Hun heavy cavalryman; note the complexity of the composite armour. (Colourplate by Patricio Greve Moller, copyright by Gabriele Esposito)
The historical origins of the Huns, probably – along with the Mongols – the most famous steppe people of history, are mysterious and extremely controversial. After many studies, conducted using various approaches, most contemporary scholars now consider the Huns to be the direct heirs of a powerful nomadic population originating from Mongolia: the Xiongnu.These people developed in the Mongolian Plateau during the third century bc and gradually became a major military power in Asia, especially after they began invading the North China Plain that is crossed by the Yellow River. For centuries, the nomadic Xiongnu and the Chinese Empire of the Han Dynasty fought in a huge clash of civilizations, during which the survival of the Chinese Empire was threatened by the expansionism of the Xiongnu. The latter, differently from the other steppe peoples who had preceded them, did not expand westwards in search of new lands but eastwards. This led to them clashing with the powerful Han Empire, which had its heartland in the fertile North China Plain. Between 133 bc and ad 91, the Xiongnu and the Chinese were continuously at war, in a conflict that saw victories and defeats on both sides. Eventually, after the Han Army obtained a decisive victory at the Battle of Yiwulu in ad 73, the Xiongnu were crushed. The Chinese had learned from their early defeats and began to adopt some features of their enemy’s troops – such as the extensive use of mounted archers and armoured heavy cavalrymen – for their own armies. After their defeat, the southern communities of the Xiongnu became semi-autonomous vassals of the Han Empire, but those in the north were forced to migrate from their homeland and moved to the area around Lake Balkhash (located on the modern border between Kazakhstan and China). It was from these groups of exiles that the Huns probably originated, since both Chinese and Indian contemporary sources use the terms ‘Xiongnu’ and ‘Huns’ to refer to them.
Around ad 370, some of the Huns began migrating westwards – probably due to climate changes taking place in the steppes of Central Asia – and started invading the Pontic Steppe of modern Ukraine. This region, as we have already seen, was inhabited by the Germanic Goths who had defeated the nomadic Sarmatians just a few decades before. The arrival of the Huns caused a political and military revolution in Eastern Europe, their superior weapons and tactics enabling them to inflict a series of humiliating defeats on the Goths. The Goths were left with no choice but to become tributary vassals of the Huns or to migrate into the Roman Empire as refugees by crossing the course of the Lower Danube. In ad 376, thousands of Goths entered Roman territory, causing a sudden collapse of the imperial defences. Two years later, in ad 378, the Roman Army was crushed by the migrating Germanic warriors in the Battle of Adrianople. This clash marked the beginning of the ‘barbarian invasions’ for the Roman Empire and was of enormous historical importance. The Huns, with their migration towards the Pontic Steppe, had initiated a series of gigantic movements of people that – in the long run – would cause the fall of the Western Roman Empire. In ad 395, after having secured control over most of the Germanic peoples living in Eastern Europe, the Huns started attacking the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire with a series of devastating raids. They struck first in Thrace, after crossing the Danube and overrunning a large portion of the Balkans. Then, coming from the Caucasus, they overran Armenia and pillaged Cappadocia. Thanks to the geographical position of their new homeland, the Huns could attack the Roman Empire both along the western coastline of the Black Sea in the Balkans and along its eastern shores from the Caucasus. The highly mobile cavalry armies of the Huns entered Syria and threatened the rich city of Antioch, an event that shocked the Romans, who were not prepared to face such a large-scale incursion of a nomadic people. In the Middle East, meanwhile, the Huns raided the territory of the Sasanian Empire, which was the main power in the region. The nomads came close to the Sasanian capital of Ctesiphon, but were driven back by an effective counter-attack. The Sasanians deployed large Iranian-style military forces that had a lot in common with those of the Huns, including horse archers and heavy cavalry.
Hun heavy cavalryman; note the complexity of the composite armour. (Colourplate by Patricio Greve Moller, copyright by Gabriele Esposito)
In ad 408, under the leadership of Uldin – who is the first Hun chief to be identified by name in the contemporary sources – the Huns crossed the Danube in great numbers and pillaged Thrace. By that time, the Western Roman Empire and Eastern Roman Empire had become separate political entities, so the Eastern Romans had to face the invading nomads alone. The Roman authorities were able to stop the Hunnic incursions into the Balkans, at least temporarily, by paying large sums of money to Uldin’s warriors. Many of these warriors deserted and the Hunnic leader was forced to return to his territories located north of the Danube (after which he is not mentioned again in any of the surviving sources). It soon became clear, however, that the Huns were interested in conquering large parts of the Roman Empire, in particular the vast plains of Pannonia (modern Hungary). By establishing military bases in Pannonia, the Huns could invade any province of the Eastern or Western Empire. The Roman military commanders, after a few encounters with the Huns, soon realized that their enemies had exceptional combat capabilities thanks to the great mobility and tactical flexibility of their mounted contingents. The first senior Roman officer who correctly identified the military potential of the Huns was Flavius Aetius, the magister militum (i.e. overall commander) of the Western Empire’s armies. By the 430s, the Western Empire was extremely weak militarily, its territory having been ravaged for decades by migrating Germanic communities and its troops shattered by several significant defeats. Most of the Roman military forces, at least in the western provinces, consisted of foreign mercenaries who were paid for their services and were loyal only to their employees, provided that these had enough money to do so. Flavius Aetius was one of the many warlords who emerged in the Western Empire during the turbulent fifth century ad, his personal capabilities allowing him to assume a prominent politico-military role and control a substantial number of effective troops. These fighters included many Germanic professional soldiers, as well as a significant number of Hun mercenaries. In 425, thanks to the positive relations that he had with some of their leaders, Flavius Aetius was able to recruit an entire army of Huns and lead them into Italy.
The friendship of Flavius Aetius with the Huns made him the most powerful man in the Western Empire. During this period, the political power of the Roman state was in the hands of Empress Galla Placidia and her son, Valentinian III. Galla Placidia was highly intelligent and had great political experience, while her Valentinian III had significant mental problems. Initially, the imperial court, based at Ravenna in northern Italy, considered Flavius Aetius a potential rival and tried to limit his military power. However, Galla Placidia eventually had to accept that Flavius Aetius was the only leader who could assemble and guide the military forces needed to face the Germanic invaders. In 433, the magister militum, who was specifically responsible for the defence of Gaul, signed an agreement with the Huns according to which some parts of Pannonia (located along the Sava River) were to be ceded to the nomads. Flavius Aetius signed the agreement with Rugila, a powerful warlord who had become the overall ruler of the Huns living on the borders of the Western Empire. In 434, however, Rugila died and was succeeded by the two young sons of his brother, Mundzuk: Bleda and Attila. Both these youngsters were extremely ambitious, but they had very different ideas about how to cause the collapse of the Western Empire. Bleda wanted to continue the policy of Rugila by signing new treaties with the Roman authorities that were extremely positive for the Huns. He was convinced that the Romans would cede to him rich territories and large sums of money in exchange for the Huns’ promise of defending the imperial lands from Germanic invasions. Attila, instead, had full confidence in the military superiority of his warriors and wanted to conquer the Western Empire with a large-scale invasion. Initially, Bleda’s political vision prevailed; Bleda was also older than Attila and thus had more authority among the Huns. They negotiated a new and extremely favourable treaty with the Eastern Empire, according to which the Romans were to pay a tribute of 700 pounds of gold to the Huns every year, as well as to open all their markets to Hun traders and pay a ransom for each Roman citizen taken prisoner by the nomads.
Hun heavy cavalryman equipped with a full set of lamellar armour. (Photo by Csongrádi Turán HSE, copyright by Hungarian Turan Foundation, Tamás Horváth)
After signing the new treaty, the Huns did not attack any Roman territories for around five years and used the large sums of money paid by the Romans to strengthen their military forces. They tried to invade the Sasanian Empire in order to obtain the payment of a further tribute, but their campaign ended in failure when they were defeated in Armenia after having crossed the Caucasus. In 440, the Huns reappeared on the borders of Pannonia and conducted a raid against the Roman markets that were established on the northern bank of the Danube (which had the specific task of trading with the Huns). After killing several Roman merchants, by using as a pretext the desecration of some of their religious sites by a Roman bishop, the Huns crossed the Danube and attacked the Roman province of Illyria. They advanced with spectacular speed and conquered many cities, aided by the Eastern Empire having failed to reinforce its military defences in the northern Balkans in recent years. The Romans, convinced that the Huns had been fully satisfied by the signing of the treaty that had been agreed a few years before, focused all their attention on the Germanic peoples instead of preparing for a Hun invasion. Bleda and Attila devastated the Balkans during 441, conquering Singidunum (modern Belgrade) and the large city of Sirmium. After a long pause that lasted for most of the year 442, they resumed their offensive by besieging Naissus (this was the first occasion that the Huns built some rudimentary siege engines) and sacking several Roman military bases. In just a few months they reached the outskirts of Constantinople, the rich capital of the Eastern Empire, where they routed a large Roman force that had been assembled to stop them. At this point, however, the Huns could not besiege Constantinople due to their lack of siege equipment capable of breaking through the city’s massive walls, which had been recently reinforced. The Romans, having no forces left to expel the Huns from the Balkans, had no choice but to negotiate with the nomads. New peace terms were agreed, which were harsher than those contained in the previous treaty: the Eastern Empire agreed to hand over 6,000 Roman pounds of gold to the Huns, the annual tribute paid by the Roman authorities was tripled and the ransom for each Roman prisoner was increased. In the long-run, such terms could have caused the complete financial collapse of the Eastern Empire.
Having left the Balkans, Attila and Bleda went back to the plains of Pannonia to reorganize their forces. They had obtained a spectacular success, but their political visions were becoming increasingly divergent. Bleda was satisfied with what had been obtained from the Eastern Empire and had no intention of attacking the Western Empire (at least for a few years), whereas Attila was determined to invest Gaul with all his strength before the Romans could recover from their recent defeats. Around 445, a power struggle began among the Huns, both Bleda and Attila gathering considerable numbers of supporters. In the end it was Attila who prevailed, since the majority of the Huns wanted to continue raiding the rich Roman provinces and were not interested in living peacefully. Bleda vehemently opposed his brother until he was assassinated by Attila. There are very few surviving details about this important episode, but it seems that Attila killed Bleda with his own hands. After having become the sole ruler of the Huns, Attila prepared for a large-scale invasion of Roman lands. Instead of first attacking the Western Empire, he decided to move again against the Eastern Empire by invading the Balkans. His violent raids ruined the economy of many Roman provinces, including Thrace, which were devastated again by the Huns. The Roman authorities in the east had no choice but to increase the annual tribute that they paid to the Huns. While operating in the Balkans, Attila established a secret channel of communication with Honoria, sister of Valentinian III and daughter of Galla Placidia. Honoria was a very ambitious woman who had already plotted against the other members of her family to secure the imperial throne. She sent a ring to Attila together with a request of help: in exchange for the Huns’ military support, she would assign lands and privileges to Attila. After receiving Honoria’s ring, Attila claimed her as his bride and half of the Western Empire as a dowry. It was the perfect casus belli for the Huns to launch their invasion.
Hun heavy cavalryman armed with a sword. (Photo by Csongrádi Turán HSE, copyright by Hungarian Turan Foundation, Tamás Horvath)
In 451, the large-scale invasion of the Western Empire that Attila had long prepared for finally took place. By that time, Roman control over the vast region of Gaul that was the Huns’ primary target was only nominal, the whole countryside being dominated by the Germanic communities that had invaded Gaul at the beginning of the fifth century ad. A significant Roman military presence could be found only in the major urban centres, while the limes, or frontier, of the Rhine River was almost defenceless. Northern Gaul was in the hands of the Franks, who were settled between the Rhine and the Lys River; the area crossed by the Garonne River was controlled by the Visigoths; the Burgundians were settled in south-western Gaul; and the Alans had established themselves along the Loire River. The Alans, as we will see in one of the next chapters, were a nomadic people of the steppes from Central Asia, and thus had a lot in common with the Huns. Differently from the other barbarian communities living in Gaul, they were extremely loyal to the Roman authorities. Flavius Aetius had the difficult task of controlling the various foreign communities living on the territory of Roman Gaul, but it was one that he performed with great intelligence. The Germanic foederati, or allies, living on imperial soil were extremely strong from a military point of view but were divided by deep internal rivalries, a situation that Flavius Aetius used to his advantage in order to avoid the formation of a large Germanic alliance that could threaten the very survival of the Western Empire. When the invasion of the Huns materialized, Flavius Aetius had no choice but to form a multi-ethnic alliance that comprised all the barbarian peoples living in Gaul: the Franks, Visigoths, Burgundians and Alans. Having established their new homelands in Gaul, they were all keen to defend against the nomadic invaders. Nevertheless, it was not easy for Flavius Aetius to convince the various barbarian warlords to put aside their contrasting interests in order to face a common menace. Attila invaded the Western Empire with his own multi-ethnic army that had a lot in common with the forces of Flavius Aetius that were facing him. During the previous years, the Huns had submitted all the Germanic peoples living in Eastern Europe and transformed them into allies. All these Germanic communities were forced by Attila to participate in the invasion of Gaul by providing sizeable auxiliary contingents. These vassals of the Huns included the Ostrogoths, Rugians, Sciri, Thuringians, Gepids and Heruli. They were all extremely warlike and had ambitions of settling in the Western Empire. The Ostrogoths, or Eastern Goths, had been the fiercest enemies of the Visigoths, or Western Goths, for several decades. The Germanic warriors fighting as part of Flavius Aetius’s alliance and those under Attila’s orders fought in the same way, being equipped as infantry spearmen, although the Alans provided horse archers and armoured cavalrymen comparable to those of the Huns.
Hun light cavalryman equipped with a spear and composite bow. (Colour plate by Patricio Greve Moller, copyright by Gabriele Esposito)
Attila crossed the Rhine in the early weeks of 451, probably at Strasbourg, before rapidly advancing by following the Roman roads. His large army, probably numbering around 100,000 men, attacked and destroyed several important urban settlements: Worms, Mainz, Trier, Metz and Reims. A large portion of northern Gaul was devastated by the invaders until they reached Aurelianum (modern Orleans) in the early summer of 451. Attila hoped to take the city swiftly, but met unexpectedly strong resistance. The inhabitants of Orleans, supported by the Alans, were able to repulse the Huns’ attacks thanks to the strong walls of their city and resisted until the army of Flavius Aetius in Gaul was fully mobilized. Soon after the Huns crossed the Rhine, the Roman general had moved some military contingents from Italy to Gaul, after which he had talks with the powerful king of the Visigoths, Theodoric, in order to persuade him to join the anti-Hun alliance that was in the process of being formed. Initially, Theodoric was reluctant to fight with the Romans, preferring to wait for the arrival of the Huns in his domains. Eventually, however, the Visigoths also mobilized their troops and joined the other components of Flavius Aetius’s army at Arles. On 14 June, after a relatively short march, the Romano-Germanic army reached the city of Orleans, where Attila, in order to avoid encirclement, had no choice but to abandon the siege and move back towards the Rhine. The leader of the Huns, keen to fight a decisive pitched battle against Flavius Aetius, wanted to choose a suitable battlefield on which he could display the superiority of his cavalry.
As a result, to gain some time, he left behind his Gepid allies with orders to slow down the advance of the enemy. Attila’s rearguard was soon destroyed by the spearhead of Flavius Aetius, which was made up of Franks. Despite this, the Huns were able to reach a vast plain – known as the Catalaunian Fields – that was perfect for their combat tactics. The battlefield was extremely flat, rising only on one side with a sharp slope to a ridge that dominated the surrounding areas and quickly became the centre of the upcoming clash. Attila seized the right side of the ridge, while Flavius Aetius occupied the left, with the crest held by neither of the opposing forces. Attila deployed his elite Huns in the centre of his line, with the Ostrogoths on the left and the other Germanic auxiliaries on the right. The Huns faced the Alans, who occupied Flavius Aetius’s centre; the Ostrogoths opposed the hated Visigoths, while the Germanic auxiliaries faced the Roman contingents. Attila initiated the battle by launching a devastating attack against his enemy’s centre, but against all odds this was repulsed. The Huns invested Flavius Aetius’s forces with a rain of arrows, but the shield wall formation of the Roman-Germanic soldiers resisted. The horse archers were repulsed with significant losses, which had a significant psychological impact on the Huns. Meanwhile, on the ridge, the Visigoths and the Ostrogoths fought with incredible violence. Many hundreds of Germanic warriors were killed in terrible hand-to-hand fighting, in which Theodoric was killed. Eventually, however, despite losing their king, the Visigoths prevailed and forced the Ostrogoths to fall back on the centre of Attila’s line. This blocked any possibility of launching a fresh attack with the Hunnic horse archers and determined the outcome of the battle. The Visigoths assaulted the enemy centre with incredible fury, forcing Attila to seek refuge in his own camp, located in the rear of his army. The camp was fortified with wagons, as was usual way for the Germanic peoples, but the Visigoths – led by Theodoric’s son, Thorismund – attacked it. Flavius Aetius, seeing that his enemies had suffered significant losses, ordered the Visigoths to suspend their assault and reorganized his line, which now controlled the ridge. When darkness came, it became apparent that the encounter had been won by the Romano-Germanic army. On the following day, Attila, whose supply lines were overstretched and whose allies no longer had the heart to fight, left the Catalaunian Fields with the remnants of his army and decided to suspend his invasion of Gaul.
Hun horse archer. (Colour plate by Patricio Greve Moller, copyright by Gabriele Esposito)
The Battle of the Catalaunian Fields was a crucial turning point in the destiny of Western Europe, since it stopped a massive nomadic invasion and – for the first time – saw the Romans and the Germanic peoples sharing a common identity in order to face a mortal menace. The clash, however, did not signal the end for Attila and his Huns, who launched another invasion against the Western Empire during 452. This time the target was Italy, with Attila wanting to capture Ravenna and claim half of the imperial lands for himself. Flavius Aetius, who by now knew the tactics of the Huns extremely well, tried to block Attila’s advance through the Julian Alps. Despite the Huns having never before crossed such a massive mountain range, the strategy of Flavius Aetius failed because he was surprised by the rapidity of his enemies. Aquileia, the most important and richest Roman urban centre in north-eastern Italy, was besieged and destroyed by the Huns, who pillaged some of Italy’s most abundant agricultural areas. Thousands of refugees abandoned the countryside to escape death, some of them moving to an area on the coast at the head of the Adriatic and creating a settlement that later gave birth to the modern city of Venice. Valentinian III, fearing imminent capture by Attila, left the imperial court at Ravenna and went to Rome, where he hoped that Pope Leo I could protect him. By the middle of the fifth century, the pope was one of the most influential leaders of the Roman Empire, able to exert a very strong moral influence. Flavius Aetius, unlike what had happened in Gaul the previous year, could not count on significant military forces or strong Germanic allies. He remained quite passive during the campaign, simply trying to block the roads passing through the Apennines mountain range that connected Ravenna to Rome. Attila halted at the Po River to reorganize his forces and his overstretched supply lines. While camped on the banks of the Po, the Huns were visited by a Roman embassy that included Pope Leo I, who held talks with Attila and tried to convince him that by destroying Rome he would massacre thousands of innocent civilians. After the intervention of the pope, Attila decided to suspend his invasion of Italy and to return to Pannonia with the vast amounts of riches that he had pillaged.
Several ancient and medieval historians, writing about Attila’s invasion of Italy from a religious perspective, attributed to Pope Leo I the success of having persuaded the king of the Huns to return back home. In reality, Attila was not convinced by the words of the pope, but by a number of practical features: his large army was suffering from lack of food and was being decimated by the diseases that were common along the banks of the Po. In addition, Attila had received news from Pannonia that his bases there were going to be attacked by Roman forces that had crossed the Danube. A new emperor, Marcian, was now on the throne of Constantinople, and he halted tribute payments to the Huns and prepared his forces for a confrontation with Attila. Since the Huns mostly funded their military campaigns with the gold received from the Eastern Empire, Attila had no option but to go back to Pannonia in order to prepare a new punitive invasion of the Balkans. Italy and the Western Empire were safe, at least for the moment. In 453, the two great protagonists of the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields died: Flavius Aetius was assassinated during a plot that was ordered by Valentinian III (who was himself killed soon after by soldiers who had remained loyal to Flavius Aetius), while Attila died of a haemorrhage on his wedding night. The fact that the king had died while celebrating his latest marriage made many contemporary historians suspect that Attila had been poisoned, probably by his new wife, Ildico, who had Ostrogoth origins. Some even suggested that the assassination had been organized in Constantinople, but there is no evidence to say that this was the case.
Following Attila’s death, the immense empire that he had created at the head of the Huns very rapidly collapsed. A violent internal struggle for power saw the Huns fighting against their Germanic vassals, who revolted against their overlords in order to regain their freedom and conquer Pannonia for themselves. The Gepids, under the guidance of King Ardaric, formed a strong alliance that comprised the Heruli, Rugii, Sciri and Suebi. The Germanic coalition confronted the Huns at the Battle of Nedao, which took place in Pannonia near a tributary of the Sava River, in 454. The Huns, commanded by Ellak, the oldest son of Attila, were crushed by their opponents and Ellak was killed during the fighting. Following this setback, the Huns lost most of their prestige but remained a considerable power in Eastern Europe for some time. In 461, the second son of Attila, Dengizich, who had succeeded his older brother, was defeated by the Ostrogoths and had to face an internal rebellion led by his younger brother, Ernak. Together with his followers, Ernak seceded from the territories controlled by Dengizich, initiating a period of internal divisions for the Huns that led to their final decay. In 467, Dengizich attacked the Roman territories in the Balkans in the hope of restoring the Huns’ former power, but had to face an unexpected offensive mounted by the Ostrogoths and his campaign failed completely. Dengizich was attacked by the Romans in Thrace, where he was defeated and killed in 469. Ernak tried to reunify the Huns after the death of his brother, but with limited success. Following Ernak’s death, the Huns were divided into a series of small groups that were rapidly absorbed by the new nomadic peoples that came into Eastern Europe. The Bulgars, in particular, seem to have absorbed significant numbers of Huns, since Ernak – the last direct heir of Attila – is listed in some primary sources as the first leader of the Bulgars. As the events described above make clear, the leadership of Attila was the only thing capable of keeping together a people such as the Huns and controlling a vast empire stretching from Hungary in the west to the Caucasus in the east. The key element that determined the fall of the Huns’ power in Eastern Europe was the revolt of the Germanic peoples who had previously been vassals of Attila, especially the Ostrogoths, who wanted to establish themselves within the Roman Empire and did not share the nomadic lifestyle of the Huns. Furthermore, they were extremely jealous of their freedom and did not want to be part of a larger political entity. The Huns’ failures in their attempts to conquer the Western Empire convinced their Germanic vassals they would be better off operating independently from the Huns against the Romans. A few decades later, this decision paid off when the former vassals of Attila settled on the territory of the Western Empire and caused its definitive fall. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that without the mass migration of the Huns, many Germanic peoples – such as the Goths – would have never moved towards the borders of the Roman Empire, so the military campaigns of Attila can be considered as one of the main factors behind the collapse of the Western Empire.
Sarmatian warrior from the Hunnic era. (Photo by Tamás Ariel Horváth, alias Pharnakes the Sarmatian, copyright by Ádám Szuromt)
Not all the Huns living in Central Asia abandoned their homeland around ad 370 to migrate westwards, with a significant portion of the Hunnic communities preferring to remain in Asia. As a result, during the 370s, the Huns divided into two separate groups that had completely different destinies: the Black or Western Huns and the White or Eastern Huns. As we have seen, the Black Huns, under the guidance of Attila, invaded the Roman Empire after settling in Eastern Europe. The White Huns, meanwhile, also known as Hephthalites, were a significant power in Central Asia for a long time and had a longer history compared to that of the Black Huns. Around 450, the White Huns started to expand their territories by conquering the large region of Bactria, which connected Iran and Central Asia to the rich lands of northern India. The White Huns, thanks to their excellent combat skills, obtained a series of victories over the other nomadic peoples living around them and started nurturing an ambition of conquering India. They also clashed with the Sasanian Empire that controlled Iran, which strove to counter the expansionism of the nomads. Initially, the Sasanians obtained a series of victories over the White Huns, but the Huns gradually gained the upper hand and by 484 had taken some key frontier areas from the Sasanians. In 457, the Hephthalites sent an embassy to China and established positive relations with the Chinese authorities. The following year, they attacked the Sasanian Empire. By the beginning of the sixth century, thanks to their campaigns of conquest, the White Huns already controlled a vast empire that stretched from the deserts of Turkmenistan as far as the Caspian Sea, as well as the whole of Bactria and Sogdia. The Huns also occupied parts Afghanistan, making them a great potential threat to the political stability of northern India.
During the mid-sixth century, however, the strategic situation started to change, largely due to the military renaissance of the Sasanians under their great emperor, Khosrow I. Recognizing the White Huns as a significant rival power, Khosrow employed all his military resources in an attempt to destroy them. After expelling the Hephthalites from the regions bordering Iran, he conquered significant portions of present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan. To defeat the White Huns on the plains of Central Asia, Khosrow allied himself with the Turkic peoples, an emerging steppe power that had created – around 552 – a tribal state in Mongolia. In 557, at the Battle of Bukhara, a powerful alliance comprising Sasanian and Turkic forces defeated the Huns. The White Huns never recovered from this clash, their empire soon fragmenting into several semi-independent principalities that had little military power. These principalities were tributaries of the Sasanians or the Turkic peoples. The Sasanians and their allies established a frontier for their zones of influence in Central Asia along the Oxus River, with the White Huns’ principalities functioning as buffer states between two large empires. After the death of Khosrow I in 579, the Hephthalites revolted against the Sasanians, but their rebellion was soon crushed by the Turkic peoples, who thus became the new overlords of the Huns living in Central Asia. In 588, having collaborated with the Sasanians for a lengthy period, their former Turkic allies invaded their lands by crossing the Oxus River. The White Huns joined with the Turkic forces and invaded a large part of the Sasanian territories, but were eventually repelled by their enemies. The decades following these events saw a progressive decay of the Sasanian Empire, which had to wage war on several fronts against multiple enemies (including the Eastern Romans and the rising power of the Arabs). This was taken advantage of by the White Huns, who began raiding the Sasanian Empire as far as Ispahan in central Iran. In 606, there was a further war between the Sasanians and the Turkic peoples, with the Huns participating on the Turkic side. The Hephthalites obtained several early victories before the Sasanians could mobilize their full military potential. Around 625, the eastern principalities of the White Huns finally lost what remained of their political freedom, being annexed by their ever-expanding former Turkic allies. The western principalities of the Hephthalites became involved in the campaigns fought between the Sasanians and the Arabs around 650. The Huns supported the Sasanians against the Muslim invaders, but their desperate resistance proved in vain: by 652, all the White Huns had been forced to pay tribute to the Arabs and accept Muslim garrisons on their territories. The independent history of the Hephthalites was over.
The economy of the Huns was not based on agriculture but on various kinds of domesticated animals. They herded sheep and goats for milk, meat, wool and skins, as well as cattle for milk, meat and hides. They also had many horses, which played a vital role in controlling such large herds over the huge distances of the steppes. The Huns, being nomadic herdsmen, moved with their extended families across the vast plains of their home territories in order to seek the best opportunities for grazing and trading as the seasons changed. The extended families were grouped into clans, whose numerical consistency usually fluctuated greatly since families could move from one group to another according to circumstances. Quite often, the number of families making up a clan increased during the summer and decreased during the winter, depending on the availability of pasture. Each clan or group worked as a herding camp and had its own hereditary pastures. Driving their grazing herds before them, the Huns trundled onwards with their families and all their goods. They lived in black tents made of felt that were packed in wagons. They followed set migratory routes and used traditional camping grounds. In general, however, their life was tough and precarious. A young Hun learned how to endure cold, hunger and thirst from his early years. The Hunnic lifestyle was also characterized by continuous skirmishes with other nomadic peoples that took place in the steppes. Plundering expeditions were extremely common, aimed at stealing animals from the camps of rival groups. Large cavalry battles could also be fought for the conquest of camping grounds, control of which could determine the survival of an entire clan. Hun boys were taught from an early age to ride horses with and without saddles, as well as to use the deadly composite bow of the steppes with great precision. The Huns were excellent hunters, and their composite bows were also used for hunting. Indeed, by grouping their herds and hunting in the steppe plains, they practiced the same movements and actions on which their battle tactics were based. From an economic point of view, the Huns were almost self-sufficient, although they had to obtain some amounts of grain through barter or as a tribute from the sedentary peoples whom they had submitted. The composite bow represented the greatest empowerment for a Hun individual over the environment in which he lived. A young Hun, for example, had to master the use of the horse and the composite bow in order to persuade the elders of his clan that he might – in time – become an effective horse archer. All the able-bodied male individuals of the Hunnic society were warriors, and many women also knew how to fight. In time of war, however, the women’s primary duty was to protect the herds and tents of the clan from enemy attacks.
Hun warrior armed with a sword. (Photo by Dimitar Atanasov, IEFSEM-BAS, Experiencing History Research Project, copyright by Jordan Sivkov – Leather Works, Dobrich, Bulgaria)
The wild appearance of the Huns made them look terrifying to contemporary Roman observers, who had never before been in contact with a people from the steppes of Central Asia. The Huns usually wore their hair cut back to the temples – leaving the hair behind to hang untidily to a great length – and shaved their cheeks. These were often ceremonially scarred with deep wounds, which were considered to be warrior adornments. The Huns also practiced cranial deformation, in order to have elongated skulls in a fashion that was common to several steppe peoples. Cranial deformation was carried out by binding in early childhood, when the skull is still soft and growing. Apparently, however, only a limited number of individuals had a deformed skull, as this distinguished members of the ruling families that made up the elite of the Hunnic society. Ceremonial scars, though, were typical of all the warriors who had some combat experience. The basic dress of the Huns was extremely simple, consisting of a short-sleeved tunic made of natural wool or goat hair, which was worn to the knee and slit to the waist, where it was gathered by a belt. Breeches were worn loose and tied around the ankles. Tall leather boots were in general use, being made of ox-hide and having heelless soles made from soft leather. Felt stockings could be worn inside the boots during cold months. The winters also saw the use of furred kaftans, which had extra-long sleeves that were designed to act as hand warmers. One breast of the kaftan crossed over the other and was tied to one side. During winter, two kaftans could be worn at the same time, one with the hair turned outwards and the other with it turned inwards. The standard headgear of the Huns was a goatskin cap with earflaps or a felt hat trimmed with fox skin. The type of fur used to produce the clothes of an individual indicated their social rank: commoners wore the fur of dogs and wolves, while noblemen were clad in the fur of sables or squirrels. Hunnic garments were sewn together using a tough thread made of twisted sinew.
Hun mercenary in Roman service; the embroidering of the tunic shows a clear Late Roman influence. (Colourplate by Patricio Greve Moller, copyright by Gabriele Esposito)
According to the ancient sources available, the armies of the Huns comprised a high percentage of mounted archers and only a limited number of armoured cavalrymen. The infantry were provided entirely by the Germanic peoples who were vassals of the Huns. The Hunnic mounted archer, equipped with a composite bow, did not wear a helmet or armour. Although he could sometimes carry a light spear and a sword, he was not used to fighting at close range. The Hunnic light spears were used both for thrusting and throwing, but were of little use against an enemy equipped with a shield or cuirass. The Hunnic swords were made of iron and were of a long-hilted type. Also long-bladed and double-edged, the swords had been copied by the Huns from the Sasanians. The Hunnic swords were designed for cutting and for mounted use, but their quality was quite poor because the Huns – differently from the Scythians and Sarmatians – did not produce durable metal weapons. The Black Huns, unlike the White Huns, also carried a dagger that hung horizontally across the belly; this was used quite rarely, only when a warrior was forced to fight hand-to-hand. The personal equipment of a mounted archer was simple but very effective: it included a bow-case that was carried on the front of the left thigh and a quiver that was hung either from a belt or across the small of the back, with the points of the arrows to the right. A small circular shield of willow, wood or hide could be carried, strapped to the left forearm, its main function being to protect the bowman from enemy arrows. It was designed for the duels that took place on the Eurasian steppes between horse archers, who fired at each other from distance. The few armoured cavalrymen were aristocrat warriors and members of the elite of the Hunnic society. Their body armour had lamellar construction and reached to the waist or the knee. Only the chieftains and their personal retinues had cuirasses, which consisted of narrow vertical plates laced together horizontally and vertically. The lamellar armour worn by the Huns was constructed according to the practices of Central Asia. The Hunnic helmets were of the spangenhelm type and had many features in common with those used by the Sarmatians. They were constructed from several plates, usually six, held together in conical form by reinforcing bands. In their basic form, they looked like a sort of skullcap, but some of the richest warriors could add extra elements to them such as cheek-pieces, neck-guards and nasal-guards.
Compared with the Scythians and the Sarmatians, the Huns did not deploy significant contingents of shock heavy cavalry; indeed, they are not mentioned in any Roman source. Apparently, however, the heavy cavalry of the White Huns was more numerous than those of the Black Huns. The fact that the Hunnic heavy cavalry did not employ the kontus spear implies that their mounted troops did not consist of cataphracts. Furthermore, due to their limited numbers, they probably did not play a significant tactical role on the battlefield. The same could be said of the infantry, which the Black Huns started to have only after settling in Eastern Europe. Consisting of foreign warriors, they performed only auxiliary duties and were taken into little consideration by the Hun military commanders. Over time, however, Attila had to accept the fact that some effective infantry were needed if he wanted to invade the Roman Empire: only foot troops could operate during sieges and perform hand-to-hand fighting against the Roman heavy infantry. During Attila’s failed invasions of the Western Empire, as we have seen, the Hunnic infantry were mostly provided by the Germanic vassals, who sometimes performed very well (as the Ostrogoths did at the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields). The loyalty of the Germanic auxiliaries, however, could not be counted upon, as the events following Attila’s death clearly showed. The amazing power of the Hunnic horse archers was the result of two factors: their composite bows and their horses. The horses ridden by the Huns were tough and rough-coated; they had short legs and were just 12–14 hands high. Their smallness and muscular nature allowed the Huns to wield considerable control over them and provided a suitable platform for mounted archery. Many of the Hunnic stallions were gelded to make them easier to handle, according to a custom that had ancient origins. The animals used by the Hun warriors were branded with the emblem of their owner’s clan or by cutting a pattern on their ears.
Germanic auxiliary infantryman in Hunnic service. (Photo by Ádám Baumgartner, alias Isenbrand the Skiri, copyright by Zoltán Krasznay)
The horse breeds living on the steppes could be fed on virtually any quality of pasturage, as they were capable of fending for themselves in the severe conditions of their natural environment. The ability of their mounts to cope well with hard riding and easily gain sustenance gave a decisive advantage to the mounted warriors of the Huns during the extended raids that they conducted. Their steeds did not require the carting of fodder but were simply let loose at the end of a day’s riding to fend for themselves. The ugly appearance of the Hunnic horses was compensated by their resilience, which impressed contemporary Roman observers. The Hunnic horses were far better at climbing, jumping and swimming than the Roman mounts. As they were used to living in a semi-wild manner, they could endure almost any hardship. During cold months, when their mounts were weaker due to the climatic conditions, the Huns travelled with a number of reserve horses to ensure that they always had a fresh mount when needed. The Huns were capable of riding without interruption for an entire day, and could thus travel enormous distances in a relatively short period of time. The riding equipment of the Huns was quite rudimentary since – according to the latest research – they did not use stirrups, exactly like the Scythians and the Sarmatians. Neither did they use spurs, but urged their horses on with riding whips. The Hunnic saddle was known as a frame saddle and was quite comfortable to use. It consisted of a wooden frame with leather cushioning on either side. The version employed by the Black Huns also had a straight vertical arch in front and a larger arch behind.
Heavy cavalryman of the White Huns armed with a mace. Both the clothes and the equipment show a certain Sasanian influence. (Colourplate by Patricio Greve Moller, copyright by Gabriele Esposito)
Horse archer of the White Huns. (Photo by Csongrádi Turán HSE, copyright by Hungarian Turan Foundation, Tamás Horváth)
Hun horse archer. (Photo by Attila Kiss and Tömör, copyright by KDZmíves Nelli Admira)
Sarmatian flask and ring-pommel short sword from the Hunnic era. (Photo by Tamás Ariel Horváth, alias Pharnakes the Sarmatian, copyright by Adám Szuromt)
Hunnic battle tactics, like those of all the steppe peoples, derived from herd management. The Huns usually approached the enemy in a loose crescent formation, which threatened less mobile opponents with encirclement around their flanks. If resisted at any point, the Huns would stage a feigned retreat to draw the enemy out of their chosen position and into a dangerous pursuit. The Huns were masters at firing arrows what was known as the ‘Parthian shot’ – turning their bodies while riding away from their enemy to shoot at any pursuers – as well as in organizing deadly ambushes. As already mentioned, they avoided engaging in close combat and usually won battles with their volleys of arrows shot at long range. Striking fast and hard was the main characteristic of Hunnic warfare, the sudden incursions of the Huns being so rapid that sedentary peoples – such as the Romans – were incapable of effectively countering them. The ability to shoot arrows with extraordinary accuracy and power while at full gallop made the Hunnic horse archers more than a match for any kind of enemy cavalry. Being fast and unpredictable, the Hunnic cavalry could route any major mounted force deployed on the field by the Romans. However, the same could not be said for their Germanic infantry, since the Huns always experienced significant tactical difficulties when facing contingents of heavy infantrymen deployed in a shield wall defensive formation. This happened, for example, during the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields, which proved decisive in the failure of Attila’s invasion of Gaul. When the Huns lost their political control over some of the Germanic peoples, they also lost the possibility to conquer the Roman Empire since they were not capable – alone – of confronting large infantry armies or conducting siege operations.