDB. We haven’t heard or seen anything that might confirm Garin’s concerns.”
Marshall looked about the room. “Anybody else?”
Secretary of State Ted Lawrence raised his hand tentatively. Regarded by many in the room as a self-promoting blowhard, even by Washington standards, he’d been chastened by his erroneous conclusions during the EMP affair. Many expected him to be replaced by Brandt after the midterm elections.
“Yes, Ted.”
“Mr. President, the troop presence near the Baltics is unremarkable. They’ve been more aggressive in that region ever since the previous administration bent over backward to make friends with them.” Lawrence struck a pedantic pose familiar to everyone who knew him. “Besides, the EMP affair was only a month ago. They have been exemplary members of the international community since then, even assisting the Western allies in the campaign against Iran. And while we’re skeptical that they were completely innocent in that affair, there really is little evidence that they did anything more than be indifferent to Iran’s efforts to strike us.”
Marshall nodded. “Thank you, Ted. But what do we make of Garin’s encounter with what he believes to be a Russian agent—or at least an associate of Bor?”
“Mr. President, not to downplay Mr. Garin’s information, but it’s no secret the Russians have scores of agents in the area,” Susan Cruz offered. “Yes, they’re up to no good, if by that we mean they are operating with Russian, not American, interests in mind. But that’s a pretty low bar. It’s true of nearly every substantial foreign power, including some of our allies.”
Several heads around the room nodded. Secretary of Defense Merritt’s was not among them.
“Mr. President,” Merritt said. “I respectfully submit that the prudent approach is to assume the worst, that the Russians are about to engage in hostile action and that such action affects the United States.”
Marshall asked, “Any ideas what the agent may have meant by ‘paralyze’?”
“Cyberattack,” Brandt said bluntly.
The room remained silent, partly because Brandt was so often right and partly because of the weight Brandt’s opinions carried with the president.
The Oracle’s sightless ice-blue eyes were cast in the general direction of the president. He listened for a response from anyone in the room. When none came he continued. “Mr. President, we should consider the possibility that the Russians are preparing to launch a massive cyberattack. And if our operating premise, as suggested by Doug, is to assume the worst, then we should expect it to affect every critical sector of our economy and government.”
“Upon what do you base this, Jim?”
“It’s a guess, but a guess informed by logic and the progression of Russian asymmetrical warfare. Consider that the EMP plot was essentially asymmetrical, so much so that we hadn’t developed a response doctrine in the event of an EMP.”
Marshall’s jaws tightened. He had been furious about learning during the EMP affair that the country had never developed a response doctrine to an EMP strike. “Please don’t tell me we haven’t developed a response doctrine to a massive cyberattack.”
“We have, Mr. President,” DHS secretary Cruz interjected. “My department, along with the Office of the DNI and the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, has been hardening the National Cyber Incident Response Plan. We’ve prepared coordinated responses for various federal agencies, military, states, and local authorities.”
Marshall exhaled. “Thank goodness.”
“We’ve also had significant success in joint DOD and DHS Cyber Guard Exercises,” Cruz added. “The last such exercise took place earlier this summer.”
“So we’re up to speed against a cyberattack, then?” Marshall asked.
“I believe so, Mr. President,” Cruz replied.
“Ted,” Marshall said, turning to Secretary of State Lawrence, “what about coordination with our allies? If Russia strikes us there’s a good chance they’ll do so against other Western nations, particularly NATO signatories.”
“We’ve conferred with NATO allies on a regular basis, Mr. President. Many of them agree that we should do what we can to prevent cyberattacks, but the threat is somewhat overblown.” Lawrence quickly raised his hand. “That’s not to say it’s not a concern, but we and our allies are ahead of the game.”
Marshall turned to Brandt. “Why are you concerned about a cyberattack from the Russians, especially if—as it seems to be the case—we’re fairly well prepared?”
“Mr. President, both Susan and Ted are correct that we’ve been coordinating both within our government and with allies to prevent or respond to any major incident of cyberwarfare. But most of that coordination is at the administrative level and is mostly responsive, not preventative. The efforts are focused primarily on what should be done to minimize the effects of a cyberattack and what agencies are responsible for addressing and remedying such effects.”
“That’s not quite accurate, Mr. President,” Lawrence countered. “We have fairly robust defenses and countermeasures in place to deflect and thwart massive cyberattacks, not just at DHS and the Defense Department, but the CIA and NSA as well. Moreover, US Cyber Command has remarkable retaliatory capabilities that, among other things, act as a powerful deterrent.
“But more important, you may remember the NATO conference last spring on asymmetrical warfare where the consensus was that while we shouldn’t understate the threat of cyberwarfare, the threat has been vastly overstated.”
Marshall looked around the room. “Anyone else?”
“Mr. President,” Secretary of Defense Merritt said, “I also was in attendance at the NATO conference this spring. No doubt the presenters were the best minds on the topic. But you may recall the dissenting opinion of Hans Richter from the German Federal Office for Information Security. His hair was on fire. He related that the Germans only by chance had discovered cyberattacks against them that had corrupted several of their best-defended systems. According to Richter, it was clear the attacks were mere probing forays to gauge the vulnerability of German systems, but had they been full-blown attacks, catastrophic damage would have been done to critical infrastructure.”
“As I recall, Richter didn’t assign blame to any particular state actor,” Marshall said.
“He did not,” Merritt acknowledged. “But the Russians are the most capable. From a defense perspective, I submit the most responsible course of action is to assume a massive cyberattack would be catastrophic, and that the Russians may be behind it.”
Marshall turned to Brandt. “Jim?”
“I concur completely with Doug. Yes, the consensus is that a massive cyberattack might cause some problems but it wouldn’t be catastrophic. I respectfully submit this view, however well-considered, suffers from a profound lack of imagination.”
Marshall’s brow furrowed. “We just averted an EMP. Could it be as catastrophic as that would’ve been?”
“The word ‘paralyze’ was used,” Brandt replied. “That’s an apt description of what a major cyberattack could do to us. But only a partial description. It would also render us deaf, dumb, and blind.”
“Wonderful.” Marshall sighed. “I’m loving this job more every day. Elaborate, Jim.”
“Senate Armed Services conducted a hearing on this just a couple of months ago. The Russians could disrupt our electrical power grid, industrial control systems, communications systems—almost any system that isn’t air-gapped. We could be without lights, cell phones, computers. Financial data could crash and disappear—trillions upon trillions of dollars could evaporate. We would, indeed, be functionally paralyzed. We couldn’t identify and respond to external threats. The economy would be in turmoil. In many respects, we’d become the functional equivalent of a third world country. We would be dangerously overmatched against any of our present or potential adversaries.”
Lawrence bristled. “Not really, Mr. President. Our military and intelligence infrastructures are largely insulated. We’ve hardened most of our defense systems.”
“But,” Brandt countered, “the domestic disturbance would render any such hardening irrelevant. Because we’d be dealing with utter chaos at home. Lord of the Flies. Besides, there’s some evidence Russia or China has already had success hacking our satellites and drones—so defense and intelligence aren’t invulnerable.”
“The dilemma, as I see it,” Marshall said, “is that we have no demonstrable evidence that a cyberattack will occur, or if one occurs, where it will come from. We have nothing to confront the potential attacker. Our option, then, is to be vigilant and do whatever we can in the interim to prevent it.”
“And prepare for the worst,” Brandt muttered under his breath.
The small but ornate conference room adjacent to Yuri Mikhailov’s office was quiet. No one spoke; there was barely any movement. Assembled within it were seven of the most powerful men in Russia, each in his own way formidable and intimidating. Each was used to being the most important person in the room, commanding attention, respect, and obedience merely by his presence.
Arranged around a rectangular marble-topped table were First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Novikov, Minister of Defense Igor Oblomov, Minister of External Affairs Grigory Goncharov, Minister of Emerging Situations Ivan Sorokin, Marshal Vitaly Brin, General Pavel Turgenev, and the head of the Twelfth Chief Directorate, Aleksandr Stetchkin. Although technically Stetchkin reported to Oblomov, the former, by virtue of his long-standing relationship with the Russian president, was the most influential person in the room.
There were two empty chairs at the table. Presently, the door leading to Mikhailov’s office opened and Alexei Vasiliev entered and took a seat. The room remained silent for another minute. Then the door opened and Yuri Mikhailov entered, taking the seat at the head of the table without looking at anyone. To the others in the room he appeared to be studying the backs of his hands.
After a few more seconds of silence Mikhailov said, “Alexei.”
Vasiliev, in turn, looked at Marshal Brin and General Turgenev. “Gentlemen?”
Brin said, “Elements of the Southern and Central Military Districts, consisting chiefly of the Fifty-eighth and Forty-ninth Armies, including the Twenty-second Spetsnaz Brigade, are staged approximately one hundred kilometers south of Makhachkala and two hundred fifty kilometers south of Aktau, respectively. We estimate they will enter Iranian territory to the west of Ardabil and to the east of Gorgan within two hours of the event. Intelligence estimates indicate we will meet minimal resistance until we are within the Tehran defense perimeter. Given the degradation of Iranian defenses by the Western bombing campaign, the resistance at the perimeter will be defeated within thirty-six hours.” Brin looked at Turgenev. “General?”
“Thank you. We estimate, Mr. President, that within a timeframe similar to that outlined by Marshal Brin, the Baltic tank battalions will have secured much of the Latvian and Estonian countryside. The event will prevent meaningful NATO resistance, let alone retaliation. Within the following twelve hours Riga and Tallinn will be under control.
“Most of eastern Ukraine will be under the control of various elements of the Sixth Army within sixty hours of the event. We project our forces to dominate the area on a line southward from Zhytomyr to Vinnytsya to Odessa.”
“What of Lithuania?” Vasiliev asked.
“NATO exercises in and around northeast Poland have caused us to recalculate the original timeframe regarding Lithuania. It is less than three hundred kilometers from Białystok to Vilnius. NATO, therefore, may be able to mount a response,” Turgenev answered.
“Even if blind?”
“We assume worst case, Mr. Vasiliev.”
“How long do you estimate before Lithuania is secured, General? Worst case?”
“Ninety-six hours.”
“Acceptable,” Vasiliev said, turning to Stetchkin. “What is the probability we will encounter a worst-case scenario?”
“Unlikely,” Stetchkin replied. “The event will immobilize NATO for several weeks. Their civilian infrastructure will be completely paralyzed and we have been, frankly, astonished at the unexpected vulnerability of their military apparatus. Most of the European NATO signatories have expended meager sums to protect their systems from electronic warfare and could not have anticipated an attack even remotely as sophisticated as the event. They will be brought to a near standstill. They will be overwhelmed.”
“What of the Americans?” Vasiliev asked.
“Their defenses are formidable but insufficient,” Stetchkin replied. “The simulations show they will be blind and effectively paralyzed, unable to mount a timely response. Our annexation of Iran and much of the near abroad will be done before they have even begun restoring their cybercapabilities. They will have virtually no telecommunication capabilities. All cellular and Internet service will be out. Financial data will be erased. Their financial markets will go dark.
“For enhanced chaos we have targeted sluice gates at approximately two dozen of their largest dams. There will be massive flooding at these locations. Power grids in the thirty largest metropolitan areas—New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Washington—will be shut down completely. No light or electricity whatsoever. That alone will be a cataclysm that will occupy all aspects of emergency response. Police, fire, and military will have to mobilize without telecommunications ability.” Stetchkin paused. “SVR says the Americans believe their military and intelligence servers will be able to weather an attack, but they have underestimated our capabilities.” Stetchkin looked at Mikhailov. “By the time they have even begun to assess the extent of their paralysis, we will have absorbed most of Greater Russia as well as Iran. And, if we so choose, much of Scandinavia and the Balkans would be ours.”
Mikhailov did not react. Vasiliev spoke instead. “What is your estimate of the time from initiation of the event until reconstitution of Greater Russia?”
“I defer to Marshal Brin,” Stetchkin answered.
“One hundred twenty hours,” Brin said. “One hundred sixty-eight at the outside.”
Vasiliev nodded, then looked to Grigory Goncharov. “Your previous estimate of the percentage of electrical equipment that would be moved as a result of the event remains the same?”
“Essentially, yes,” Goncharov answered cautiously. “Demand will be appreciably less than if an electromagnetic pulse had struck the US mainland. But the event will affect far more territory. There will certainly be demand.”
Mikhailov rose, drawing everyone’s riveted attention. “We are getting ahead of ourselves. Discussion of markets can and will wait until control of Greater Russia is secure and we have seized Iran. Any discussion of Scandinavia, the Balkans, and other regions will wait, also. Should the event be successful, dominoes will fall of their own accord.”
Everyone in the room nodded. Stetchkin did so with a smile of satisfaction, a smile that was short-lived. Mikhailov pointed at Stetchkin and said, “Be certain that the event succeeds.”
The Russian president walked to the entrance to his office, opened the door, and shut it sharply behind him.