Surveillance Cameras Are a Slippery Slope
American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, dedicated to protecting freedom, liberty, equality, and justice for all within the United States.
Chicago has our nation’s most “extensive and integrated” network of government video surveillance cameras, according to former U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. While the City of Chicago is secretive about the number of cameras (as well as many other critical aspects of its camera program), the City does not dispute the repeated public reports that it has access to 10,000 publicly and privately owned cameras throughout the City. In the downtown district, virtually every segment of the public way is under video surveillance. These technologically sophisticated cameras have the power to automatically identify and track particular persons, and the capacity to magnify and make visible small details and objects at great distances.
Nevertheless, the City seeks to expand and enhance the level of surveillance. Mayor Daley has announced a plan to place a camera “on every corner” of the City. In the words of another top City official, the objective is to “cover one end of the city to the other.”
The American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois believes that Chicago does not need a camera on every sidewalk, on every block, in every neighborhood. Rather, our City needs to change course, before we awake to find that we cannot walk into a bookstore or a doctor’s office free from the government’s watchful eye.
We urge the City to order a moratorium on the expansion of the camera system. Then the City should initiate a thorough and open review of this surveillance system, including whether to reduce the number of cameras. Finally, for those cameras that remain, the City should implement new rules to safeguard individual privacy.
The ACLU hopes that this report—the first large-scale, independent analysis of Chicago’s camera system—will contribute to an informed public dialogue about the future of Chicago’s system of surveillance cameras.
Chicago’s Surveillance Cameras
Many of Chicago’s cameras are highly visible to the general public, like the more than 1,000 cameras with flashing blue lights installed by the Chicago Police Department. Many others are unmarked or invisible. Under a program known as “Operation Virtual Shield,” all of these public and private cameras are integrated together, and monitored by the City’s Office of Emergency Management and Communications (“OEMC”).
In addition to vast numbers and tight integration, Chicago’s cameras have three powerful and potentially invasive technologies:
• The cameras have a “pan-tilt-zoom” capacity, meaning operators can increase substantially the size of the captured images.
• The cameras have a “facial recognition” capacity, meaning a computer can automatically search for a particular person’s face.
• The cameras have an “automatic tracking” capacity, meaning a computer can automatically track a person or vehicle moving along the public way, jumping from one camera to the next.
All three of these technologies far exceed the powers of ordinary human observation, and dramatically increase the power of the government to watch the public.
The reach and expanse of the Chicago surveillance camera system also serves as a catalyst for other communities to expand their own systems. At least ten other Illinois communities have installed law enforcement video surveillance cameras. Although these systems are not as large, integrated, or powerful as Chicago’s network, other communities clearly are following Chicago’s lead.
The Problems with Chicago’s Surveillance Cameras
Chicago’s camera network invades the freedom to be anonymous in public places, a key aspect of the fundamental American right to be left alone. For City residents, the personal habits of daily life are carried out on our streets and sidewalks.
While earlier camera systems tracked only how some people spend some of their time in the public way, a camera on every corner—coupled with pan-tilt-zoom, facial recognition, and automatic tracking—results in government power to track how all people spend all of their time in the public way.
Each of us then will wonder whether the government is watching and recording us when we walk into a psychiatrist’s office, a reproductive health care center, a political meeting, a theater performance, or a book store. While the dystopia described by George Orwell in “1984” has not yet been realized, Chicago’s current 10,000 surveillance cameras are a significant step in this direction. And a camera “on every corner” would be an even greater step.
Further, Chicago’s growing camera network is part of an expanding culture of surveillance in America. Combined with other government surveillance technologies (such as seizure of phone, email, and credit card records, RFID chips, and GPS devices), cameras can turn our lives into open books for government scrutiny.
Moreover, Chicago’s camera network chills and deters lawful expressive activities protected by the First Amendment, like attending a political demonstration in the public way. Chicago has a long history of unlawful political surveillance, including the notorious “Red Squad” of the Chicago Police Department, which violated the rights of thousands of innocent people from the 1920s through the 1970s. Today, the Chicago police film political demonstrations, so long as the police believe they comply with the City’s nebulous requirement of a “proper law enforcement purpose.” Reasonable people will respond to past and present Chicago police practices by staying away from controversial events.
Chicago officials will not say whether any of its employees have been accused of abusing the camera system. Other cities have seen abuses from much less extensive camera systems. Male camera operators have ogled women. Sensitive images have been improperly disclosed—like the image of a person committing suicide, which was later posted to a violent pornography website. A study from England found that camera operators targeted black civilians, substantially out of proportion to both their suspicious conduct and their presence in the population being monitored.
Finally, it is important to consider what Chicagoans are not getting, because of the more than $60 million that the City has spent on our nation’s largest and most integrated camera network. For example, these taxpayer funds might have helped fill the 1,000 vacancies in Chicago’s understaffed police force.
In light of these civil liberties and civil rights concerns, the ACLU opposes the unreviewed expansion of Chicago’s camera system, and the absence of critical privacy regulations, even if the camera system were proven to reduce crime. In any event, numerous studies by independent scholars have concluded that video surveillance cameras in fact do not reduce violent crime, and only in certain circumstances reduce property crime (such as in parking garages). While the City asserts that its cameras reduce crime, it has not supported this assertion with methodologically sound reports or underlying statistical data. Also, while the City asserts that its cameras have led to 4,500 arrests in the last 4 years, that is less than 1% of all the arrests during that time.
The ACLU’s Proposals
Given the many grave problems created by Chicago’s cameras, and the lack of proof that they are effective, the ACLU of Illinois offers the following proposals.
First, there should be a moratorium on the deployment of more cameras.
Second, during this moratorium, there should be a comprehensive review of the past, present, and future of Chicago’s surveillance camera system. This review should define the City’s objectives, consider all of the costs, and weigh all of the evidence about effectiveness. This review should be conducted in the open, and solicit the input of the general public. Perhaps most importantly, this review should consider whether to reduce the number of cameras in the City’s system.
Third, for the cameras that remain operational, there should be new safeguards to protect the privacy and other rights of the public. Specifically, the City should:
1. Pan-Tilt-Zoom (“PTZ”)
a) Require individualized reasonable suspicion either of criminal activity or of a threat to public safety, before a camera operator uses the PTZ function to magnify the image of a particular person, or anything in his possession.
b) Require individualized reasonable suspicion either of criminal activity or of a threat to public safety, before a camera operator uses the PTZ function to either aim a camera at activity protected by the First Amendment, or to magnify such activity.
c) Prohibit camera operators from considering race, national origin, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or sexual identity when deciding whether to use the PTZ function to aim a camera at a particular person, or to magnify the image of a particular person—except when there is a “look-out” order providing specific information linking a person with one of these demographic characteristics to a particular criminal incident.
2. Facial Recognition and Automatic Tracking
Require probable cause either of criminal activity or of a threat to public safety, before using the camera system to perform facial recognition or automatic tracking of a particular individual.
3. Recording Private Areas
Prohibit the use of cameras to record activities taking place in private areas, such as a private residence or business. (While a CPD training DVD states this rule, it does not currently appear in a written policy.)
4. Retention of Camera Images
Prohibit retention of cameras images (beyond a short period of time, such as 7 days), unless a supervisor determines that (1) there is reasonable suspicion that the images in question contain evidence of criminal activity, or (2) the images are relevant to an ongoing investigation or pending criminal trial.
5. Dissemination of Camera Images
Prohibit dissemination of camera images to third parties, except that a supervisor can disseminate images:
a) To another governmental agency, if (1) there is reasonable suspicion that the images in question contain evidence of criminal activity, or (2) the images are relevant to an ongoing investigation or pending criminal trial.
b) To a criminal defendant, if the images in question are related to the pending charges.
6. Periodic Audits
Require:
a) An annual audit of the City’s camera systems to identify and evaluate:
(1) the effectiveness of the cameras at reducing crime or achieving some other legitimate government purpose;
(2) the impact of the cameras on the privacy and other civil rights and civil liberties of the general public; and
(3) any misuse of the cameras, and the corrective action taken.
b) Public disclosure of such audits, including all electronic statistical data used to evaluate camera effectiveness.
7. Public Notice
Require:
a) Public notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to installation of any new cameras.
b) Public notice of the location of all cameras linked to the City’s camera network.
8. Enforcement
Require:
a) Supervisory review of camera operators to ensure their compliance with the rules herein, and any other rules regarding the City’s cameras that protect the privacy and other civil rights and civil liberties of the general public.
b) Investigation of all camera operators alleged to have violated such rules.
c) Discipline of all camera operators found to have violated such rules.
9. Linked Private Cameras
As to all private sector cameras that are linked into the City’s camera network, apply all of the rules herein, and any other rules regarding the City’s cameras that protect the privacy and other civil rights and civil liberties of the general public.
10. Traffic Enforcement Cameras
a) Pictures may be taken only while a traffic infraction is occurring.
b) Pictures may be taken only of the vehicle and license plate, and not of the face of the motorist or passengers.
c) Pictures may be used only for the enforcement of a traffic infraction.
d) Pictures shall be destroyed upon completion of the enforcement of a traffic infraction.
e) Intersections with traffic enforcement cameras shall be clearly marked.
The ACLU’s Investigation
The ACLU of Illinois has investigated the nature, scope, capacity, and regulation of Chicago’s system of video surveillance cameras. The ACLU has reviewed the information in the public domain, including government records and media accounts. Moreover, the ACLU used the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to obtain records from the City, including policies, forms, a training DVD, reports regarding effectiveness, and contracts providing City access to private cameras. The law firm of Miller Shakman & Beem served as ACLU co-counsel in the administrative enforcement of this FOIA request. Unfortunately, the City refused to state whether it has additional policy and training records; refused to disclose any records concerning alleged misuse of the cameras, or even to state whether there have been such allegations; and did not disclose any electronic data, including the data underlying the effectiveness reports. The ACLU also used FOIA to obtain records from many other Illinois communities that use video surveillance cameras.
In March 2010, the ACLU repeatedly asked the City for permission to visit the Operations Center of the OEMC, in order to view and better understand the nerve center of the City’s camera system. Unfortunately, the City did not respond.
In April 2010, the ACLU sent the City a letter proposing the new regulations stated above. Again, the City did not respond.
This lack of transparency and unresponsiveness concerning a partially covert surveillance system bodes ill for the residents of Chicago, of whom 10,000 are ACLU members and supporters.
Excerpt, “Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras: A Pervasive and Unregulated Threat to Our Privacy,” ACLU of Illinois, February 2011. Reprinted by permission.