^*Eight months later Poindexter testified under oath that he thought North’s contra diversion scheme was a good idea and that he approved it but never informed or sought the approval of the President. Since 1981 the President’s policy of aiding the contras had not changed. Poindexter testified. He said that a diversion of Iranian arms sales profits to the contras would be similar to third country support. Instead of the Saudis giving, it would be the Iranians, or it could be considered a private Iranian contribution. This was a matter of implementing the President’s known policy. Poindexter claimed he felt he had the authority to approve the diversion, that he knew it would be politically explosive and that his job was to deliberately insulate the President from the decision. “On this whole issue,” he testified, “you know the buck stops here with me.” He said that the President would have “absolutely” approved of the decision and would have enjoyed knowing about it, but that Poindexter’s plan of total deniability required that it never be mentioned to Reagan, tempted as Poindexter was on several occasions. North’s secretary, Fawn Hall, testified under a grant of full immunity that the one diversion memo that Meese’s investigators had discovered had been revised by Poindexter at one point, suggesting that it was intended to be forwarded to the President. North testified that, in total, he prepared five memos that referred to the contra diversion for Poindexter to forward to the President, but that he believed he had shredded them. Poindexter testified that he did not recall these other memos. When the detailed financial records were finally deciphered, investigators established that only about $3 million eventually reached the contras from all the Iranian arms sales profits, and an excess of $8 million remained in various bank accounts in Switzerland.